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Document 1300 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the frrst part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session 
Paris, 1st-4th June 1992 
MONDAY 1st JUNE 
Meetings of political groups 
11.30 a.m. 
27th May 1992 
1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session by the Provisional President 
2. Examination of credentials 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly 
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-eighth ordinary session 
7. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Caro. 
Debate. 
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
9. Composition of political groups- Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Thompson on behalf of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
A new security order in Europe: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the Political Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY 2nd JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council. 
2. WEU after Maastricht: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee. 
Debate. 
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Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. WEU after Maastricht: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Arms export policy: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Aarts on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace 
Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
3. WEU: the operational organisation: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY 3nl JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1992: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Mackie of Benshie on behalf of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. New Euro-American relations: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Riihe, Minister of Defence of Germany. 
At approx. 4 p.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Joxe, Minister of Defence of France. 
3. The development of a European space-based observation system: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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THURSDAY 4th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Address by Mr. Bjorck, Minister of Defence of Sweden. 
2. Arms control: CSCE and WEU: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Document 1301 
Dear President, 
INFORMATION LETTER 
from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
on the activities of the ministerial organs 
(21st No•ember 1991 - 29th February 1992) 
8th April 1992 
The declarations by the WEU member states issued in Maastricht on 1Oth December 1991, 
together with the treaty on European union, have opened up clear prospects for the future ofWEU. We 
can assume that our organisation's reactiviation phase has now come to an end. It has been an unde-
niable success, as evidenced by the adoption of The Hague platform in October 1987, then the 
enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal in 1990. The success of its reactivation is, I feel, 
also reflected in the growing belief among all those who have helped to bring it about that our 
organisation cannot remain just a forum for politico-military consultation on European security 
problems. The two Gulf crises, as well as the events in Yugoslavia, have shown that WEU has both the 
vocation and the ability to serve as a framework for the operational co-ordination of actions decided by 
its member states when it felt that European interests were at stake and should be defended. With these 
seven years of constructive groundwork, WEU can move forward, strengthened by what has been 
achieved at Maastricht. In the coming year 1992 the Ministerial Council will be taking decisions that 
will give our organisation the resources it needs to prepare for any contingencies calling for concerted 
action by Europeans, and also to perform an operational role when needed. 
The Maastricht summit has demonstrated the determination of Europeans to face up to chal-
lenges as they arise and to direct their efforts in such a way as to promote the continuity of the process 
of European construction. The pace of European integration is accelerating. At the same time, work is 
starting on defining European security needs and institutions with a view to a political union and the 
formulation of a common foreign and security policy. WEU will have a vital role to play, and to do so 
effectively it must grow, opening out to European allies who are not yet members so that it can genu-
inely serve as the European pillar of the alliance. This is the aim in the work now being done on the 
status of associate member of WEU. In parallel, preparations must be made for further enlargement 
and for WEU assuming its rightful place among European institutions, now that it is being called upon 
to become the defence arm of the future European union. Up to the mid-1990s, WEU's mandate is to 
plan for action and to apply those decisions taken by the European Council having defence implica-
tions. This will be done in consonance with the positions adopted within the alliance as a result of the 
transatlantic dialogue between the partners forming the European pillar and their allies in North 
America. Relations between WEU and NATO bodies will be developed in the light of the twofold prin-
ciple of transparency and complementarity. 
Many practical problems will have to be faced and solved in the near future, and the Permanent 
Council is addressing them vigorously. The essential task now incumbent on WEU is to produce the 
blueprints, not just for a European security and defence identity in a profoundly different geostrategic 
context, but also for a common defence policy. This will lead more swiftly than might be expected to a 
common defence, the tangible expression of the common destiny uniting all the countries that have 
committed themselves to forming the European union. 
In this new chapter of the European integration process, the thinking and debates of your Parlia-
mentary Assembly will be even more useful than before. I feel it is essential for the work of the inter-
governmental organs to continue to benefit from the contribution of the Assembly's proposals. The 
Assembly still has a vital role in mobilising public opinion, for our citizens may often tend to forget 
that there are demands to be met and a price to be paid for upholding their freedom . 
• 
• • 
Between 20th November 1991 and 29th February 1992, the Permanent Council met on six occa-
sions (on 26th November and lOth December 1991, on 15th and 24th January and on 5th and 26th 
February 1992). During those Council meetings, there were many discussions on the Yugoslav crisis, 
developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Middle East Peace Conference 
and the situation in Algeria and its repercussions in the Maghreb. The results of the Council of CSCE 
foreign ministers held in Prague on 30th and 31st January were discussed. For the first time, the WEU 
Secretary-General had been invited to attend that meeting by the Czechoslovak Deputy Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister, and was represented there by the Deputy Secretary-General. 
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The United Nations Commission for Europe, NATO, OECD and EBRD had also been invited. 
With the enlargement of CSCE to embrace ten new members and with debates on the development of 
its institutions and its peace-keeping capacity, it was an historic meeting. The United Nations Security 
Council summit on 31st January 1992 was also commented on. The discussions reflected the interest in 
the concept of" preventive diplomacy ". The end of the cold war is now opening up new prospects for 
using hitherto neglected provisions of the United Nations Charter. A growing role for the United 
Nations in any peace-keeping operations can be envisaged for the years to come. The United Nations 
will step up its efforts to persuade all its members to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is also 
being urged to exercise broader responsibility for arms control and disarmament; and a global ban on 
chemical weapons is a priority for 1992. 
At its meeting on 12th December 1991 the Council made a preliminary assessment of the results 
of the Maastricht European Council as they affect WEU. The summit was a milestone in the process of 
strengthening the organisation. The Council acknowledged that WEU would have to start preparing to 
implement the declarations without waiting for the treaty on European union, more particularly its 
article on common foreign and security policy. With regard to the transfer of the Secretariat to 
Brussels, the Belgian Representative pointed out that his government had a building in mind which it 
felt would meet WEU's needs. 
During its first meetings in 1992, the Permanent Council kept itself closely informed of the work 
being done by its working group on defining the relations between WEU and other European member 
states of the European union or NATO. On 26th February 1992, General Antonio Milani gave the tra-
ditional annual address by the SACEUR representative to the Council on developments in the forces of 
WEU member states forming part of the Atlantic Alliance integrated structures, in accordance with 
Article IV of Protocol 11 of the modified Brussels Treaty. General Milani described the start that had 
been made on implementing the alliance's strategic concept, in particular the creation of multinational 
units. 
* 
* * 
Pursuant to our relations with your Assembly's committees, I visited Paris on 13th February, at 
the invitation of the Political Committee, to tell its members about the prospects opened up by the 
Maastricht European Council as regards WEU and the implementation of the two declarations 
adopted by the member states. I pointed out that WEU was embarking on hitherto unexplored territory 
in defining the status of associate member; this would allow countries to participate in the very sub-
stance of our organisation's work, although not to block the consensus of full members. We also dis-
cussed the Secretariat's transfer to Brussels, the implementation of which should gradually begin 
during the second half of this year. The advantage of this transfer will be that we shall be closer to the 
Assembly and can develop close working relations with European institutions and NATO. Apart from 
these fundamental questions of enlargement and the reorganisation of intergovernmental organs, we 
reviewed the major issues for politico-military consultation within WEU: relations with the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe that are about to enter a new phase, the advisability of 
similar contacts with the republics of the CIS, the giving of a further ministerial mandate that is now 
seen as essential if we are to make further progress, establishing regular relationships with CSCE insti-
tutions, defining WEU's operational missions and resources (the focus of discussions for the chiefs of 
defence staff at their meeting on 27th January) and, lastly, the continuance and expansion of 
co-operation on space within WEU. 
Speaking on behalf of the Permanent Council, I reiterated its offer to meet the chairmen and/or 
rapporteurs of committees to discuss specific subjects on their agendas so as to provide, if they so 
wished, further information before they finalised their reports. In making this proposal, the sole aim is 
to promote mutual understanding and to ensure that the dialogue between the Assembly and the 
Council is simpler and better-informed, and so that criticisms can be dealt with better, with due respect 
for the independence of mind of members of your parliamentary Assembly. In the same way, the Pres-
ident of the Assembly might consider such informal meetings, if deemed advisable, with the Chairmen 
of the Political and Defence Committees before each session. 
One last point: on 12th December, the Permanent Council expressed the unanimous wish that 
the Council's replies to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions should normally be 
sent back within a maximum of three months. 
* 
* * 
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The Council's Special Working Group (SWG) and the Defence Representatives Group (DRG) 
held joint meetings on 16th December 1991 and 17th January 1992, in the wake of the Maastricht 
summit. The SWG met on its own on 22nd and 27th November to evaluate the lessons of the minis-
terial meeting of 19th November, and then on 5th and 25th February - at the level of deputies in the 
latter case - to work on the implementation of the Maastricht declarations issued by WEU member 
states in the margins of the European summit. 
Addressing topical questions, the group had a wide-ranging discussion on " post-Helsinki " 
security questions during these various meetings, in preparation for the CSCE Ministerial Council in 
Prague on 30th and jtst January, as well as the Helsinki conference. Its discussions focused on two 
themes: the consequences of admitting new CSCE members for negotiations on arms control, in par-
ticular the problem of extending the zone of application east of the Urals; and the mandate for those 
negotiations and· the framework for the post-Helsinki negotiations (definition of a European security 
forum, decisions on the practical measures to be negotiated, procedure for a permanent dialogue on 
security, the advisability of codification of standards as a basis for undertakings entered into under 
CSCE, strengthening the role of CSCE in the field of prevention). Finally, delegations decided in 
favour of the gradual establishment of institutional relationships between WEU and CSCE through the 
exchange of information and documents, and through ad hoc attendance of meetings and seminars 
arranged by CSCE institutions, to which WEU might contribute. 
With regard to the implementation of the member states' Maastricht declarations, the group 
pointed out that the strengthening of WEU's role implied simultaneous progress. in all fields: 
enlargement, relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, WEU's operational 
role and the transfer of the Secretariat-General from London to Brussels. On all these points, the most 
delicate being those associated with enlargement, it is hoped that conclusions will be reached for 
endorsement by ministers at their meeting on 19th June next. In this information letter I obviously 
cannot go into detail on current work or on the various national positions, in view of their changing 
nature and the need to seek a consensus. Some of the problems, moreover, should be viewed in a 
long-term perspective. WEU's responsibilities will, to a great extent, depend on the way in which 
European institutions adapt to the demands of the next stages in building a political union in the field 
of security and defence. 
Eight practical measures are being considered con~urrently: 
1. The role and composition of the Permanent Council in Brussels; 
2. WEU co-ordination, with a view to the introduction of joint positions into the process of 
political consultation of the Atlantic Alliance; 
3. The division oflabour between WEU and the organs to be tasked with the implementation of 
the the common foreign and s~curity policy (CFSP) in the field of security and defence; 
4. The harmonisation of presidencies and the synchronisation of meetings, both with alliance 
bodies and with the European institutions; 
5. Informing and consulting the Commission where necessary regarding WEU activities, 
depending on the role that WEU is assigned in defining and implementing the CFSP; 
6. The Secretariat's transfer from LOndon to Brussels; 
7. Procedures for future co-operation between the WEU Secretariat and the Secretariat of the 
Council of the union on the one hand and, on the other, with NA TO's Secretariat-
General; 
8. Development of the Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy. 
The Defence Representatives Group met to discuss its own agenda on 17th December 1991, and 
then on 16th January and 11th February 1992. A meeting ofthe Defence Representatives Group (dep-
uties) was held on 24th February to discuss the draft mandate for the Planning Cell. These meetings 
have furthered the debate on the missions that may be envisaged for WEU's operational capability and 
the resources it needs to perform those missions satisfactorily. The question of resources assumes that 
there should be a review of member states' available capabilities, as well as a study of additional needs 
in the light of the missions decided upon. 
On the question of the " military units answerable to WEU " mentioned in the Maastricht decla-
ration, the French and German delegations gave more detailed explanations of their plan to create a 
European corps. It would have three main tasks: common defence in close co-operation with NATO; 
participation in peace-keeping and peace-making operations; and contribution to humanitarian tasks. 
There are no plans for sharing out tasks between the NATO forces and the European corps based on 
geographical criteria. Close links with the alliance's military structure should be set up, in particular on 
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planning matters. This corps, whose configuration will be mapped out in a series of Franco-German 
seminars (some of them to be open to experts from other member states), will be one of the factors in 
implementing paragraph 52 of the alliance document on this new strategy. The corps will have a 
planning headquarters this year. The aim is that the Franco-German elements of the future European 
corps should be operational by 1995-1996 at the latest. 
The second key theme of the work done by the group has been an evaluation of needs for WEU 
co-ordination and planning structures. Delegations have reviewed the various aspects of setting up a 
planning cell within the organisation, which will draw up contingency plans for various configurations 
for the use of member states' forces. Its field of competence should be all European independent mil-
itary activities. Finally, exercises, both headquarters and field, should come within its sphere. Its com-
position, setting-up and answerability to the Permanent Council questions are being considered. Once 
the proposed procedures have been approved, a draft decision will be submitted to the Ministerial 
Council. 
The group has been briefed on progress with the study, produced by German and French experts, 
on European strategic military requirements. 
The Mediterranean Sub-Group met on 31st January 1992. It has reviewed the situation in the 
Yugoslav republics and the Western Sahara, with the emphasis on the role of the United Nations. It has 
continued with its assessment of the potential risks to security in the Mediterranean and the Gulf 
region. Developments in the situation in Algeria: and the risks associated with the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction have been the subject of in-depth discussion. Finally, the group has 
briefly debated the content of a future dialogue between WEU and the Maghreb countries. 
Experts on the verification of arms control agreements met on 29th November 1991 and 28th 
January 1992. They have continued their exchange of information on practical arrangements for CFE 
inspections, reviewed the process of ratification of the CFE Treaty and considered the effects on verifi-
cation of the new Commonwealth of Independent States. In addition, two meetings of the Group of 
Experts on open skies verification took place in Vienna on lOth December 1991 and 4th February 
1992, discussing technical subjects such as quotas, available aircraft and sensors and prospects for 
co-operation within WEU. 
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space met on 5th and 6th December 1991, and also on 20th and 21st 
January 1992. Its agenda was basically the setting-up of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n in Spain, 
and the organisation of the work of the experts responsible for medium- and long-term studies. The 
experts have held many meetings to discuss practical problems arising in these two fields of space 
co-operation within WEU (27th-29th November 1991, on 12th December 1991 and 14th February 
1992 for the studies; on 16th and 17th December 1991, 7th-9th January and 6th, 7th and 19th Feb-
ruary 1992 for the Centre in Torrej6n). 
* 
* * 
Two-way information contacts with the democratically-elected governments of Central and 
Eastern Europe over the period covered by this letter took the form of the fact-finding missions by 
Ambassador K.leiber and myself to the three Baltic countries from 21st to 24th January 1992, and my 
visit to Hungary at the invitation of Mr. G. Jeszenszky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Hungarian Republic, on 17th February 1992. 
* 
* * 
On 21st January in Tallinn, we met the Foreign Minister, Mr. Lennart Meri, the President of the 
Supreme Council, Mr. Arnold Ruutel, and the Minister of State for Defence, Mr. Raivo V are, as well as 
the Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy, Mr. Jaak Leimann. 
We explained WEU's role and place in the new European security architecture based on the two 
declarations adopted in Maastricht by member states, and reported on the initiatives so far adopted by 
WEU in developing relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We then invited our 
Estonian hosts to explain their views on these questions, as well as on the broader problems of 
European security, in particular the future of CSCE and the risks being created by the current changes 
in the Commonwealth of Independent States. They explained the main directions being taken in 
Estonian security and defence policy. 
Our hosts outlined the many practical difficulties that Estonia has been facing since it regained 
its independence. They felt that the presence of former Soviet troops on their territory and the material 
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impossibility of acquiring genuine control of their frontiers were serious obstacles to the full exercise of 
Estonian sovereignty. They also described their country's demographic situation, reminding us that 
under Soviet occupation many Russians had been encouraged to settle in Estonia. For fifty years, 
Russian officers approaching retirement age had been assigned to the Baltic military district, and most 
of them stayed on. 
All the people with whom we talked advocated the development of a political dialogue with 
WEU, at parliamentary and other levels. In discussing security, they again stressed the risks arising 
from the presence of foreign forces, the possibility of conflict between Russia's civil and military 
leaders and the disintegration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They expressed their 
intention to use the CSCE framework to secure, and accelerate, the withdrawal of former Soviet troops. 
Finally, they stated their determination to continue with the democratisation of their country and to 
work for economic development to promote the transition to a market economy. 
* 
* * 
In Riga on 22nd January, we met in turn the Minister of State, Mr. Janis Dinevics, the Defence 
Minister, Mr. Talavs Jundzis, and the Chairman of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee of the 
Supreme Council, M(. Janis Jurkans, and his Deputy Minister, Mr. Martins Virsis, the Chairman of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Council, Mr. Indulis Berzins, and the President of the 
Supreme Council, Mr. Anatolijs Gorbunovs. 
As we had done during our mission to Tallinn, we explained the role and place of WEU in the 
European security architecture, describing the steps that WEU had taken so far to foster a political dia-
logue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We asked our Latvian hosts for their reactions, 
and to outline their concept of European security architecture as well as Latvia's policy on security and 
defence. 
They told us that they regarded Latvian security as inseparable from that of the rest of Europe as 
a whole. Latvia had set itself two priorities: to secure the rapid withdrawal of former Soviet forces still 
in the territory and to set up armed forces of its own. 
Our hosts expressed their approval of Mr. Yeltsin's decision to pass the command of former 
Soviet forces stationed in the Baltic states to Russia. They deplored the fact that there had been so far 
no more than discussion about the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops from Latvian territory, but 
no practical results. They said they feared the risks of instability in Russia and in the CIS which might 
have serious repercussions for Latvian security. Finally, they expressed the hope that Latvia might 
serve as a bridge between East and West. 
All the people we saw expressed their wish to see their country enter into a political dialogue 
with WEU at parliamentary and other levels. They stressed their resolve to move towards democracy 
and to direct their country's economic revival towards creating a market economy. 
* 
* * 
In Vilnius on 23rd and 24th January, we then met the Foreign Minister, Mr. Algirdas Saudargas; 
Defence Minister Audrius Butkevicius; the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council, Mr. Bronislovas 
Kuzmickas, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Zigmas Vaisvila. 
Having described WEU's role and place in the new European security architecture in the light of 
the prospects opened up by the success of the Maastricht summit, and having reminded them of the 
contacts which WEU had now made with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we asked our 
hosts for their views on the problems of Lithuania's security. 
Lithuania was open to all possible forms of co-operation with international organisations in the 
West, and would welcome any offer of participation in the process of building a European security 
architecture. They appreciated this contact with WEU and felt it was in the interests of Western 
Europe to encourage Lithuania's current political evolution. They stressed the importance they 
attached to the development of a pluralist society in Russia and the other republics of the CIS; for it 
would be of great benefit to the security of Lithuania, which itself had irrevocably embarked on its own 
process of democratisation and liberalisation of the economy. Our hosts also said that their country's 
main security concern was to obtain the rapid withdrawal of former Soviet troops stationed in its ter-
ritory. Finally, they touched on the Yugoslav crisis and asked us about WEU's contribution to the 
peaceful settlement of European conflicts. 
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Our hosts were much in favour of continuing the political dialogue with WEU, at parliamentary 
and other levels. 
• 
• • 
During the brief visit I paid to Budapest, I had the opportunity of meeting the Foreign Minister, 
Mr. G. Jeszenszky, the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tamas K.atona, the Secretary of State 
for Relations with the European Community, Mr. Janos Martonyi, the acting Deputy Secretary of 
State, Mr. lvan Baba, the Secretary of State and Chef de Cabinet to the Prime Minister, Mr. Gyula 
Kodolanyi, the Secretary of State responsible for Defence Industries, Mr. Jeno Laszlo, and the Deputy 
Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Rudolf Joo. 
During our discussions, which were in the presence of Mr. Arnot, German Ambassador to 
Hungary, I described the role and place ofWEU in the new European security architecture and we had 
a useful discussion on the political dialogue between WEU and the new democracies. 
My hosts were concerned that Hungary should move as close as possible to institutions in 
Western Europe. They showed great interest in the content of the two declarations adopted in Maas-
tricht by the WEU member states. We discussed developments in the crisis in Yugoslavia, relations 
among the CIS republics, Hungary's economic situation, its role in the three-way co-operation with 
Czechoslovakia and Poland and prospects for arms control. 
Towards the end of my stay, I gave a paper in Budapest on the role ofWestern European Union 
in the new European architecture to the Hungarian army's cultural centre, in the presence of senior 
civil and military personalities. 
• 
• • 
In the field of public relations and information on WEU's current and future role and missions, 
my colleagues and I have taken part in the following events: 
- on 21st and 22nd November, I attended the conference on Turkey in a changing Europe: security 
challenges of the 1990s, organised by the Department of Political Science and International Rela-
tions of Bogazici University in Istanbul, where I gave an address on the WEU perspective con-
cerning the new European security identity; 
- on 25th November, I gave a paper on Aufgabe und Rolle der WEU bei der Gestaltung einer 
europischen Sicherheitsidentitat (WEU's mission and role in the formation of a new European 
security indentity) in Dortmund during an event organised by the Deutsche Atlantische 
Gesellschaft; 
- on 28th and 29th November, Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, and I went to Paris 
for a seminar on the Soviet revolution and its implications for European security, organised by the 
WEU Institute for Security Studies, attended by senior officials responsible for politico-military 
affairs in foreign and defence ministries, the representatives of member states and their counterparts 
from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia; 
- on 29th and 30th November, I attended the annual meeting in The Hague of delegates of the 
European Mmovement, together with the Secretaries-General of European institutions; 
- on 5th December, I made a speech in Paris on European security in a world in transition, to trainees 
at the Cours Superieur Interarmees (CSI), half of whom were nationals of Atlantic Alliance countries 
and half French officers from the Ecole de Guerre; 
- on 7th December in Voorschoten in the Netherlands, I spoke about WEU's role at a dinner-debate 
arranged by the Stichting voor internationale vraagstukken- Jason; 
- on 13th December, my colleague Mr. Paolo Casardi gave a paper at the conference on multinational 
naval co-operation in a changing world, at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, taking as his subject 
the operational experience of WEU in the Gulf crises; 
- on the same day, I made a speech to the Dutch Institute for International Relations, Clingendael, on 
the subject of WEU in a common European security structure, as part of the 44th course on interna-
tional relations (Leergang Buitenlandse Betrekkingen); 
- on 8th January, I went to Heriott-Watt University in Edinburgh for the_22nd annual conference of 
the University Association for Contemporary European Studies, whose theme this year was the new 
Europe, where I spoke about European security problems and the role of WEU; 
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- on lOth January, together with Mr. Arnaud Jacomet, Head of the Policy and Planning section, I gave 
a presentation on WEU to students at the Royal Military College of Science in Shrivenham; 
- on 17th-19th January, I attended the fifth Dolder Conference in Zurich on the theme of the interna-
tional security situation in Europe, where I gave an address on WEU's future role as part of the 
debate on Forecast 1992; 
- on 22nd January, Mr. Paolo Casardi gave a paper to the University of Southampton, entitled the 
future of WEU; 
- on 28th January, I delivered the opening address on the global context of arms control, at a seminar 
on Europe and the future of conventional arms control, arranged jointly by the WEU Institute for 
Security Studies and the Dutch Institute for International Relations, Oingendael; 
- on 29th January, I was invited by the House of Commons Parliamentary Space Committee to 
discuss space co-operation in the context of Western European Union; 
- on 30th January, my colleagues Mr. Casardi and Mr. Jacomet welcomed to the Secretariat a dele-
gation from the Finnish Parliament's Defence Committee, which was on a study visit to the United 
Kingdom; 
- on the same day, I spoke about WEU.to the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales 
in Geneva, taking. as my theme European security in a world in transition and the prospects opened 
up by the European summit in Maastricht; 
- on 4th February, I spoke about the future of European security to a group of students from the 
London School of Economics; 
- on the same day, Mr. Paolo Casardi attended a seminar for NATO reserve officers organised by the 
Institut fUr politische Bildung of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung at Schloss Eichholz near Bonn, 
where he spoke about the future of Western European defence; 
- on 5th February, I gave a talk on WEU to the 377th Wilton Park Conference, whose theme this year 
was shared leadership for global security; 
- from 7th to 9th February, I attended the 29th conference on security policy in Munich, devoted to 
Neue Dimensionen der Sicherheitspolitik (New dimensions of security policy); 
- on 12th February, I attended the Sicherheitspolitisches Forum (security policy forum) at St Gallen 
University, where I spoke on the subject of European security policy; 
- on 14th February, I gave a paper entitled security issues and the European Community to All Souls 
College, Oxford, as part of a series of seminars entitled foreign relations of the European Com-
munity in 1992 and after; 
- on 19th February, I commented on WEU's work to journalists from the Foreign Press Association in 
London; 
- on 20th February, I spoke about WEU's role to a Business Forum lunch meeting, arranged in 
London by the United Kingdom European Movement; 
- on 25th February, ·I gave an address on WEU and European security to the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London; 
- on 28th and 29th February, I attended the 24th session of the Academie de la Paix et de la Securite 
Internationale in Monaco, organised with the support of the Commission of the European Commu-
nities, where I was a member of the panel discussing new strategic data; 
- over these three and a half months, I have continued to have regular contacts with the press, radio 
and television as well as with university circles, both in London and during my travels. Through 
these meetings I have been able to clarify the direction being taken by WEU in its work in the 
aftermath of Maastricht. 
* 
* * 
At the Permanent Council's request, the Secretariat produces a brief review of how the interna-
tional press reports on WEU's activities and comments about its future. The following is a summary of 
the reviews for November and December 1991 as well as January and February 1992. 
I. WEU was mentioned extensively throughout November 1991. Most of the reports and comments 
were on the WEU ministerial meetings in Bonn on 29th October and 18th November, the NATO 
summit in Rome on 7th and 8th December and developments in the Yugoslav crisis. 
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Commentators viewed the results of the Bonn meeting on WEU's role and place as a modest 
European contribution to the NATO summit in Rome. In the aftermath of this summit, the press 
devoted a good deal of attention in its editorial comment to WEU, which had enhanced its profile by 
being called upon to reinforce the European pillar of the alliance and become the defence component 
in the process of European unification. 
The Ministerial Council meeting in November had raised certain expectations, and the press 
looked for decisions in the run-up to Maastricht on WEU's role and place in the European security 
architecture. The fact that WEU's ministerial communique covered other subjects took analysts 
somewhat by surprise. WEU's positions on Yugoslavia, relations with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and co-operation on space were widely reported in the press. · 
11. Despite a busy agenda, the December session of the WEU Assembly, held just a few days before 
the Maastricht summit, received scant attention from the international press. Even the French press, 
which usually devotes more space to the subject, had relatively little to say. 
In the run-up to Maastricht, however, commentators made frequent reference to WEU, 
analysing the organisation's future role in the move towards European union. Post-summit assessments 
of the security and defence dimension focused on the question of establishing an organic link betewen 
WEU and the political union, although the fact that NATO's role would remain intact was welcomed 
in some sections of the British press and in the American press. 
WEU enlargement also attracted comment, the prospects being judged promising. The press wel-
comed the decision to transfer the Secretariat-General to Brussels. Its reaction to WEU in the light of 
the Maastricht summit was positive and it stressed that Maastricht had given the organisation a new 
role, justifying its reactivation. 
Ill. During the month of January 1992, the press devoted less attention to discussions on the 
European security architecture in the context of the Maastricht summit. 
References to WEU were generally indirect, taking the form of general commentary on the crisis 
in Yugoslavia or the French suggestion to develop a nuclear doctrine for Europe. 
Diplomatic correspondents devoted a good deal of attention to the problem of nuclear weapons 
in the CIS. Proposals on disarmament formulated by the United States and Russia as regards long-
range missiles were widely commented upon. The CSCE meeting in Prague, as well as the extraor-
dinary meeting of the United Nations Security Council, were also the subject of many articles. The 
agenda for the meeting of chiefs of defence staff in Bonn on 27th January gave rise to some comment. 
IV. In early February, Germany invited WEU member states to a seminar to discuss the Franco-
German plan for a joint corps that might later be open to other European forces. This led to a good deal 
of comment, with some articles mistakenly attributing the initiative to WEU. 
Our organisation has also been more indirectly mentioned in articles on the Wehrkunde con-
ference in Munich and the suggestions made by the Vice President of the United States on links 
between GATT negotiations and United States participation in NATO. 
In February, the Scandinavian and Hungarian press showed growing interest in the 
organisation. 
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The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
Amendment of Rule 39, paragraph 4, 
of the Rules of Procedure 
MOTION FOR A DECISION 1 
tabled by Mr. BeiUISsi and others 
in accordance with Rule 52 of the Rules of Procedure 
To amend Rule 39, paragraph 4, to read as follows: 
" A group shall consist of not less than six representatives or substitutes. " 
14th April 1992 
Signed: Benassi, Gabbuggiani, Greco, Mesoraca, Pasquino, Pecchioli, Piera/li; Rubbi, Rodota, 
Thompson 
Letter from Mr. BeiUISsi and others 
to Mr. Sinuio, Acting President of the Assembly, 
requesting a motion for a decision 
to amend Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure 
Rome, 14th April 1992 
In accordance with Rule 52, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure ofthe Assembly ofWestem 
European Union, please convey to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges our request to 
amend Rule 39, paragraph 4, concerning the composition of political groups. 
We wish Rule 39, paragraph 4, to be amended to read as follows: 
"A group shall consist of not le~s than six representatives or substitutes." 
Our request is made as a result of the recent parliamentary elections in Italy with the aim of 
guaranteeing the maintenance of the Unified European Left Group of the Assembly which, in the last 
five years, has made a significant contribution to the work of the Assembly, the Political Committee 
and the Presidential Committee. 
We very much hope that the Assembly will be able to take a decision in this sense at the forth-
coming session in June. 
Signed: Benassi, Gabbuggiani, Greco, Mesoraca, Pasquino, Pecchioli, Pieralli, Rubbi, Rodota 
I. Motion referred by the Presidential Committee to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
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OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS 
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1992 1 
submitted on behlllf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Lord Ma.ckie of Benshie, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the 
financial year 1992 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Lord Mackie of Benshie, Rapporteur 
I. General 
Il. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1992 
Ill. The budget of the Institute for Security Studies for 1992 
IV. Conclusions 
V. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 499 
APPENDICES 
I. Table of establishment of the Secretariat-General 
Il. Summary of estimated expenditure and income of the Secretariat-General 
for 1992 
Ill. WEU budget estimates for 1992 - Proposed expenditure and income 
IV. Table of establishment of the Institute for Security Studies 
V. Summary of estimated expenditure and income of the Institute for 
Security Studies for 1992 
VI. Assembly Recommendation 499 and reply of the Council 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Lagorce, Maass (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez, Antretter, 
Biefnot, Bowden, Biich/er, Curto, Diaz (Alternate: Fabra), Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. de Gaulle, Garcia Sanchez, 
Greco, Jurgens, Masseret, Meyer zu Bentrup, Oehler, Pinto, Rauti, Redmond, Regenwetter, Sinesio, Thissen, Triglia. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Reeommelllllltion 
011 tlu blulgeu of tlu ~ orgt1111 of Wutem Europealt U11io11 
for tu /i~UUU:illl year 1992 
~ .· 
• l ..J} '\;•,\1 
(i) Considering that: 
(a) in Maastricht the ministers of the WEU member countries decided to transfer the 
Secretariat-General of WEU to Brussels; 
(b) the budget of the Secretariat-General of WEU for 1992 does not consider the financial impli-
cations of this transfer and is therefore of a provisional nature; 
(c) credits in this budget, in particular those relating to the mission expenses of members of the 
Secretariat-General of WEU, are estimated on the basis of restrictive criteria; 
(d) the budget of the Institute for Security Studies sets out the financial requirements of that 
Institute without modifying the organogram authorised last year; 
(e) the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are extremely cost-effective; 
(f) problems relating to staff policy are still being studied by the co-ordination bodies concerned 
and that, among these, the problem of financing the pension scheme is becoming increas-
ingly important; 
(ii) Welcoming the fact that the budgets of the ministerial organs ofWEU are presented clearly and 
efficiently and allow a detailed examination of those organs' needs, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Give the Secretariat-General the wherewithal to exercise its activities during a period which, 
although transitional, is no less important and complex; 
2. Notify the Assembly of any structural changes that are envisaged on the occasion of the transfer 
of the Secretariat-General to Brussels and of the measures taken in respect of staff not wishing to be 
transferred; 
3. Inform the Assembly of decisions taken in regard to staff policy in the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations, particularly in respect of the financing of the pension scheme. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Lord Mackie of Bens/lie, Rapporteur) 
I. General 
1. According to Article VIII (c) of the 
Charter of the Assembly, "the Assembly shall 
express its views on the annual budget of 
Western European Union as soon as it has been 
communicated ". 
2. The present report has been prepared in 
application of this provision and relates to the 
budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 
1992. It is important to bear in mind that these 
budgets were prepared during the second half of 
1991, which was marked by extraordinary 
political changes leading, on the one hand, to an 
increase in WEU's activities and, on the other, 
to difficulty in foreseeing how the following 
year's requirements would evolve. 
3. The ministerial organs of WEU had 
already carried out restructuring in 1990 that 
consisted mainly of a slight increase in the 
number of staff of the Secretariat-General, the 
abolition of the agencies for security questions 
(except for the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments, which was maintained with a very small 
staff) . and the creation of the Institute for 
Security Studies. However, since the exceptional 
political events that occurred in 1990 and 1991 
considerably speeded up the process of building 
Europe, member countries had to assign a 
broader role to WEU and increase the range and 
extent of its activities. 
4. It should be recalled that, meeting in 
Vianden (Luxembourg) on 27th June 1991, 
member countries' Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
and Defence had already reaffirmed the leading 
role now played by WEU in the debate on the 
emerging European security and defence 
identity and specified that " the role of WEU 
should be strengthened in the context of the 
European construction process, which is leading 
the Twelve to a political union having a 
common foreign and security policy ". 
5. The decisions taken in Maastricht on lOth 
December 1991 merely give substance to the 
guidelines laid down in Vianden. The aims have 
now been clearly defined: closer co-operation 
between WEU bodies and those of the European 
Community and between the 
Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO; 
strengthening the role of WEU; greater 
co-operation in armaments matters with a view 
to setting up a European armaments agency; 
transforming the Institute for Security Studies 
into a European security and defence academy; 
and transferring the seat of the WEU 
Secretariat-General from London to Brussels. 
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6. In view of the magnitude of these aims 
and of their financial implications, it must be 
acknowledged that the present structure of the 
ministerial organs, particularly the Secretariat-
General, is likely to undergo considerable 
changes during the financial year 1992. Conse-
quently, the budgets of the WEU ministerial 
organs which are the subject ·of this report may 
be considered simply as renewal budgets 
allowing the WEU organs to carry out their tasks 
pending the preparation of operational pro-
grammes as a follow-up to the decisions taken in 
Maastricht. It is worth underlining that, in view 
of the uncertainty of the present situation, the 
budget estimates of the WEU ministerial organs 
were worked out with a concern for economy so 
that they are cost-effective. Examination of 
these budgets confirms this appraisal. 
11. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1992 
7. In accordance with the practice intro-
duced in 1991 following the abolition of the 
agencies for security questions, the budget of the 
Secretariat-General has three sections, i.e.: 
Section A: Secretariat-General; 
Section B: The former Paris ministerial 
organs; 
Section C: The ACA in Paris. 
8. It is most likely that a fourth section -
Section D - will be added to the budget. It will 
relate to the financing of medium- and 
long-term space co-operation for which the 
Council of Ministers has granted a provisional 
global sum of 5 million ecus (£ 3.5 million). 
Your Rapporteur has been informed that the 
draft budget relating to these studies will be 
examined by the WEU Budget and Organisation 
Committee at its meeting on 28th February 
1992. At the same meeting, the committee will 
also examine the draft 1992 budget of the WEU 
satellite centre in Torrej6n in Spain that the 
Council of Ministers decided to set up for an 
experimental period of three years. As pro-
cedure for approving these texts has not yet been 
completed, it will be possible to examine them 
only when the next report is prepared. 
9. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 
1992 (Section A) was drawn up on the basis of 
the existing organogram (see Appendix I) but 
taking into account, when estimating operating 
expenditure, the fact that " the reactivation of 
WEU, the further promotion of ideas set out in 
the platform of October 1987, and the extraor-
dinary political developments which have taken 
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place in 1990 and 1991 will continue to affect 
the workload of the Secretariat-General in 
1992 ". 
10. In fact - as stated in the explanatory 
memorandum to this budget - the Secretariat-
General is playing a more direct part in the 
preparation of a European defence and security 
policy; this increasingly operational approach 
has led to the creation of new working groups 
and the organisation of more frequent meetings 
of existing working groups and of the Council of 
Ministers, involving travel to the capital of the 
country holding the chairmanship-in-office. 
11. It is therefore mainly in the " Travel " 
chapter of its budget that the 
Secretariat-General has asked for a large 
increase compared with the financial year 1991. 
On the recommendation of its Budget and 
Organisation Committee, the Council gave a 
figure of£ 112 950 for this chapter (the initial 
1991 budget gave an estimate of£ 76 600 which 
was increased to £ 9 5 600 in the course of the 
year), but froze part of this sum (£ 21 000), 
which was intended to cover additional expend-
iture arising from extraordinary ministerial 
meetings that had not been foreseen and other 
travel decided by the Council. 
12. It seems clear that, in blocking this sum, 
the Council wished to recall the need to limit 
expenditure on travel by members of the 
Secretariat-General as far as possible. This 
economy measure seems highly appropriate in 
the present economic circumstances of member 
countries. However, the Assembly trusts its 
strict application will not result in a slowing 
down in the activities of the Secretariat-General 
just when its representatives are about to 
increase their contacts with other international 
organisations and European countries and when 
the intensification of relations with public 
opinion and the media in European countries 
and the United States is becoming a priority. 
13. The other items in the budget can for no 
special comment. As the Council did not agree 
to the change in the organogram proposed by the 
Secretariat-General (the regrading of a post from 
A2 to A2/3)- just as it did not agree to similar 
proposals by the Assembly - estimates under 
Chapter I " Personnel costs " were worked out 
on the basis of the existing organogram, bearing 
in mind the foreseeable trend of salary scales. 
14. As regards the other chapters (Ill, IV and 
V), estimates are on the whole lower than for the 
previous financial year. This is due to lower esti-
mates under Chapter V " Buildings " ( consid-
erable work having been carried out in 1991) 
and by the foreseeable fall in the cost of main-
taining the official cars (Chapter Ill), due to the 
replacement of one of these in 1992. 
15. These decreases make it possible to offset 
the large increase in the cost of communications 
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(postage, telephone and the WEUCOM system, 
which come under Chapter Ill). Furthermore, 
revision of the programme for the purchase of 
various items of equipment - for which there is 
an estimate of £ 1 800 in Chapter IV of the 
budget compared with £ 9 700 in 1991) - and 
the elimination of estimates for secure commu-
nications equipment (WEUCOM), which 
amounted to £ 13 700 in 1991, make it possible 
to offset in full the purchase of a new car to 
replace the present one. 
16. The total operating budget for the 
Secretariat-General amounts to £ 3 644 050. 
Account being taken of receipts, the net total 
operating budget (Section A) amounts to 
£ 2 461 150. Compared with the operating 
budget for the financial year 1991 as adjusted 
during that financial year (see Appendix 11), the 
growth rate of the new budget is 1.62%. 
17. In the pensions budget of the Secretariat-
General (Section A), estimates take account of a 
new pension and the end of an orphan's pension 
which will no longer be payable as from 1992. In 
all, twenty-two beneficiaries are taken into 
account. However, there is an overall decrease 
ofF 79 675 in the net total of this budget (pen-
sions less receipts from the contributions of per-
manent stafi) compared with the previous 
financial year. This 16.62% decrease is due to 
the inclusion in the 1991 budget of sums for 
leaving allowances that are no longer included in 
1992. 
18. The net grand total (operating and pen-
sions budgets) of Section A of the budget of the 
Secretariat-General therefore amounts to 
£2 860 750 (see Appendix 11); this total is 
£ 40 535 (i.e. 1.40%) lower than for the financial 
year 1991. However, after deducting sums 
brought over to 1991 from the previous 
financial year (see Appendix Ill) and comparing 
sums granted for 1992 with those in the initial 
budget for 1991, it can be seen that there is a 
growth rate of 3.14%. 
19. Since, according to OECD forecasts, there 
will be an inflation rate of about 4.6o/o in the 
United Kingdom in 1992, your Rapporteur can 
but emphasise the effort made by the 
Secretariat-General to make economies in pre-
paring its budget for 1992 which, in any event, is 
a transitional budget. In the near future, the 
transfer of the Secretariat-General to Brussels 
can but raise considerable problems, particularly 
in regard to the fitting out of the premises that 
have already been made available to it by the 
Belgian Government and to expenditure on 
staff, whether the latter move to Brussels or opt 
for the resiliation of their contracts. It is 
therefore obvious that a supplementary budget 
will have to be prepared. Hence budgetary 
problems stemming from the transfer of 
the Secretariat-General to Brussels remain 
pending. 
20. Sections B and C of the budget of the 
Secretariat-General call for no special comment. 
The first shows the implications of the 
Secretariat-General assuming responsibility for 
pensions payable to retired staff of the Paris 
ministerial organs: these are included in the 
budget and amount to F 10 633 500. Section C 
includes estimates for running the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments, whose seat is still in 
Paris. Estimates here cover the salary of one per-
manent official and the cost of two official mis-
sions. 
Ill. Budget of the Institute for Security Studies 
21. At the end of its first year's work (it was 
set up on 1st July 1990), the Institute for 
Security Studies was able to determine the total 
budgetary resources of all kinds that it needed to 
carry out its tasks properly. Twenty-four posts 
are included in its budget (see Appendix IV), all 
of which are filled. There are no proposals in the 
1992 budget in regard to these staff (creation of 
additional posts or regrading existing posts). 
Estimates for expenditure on staff in this budget 
amount to F 14 624 000, which takes account of 
the trend of salary scales for staff of the 
co-ordinated organisations. 
22. There is an estimate of F 330 000 in the 
chapter" Travel". Compared with last year, this 
represents an increase of 10%, mainly due to the 
rise in the cost of transport and the rate of daily 
allowances. A similar increase (9.83%), i.e. 
F 1 900 000, is foreseen in Chapter Ill for func-
tional expenditure. This sum should allow the 
Institute to carry out its operational tasks, 
including the award of scholarships to nationals 
of Eastern European countries, conducting ad 
hoc studies, organising seminars, etc. 
23. In this connection, the Council said it 
would examine the possibility of granting the 
Institute further sums if warranted by the inten-
sification of its activities (in particular the 
extension of its contacts with the Central and 
Eastern European countries). In that case, pro-
cedure for preparing a supplementary budget 
would have to be applied. 
24. The other chapters (IV, V and VI) call for 
no special remarks since estimates under them 
are on the whole lower than in the 1991 budget. 
The only item requiring comment is the 
inclusion under Chapter V.2 of the purchase of a 
new car to replace the old one, inherited from 
the Paris ministerial organs, the cost of which 
(F 100 000) is offset by savings within these 
chapters. 
25. As shown in the table at Appendix V, the 
total budget of the Institute amounts to 
F 13 516 000 (net operating budget: F 
13 985 100 less pensions receipts: F 469 000). 
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There is a growth rate of 4.86% in the total net 
budget. Your Rapporteur has no other com-
ments to make on this subject. 
IV. Conclusions 
26. An analysis of the budgets of the WEU 
ministerial organs for 1992 allows your 
Rapporteur to conclude that they correspond 
perfectly to the criteria of clarity that should 
always govern the preparation of documents of 
this kind. They show WEU's needs, assessed at a 
strict minimum, thus committing the organs 
concerned to apply criteria of the utmost strin-
gency in their budgetary management. In all 
fairness, it must be acknowledged that, in spite 
of the limited financial resources made available 
to it, WEU is increasing its activities consid-
erably, as can be seen from the half-yearly 
reports from the Council to the Assembly and 
the information letters from the Secretar-
y-General to the President of the Assembly. 
Your Rapporteur is anxious to underline this 
fact. 
V. Action taken 
on Assembly Recommendation 499 
27. In adopting Recommendation 499, the 
Assembly recommended that the Council: 
(a) reconsider its position towards the 
Assembly's requirements, which were 
set out and duly justified in its draft 
budget for 1991; 
(b) arrange for all documents on budg-
etary matters, circulated under B, 
C-B, BR or CR references, to be syste-
matically sent to the Assembly; 
(c) communicate to the Assembly its con-
clusions on staff policy problems; 
(d) examine to what extent the proposals 
contained in the study of the careers 
of staff of the Council of Europe might 
be taken into account in the 
framework of WEU's staff policy. 
28. Replying to this recommendation, the 
Council remarked on the first point that " the 
regular contacts between the Secretariat-General 
and the President of the Assembly have cleared 
the way for a mutually accepted compromise 
solution as to the Assembly's budget for 1991 ". 
Your Rapporteur takes note of the method 
which allowed the problem of the Assembly's 
budget for 1991 to be solved and trusts that it 
will be possible to resume the contacts estab-
lished on that occasion so as to facilitate the 
process of approving the Assembly's future 
budgets. 
29. On the second point, the Council said it 
was prepared to send the documents mentioned 
by the Assembly, not systematically but on a 
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case-by-case basis. Your Rapporteur considers 
that, although this reply does not entirely meet 
the Assembly's wishes, it is acceptable insofar as 
the Assembly may receive all the documents it 
needs. Initial application of this measure proved 
satisfactory. The Secretary of the committee, 
during a talk in London with the administrative 
staff of the Secretariat-Geneia.I, held in a 
co-operative, cordial atmosphere, was able to 
obtain all the information he requested with a 
yiew to drafting the present report. 
30. On the other points, relating to staff 
policy, the Council referred to" a maximum of 
flexibility " in order to cope with the changing 
challenges to which the organisation has to 
react. It proposes to study the possibility of 
adopting a longer-term staff policy when a final 
decision has been taken on the role and place of 
WEU in the European security architecture. 
31. The aftermath of Maastricht seems to be 
an appropriate framework for studying a staff 
policy that takes account of the legitimate aspi-
rations of staff of all grades, particularly in 
regard to assurances about their future. Trans-
ferring the Secretariat-General to Brussels can 
certainly not fail, once again, to raise problems 
relating to staff unable to follow the secretariat 
to Brussels. Experience acquired on the occasion 
of the abolition of the Paris agencies should 
encourage the Council to seek the fairest 
solution without delay. 
32. In the context of staff policy, your 
Rapporteur must refer to the problem already 
mentioned in the previous report, i.e. policy for 
negotiating salaries in the co-ordinated 
organisations and the establishment of a 
European civil service. 
33. In regard to salary negotiations, it is inter-
esting to quote the final reply given by the Com-
mittee of Ministers on 25th September 1991 to 
Recommendation 944 (1982) of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: 
" The regulations concerning the co-
ordination system define the object of the 
co-ordination system and the role of the 
Co-ordinating Committee on Remune-
ration which is to replace the Co-
ordinating Committee of Government 
Budget Experts. A more active role of the 
Committee of Ministers in remuneration 
policy as advocated in paragraph 14.i of 
the recommendation would entail the risk 
of divergencies within the co-ordination 
system and might even threaten its exis-
tence. The Committee of Ministers is of 
the opinion that it is in the interest of all 
parties concerned to maintain this system. 
The idea of a high-level meeting on remu-
neration policy within the framework of 
the co-ordinated organisations has been 
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examined by the Committee of Ministers. 
Since no agreement on the modalities of 
such a high-level meeting could be found, 
the Committee of Ministers has accepted 
the recommendation of the secretaries I 
directors general of the co-ordinated orga-
nisations that there was no need to pursue 
further the idea of institutionalising such 
a meeting. " 
This seems. to be the · position of all the 
co-ordinated organisations. 
34. As for the" European civil service", it is 
interesting to quote a note of 16th December 
1991, drafted by Mr. Speed, Rapporteur of the 
Budget Committee of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, who sums 
the problem up as follows: 
" Both the Council of Europe and the 
European Community base their civil 
service on three principles, which our 
Assembly has often had the occasion to 
highlight: permanence, independence and 
the competence of the civil servants. 
Other international organisations ... have 
wholly or partly abandoned the principle 
of permanence and opted for a body of 
civil servants consisting of national civil 
servants seconded to the organisation for 
a period of time. In such circumstances, 
the second principle - that of indepen-
dence- is jeopardised. How, in such cir-
cumstances, can a civil servant be inde-
pendent of his or her national 
government? " 
35. Your Rapporteur endorses these remarks. 
He believes that, if the problem of the European 
civil service is at a deadlock, it is because the 
governments have concentrated on the present 
cost of the pensions scheme, having chosen at 
the outset to finance it in accordance with the 
budgetisation system. Since a minimum period 
of service of ten years is required in order to be 
entitled to a retirement pension, a shorter period 
of service in the international organisations, as 
is the case for seconde(\ officials, would avoid 
the cost of the scheme rising excessively. Hence 
government reticence about creating a European 
civil service. 
36. The OECD, the EEC, the Council of 
Europe, ESA and the ECMWF have conducted 
separate actuarial studies on this subject but 
their conclusioqs differ. (WEU has not produced 
a study.) Co-ordination is thus called in question 
in this area at least. It is planned that the CCR 
(Co-ordinating Committee · on Remuneration) 
will examine the matter in September-October 
1992 with representatives of the secretaries-
general and staff of all the co-ordinated 
organisations. Since this problem is of vital 
interest to the staff, the Assembly wishes to be 
informed of decisions taken on the subject. 
APPENDIX I 
No. Grade 
1. H.G. 
2. H.G. 
3. B.4 
4. B.4 
5. A.6 
6. B.3/4 
7. B.4 
8. A.4/5 
9. A.2/3 
10. A.2/3 
11. A.2/3 
12. A.3/4 
13. A.2/3 
14. A.3/4 
15. LT.5 
16. LT.4 
17. LT.3 
18. LT.3 
19. LT.2 
20. A.4 
21. B.3 
22. B.5 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of establishment of the Seeretariat-General 
Function 
Secretary-General 
Deputy Secretary-General 
Personal Assistant to S.G. 
Personal Assistant to D.S.G. 
Political Affairs Division 
Head of Division 
Sec. to Head of Division 
Divisional Assistant 
Section - Council Secretariat 
Head of Section 
Committee Secretary 
Committee Secretary • 
Committee Secretary 
Section - Policy and Planning 
Head of Section 
Planning Secretary 
Press and Information 
Head of Section 
Translation Department 
Head (Reviser E/F) 
Translator/Reviser FIE 
Translator E/F 
Translator FIE 
Translator E/F 
Administration Division 
Legal Adviser/Head of Personnel/ 
Division co-ordinator 
Secretary to the Division 
Administrative Assistant 
No. Grade 
23. A.3/4 
24. A.2 
25. B.4 
26. A.2 
27. B.4 
28. B.3/4 
29. B.2 
30. B.2 
31. B.2/3/4 
32. B.2/3/4 
33. B.2/3/4 
34. B.2/3/4 
35. B.2/3 
36. B.2/3/4 
37. B.2/3/4 
38. B.2/3/4 
39. B.2/3/4 
40. B.2/3/4 
41. B.2/3/4 
42. B.1 
43. B.1 
44. C.3 
45. C.2 
46. C.3 
47. C.3 
48. C.3 
49. C.3 
50. C.3 
51. C.3 
52. C.3 
53. C.3 
1. A.4 
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Function 
Section - Finance and budget 
Controller 
Accountant 
Financial Assistant 
Section - Registry, security and 
communications 
Head of Section 
Documentation Clerk 
Clerk/communications 
Clerklrepro 
Clerklrepro 
Section - Secretarial assistance 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Sec/shorthand-typist 
Section - General services 
Telephonist 
Telephonist 
Messenger/storekeeper 
Messenger 
Chauffeur 
Chauffeur 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Security Guard 
Agency for the Control of arma-
ments 
Expert 
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APPENDIX 11 
Summary of estimated expenditure and income 
of the Secretariat-General for 1992 
Expenditure Credits 
/income approved 
1990 for 1991 (a) 
(£) (£) 
Expenditure 
Personnel costs ..... 2 529 443 3 080020 
Travel ............. 91476 76600 
Other operating costs 267 051 373 970 
Purchases .......... 13 939 25 200 
Buildings ........... 96 16 920 
TOTAL ............ 2 902 005 3 572 710 
Income 
WEU tax ........... 924 494 1124 200 
Other receipts ...... 35 921 26 500 
TOTAL ............ 960 415 1150 700 
NET TOTAL ........ 1 941 590 2 422 010 
Pensions ........... 341197 479 275 
TOTAL ............ 2 282 787 2 901 285 
B (91) 10 C-B (90) 28 
Page 14 B (91) 7 
Note (a) Includes amounts brought forward from 1991 (B (91) 7). 
(b) Includes p.m. for " military cell ". 
(c) Includes p.m. in respect of Appeals Board. 
(d) includes p.m. for Fire Precaution Work. 
(e) Includes £ 21 000 "frozen" (B (91) 23). 
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Credits 
proposed 
for 1992 
(£) 
(b) 3 141 800 
(e) 112 950 
(c) 365 400 
22400 
(d) 1 500 
3 644050 
1 156 400 
26 500 
1 182 900 
2 461 150 
399 600 
2 860 750 
B (91) 17 
Partll 
APPENDIX 11 
Difference 
between 1992 
and 1991 
(£) (%) 
61 780 2.01 
36 350 47.45 
-8 570 -2.29 
-2800 -11.11 
-15 420 -91.13 
71 340 2.00 
.. 32 200 2.86 
0 .00 
32 200 2.80 
39140 1.62 
-79 675 - 16.62 
-40 535 -1.40 
APPENDIX IIJ 
APPENDIX Ill 
WEU budget estimates for 1992 
Proposed expenditure and income 
Section A 
London 
(£) 
Expenditure 
Personnel costs ..................... 3 141 800 
Travel ............................. (b) 112 950 
Other operating costs ............... 365 400 
Purchases .......................... 22400 
Buildings .......................... 1 500 
TOTAL ........................... 3 644 050 
Income 
WEU tax .......................... 1156 400 
Other receipts ...................... 26 500 
TOTAL ............................. 1182 900 
NET TOTAL ......................... 2 461 150 
Net pensions ....................... 399 600 
TOTAL ............................. 2 860 750 
Budget surplus 1990 (-) 
(B (91) 10 P.6) ..................... 35 664 
Net contributions 1992 ............. 2 825 086 
Difference: 
(a) 1992 total compared with 
approved 1991 budget C-B (90) 28 
and including credits brought 
forward to 1991 (B (91) 7) ...... -1.4% 
(b) 1992 total compared with 
approved 1991 budget C-B (90) 28; 
excluding credits brought forward 
to 1991 (B (91) 7) .............. + 3.14% 
(a) Includes p.m. for removal costs (Part 11 page 22 para 2). 
(b) Includes£ 21 000 "frozen" (B (91) 23). 
(c) No credits brought forward. 
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Section B 
Ex-PMO Paris 
(F) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 633 500 
10 633 500 
2 264 476 
8 369 024 
(c) + 2.9% 
+2.9% 
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Section C 
ACA Paris 
(F) 
(a) 1102 400 
14 500 
2 500 
0 
0 
1119400 
377 000 
0 
377 000 
742 400 
0 
742 400 
10 775 
731 625 
(c)+ 6.0% 
+6.0% 
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Post No. 
ISS 1 
ISS 2 
ISS 3 
ISS 4 
ISS 5 
ISS 6 
ISS 24 
ISS 7 
ISS 8 
ISS 9 
ISS 10 
ISS 11 
ISS 12 
ISS 13 
ISS 14 
ISS 15 
ISS 16 
ISS 17 
ISS 18 
ISS 19 
ISS 20 
ISS 21 
ISS 22 
ISS 23 
APPENDIX IV 
Table of establishment 
of the Institute for Security Studies 
Grade(s) of Post Function 
H.G. Director 
B.4 Assistant to the Director 
A.2/ A.3/ A.4 Research Fellow 
A.2/ A. 3/ A.4 Research Fellow 
A.2/ A.3/ A.4 Research Fellow 
A.2/ A.3/ A.4 Research Fellow 
A.2/ A.3/ A.4 Research Fellow 
B.3/B.4 Assistant/Shorthand typist 
B.3/B.4 Assistant/Shorthand typist 
B.3/B.4 Assistant/Shorthand typist 
A.4/A.5 Head of Administrative Services 
L.3/L.4 Translator/Interpreter 
L.3/L.4 Translator/Interpreter 
B.4 Administrative Assistant/Shorthand typist 
B.4/B.5 Book-keeper 
B.4 Information assistant 
C.4 Chief Security Guard 
C.3 Security Guard 
C.3 Security Guard 
C.3 Security Guard 
C.3 Security Guard 
C.3 Security Guard 
B.3 Switchboard operator 
APPENDIX IV 
B.4* Technical and administrative assistant (building and 
general services) 
* The holder of this post is graded B.5. 
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APPENDIX V 
Summary of estimated expenditure and income 
of the Institute for Security Studies for 1992 
Expenditure/ Credits Credits 
Income - second approved proposed 
half of 1990 for 1991 for 1992 
(F) (F) (F) 
Current expenditure 
I. Personnel costs ........ 6 565 881.25 13 748 600 14 624 000 
11. Travel ................. 101 613.10 300000 330000 
Ill. Functional expenditure . 249 316.76 1 730 000 1900000 
IV. Operating costs specific 
to the Institute ......... 431 615.86 820000 780000 
V. Purchase of furniture and 
equipment ............. 378 448.70 200000 140000 
VI. Contribution by the 
Institute to the joint 
charges for the building . 1 015 099.71 1436 100 1 502 100 
Total: Gross operating costs 8 741 975.38 18 234 700 19 276 100 
Income 
VII. WEU tax .............. 2 245 938.69 4 783 800 5171000 
VIII. Other receipts .......... - 57 322.50 120000 120 000 
Operating income ............ 2 188 616.19 4 903 800 5 291 000 
Total: Net operating costs. 6 553 359.19 13 330 900 13 985 100 
Pensions 
P. I. Expenditure ........... - - -
P .. 11. Income ................ - 441 000 469 000 
Net pension income . . . . . . . . . . + 204 697.97 + 441 000 + 469000 
(credit) 
Total: Net expenditure .... 6 348 661.22 12 889 900 13 516 000 
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Difference 
between 1992 and 1991 
(F) (%) 
+ 875 400 + 6.37 
+ 30000 + 10.00 
+ 170 000 + 9.83 
- 40000 - 4.88 
- 60000 -30.00 
+ 66000 + 4.60 
+ 1041400 + 5.71 
+ 387 200 + 8.09 
- -
+ 387 200 + 7.90 
+ 654 200 + 4.91 
+ 28000 + 6.35 
+ 28000 + 6.35 
(credit) 
+ 626 200 + 4.86 
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APPENDIX VI 
RECOMMENDATION 499 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western Europea11 Union 
for the financial years 1990 (supplementary budgets) and 1991 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that: 
APPENDIX VI 
(a) the abolition of the Agencies for Security Questions meant the Secretariat-General bearing 
the cost of pensions payable to the staff of those agencies and expenditure relating to the 
operation of the- Agency for the Control of Armaments; 
(b) the Secretary-General consequently submitted two supplementary budgets (the first and the 
third) during the financial year 1990 to include the abovementioned expenditure in his 
budget; 
(c) a "liquidation" budget terminated the management of the former agencies as from 
30th June 1990; 
(d) in the financial year 1990, the Secretary-General strengthened his staff on the basis of a man-
agement study conducted by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, intro-
duced new means of work and included the corresponding credits in a supplementary budget 
(the second) for 1990 and in the 1991 budget; 
(e) these measures, representing a growth rate of 15.05% in the budget for 1991, seem fully jus-
tified by the increase in work due to the reactivation of WEU and the implementation of the 
principles set out in the platform of October 1987; 
(ii) Regretting that: 
(a) the WEU Council refused the proposals to strengthen the staff of the Office of the Clerk of 
the Assembly and authorised the creation of only two new posts on condition one of them 
was financed by savings elsewhere in the Assembly's operating budget; 
(b) this decision, justified by "the present climate of financial stringency [which] places severe 
constraints upon national budgets", is in contradiction with the decisions taken in respect of 
the Secretariat-General and discriminates against the Assembly; 
(c) the Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration had great diffi- , 
culty in obtaining the budget documents from the Secretariat-General whereas communi- ! 
cation of these documents is an obligation for the Council under Article VIII (c) of the 
Charter and Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly; 
(iii) Noting that: 
(a) the conclusions of the examination in the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts of matters concerning the staff (participation of staff representatives in negotiations 
on employment conditions and establishment of means for encouraging and facilitating 
movements of staff from one co-ordinated organisation to another), referred to in Assembly 
Recommendation 487, have still not been communicated; 
(b) the Committee on the Budget and the Intergovernmental Work Programme of the Assembly 
of the Council of Europe has conducted a study of the careers of staff of the Council of 
Europe and this study sets out the broad lines of a career policy which might be applied to 
WEU sraff, 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1991 during the first part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (4th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fabra on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Admin-
istration (Document 1264). 
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Reconsider its position towards the Assembly's requirements, which were set out and duly jus-
tified in its draft budget for 1991; 
2. Arrange for all documents on budgetary matters, circulated under B, C-B, BR or CR references, 
to be systematically sent to the Assembly; 
3. Communicate to the Assembly its conclusions on staff policy problems; 
4. Examine to what extent the proposals contained in the study of the careers of staff of the Council 
of Europe might be taken into account in the framework of WEU's staff policy. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 499 
1. The regular contacts between the Secretariat-General and the President of the Assembly have 
cleared the way for a mutually accepted compromise solution as to the Assembly's budget for 1991. 
2. As the references B, C-B, BR or CR indicate working or classified documents, an automatic pre-
sentation to the Assembly cannot unfortunately be envisaged. However, in order to meet the 
Assembly's increasing information requirements, such documents, or an indication of their content, 
could be sent to the Assembly at the latter's request, on a case by case basis and when deemed nec-
essary. 
3. At the present moment, the Council endeavours to maintain a maximum of flexibility in the for-
mulation of its staff policy in order to cope with the changing challenges to which the organisation has 
to react. When a final decision has been taken as to the role and place of WEU in the European security 
architecture it would of course become possible to envisage a longer-term staff policy. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th November 1991. 
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The derelopment of a European space-based obse,.,ation system 
REPORT' 
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee 2 
by Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Valleix, Rapporteurs 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
30th April 1992 
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on the development of a European space-based observation system 
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submitted by Mrs. Blunck and Mr. Valleix, Rapporteurs 
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(a) The WEU Satellite Data Interpretation and Training Centre 
(b) The study management team 
Ill. Consequences of international developments for the establishment of a 
European space-based observation system 
IV. Consideration of the various missions 
(a) Verification 
(b) Crisis monitoring 
(c) Environmental management 
V. Outstanding questions 
VI. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Ministerial decision setting up a WEU satellite centre taken at Vianden, 
Luxembourg, on 27th June 1991 
11. Communique issued at the close of the meeting of the WEU Council of 
Ministers in Bonn on 18th November 1991 (Extract) 
Ill. Satellite programmes 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. Garrett (Alternate: Lambie), Lopez Henares (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Atkinson, Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Bohm, Caccia (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Curto, Dimmer, Mrs. Francese, MM. Lagorce, 
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Sarens, Tummers (Alternate: Aarts), Valleix, Verbeek, Worms, N .... 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
011 tile dnelopme11t of a Europea11 
llpaee-btlsed observatio11 qstem 
(i) Welcomes the establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre and the fact that the management team 
to study conditions for developing a European space-based observation system has started work; 
(ii) Emphasises that this first multinational effort to make use of space to establish a control system 
for international peace-keeping and security is unique in the world; 
(iii) Underlines the importance of obtaining public support in order to carry out the planned project; 
(iv) Considers the definition of the tasks of the system requires a more intensive, regular dialogue 
between the Council and the Assembly than has been the case hitherto; 
(v) Recalls its Recommendations 465 and 466; 
(vi) Welcomes the conclusion of the Open Skies Treaty and trusts it will be ratified as soon as pos-
sible by all the countries concerned; 
(vii) Is convinced that, in setting up the observation system, WEU should take the fullest possible 
advantage of the services and experience of the European Space Agency (ESA) in carrying out earth 
observation programmes; 
(viii) Recalls the work carried out by the IEPG in the context of the Euclid programme on radar tech-
nology and satellite observation; 
(ix) Considers it essential for the principle of transparency to be applied to the interpretation of sat-
ellite data and for all aspects of the activities of the Centre and observation system as a whole to be 
subject to parliamentary scrutiny, 
THE ASSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Design the planned system in such a way as to serve the security of WEU member countries and 
also to be useful to wider organisations with a European, Atlantic or universal vocation; 
2. Inform the Assembly regularly 
(a) about each stage of the entry into service of the Satellite Centre, its organogram and the 
progress of feasibility studies; 
(b) about criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the Centre and establish the 
observation system; 
3. Define 
(a) the consequences of the Open Skies Treaty for satellite verification and for the tasks of the 
WEU Satellite Centre; 
(b) the exact significance of the expression crisis observation and the consequences of closer 
WEU co-operation in strategic observation for the tasks of the Centre and of the space-based 
observation system; 
and submit its conclusions to the Assembly; 
4. At the earliest possible opportunity, contact the European Space Agency (ESA) in order to work 
out with it the possibilities for co-operation between WEU and ESA in space-based observation and 
arrange to be represented at the next meeting of the ESA Council of Ministers in Spain in November 
1992; 
5. Contact the IEPG to co-ordinate the work carried out by that group on space technology in the 
context of the Euclid programme with WEU's activities in this area; 
6. Keep the public better informed about its space policy. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submined by Mn. Bluru:k tllld Mr. Valleix, Rapporteun) 
I. Introduction 
1. The ministerial decision on setting up the 
WEU Satellite Centre was published on 27th 
June 1991 1 and, on 18th November 1991 2, it 
was announced that a group was being set up to 
study the feasibility of establishing a medium-
and long-term European space-based obser-
vation system. It is therefore gratifying that the 
WEU Council has taken the first steps to give 
Western Europe an independent space-based 
intelligence system, as so often advocated by the 
WEU Assembly 3• 
2. The time it will take the experts and 
industrialists to set up this Centre and 
co-ordinate feasibility studies will probably play 
in favour of the governments meeting in the 
WEU Council. They will be tempted to consider 
that they have been relieved, for quite some 
time, of a complicated and perhaps embar-
rassing political problem. The Council might 
also give a dilatory· answer to any request for 
information, invoking the need to wait for the 
results of the experts' work. 
3. The only additional official information 
the Council has actually given on space 
co-operation is to be found in paragraph 2 of its 
reply to Recommendation 509 where the news is 
the announcement that preparations have been 
made to call for tenders for the feasibility study 
for a WEU satellite system. 
4. However, let there be no mistake: the 
decisions so far taken are but the first steps in a 
vast undertaking whose conditions and aims are 
far from having been examined and defined in 
depth. It should be recalled that, at the sym-
posium organised by the Technological and Aer-
ospace Committee in Rome on 27th and 
28th March 1990, Mr. Ter Beek, Netherlands 
Minister of Defence, rightly recalled that " the 
realisation of an independent European satellite 
surveillance system will involve a technical, 
financial, organisational and political challenge 
of such magnitude that it may not ever come 
about". 
l. See Appendix I. 
2. See Appendix 11. 
3. See in particular the report by Mr. Fourre on verification: 
a future European satellite agency (Document 1159, 3rd 
November 1988), the report by Mr. Malfatti on scientific 
and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite 
(Document 1160, 7th November 1988) and the report by 
Mr. Lenzer on observation satellites - a European means of 
verifying disarmament - guidelines drawn from the sym-
posium (Document 1230, 25th May 1990). 
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5. To the list of efforts that will be required 
should be added the need - in this area in par-
ticular - to be certain to obtain public support, 
without which the project will be impossible. To 
obtain this support, the public must first be reg-
ularly informed and adequately prepared before 
major political decisions are taken. 
6. Apart from the traditional parliamentary 
task of supervising the Council's space activities, 
this report is therefore intended to reaffirm the 
politically topical nature of the problem raised, 
sustain public interest and stimulate a public 
debate with the Council in order to help to solve 
outstanding questions in an equitable manner. 
II. Acti,ities of the WEU Council 
(a) The WEU Satellite Datal•terpretatio• 
and Trai•i•g Ce•tre 
7. In accordance with the decisions taken by 
the Council on 27th June and 18th November 
1991, on 1st January 1992 work started on 
setting up the Centre in Torrej6n under its 
Director, Mr. Barry Blaydes, a former official of 
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, who 
has been appointed for a period of three years. 
The Centre is to come into service in the course 
of 1992 and is to be officially inaugurated in 
June, although no exact date has been given. 
8. The Centre is a subsidiary body of WEU 
in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of 
the modified Brussels Treaty and will be placed 
under the authority of the Council. Its managing 
bodies will be the Director and the Steering 
Committee. 
9. According to paragraph 4 of the decision 
issued in Vianden on 27th June 1991: 
" Each member state will appoint a repre-
sentative to the Centre's Steering Com-
mittee. The latter will lay down technical 
and financial guidelines to be imple-
mented by the Centre, and be in constant 
liaison with the national authorities 
calling upon the Centre's services." 
This raises the following questions: 
- Who chairs the Steering Committee 
(e.g. the Director of the Centre)? 
- Have national representatives already 
been appointed? 
- Where and how frequently does the 
Steering Committee meet? 
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10. The Director of the Centre is now 
recruiting about fifty staff, including some 
twenty technicians to interpret satellite images. 
For the organisation of its activities, the Centre 
will have operational, computer, staff man-
agement, financial and scientific sections. 
11. The Centre's budget for the three-year 
experimental stage is subject to a ceiling of 
38.25 million ecus financed by contributions 
from member states. 
12. At the beginning of March 1992, a call for 
tenders to equip the Centre was made to 
eighty-five industrial firms in the WEU member 
countries. Offers have to be sent in before the 
end of May 1992. Contracts, which will be 
drawn up under the authority of the Secretariat-
General of WEU, will represent an initial sum of 
about 5 million ecus and will subsequently he 
completed by a contract worth 5 million ecus for 
software. 
13. Mr. van Eekelen gave the following infor-
mation on the activities of the Centre when 
addressing the Parliamentary Space Committee 
of the House of Commons on 29th .January 
1992: 
" ... Ministers have agreed to a step-
by-step approach, and in its experimental 
phase the first three years of the Centre 
(1992-1994) will be spent on training ana-
lysts in the interpretation of satellite 
imagery... and also in demonstrating the 
technology. This will be done using data 
available from commercial sources such 
as Spot 4, La.ndsat s and ERS 6• The aim 
will be to achieve a ·certain amount of 
integration by pooling knowledge and 
standardising working procedures. The 
future of the Centre will be reviewed 
towards the end of the three-year period. 
Subsequently, th~ Centre ~d become 
. more operational .by using data from sat-
ellites with better resolution such as 
Helios 7 - due to be launched in 1994. In 
this context, an MOU has been drawn up 
under which the Helios partners (France, 
Italy and Spain) would make data 
available to the WEU Satelijte Centre. 
This data could then be analysed by the 
photo-interpreters who have been trained 
in the Centre, and the results passed back 
to national capitals. 
In its ultimate phase, ·the Centre could be 
responsible for operating WEU's auton-
omous satellite observation capability, 
currently the subject of the medium- and 
long-term studies. " 
4. See Appendix Ill. 
5. See Appendix Ill. 
6. See Appendix Ill. 
7. See Appendix Ill. 
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14. This description leaves outstanding a 
number of questions of a political nature or 
others which are more technical and organ-
isational. On the last two aspects, it is satisfying 
to note that the Director of the Centre was 
willing to inform committee members about 
work to set up the Torrej6n Centre. After a first 
contact with the Technological and Aerospace 
committee in Berlin on 1st April 1992, he 
briefed it at its meeting in Paris on 30th April 
1992. 
15. Inter alia, it was learned that a group of 
experts is to set up the Centre and work out a 
concept for the image interpreters' missions and 
the organisational structure of the Centre in 
agreement with the Spanish Government. The 
necessary work on the premises assigned to the 
Centre in Torrej6n is due to be completed in 
autumn 1992. There will be eight image stations 
and a photographic laboratory. Contracts with 
the industries chosen to equip the Centre are to 
be concluded by August 1992 and the 
equipment is to be installed by the end of 1992. 
16. The work to be carried out by the end of 
the year will cost about 9 million ecus. Out-
standing questions include the criteria on which 
industries' tenders for equipping the Centre are 
examined. 
17. Without knowing the result of the exami-
nation of industrial tenders, it seems quite right 
for the Council to give priority to European 
space industries with a view to enhancing their 
efficiency and competitiveness, which have 
increased with time, particularly through 
European Space Agency programmes. This 
policy is also, and perhaps more, justified in 
areas which are still the weak points of 
European industry, i.e. the development of data 
processing and interpretation, which is the main 
vocation of the Torrej6n Centre. 
18. Political questions include the purpose of 
the overall system of which the Centre is only 
one component. The question of its tasks and 
external relations, for instance, depend on this 
purpose being determined. On the latter aspect, 
the text issued on 27th June 1991 says that " the 
possibilities for future co-operation between the 
Centre and other corresponding bodies, particu-
larly in Europe and in the United States, on the 
basis of a balanced partnership, will also be 
studied" . Conversely, when addressing the 
House of Commons, the Secretary-General of 
WEU went further and underlined that the 
abovementioned possibilities " will therefore 
remain high on our agenda " . Is it to be deduced 
that decisions on co-operation have been taken 
in the meantime and, if so, what are they? 
19. Other questions calling for a political 
answer include, on the one hand, the geo-
graphical area to be covered by the Centre's 
activities and, on the other, which authority will 
determine its tasks, working methods and rela-
tions with the future WEU planning cell and 
decide from which outside sources the Centre 
should receive data for interpretation. 
20. When briefing the committee, the 
Director of the Centre confirmed that there were 
still many questions to be settled, including the 
definition of the Centre's specific tasks and its 
working methods. It has to be decided whether 
the Centre will carry out missions in the direct 
interest of WEU or in that of member countries. 
It must also be decided whether national cells 
should be set up and, if so, how they will be inte-
grated in the Centre. 
21. According to its Director, the Centre is 
quite prepared to establish relations with the 
CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and with veri-
fication mechanisms resulting from the imple-
mentation of the Open Skies Treaty. The 
Director said that, to date, no arrangement had 
been made with countries and organisations 
outside WEU and that, as long as no political 
decision had been taken on the exact missions, 
the line followed in setting up the Centre was to 
ensure maximum flexibility in order to meet all 
sorts of requirements. In this spirit, the Centre 
was to come into service on 1st January 1993, 
on which date it would start to use and interpret 
images from all suppliers of space data with 
whom arrangements could be made. 
22. It is therefore clear that the Centre is 
going to be commissioned and start the first 
experimental stage of its work in an atmosphere 
of uncertainty and in the absence of political 
decisions on its final aims and missions, which 
does not facilitate its task. It will be particularly 
important for the feasibility studies for a 
European space observation system to produce 
positive results as soon as possible to give the 
governments concerned an adequate basis for 
taking the essential political decisions. 
23. It emerges from the communique issued 
by the WEU Council of Ministers on 18th 
November 1991 that " a study group should be 
formed in 1992 to examine the necessity and 
desirability of a medium- and long-term 
realisation of a European space-based obser-
vation system. This group will be based in 
France and have an Italian chairman". 
24. Speaking to the WEU Assembly in 
December 1991, the Secretary-General of WEU 
said Mr. Leonardo Gagliardi of the Agenzia 
spaziale italiana had been appointed Chairman 
of the group, which has its seat at the Direction 
generale pour l'armement of the French Min-
istry of Defence in Paris. In the Council's reply 
to Recommendation 509, this group was called a 
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" study management team " and was said to 
have been " set up in early 1992... in order to 
manage the actual conduct and co-ordination of 
the industrial studies " . According to the same 
reply, the Study Management Team would be 
working under the aegis of the Council's ad hoc 
Sub-Group on Space. 
25. When Mr. van Eekelen addressed the Par-
liamentary Space Committee of the House of 
Commons on 29th January 1992, he said: 
" ... an invitation to tender for the main 
system feasibility study was issued on 6th 
January,... (total eighty-one firms) ... 
Offers for the contract, which is worth 
some 4.5 million ecus ... , have been 
requested by 2nd March. The objectives 
of the study are: 
- identification of the satellite system 
(payload, satellite and ground segment) 
concepts providing optical, infrared 
and radar imaging capabilities, which 
will meet the full set of mission require-
ments; 
- identification of programme steps 
which will lead to the development of 
the full operational system; 
- comparison of the satellite system con-
cepts and programme steps with respect 
to capabilities, cost, development 
timescales and risks. " 
26. A consortium of about thirty industrial 
firms under the aegis of a prime contractor, 
DASA (Deutsche Aerospace AG), answered the 
call for tenders. If it is awarded the contract, this 
group will have to carry out feasibility studies as 
from the beginning of May 1992, covering a 
two-stage period of about sixteen months. These 
studies will be co-ordinated by the study man-
agement team in Paris. In order to have a more 
accurate idea of the working methods of this 
team, the Chairman of the Technological and 
Aerospace Committee invited its Chairman, Mr. 
Gagliardi, to give a briefing at the committee 
meeting on 30th April 1992. 
27. In his briefing, Mr. Gagliardi confirmed 
that the tender submitted by the 
abovementioned industrial consortium for car-
rying out the principal feasibility study had been 
accepted by WEU's ad hoc Sub-Group on Space 
and that the contract should be signed on 6th 
May 1992. At the same time, the first stage of 
the study will be launched and will last until the 
end of 1992. The second stage will end in 
October or November 1993 and should lead to 
concrete proposals for the establishment of a 
space observation system. Apart from the prin-
cipal study, consideration is being given to aux-
iliary studies to examine areas in which specific 
technical problems might arise. An important 
problem will be the point of intersection 
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between the space segment and the ground 
segment. Close co-ordination between the man-
agement team and the Torrej6n Centre is 
therefore planned. The study management team 
comprises eleven permanent members from 
national administrations and six non-permanent 
experts. 
28. Problems to be solved in regard to the 
requirements of an observation system which, 
initially, was primarily intended to be used for 
verifying conventional disarmament agreements 
have so far been concentrated on the need for: 
- permanent observation; 
- a high rate of repetition; 
- great flexibility in the choice of areas 
observed;· 
- total coverage of areas of interest; 
- speed in obtaining data; 
- a high image standard, what is known 
as resolution 8• 
29. Where observation technology is con-
cerned, work is being carried out on visible 
optical systems such as Spot, Landsat and Helios 
which allow very high resolution but need satis-
factory meteorological conditions and sunlight 
and on infrared optical systems which are useful 
for ascertaining the operational position of 
installations (airports, military bases, industrial 
sites, etc.) which do not depend on lighting. The 
application of synthetic aperture radar systems 
(SAR) such as ERS is also being developed. 
These have all-weather capability and are not 
dependent on lighting, thus allowing specific 
objects such as hardened targets to be detected. 
They can penetrate plant cover. 
30. By working out the architecture of the 
system, consideration might thus be given to 
combining the various observation techniques, 
which would also mean using relay satellites. 
31. The complete configuration of the system 
will depend largely on a political decision being 
taken on the end-use of the entire system, but it 
is not yet possible to foresee what the content of 
this decision will be. 
Ill. Consequences of international developments 
for the establishment 
of a European space-based observation system 
32. When the WEU Council decided to set up 
a centre for satellite data interpretation and 
training and to study the feasibility of an inde-
pendent European space-based observation 
8. The resolution or resolving power of equipment on a sat-
ellite is an essential pointer to the ability of the satellite to 
produce visual images of the earth's surface. For a photo-
graphic camera, the resolving power may be defined as the 
minimum distance between two identical small objects when 
they can still be distinguished as two separate objects. 
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system, everyone had in mind the lessons of the 
Gulf war that had just come to an end and which 
had opened totally new prospects for the use of 
space for surveillance purposes and for 
co-ordinating land, air and naval military opera-
tions. 
33. Meanwhile, in Europe, the process of rati-
fying the CFE Treaty had started, as had the 
implementation of the Charter of Paris for a 
new Europe, signed by the CSCE member coun-
tries on 21st November 1990. The latter pro-
vided for the institutionalisation of that process 
and in particular the creation of a conflict pre-
vention centre in Vienna. Germany was 
reunited, the Warsaw Pact had collapsed but the 
Soviet Union still existed. 
34. Since then, the Soviet Union has been 
divided into states, some totally independent, 
others grouped in a Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States whose instability arouses fear of 
multiple crises exacerbated by inter-ethnic dis-
putes, frontier problems and disputes over the 
right to manage the enormous mass of 
equipment and troops of the former Soviet 
army. However, the most serious problem is to 
handle the non-proliferation of nuclear systems 
scattered over the territory of the former Soviet 
Union, and particularly in Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
and Byelorussia. 
35. It is not yet possible to know whether, in 
the long run, Russia, which considers itself as 
the inheritor of the Soviet Union, may again 
prevail as a superpower. At present, it may be 
said that there is now only one world power, the 
United States. While the threat to Western 
Europe that lasted for almost forty years has 
practically disappeared, the potential risks have 
on the other hand increased. 
36. The outbreak of hostilities between the 
components of former Yugoslavia gave Europe 
proof of this and the re-emergence of an arms 
race in the Middle East and in Europe's 
southern approaches keep alive the fear that 
conflicts between regional powers may threaten 
international peace. 
37. With the appearance of medium-range 
ballistic missiles in several parts of the world, 
sometimes equipped with arms of mass des-
truction, remote crises assume new dimensions. 
Furthermore, the Open Skies Treaty signed on 
24th March 1992 will provide new verification 
possibilities whose consequences for a verifi-
cation satellite system should be examined. 
38. However, disarmament and the large 
reduction in forces in Europe also mean that 
Europeans must protect more territory with 
fewer forces. One result is the need for intelli-
gence means. 
39. Yet neither the public document 
announcing the Council's decision to set up a 
WEU satellite centre nor the communique 
issued by the Council on 18th November 1991 
sets out the exact missions of the Centre and 
of the space-based observation system as a 
whole. 
40. However, it emerges from what the Secre-
tary-General told the Parliamentary Space Com-
mittee of the House of Commons that, in April 
1989, the Council had identified three specific 
needs for the drafting of a study on the possible 
use of space technology, i.e.: 
- verification of arms control agree-
ments; 
- surveillance of crises affecting Euro-
pean security; and 
- surveillance of environmental risks. 
41. The Secretary-General went on to say: 
" The political background to the require-
ment for the Centre has clearly changed 
since 1989, particularly in the light ofthe 
Gulf war and the feeling that the Euro-
peans need to have better access to infor-
mation on which to base their decisions in 
the field of security (or in case of crises), 
but also more recently the Maastricht 
declaration whereby WEU's operational 
role will be strengthened by examining ' ... 
closer military co-operation comple-
mentary to the alliance ... ' inter alia in the 
field of ' .. . strategic surveillance '. The 
emphasis may therefore now be moving 
away from verification towards crisis 
monitoring. " 
42. It is clear that this last remark is of crucial 
importance and the Assembly, which was the 
first to call for the creation of a space-based 
observation system for verification purposes, 
and the public should insist on clarification. In 
particular, the meaning of these notions needs to 
be made clear. There was reference to crisis 
monitoring in the context of the Centre's three 
initial missions. 
43. Conversely, in the declaration by WEU 
member states published in Maastricht on 
1Oth December 1991 concerning the operational 
role of WEU, there was reference to strategic 
surveillance in the framework of closer military 
co-operation. The WEU Assembly is aware 
neither of the content of the calls for tenders 
made to industries nor of the latter's replies. 
Consequently, it does not know what require-
ments were expressed for the planned system. 
However, it cannot be left completely in the 
dark about the missions envisaged for a system 
whose achievement needs the support of the 
public in all WEU member countries and of the 
national parliaments which vote the necessary 
budgets. 
44. It would appear that public support will 
be relatively easy to obtain in the area of verifi-
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cation and environmental surveillance. How-
ever, in the latter case, it is clear that experience 
in national and European organisations and in 
the European Space Agency (ESA) in respect of 
earth observation by satellite raises the question 
of the expediency of creating additional struc-
tures in the framework of WEU. In any event, 
close co-operation with ESA in this area seems 
essential. 
45. More complex problems will arise when 
the question of strategic and crisis surveillance 
has to be tackled, i.e. the military application of 
observation, which may be considered a new 
element resulting from the decisions taken by 
WEU in Maastricht with a view to the organ-
isation being given a more operational role. 
According to information obtained by your 
Rapporteurs to date, the first feasibility studies 
are to include all three missions mentioned 
above. But if, as the Secretary-General said, 
"the emphasis may ... be moving away from ver-
ification towards crisis monitoring " , it is of 
crucial interest to the Assembly and the public 
to know, first, whether the main mandate has 
been changed or, second, if so, what will be the 
consequences. 
IV. Consideration of the various missions 
46. The purpose of this report is not to take 
the place of the technical experts who have to 
trace the course to be followed for an inde-
pendent European observation system to be set 
up and operated to the satisfaction of those con-
cerned. 
47. Nor is it for the WEU Assembly to favour 
one or other industrial option, but it is perfectly 
entitled to make known its views on the aim of 
the undertaking and to ensure that the process 
that has been started serves a common goal. 
However, the international situation has 
changed so much since the WEU Council started 
to examine more closely the applications of 
space technology that it might be necessary to 
review the initial aims. 
48. Even if one follows a recommendation 
made at the Rome symposium on observation 
satellites 9 according to which a system of a very 
flexible concept should be set up that might be 
adapted to changes in the international situation 
compared with the original one, it must not be 
forgotten that, because of budgetary problems in 
most WEU member countries, any uncertainty 
about the aim of the project might make it hard 
to justify, in the eyes of the tax-payer and of 
national parliaments, pursuing the successive 
stages of the undertaking. 
9. Address by Mr. Rothmeyer, Electronic System Gesell-
schaft, Germany. 
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49. In the light of what has been said above, 
consideration should be given to whether the 
three initial missions, i.e. verification, crisis 
monitoring and environmental management, 
still correspond to real needs. 
(a) Verification 
50. Even after the end of the East-West con-
frontation the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact 
and the break-up 'Of the Soviet Union, verifi-
cation of the CFE agreements, which are at the 
ratification stage, retains its full importance. As 
long as the situation remains unstable in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet tJnion, it will be 
necessary, in addition to on-site inspect~ons ~nd 
air surveillance, to have a means of venficat10n 
authorised by the CFE Treaty and not con-
sidered to be intrusive, i.e. surveillance by sat-
ellite. 
51. It is important nevertheless to examine 
the consequences of the signing, on 24th March 
1992, of the Open Skies Treaty between the 
member countries of NATO and of the former 
Warsaw Pact for verification by space-based 
means. The Open Skies Treaty will allow 
member countries to make a specific number of 
overflights each year- which m~y not. be refuse_d 
- subject to seventy-two hours notice 10• Thts 
has made several commentators consider that 
air controls in the framework of the open skies 
regime offer some advantages compared with a 
system of observation by satellite, for in~tance 
greater efficiency thanks to· the use of atrcraft 
with sensitive, less expensive equipment. 
52. Consideration of the implications of this 
treaty, which has to be ratified by ~ partici-
pating countries, would warrant a spectal repo~ 
but it may already be expected. that the Council 
will have to decide whether it should extend the 
mission of the WEU Satellite Centre to include 
interpretation of images from overflights 
effected in implementation of the Open Skies 
Treaty. 
53. It would be particularly interesting to 
know to what extent civil technology can be 
applied and used for verification by space-based 
means. According to information ol:>tained to 
date, it would appear that the experts are 
divided on this point. On the one hand, one 
should recall the remarks made by Mr. Gold-
smith, representing the European Space Agency 
(ESA) at the Rome symposium, who said " the 
agency has built up unique expertise a~d ~pe­
tence which would allow cost-effective Imple-
mentation of a European verification satellite 
programme, taking maximum advantage of 
ESA's available in-orbit infrastructure and 
on-ground facilities for satellite testing and data 
archiving, processing and dissemination ". He 
10. Cf. Le Monde, 22nd-23rd March 1992. 
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consequently presented ESA as a most appro-
priate organisation for backing up a European 
verification satellite programme. 
54. If the information your Rapporteurs have 
obtained is accurate, the European Space 
Agency is still quite prepared to co-operate _with 
WEU in this area. The agency also constders 
that its convention 11 is no obstacle to such 
co-operation and that it might assume responsi-
bility for introducing measures to ensure confi-
dentiality and security. 
55. On the other hand, the detailed report by 
the Eucosat association on the proposed 
European verification satellite agency concludes 
that a comparison of the capability required for 
verification with the resolution of civil obser-
vation satellite systems that already exist or are 
expected between now and the year 2000 suggest 
that these systems do not attain the high reso-
lution levels (metric or decimetric) required for 
the last two stages of interpreting and analysing 
military targets. 
56. This report nevertheless recognises that 
the civil sector can use some of the means 
needed for verification. While it is true that civil 
and military users have different requireme~ts, 
particularly in regard to the degree o~ resolution, 
information frequency and the requtred rate of 
passes over the targets to be observed; _there are 
certainly areas, such as those mentioned. by 
Mr. Goldsmith, where ESA and WEU mtght 
co-operate. 
57. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that 
relay satellites will be necessary for continu~ms 
transmission of data obtained by observation 
satellites. The European Space Agency is 
working actively in this area by devel<?ping relay 
satellite technology (Data Relay Satellite - DRS) 
which should be operational as from 1996. This 
is yet another reason why WE_U is e~deavouri~g 
to establish close co-operation wtth ESA m 
space-based observation. 
(b) Crisis monitoring 
58. While it is true that the problem of crisis 
management was among the initial considera-
tions relating to the development of a European 
space-based observation system, at the outset it 
was considered to be more of a secondary 
mission for a system designed above all for the 
verification 12 of disarmament agreements. 
There was talk of the principle that the two mis-
11. According to Article 11 of the Convention of the 
European Space Agency: " The purpose of the Agency shall 
be to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful 
purposes co-operation among European states in space 
research ~d technology and their space applications, with a 
view to their being used for scientific purposes and for oper-
ational space applications systems. " 
12. Cf. e.g. Eucosat's final report on the proposed European 
verification satellite agency. 
l 
\1 
' 
' 
. 
{ 
sions would have many common features and 
that it would be difficult to draw a clear dis-
tinction between them. This idea has changed 
considerably since the Gulf war which, for the 
first time, brought out all the implications of 
using space-based means, and in particular satel-
lites, for observing the theatre of operations. 
The dependence of most European forces on 
information supplied by American satellites led 
Europeans to intensify their efforts to find 
means of becoming more independent in gath-
ering information. 
59. As stated above, the need for such efforts 
was increased by the outbreak of civil war in 
Yugoslavia and the greater risk of further crises 
in the Middle East and other parts of the world. 
The member states of WEU drew the first conse-
quences of this at Maastricht by establishing a 
link between strategic surveillance and strength-
ening the operational rOle of WEU and military 
co-operation between member countries. 
60 The Council will soon have to provide 
explanations and details regarding the signifi-
cance of this, particularly in view of the remark 
made by the Secretary-General when addressing 
the Parliamentary Space Committee of the House 
of Commons, that the future of WEU space 
co-operation " will very much depend, in the 
-long run, on whether WEU members recognise a 
common and autonomous strategic surveillance 
capability as a priority in the constitution of the 
defence component of the European Union " . 
61. Crisis monitoring may be a matter of 
detecting events foreshadowing a crisis in order 
to allow diplomatic action to defuse them and of 
interpreting the salient features of an on-going 
crisis, also with a view to diplomatic or intelli-
gence action, and also of allowing analysis of a 
strategic situation prior to a decision to take mil-
itary action and to provide tactical intelligence 
for the conduct of military operations. 
62. It is hard to imagine a move towards stra-
tegic surveillance not having major repercus-
sions on the concept of the space-based obser-
vation system. First, there is sure to be 
overlapping; for instance, verification of the 
CFE Treaty means covering only part of the 
earth whereas the satellite designed for this task 
will be technically capable of observing almost 
the whole earth 13, which is essential for crisis 
monitoring. 
63. For the capabilities of verification satel-
lites and the limits on their use for disarmament 
purposes and crisis monitoring, reference is 
made to the Eurosat report on the proposed 
European verification satellite agency: 
" A priori, there is no fundamental dis-
continuity between the verification of dis-
armament treaties and crisis monitoring. 
13. See Eurosat final report, page 85. 
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Both activities imply observation of mil-
itary equipment and the violation of a dis-
armament agreement may constitute a 
crisis in itself. However, there are some 
significant differences. 
In the framework of a disarmament 
agreement, the satellite is but one com-
ponent of the verification means. Notifi-
cations, exchanges of information and 
on-the-spot inspections allow its role to be 
confined to detection and general identifi-
cation. The necessary resolution ( 1 to 
3 m) is therefore often less than that 
required when observing a crisis, which 
requires a description and detailed 
analysis of sites and equipment and hence 
the use of intelligence satellites. To 
improve the permanent resolution of an 
observation satellite would lead, in the 
framework of disarmament verification, 
to a very large increase in the amount of 
data to be processed and consequently the 
need for more men and equipment. The 
cost of implementing and operating the 
system would then rise significantly. A 
possible solution would be to envisage a 
satellite with a nominal in-orbit resolution 
sufficient for the needs of verification but 
capable of descending exceptionally to 
lower orbits and thus obtaining images 
with a better resolution. 
The adoption of such a system would, 
however, mean making certain changes: 
increasing the capacity of the fuel reserve 
and improving the command and orbit 
control system. 
The requirements of verification call for 
passes only every few days, which may be 
insufficient for monitoring certain crises 
effectively. 
Verification of disarmament agreements 
does not require such advanced specifica-
tions as crisis monitoring, which is usually 
a matter for intelligence satellites. " 
64. To understand the principal missions and 
limits of verification, it must also be recalled 
that the CFE Treaty relates to troop levels, 
armoured vehicles and tanks, aircraft and heli-
copter units limited by the treaty. There is also 
equipment limited by the treaty which is nec-
essary for the support of these platforms. 
However, the treaty covers neither naval forces 
nor nuclear and chemical weapons systems. 
65. In trying to ascertain the consequences, it 
should be specified that the crisis monitoring 
mission may have the following further implica-
tions: 
66. In regard to the specific needs of obser-
vation, what is needed is greater flexibility of 
observation missions, almost real-time infor-
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mation on inaccessible regions (surveillance, 
close surveillance, rapid access to critical areas) 
and very high image resolution. 
67. However, intelligence means must be 
completed by space-based communication 
systems, monitoring stations, navigation, meteo-
rology and mapping. A special problem is raised 
by early warning of missile firings, as was seen 
during the Gulf war when Iraq launched Scud 
missiles against Israeli targets. 
68. For communications, it is mainly France, 
with the Syracuse system, and the United 
Kingdom, with the Skynet system, that have 
military intelligence satellites. It should be noted 
that these two countries have proposed to 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain that 
a study be made of a space-based military com-
munications network to operate on a trilateral 
basis or in WEU. The first consultations on this 
project, known as the European military satellite 
for communications (Eumilsatcom) 14, were held 
in Paris last November. 
69. The need for global coverage also means 
having a larger number of ground-based 
receiving stations than for verification or the use 
of geostationary relay satellites which can 
receive continuous data from reconnaissance 
satellites and transmit them in real time direct 
to the processing centre. 
70. It must also be borne in mind that the 
camouflage problem is not the same in areas 
covered by the verification regime as it is 
outside these areas. As the Gulf war showed, rel-
atively elementary camouflage techniques can 
prove very effective against observation satellite 
systems; in verification areas, additional means 
of observation, i.e. on-the-spot inspections and 
overflights, make camouflage more difficult 
than elsewhere. As soon as an effective satellite 
crisis monitoring system has been set up, it is 
therefore to be expected that improving camou-
flage techniques might be the first concern of 
certain countries liable to be the target of this 
type of observation. 
71. These examples, which are not 
exhaustive, show that the establishment of a 
crisis monitoring system will have major conse-
quences whose broad lines can already be 
foreseen, even before the experts have com-
pleted their in-depth studies. In view of the vast 
implications of such a project for the funda-
mental question of the use of space and the need 
to draw up international and universal rules on 
the subject, it is very important to know as soon 
as possible in which direction we are moving 
and where - apart from the question of cost -
the limits should be placed for the military use 
of space. 
14. Cf. e.g. Le Monde, 12th December 1991. 
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(c) Environmental management 
72. The importance of earth observation in 
detecting and possibly controlling risks to the 
environment can but increase. Although envi-
ronmental questions were not among those ini-
tially to be dealt with by Western European 
Union, they are of general interest and may have 
major repercussions for international security. 
In particular, there is the assessment of eco-
logical disasters, either natural or caused by 
man, such as the Chernobyl nuclear reactor dis-
aster. 
73. In this connection, the experience of the 
European Space Agency (ESA) should be taken 
into consideration. Inter alia, ESA's pro-
grammes cover observation of the ice cap, 
oceans and continents, and observation of the 
atmosphere, which provides meteorological 
information. This is especially the case of the 
ERS programme (European remote sensing) 
which uses radar or very high frequency tech-
niques to observe, inter alia, oceans and ice-
covered surfaces. Launched on 17th July 1991, 
ERS-1, ESA's first environmental observation 
satellite, was declared operational on 27th 
January 1992. Thanks to the use of synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR), the satellite was able to 
transmit the first images each covering an area 
100 km square with a ground resolution of about 
25 to 30 m. These images were of exceptional 
quality. 
74. At the beginning of February 1992, the 
Agency gave the go-ahead for the com-
mercialisation and sale of ERS-1 data. In the 
meantime, ESA has awarded the space industry 
(Dornier) a contract to build ERS-2, the second 
European radar satellite, which is to be 
delivered in spring 1994. It would appear that 
use of the ERS system by the WEU Centre for 
Satellite Data Interpretation and Training might 
prove promising, particularly as the SAR system 
of the ERS satellite might include, in part at 
least, specifications for a verification satellite 
system. 
75. It may be deduced from what has been 
said above that each of the missions has its 
political importance and that there is consid-
erable overlapping between them, in particular 
between the civil and military applications of 
the systems. 
V. Outstanding pestions 
76. One question is how the system is to be 
integrated in a new security order at European 
and world level. 
77. In his address in London on 29th January 
1992, the Secretary-General of WEU said that: 
" The establishment of an independent 
European space-based observation system 
will be consistent with the strengthening 
of the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance, as foreseen in the Maastricht 
declaration. It is not intended to replace 
e.g. United States space-based obser-
vation capabilities, but to develop a 
system for the benefit of all concerned. " 
78. What does "all concerned" mean? To 
settle the problem of who should benefit from 
the system, it should be recalled that neither the 
Centre nor the observation system as a whole 
are ends in themselves but will, in the long run, 
have to allow a European satellite agency to be 
set up with tasks that might vary in the light of 
the international situation. Whatever their prin-
cipal missions may be - verification, crisis man-
agement or environmental monitoring - it is 
essential to decide for whom the agency is to 
work. 
79. As a WEU instrument, it is essential for it 
to guarantee the security of member countries of 
the organisation on the basis of the commit-
ments laid down in the modified Brussels 
Treaty. In this context, the system will inter alia 
be able to serve as a means of intelligence for the 
purposes of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the 
treaty, for instance by assessing "any situation 
which may constitute a threat to peace, in 
whatever area this threat should arise ". 
80. Since WEU is at one and the same time 
part of the European Political Union and the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, it may 
be thought that the observation system must 
also serve the security interest of the Twelve and 
of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole. 
81. However, the question of the partici-
pation of other countries concerned, in par-
ticular in the Eastern European countries and 
the CIS, or even elsewhere in the world, goes 
beyond the framework of the alliances and of the 
European Union. In a new security order, it is 
quite conceivable that others may benefit from 
the European space-based observation system if 
it can be of use to collective security systems 
such as the CSCE, with its Conflict Prevention 
Centre, and/or the United Nations. 
82. It may seem particularly desirable for the 
United Nations to use the services offered by the 
system, because all rules of behaviour con-
cerning the use of space should be worked out at 
world level and because all initiatives taken, in 
particular by France, Canada and Sweden, to set 
up an international control agency in the 
framework of the United Nations have so far 
come to naught. 
83. As to how the confidentiality of certain 
data should be handled in the framework of the 
system, the principle should be adopted of as 
much transparency as possible and as much con-
straint as necessary. If it is necessary to classify 
certain data confidential, a system must be 
worked out that prevents this type of activity 
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from evading parliamentary scrutiny. It must 
also be borne in mind that the system is 
intended to enhance international confidence, 
which requires a high degree of openness and 
transparency. Finally, the aim of the under-
taking - depending on whether it is solely at the 
service of the alliances or has a universal 
vocation - will also have an impact on the 
degree of confidentiality. 
84. Another question relates to practical co-
operation with other international and national 
organisations. Initially, it would be desirable for 
WEU to take advantage of the experience and 
availability of the European Space Agency to 
establish fruitful co-operation which may be 
more than just technical assistance. 
85. If the content and conditions of 
co-operation with ESA are to be defined, more 
regular contacts must first be established 
between the two organisations. Moreover, an 
early solution must be found in order to 
co-ordinate the space activities of WEU and of 
the IEPG, particularly in the framework of 
Euclid. The latter is studying common European 
priority areas relating inter alia to radar tech-
nology (CEPA 1) and satellite surveillance tech-
nology (CEPA 9). 
86. In terms of cost, it is to be expected that 
the development of a full space-based obser-
vation system, i.e. a European satellite agency, 
will require far more investment than the 
Council has so far authorised. There are still too 
many unknown factors, particularly in regard to 
missions, to be able to draw clear conclusions 
from the estimates made by the various bodies. 
However, since, as a result of disarmament, 
defence budgets are being reduced in most coun-
tries, it is essential to explain to the public the 
need to set up this space-based observation 
system in order to increase security. 
VI. Conclusions 
87. With the start of the first stages of work 
leading to the establishment of a European 
space-based observation system, WEU has 
launched a project which, by its nature and mag-
nitude, exceeds anything the organisation has 
done since its creation. Considered by most 
member governments of the Council for more 
than thirty years as being primarily a forum for 
exchanges of views and consultation, WEU is 
now beginning to become effectively operational 
in an area - space - whose importance for the 
whole of mankind is growing from day to day. 
88. Much uncertainty and many difficulties 
still have to be overcome before this under-
taking, which will have fundamental conse-
quences for the role and position of Europe in 
the world and for international security, can be 
crowned with success. This requires a major 
DOCUMENT 1304 
joint effort by all parts of WEU. The Council 
may be sure that the Assembly will not fail to 
give its full support, within the limits of its 
resources, in contributing to the success of this 
project. However, the Council must allow it to 
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play an active part in its thinking and in 
defining the missions to be attributed to the 
planned system on the basis of a more regular 
dialogue and more detailed information 
throughout every stage of the .operation. 
APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX I 
Ministerial decision setting up a WEU satellite centre 
taken at Vituulen, Luxembourg, 27th June 1991 
The Ministerial Council, 
DOCUMENT 1304 
Recalling its decision of lOth December 1990 on space co-operation within WEU, 
Approving the results of the work of the ad hoc Sub Group on Space regarding the setting-up of a 
WEU satellite centre, 
DECIDES AS FOLLOWS 
1. A WEU subsidiary body will be set up, in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, to be known as the WEU satellite centre, hereinafter referred to as the centre. 
2. The centre will be placed under the authority of the WEU Council. Its legal personality will not 
be separate from that of WEU. The centre's managing bodies will be the Director and the Steering 
Committee. 
3. The Director will be appointed for a term of three years by the WEU Council. He will be respon-
sible for the management of the centre. He will exercise hierarchical authority over the centre's staff. 
4. Each member state will appoint a representative to the centre's Steering Committee. The latter 
will lay down technical and financial guidelines to be implemented by the centre, and be in constant 
liaison with the national authorities calling upon the centre's services. 
5. The centre will offer no legal guarantee as to services supplied in accordance with this decision, 
and WEU will incur no liability to member states by virtue of this fact. 
6. The financial resources of the centre will be provided for in a separate budget approved annually 
by the WEU Permanent Council in accordance with the current financial regulations of WEU. The 
budget shall be financed by contributions from member states in accordance with a cost-sharing 
formula agreed by the Council. The centre's budget for the experimental phase will be within a 
maximum ceiling of 38.6 million ecus, based on an estimate of 30.6 million ecus plus 25% for contin-
gencies. 
7. The centre will be established in the territory of one of WEU's member states. 
8. The personnel responsible for setting up the centre will be appointed by member states or on the 
recommendation of the ad hoc group before 1st September 1991. The centre will be established with 
effect from 1st January 1992 and will enter into operations later that year. 
9. At their next meeting, a report reviewing progress on the establishment of the centre, and a draft 
framework agreement covering access by the centre to Helios data, will be presented to ministers, who 
will decide on the location of the centre and the appointment of a director. 
10. The activities of the centre should be reviewed no later than three years after it has entered into 
operation, when it will be possible for each member state to reconsider its participation in the centre. 
The possibilities for future co-operation between the centre and other corresponding bodies, par-
ticularly in Europe and in the United States, on the basis of a balanced partnership, will also be 
studied. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Communique issued at the close of the meeting 
of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Bonn 
on 18th November 1991 
(Extract) 
4. Operational co-operation among member states 
In the field of space 
APPENDIX 11 
With the aim of intensifying space co-operation within WEU, and to give substance to the reso-
lutions made at their last regular meeting in Vianden (Luxembourg), ministers decided that the satellite 
data interpretation and training centre should be established in Spain, with effect from 1st January 
1992. They agreed that a British national will be be appointed as Director of this centre for a period of 
three years. 
Ministers also decided that a study group should be formed in 1992 to examine the necessity and 
desirability of a medium- and long-term realisation of a European space-based observation system. 
This group will be based in France and have an Italian chairman. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Satellite programmes 
1. Spot (earth observation satellite) is the name of a series of civil optical observation satellites 
placed in circular heliosynchronous orbit. The satellite always passes over the same point of the earth 
at the same solar time, which allows the same lighting conditions at all times at a given point. The 
series was developed by the French Centre national d'etudes spatiales (CNES). Spot-1 was launched in 
1986 and Spot-2 in January 1990. Its altitude is 832 km and its orbital cycle 26 days. Its maximum res-
olution is 10 m in multispectral mode and 10 m in panchromatic mode. It is expected that Spot-4 will 
be launched in the mid-nineties. 
2. Landsat is an American series of civil observation satellites on heliosynchronous orbit. They 
have an altitude of 705 km and an orbital cycle of 16 days. The first Landsat satellite was launched in 
1972. On the basis of the United States Land Remote Sensing Commercialisation Act of 1984, Landsat 
is commercialised by the firm Eosat. Landsat-5, launched in 1984, has a maximum resolution of 30 m. 
Landsat-6, launched in 1991, should achieve a resolution of 15 m. 
3. ERS (European remote sensing) is a radar observation satellite developed in the framework of 
ESA's scientific programme. ERS-1, launched on 16th July 1991, is in orbit at an altitude of785 km. It 
uses synthetic aperture radar (SAR) which allows, by day and by night and in all weather conditions, 
images to be taken of the earth's surface, land areas, coastal areas and ice caps, with a resolution of 
about 25 m. It is expected that ERS-2 will be launched in 1994. 
4. Heliosis a French programme, launched in 1986, which comprises a series of optical observation 
satellites for military purposes in which Italy has a 14.1% stake and Spain 7%. Technically, Helios 
follows the design of Spot. The main differences between Helios and the other system are its higher res-
olution and the coding of data. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Dnelopment of a Europellll space-based observation system 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Fourri 
3rd June 1992 
1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after " WEU Satellite Centre " 
add, " a first step towards the future creation of a European agency for verification by satellite, ". 
2. In paragraph (vii) of the .preamble to the draft recommendation, after " experience " add, " on 
the one hand," and, at the end of the paragraph, add "and, on the other, of national agencies". 
3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " wider organisations with a 
European, Atlantic or universal vocation" and insert "any other organisation". 
4. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add the following paragraph: 
" Reaffirm its will to set up in successive stages, of which the Satellite Centre is the first step, a 
European agency for verification by satellite. " 
Signed: Fou"e 
1. See 6th sitting, 3rd June 1992 (amendments 1, 3 and 4 negatived; amendment 2 agreed to). 
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Draft Recommendation 
011 arms export policy 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalls the international public debate during and immediately after the Gulf war expressing 
embarrassment regarding earlier large sales of arms to Iraq and calling for reductions in the interna-
tional sale of armaments; 
(ii) Is preoccupied that continuing uncontrolled international armaments transfers might worsen 
existing tensions and latent conflicts in a number of world regions; 
(iii) Also fears that economic difficulties among the members of the now defunct Warsaw Pact may 
encourage the development of the black market in armaments because of the large stocks that exist; 
(iv) Welcomes therefore the declared determination of the CSCE member countries to support the 
new United Nations Register of International Arms Transfers and to provide it with comprehensive 
information; 
(v) Underlines the rising danger of nuclear proliferation and know-how and the imperfection of 
existing international regimes responsible for preventing the dissemination of chemical and biological 
weaponry and of missile technology; 
(vi) Welcomes therefore the decisions of France and the People's Republic of China to sign the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty and of North Korea to join the nuclear safeguards agreement; 
(vii) Also welcomes the decision ofthe European Community, the United States, Russia and Japan to 
establish an international Science and Technology Centre in Russia in order to discourage scientists of 
the former Soviet Union from selling nuclear, biological and chemical know-how to third coun-
tries; 
(viii) Recalls the need to restrict arms exports and to harmonise arms export policies and regulations 
governing dual use items within the European Community prior to the abolition of frontiers and 
internal controls on 1st January 1993; 
(ix) Also recalls the special responsibility of Western European Union in the arms export area since 
it has implications for the defence and essential security interests of its member countries; 
THE AsSEMBLY THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Elaborate and implement the necessary decisions of the European Union for a harmonised arms 
export policy restricted in accordance with common criteria identified by the European Council in 
Luxembourg; 
2. Take a joint initiative in the United Nations in order: 
(a) to make the information to be sent in to the United Nations Register of International Arms 
Transfers a binding obligation for all United Nations member countries and enforceable by 
sanctions; 
(b) to call on all United Nations states to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the safe-
guard agreements making the United Nations Security Council responsible for supervising 
their observation; 
(c) to strengthen the IAEA's role by increasing its budget, giving it the power of sanctions and 
placing it under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the Secretary 
General of the United Nations; 
(d) to draw up an international convention in order to complement the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and to prevent the export of nuclear know-how or technology; 
(e) to call for the early conclusion of a worldwide convention on chemical weapons and to make 
the chemical list of the Australia Group a worldwide exportation ban list under United 
Nations supervision; 
(f) to make the missile technology control regime a worldwide regime; 
3. Call upon the next Munich economic summit to held in July 1992 to support vigorously the 
strengthened role of the United Nations in monitoring a worldwide arms export regime; 
4. Urge its member countries to provide financial contributions for establishing and operating the 
International Science and Technology Centre in Russia. 
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Expliuultory Memorandum 
(admitted by Mr. Aarts, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. For decades during the cold war, which 
now belongs to history, considerations regarding 
arms export policy and transfers of high tech-
nology were overshadowed by the East-West 
conflict and by competition between the 
western- and Soviet-dominated worlds to win 
influence in· the third world. 
2. A new element in the international dis-
cussion was introduced following the Iran-Iraq 
war and, even more intensively, following the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq when some of the 
allied· coalition forces were confronted with the 
results of the arms export practices of numerous 
countries and industries which had contributed 
to the establishment of the impressive war 
machinery at Saddam Hussein's disposal. Thus 
the Gulf war rang an almost general alarm call 
and led to an intensive debate at both national 
and international levels. Many proposals and 
declarations with the aim of reaching an 
effective arms export control regime have been 
made public,.but meanwhile international arma-
ments transfers are continuing. 
3. The problem has become even more 
complex due to various new and decisive 
factors, including the implementation of the 
conventional disarmament treaty, the end of the 
East-West confrontation following the collapse 
of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, German reunification, the transfor-
mation of the Soviet Union into a Common-
wealth of Independent States, the break-up of 
Yugoslavia and the rise of nationalism in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the territory of 
the former Soviet Union. 
4. The first problem arises from the fact that 
true figures and statistics are difficult to obtain. 
Whenever a governmeQt or institution produces 
statistical data there is a tendency to select the 
criteria which present the producer's case to its 
own advantage. The most respected inde-
pendent data base on the arms trade is published 
by the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI). However it is dependent on 
public sources and does not cover small arms, 
ammunition, artillery, mortars of a calibre of 
less than 1 OOmm and support items, 
sub-systems and components. For illegal arms 
transfers, no statistics are available. 
5. Secondly, the fundamental task of 
defining the objectives of a possible common 
regime, is very difficult. It is therefore not aston-
ishing that there are so far no general interna-
tional rules in the matter. Apart from a number 
56 
of special agreements and treaties which will be 
examined in this report, arms export policy has 
been considered so far as exclusively a matter 
for national sovereignty. 
6. It may therefore be regarded as a great 
step forward that the European Council agreed 
in Maastricht on 9th and lOth December 1991 
to list questions relating to nuclear non-
proliferation, technological transfers to third 
countries and arms export controls within the 
areas in which the European Political Union 
intends to carry out joint actions on the basis of 
majority voting 1• 
7. These tasks are complicated by the 
diversity of internal structures in Community 
member countries with large-scale armaments 
industries. In some countries, these industries 
are totally or partly government-controlled, in 
others not. There is often a conflict between tbe 
tendency to liberalise international trade exports 
(crucial for industrialised countries whose eco-
nomic development depends on exports) and the 
wish to prevent an arms race in sensitive areas 
of the world. 
8. A particularly difficult problem is raised 
by the task of defining the so-called dual-use 
products which can be used for both civilian and 
military purposes. 
9. It is obvious that the problem of arms 
export policy cannot be confined to a specific 
category of weaponry. It would, however, be too 
ambitious in this report to seek solutions for 
managing the whole area of nuclear, biological, 
chemical and conventional armaments transfers 
and that of dual-use products. Criteria for this 
report consist of identifying weaponry categories 
where expert controls seem to be particularly 
urgent, but also circumstances in which rea-
sonable solutions might be most feasible. 
11. The problem of III'IIUUIIenta proliferation 
in the preaent intematioul en,ironment 
10. It is interesting to note that in 1990 
worldwide international sales of conventional 
arms fell by 35% in comparison with 1989 2 and 
again declined in 1991 3• According to SIP RI, 
before the full-scale war broke out on 17th 
January 1991, the crisis in the Gulf had not yet 
reversed the overall trend towards reductions in 
arms transfers. 
1. See Appendix I. 
2. SIPRI Yearbook 1991, page 197. 
3. Provisional SIPRI Report, cited in the United States 
Wireless File No. 50, 16th March 1992, without figures. 
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11. The following table shows the value of I 1986-90. The decline in 1990 was mainly due to 
exports of major conventional weapons by substantial export reductions recorded for the 
fifteen leading exporting countries in the period former Soviet Union in that year. 
TABLE 1 4 
The letuling exporters of major conventional weapons, 1986-90 
The countries are ranked according to 1986-90 aggregate exports. 
Figures are in US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Exporters 1986 1987 
1. USSR ............ 14 731 14 916 
2. United States ..... 10304 12 596 
3. France ........... 4096 3011 
4. United Kingdom .. 1 500 1 817 
5. China ............ 1463 2 553 
6. Germany, FR ..... 1120 676 
7. Czechoslovakia ... 497 570 
8. Netherlands ...... 240 265 
9. Sweden ........... 324 489 
10. Italy ............. 457 389 
11. Brazil ............ 150 507 
12. Israel. ............ 269 340 
13. Spain ............ 172 139 
14. Canada ........... 317 265 
15. Egypt ............ 159 194 
Others ........... 656 1047 
Total ................ 36 453 39 777 
12. It is understood that conventional 
weaponry consists mainly of battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, artillery systems, 
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, 
launching and missile systems and their compo-
nents. 
13. There might also be an immense market 
for light conventional weaponry such as hand 
guns, but international security is affected first 
and foremost by the kind of heavy weaponry 
described previously. 
14. Despite the general trend, there are signif-
icant indications that a new arms race has 
begun, particularly in the Middle East. In 1991, 
Israel was the largest importer in the region, fol-
lowed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait. 
Developing countries in the Middle-East, but 
also in other world regions, particularly in Asia, 
remain the main beneficiaries of conventional 
arms contracts although many of them have 
reduced their imports for lack of currency now 
that the cost of modem equipment is steadily 
rising. 
15. The evolution of the international con-
ventional arms market has been influenced 
4. SIPRI Yearbook 1991, page 198. 
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1988 1989 1990 1986-90 
12 559 12 220 6 373 60 799 
10 503 11 669 8 738 53 811 
2 300 2 577 1 799 13 783 
1401 1 816 1220 7 752 
1 868 874 926 7 684 
1270 716 963 4 745 
548 437 355 2408 
532 725 152 1 915 
575 311 115 1 813 
471 169 96 1 582 
356. 152 24 1189 
127 318 39 1094 
199 506 74 1090 
106 54 60 802 
216 65 33 668 
735 900 760 4097 
33 767 33 509 21 726 165 232 
recently by several new factors which have their 
origin mainly in the changed political situation 
in Europe. One of these factors is the implemen-
tation of the CFE Treaty at a time when one of 
the signatories, the Soviet Union, has been 
transformed into a Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States, while all conventional equip-
ment of the former GDR has come under the 
control of united Germany as a NATO and 
WEU member country. 
16. Implementation of the CFE Treaty makes 
it binding on signatories to destroy certain 
equipment, ranging from battle tanks to attack 
helicopters, in the Central European region. To 
ensure that countries concerned are not obliged 
to destroy relatively modem equipment from 
the central region, NATO has drawn up plans to 
transfer some equipment from the central region 
to allies outside this region in order to 
modernise their older equipment 5, for instance 
to Greece and Turkey. 
1 7. Even if all these transfers are to be carried 
out in conformity with the CFE Treaty and 
between allied countries, in some parliaments, 
5. See Jane's Defence Weekly, 1st June 1991, and NATO's 
Sixteen Nations, May/June 1991, Wall Street Journal, 28th 
February 1992. 
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governments were asked if the transfer of 
modern weaponry to include Greece and Turkey 
was appropriate as long as these two countries 
had not settled their differences. 
18. On the other hand, the then Soviet Union 
had moved a substantial and undeclared part of 
its conventional equipment East of the Urals, 
i.e. outside the Atlantic to the Urals zone, in 
order to avoid their destruction. The break-up of 
the Soviet Union makes it most difficult to 
identify the actual deployment of the enormous 
amount of equipment and to prevent eventual 
black market transfers to third countries. After 
the publication of press reports according to 
which Russia planned to set up a weapons sales 
agency to sell weapons on the world market to a 
value of $1 000 million 6, it was announced that 
the Russian government had approved the cre-
ation of a quasi-governmental arms-sales organ-
isation 7 and that the Russian President had 
authorised the export of about 1 600 combat 
aircraft 8• 
19. According to recent press revelations pub-
lished by SIPRI 9, an increasing number of 
Western European firms are advertising Soviet 
and Eastern European equipment from stocks 
which are no longer needed. Iran, for instance, 
was reported to have made major weapons pur-
chases from the former Soviet Union such as an 
unspecified number of MiG-29 fighters and 
Su-24 fighter-bombers 10• In Germany the 
destruction of the major part of the former 
GDR's military equipment has begun. Never-
theless, at the end of 1991, the German Gov-
ernment authorised the transfer of some naval 
equipment from the former GDR (five mine-
sweepers and two tug boats) 11 to Hungary and a 
number of small calibre arms and ammunition 
to Finland. Some Eastern European countries, 
formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, such as 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and especially Hungary, 
are interested in acquiring war equipment from 
the former GDR since their forces mainly use 
Soviet-made armaments. 
20. The Federal Republic of Germany has 
so far been reluctant in response to the 
abovementioned demands in order to avoid 
arguments that such deliveries might contravene 
the spirit of the CFE Treaty if not its letter. 
Another reason is that Germany wants to avoid 
any possibility that these kinds of weapons 
might reach the warring parties in Yugoslavia 
(mainly Croatia) via Hungary. 
6. The Guardian, 4th February 1992. 
7. Jane's Defence Weekly, 15th February 1992. 
8. Air et Cosmos No. 1371, week from 23rd to 29th March 
1992. 
9. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1st February 1992. 
10. See International Herald Tribune, 8th-9th February 
1992, NZZ, 6th February 1992. 
ll. International Herald Tribune, 4th-5th January 1992, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4th January 1992. 
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21. Another problem arising out of the fall in 
equipment requirements as a result of the CFE 
Treaty stems from the difficulties defence indus-
tries are having in converting from military 
to civilian production without threatening 
employment. For instance, these difficulties led 
the Czechoslovak Government to approve the 
transfer of 250 T -72 tanks and armoured per-
sonnel carriers made in Slovakia to Syria. This 
delivery was intended to help to finance con-
version of the Slovak defence industry. The non-
existence of a joint, harmonised European arms 
export policy was shown when a number of 
these Czechoslovak T -72 tanks were to be 
shipped by a German vessel to Syrian importers. 
German warships stopped the ship because it 
was not authorised under German export legis-
lation to carry such a cargo 12• Another load of 
Czechoslovak tanks for Syria on a Danish ship, 
first stopped by the Danish authorities 13, was 
finally authorised by a Danish court to continue 
its journey 14• Some of the tanks initially shipped 
by a German vessel were finally transported by a 
Polish ship to Syria 15• 
22. It is obvious that some European and 
American defence industries are seeking to 
offset their countries' decreasing demand for 
weapons by exports on the world market, where 
they are in competition with each other and with 
other suppliers such as the People's Republic of 
China, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil, 
India, South Africa and others. 
23. With effect from 1st January 1992, 
however, both the United States and the former 
Soviet Union ceased to deliver armaments to 
the quarrelling parties in Afghanistan as decided 
by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on 13th Sep-
tember 1991. However, in view of its reduced 
defence budget for 1992 and 1993 the United 
States will continue to provide military 
assistance to third countries, mainly to Egypt, 
Israel, the Philippines and Salvador, whereas no 
such proposals are made for Pakistan 16• 
24. Russia has announced a dramatic cut in 
arms purchases. These would be aimed mainly 
at keeping some existing military equipment, so 
that many military firms will have to shut down, 
according to General Dimitri Volkogonov, 
adviser to the Russian President 17• 
25. Most Western European armaments 
industries are forced to dismiss large numbers of 
staff. The French Defence Minister, however, in 
12. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1st February 1992. 
International Herald Tribune, 31st January 1992. 
13. NZZ, 7th February 1992. 
14. Die Welt, lOth February 1992. 
15. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2nd March 1992. 
16. Le Monde, 31st January 1992. 
17. International Herald Tribune, 25th-26th January 
1992. 
a reply transmitted on 13th January 1992 18 to a 
question put by Mr. Alphandery, underlined 
that armaments exports, which are an aspect of 
France's foreign policy, represent a surplus in its 
trade balance. There was therefore no question 
of reducing unilaterally governmental financial 
assistance to French arms industries. 
26. France recently agreed to the delivery of 
three mine-hunters and (under certain condi-
tions) a number of Mirage 2000s as well as a 
nuclear plant to Pakistan 19• Last December, the 
French manufacturer Matra signed a contract 
with South Korea for the delivery of Mistral 
anti-aircraft missiles. According to Defense 
News 20, other customers for this French system 
include (apart from some NATO allies) Cyprus, 
Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Finland, Qatar, Chile 
and three Asian countries. 
27. In many other European countries the 
problem of conventional arms exports policy is a 
subject of internal debate. Whereas, particularly 
in Germany, Belgium and Italy, export legis-
lation has been tightened (the Italian arms 
industry in particular has criticised the new leg-
islation), other countries such as Sweden and 
Norway are reported to be envisaging easing 
armaments export rules 21• 
28. The East-West conflict has disappeared, 
and with it the so-called " balance of terror " 
based on the nuclear stalemate between the two 
superpowers thanks to which Europe could live 
in relative security. Meanwhile new areas of 
regional conflict have emerged in several parts 
of the world and - for the first time since 1945 -
in Central and Eastern Europe - as shown by the 
implosion of Yugoslavia, as well as in some 
republics on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union. The outbreak of a conventional war, 
which had for decades been ruled out, is now 
thinkable again. The need for the definition of a 
common arms export policy and for an effective 
export control regime is therefore obvious. 
29. But is it possible to limit the problem to 
conventional arms? In 1991 the world was con-
fronted for the first time with an open breach of 
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by Iraq, 
which is a signatory. The disintegration of the 
Soviet Union has created a danger of their 
enormous amounts of nuclear weaponry being 
disseminated. 
30. While it might be relatively easy to 
control strategic systems, there is considerable 
concern about short-range systems and still 
more about nuclear artillery and warheads. 
18. Journal officiel de la Republique fran~aise, 13th January 
1992. 
19. Le Monde, 19th January 1992. 
20. Defense News, vol. 7, No. 4, 27th January 1992. 
21. See footnote 20. 
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Neither is it known exactly where and how to 
verify their destruction and - even more 
important - to prevent their illegal transfer 
abroad. The number of nuclear warheads on the 
territory of the former Soviet Union was esti-
mated in 1988 at about 33 000 22• 
31. According to an agreement signed on 
22nd December 1991 in Alma Ata between 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Byelorussia, 
all nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine 
and Byelorussia are to be destroyed in the long 
run. All tactical systems deployed on the ter-
ritory of the non-Russian republics are to be 
removed by 1st July 1992 to a central instal-
lation for destruction. Furthermore, Ukraine 
and Byelorussia have signed a commitment to 
accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. 
All four republics signed a commitment not to 
deliver either nuclear weapons or nuclear tech-
nology to third countries. 
32. Nevertheless, Victor Mikhailov, Deputy 
Minister for Nuclear Power of Russia, recently 
announced that Soviet stockpiles of nuclear war-
heads were so enormous that it would be most 
difficult to control and destroy them in a rea-
sonable lapse of time without western 
assistance 23• There have even been press 
rumours in Egypt 24 according to which three 
Soviet tactical warheads had been transferred to 
Iran by Kazakhstan. However, this was denied 
immediately by the Russian Ambassador to the 
United Nations. 
33. Meanwhile, difficulties arose between 
Russia and Ukraine which led the latter to stop 
temporarily the transfer of its tactical nuclear 
weapons to Russia for dismantling until 
Moscow agreed to international controls over 
the destruction of the systems. There is also 
uncertainty about the attitude of Kazakhstan 
regarding its willingness to remove its tactical 
nuclear systems to Russia 25• 
34. Then there is the problem of the prolife-
ration of Soviet nuclear know-how. According to 
recent press reports, several countries, especially 
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya and the Peoples' 
Republic of China but also Cuba, India, Syria 
and Egypt, are said to be interested in employing 
former Soviet nuclear scientists and experts. The 
Pakistani Government recently officially con-
firmed the country's ability to produce nuclear 
weapons 26• 
35. It is well known that India and North 
Korea are close to becoming nuclear powers. 
22. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6th February 1992. 
27 000 warheads according to estimates published on 5th 
February 1992 by the International Herald Tribune. 
23. International Herald Tribune, 5th February 1992. 
24. Al Watan Al Arabi of Cairo, January 1992. 
25. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2nd April 1992. 
26. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8th February 1992. 
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Other countries in the world might have reasons 
for wanting to possess nuclear weapons, even 
without wishing to use them. In an article pub-
lished in the Financial Times on 1st-2nd Feb-
ruary, Edward Mortimer recalls the theory of the 
French General Andre Gallois, according to 
which nuclear weapons enable a state to make 
its national territory an invulnerable " sanc-
tuary " which no one will dare to attack. 
36. He then continues that any state in the 
world may want to deploy nuclear weapons to 
deter an attack on its own territory by superior 
conventional forces.There might be other coun-
tries in the world endorsing the French theory in 
the hope that nuclear weapons will make their 
territory invulnerable. Against this background 
it is the question " of nuclear proliferation, 
rather than any conventional threat, which is 
now worrying for NATO countries" 27• 
37. All reports of clandestine trade in nuclear 
material or know-how are therefore to be 
watched with great concern. But there are also 
similar important problems regarding Soviet 
chemical and biological weaponry stocks and 
know-how. According to American sources, 
there are 40 000 tons of chemical agent in the 
former Soviet republics, much of which is old 28• 
The United States Defence Secretary, Richard 
Cheney, said in January 1992 29 that he did not 
believe that the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) would be able to destroy the 
enormous chemical potential of the former 
Soviet Union. 
38. But there are also worries about Soviet 
chemical and biological weapons expertise going 
abroad. This is also a matter of urgency since 
there is still no international agreement on 
banning chemical weapons in the United 
Nations framework since a number of third 
world countries still refuse to accept export con-
trols in regard to certain chemical substances. 
39. It was therefore good news that the 
European Community, the United States, the 
Russian Federation and Japan reached an 
agreement on 11th March 1992 to promote the 
establishment, in Russia, of an International 
Science and Technology Center 30• Its primary 
focus would be to provide weapons scientists 
and engineers of the former Soviet Union, par-
ticularly those working on weapons of mass 
destruction, with opportunities to redirect their 
talents to peaceful activities. One of the major 
problems in achieving this project will be 
financial. The parties to the agreement therefore 
27. Edward Mortimer, Financial Times, 1st-2nd February 
1992. 
28. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20th January 
1992. 
29. Die Welt, 15th January 1992. 
30. United States Wireless File, No. 48, 12th March 
1992. 
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intend to encourage other governments, inter-
governmental and non-governmental organ-
isations to participate in the Centre's activities 
and to provide financial contributions. 
40. Quite apart from the special situation 
arising out of the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the difficult question of handling the 
export of dual-use systems which can be used for 
both civilian and military purposes remains on 
the international agenda as an urgent item. The 
relative ease with which civilian technologies 
can be turned into military potentials makes it 
impossible to manage the proliferation problem 
only through the creation of a control regime. 
Technology is permanently evolving which 
makes it unfeasible to produce regular 
up-to-date definitions for proscribed dual-use 
products. 
41. An important step for controlling dual-use 
products was made when, on 3rd April 1992, the 
United States and twenty-six other countries 
agreed in the framework of the Nuclear Supplies 
Group (NSG) to impose export controls on sixty 
civilian products which could be used for pro-
ducing nuclear explosives. 
Ill. Arms exports to ~'eloping countries 
42. According to SIPRI statistics 31 , in the 
third world a group of fifteen countries -
Mghanistan, Angola, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Libya, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan, and 
Thailand were among the major arms importers 
during the period 1986-90. Some of them, such 
as South Korea, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan 
are registered in the third world without being 
" developing countries " . 
43. According to a provisional assessment 
made by SIPRI 32 in 1991, Asia accounted for 
35% of world imports of conventional arms, 
whereas the Middle East and the European 
Community each accounted for 22%. In the 
Middle East, Israel and Kuwait increased their 
armaments imports in 1991 as a consequence of 
the Gulf war. Israel was the largest importer in 
the region, followed by Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. 
44. Still in 1990, arms imports to South Asia 
were reduced. Although Mghanistan, India and 
Pakistan remained large importers of weapons, 
the region was replaced as the major importing 
region by the Middle East. This development 
was reversed in 1991 as indicated in the pre-
vious paragraph. Countries such as Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and 
31. SIPRI Yearbook 1991, page 199. 
32. Quoted in the International Herald Tribune, 1Oth 
March 1992. 
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TABLE 2 33 
The leading importers of major con,entional weapons, 1986-90 
.The countries are ranked according to 1986-90 aggregate exports. 
Figures are in US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Importers 1986 1987 
Third World 
1. India ............. 3 729 4 582 
2. Saudi Arabia ..... 2 413 2400 
3. Iraq .............. 2484 4440 
4. Afghanistan ....... 692 768 
5. Korea, North ..... 1 019 631 
6. Egypt ............ 1 645 2 379 
7. Syria ............. 1 511 1172 
8. Angola ........... 980 1140 
9. Korea, South ..... 287 604 
10. Iran .............. 738 704 
11. Israel. ............ 446 1629 
12. Pakistan .......... 609 467 
13. Taiwan ........... 825 575 
14. Thailand ......... 94 644 
15. Libya ............ 1 363 294 
Others ........... 5 279 4 797 
Total ................ 24114 27 228 
Thailand seem to be determined to increase 
their military spending substantially over the 
next few years 34• 
IV. Existing international arms 
export control rigimes 
and their imperfections 
(a) The lfuclear IIOif-proliferatiolf treaty 
45. The particularly topical nature of the 
dangers of uncontrolled transfer of former 
Soviet nuclear technology and know-how to 
interested third world countries, such as Libya, 
Pakistan, but also Malaysia, made it a prom-
inent subject at the conference on security policy 
held on 9th February 1992 in Munich. It is 
therefore justified to look at the prospects of the 
treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. 
46. The treaty, initiated by the United 
Nations, was signed on 1st July 1968 and 
entered in force in 1970. Under normal circum-
stances, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is to 
be reviewed in 1995 - but in view of current 
developments this date might be too late. 
4 7. The treaty was intended to prevent prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons technology to coun-
33. See footnote 31. 
34. International Herald Tribune, lOth March 1992. 
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1988 1989 1990 1986-90 
3382 3 754 1 541 16 989 
2046 1427 2 553 10 838 
2 155 1177 59 10 314 
1009 2 183 1 091 5 742 
1458 1 276 516 4900 
348 139 206 4 717 
1172 336 0 4 191 
889 74 508 3 592 
987 997 249 3 125 
558 336 578 2 913 
507 100 21 2 703 
467 760 390 2 693 
459 391 178 2427 
540 489 558 2 325 
78 511 0 2247 
3 971 4 306 3 393 21'747 
20025 18 256 11 841 101464 
tries other than the then recognised nuclear 
powers, i.e. the United States of America, the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and 
the People's Republic of China. More than 141 
countries acceded to it; most recently France 
and the People's Republic of China decided to 
join the treaty. But India, Israel and Pakistan 
have not signed so far. 
48. South Africa signed in June 1991 and 
Ukraine and Byelorussia have also promised to 
accede to it. These are encouraging signs but the 
question arises more and more as to whether the 
treaty and its .control mechanism are still effi-
cient enough. 
49. According to Article 3 of the treaty, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
Vienna was made responsible for verification. It 
is stipulated that: 
" Each non-nuclear weapon state party to 
the treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, 
as set forth in an agreement to be nego-
tiated and concluded with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Agency's safeguards system, for the 
exclusive purpose of verification of ful-
filment of its obligations assumed under 
this treaty with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful 
uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices." 
50. But only 68 countries have concluded 
safeguard agreements with the IAEA. Most 
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recently, North Korea, as a party to the treaty 
has completed a full-scale safeguards agreement. 
Furthermore, the ability of the IAEA to fulfil its 
duties arising out of the treaty has been called in 
question because of financial difficUlties. The 
budget of the IAEA has not been increased for 
eight years, whereas the quantity of nuclear 
material to be verified is rising constantly. 
51. The IAEA has only verification responsi-
bilities and cannot impose sanctions. Techno-
logical developments represent new challenges 
to the safeguards regime and in order to counter 
the loopholes in the control system for interna-
tional nuclear transfer many proposals have 
been put forward. 
52. Since the treaty does not cover the 
problem of preventing nuclear scientists from 
being tempted abroad by third world countries, 
Mr. Genscher, Chairman-in-Office of the WEU 
Council, proposed: 
- providing for countries concerned to 
take sanctions against any of their 
nationals taking part in the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons abroad; 
- setting up a fund to compensate nuclear 
experts who had lost their jobs; 
- that the United Nations Security 
Council decide to isolate any country 
which tried to acquire nuclear 
know-how for military purposes. 
53. Mr. Genscher also called for an interna-
tional convention in order to complement the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty, under which 
the signatories would undertake to prevent the 
export of nuclear know-how or technology 35• 
54. The French proposal for holding a con-
ference on nuclear forces in the former Soviet 
Union with the participation of the United 
States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia 
has now been accepted by the United States but 
it is not yet clear whether the other three nuclear 
republics of the CIS will be invited 36• 
55. The meetings of five permanent members 
of the United Nations Security Council (P-5) 
initiated by France, in July and October 1991, in 
order to review issues related to conventional 
arms transfers and the non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction were held at a time 
when the consequences of the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union could not yet be foreseen. Con-
versely, the participants were feeling the effects 
of the Gulf war and saw the danger of a nuclear 
arms race in the Middle East. 
56. But their proposals that all countries in 
that region should submit all their nuclear activ-
35. The Independent, 16th January 1992. 
36. Atlantic News, No. 2395, 6th February 1992. 
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ities to IAEA safeguards and refrain from the 
importation and production of nuclear weapons-
usable materials were watered down by the 
acknowledgment that the right of self-defence 
guaranteed by the United Nations Charter 
" implies that states have also the right to 
acquire means with which to defend them-
selves". 
57. The Five announced that, as from June 
1992, they would use common guidelines to 
address arms transfers. The London economic 
summit (G-7) on 16th July 1991 37 also dealt 
with the problem of NBC non-proliferation, but 
only issued a number of recommendations 
without taking firm decisions, as did the 
European Council in its declaration on non-
proliferation and arms exports published on 
30th June 1991 38• There is, therefore, for the 
moment no indication that the urgent problem 
of dissemination of nuclear material, know-how 
and technology will find an early solution. 
(b) The Co-ordillllti11g Committee 
for Multilateral Export Co11trols (Cocom) 
58. Control ofthe proliferation of products of 
nuclear energy is one of the objectives of the Co-
ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls (Cocom) but it also covers high tech-
nology in a broader sense. 
59. Cocom, created in 1949 as a consequence 
of the cold war, was not based on a treaty but on 
an unofficial co-ordination agreement including 
all member countries of the Atlantic Alliance 
(with the exception of Iceland), as well as Aus-
tralia and Japan. It was mainly directed against 
the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies and a 
number of other countries belonging to the com-
munist world such as Mghanistan, the People's 
Republic of China, Mongolia, North Korea, 
Vietnam and Cuba. 
60. Products under Cocom control are, firstly, 
those destined for the production of nuclear 
energy, secondly, munitions and other military 
material and lastly, industrial products with 
military and civil applications (dual-use 
products). 
61. Apart from compiling and revising the 
lists of proscribed products, Cocom's function 
has so far also been to co-ordinate the opera-
tional activities of export controls and to 
examine particular cases where member states 
are authorised to deliver products subject to the 
embargo to proscribed countries. Relevant deci-
sions must be taken unanimously. 
37. See Appendix 11. 
38. See Appendix Ill. 
62. The future of Cocom has already been the 
subject of several Assembly reports 39, and on 
December 1991 the Assembly adopted Recom-
mendation 510 calling for Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland to be removed from the 
Cocom list of proscribed countries as soon as 
possible. On 1st May 1992, Hungary was the 
first country ever to be removed from the 
Cocom list of proscribed countries. 
63. Although Cocom has already replaced its 
unwieldy industrial list by a core list of items of 
essential strategic significance, it is now facing 
fundamental challenges that call in question its 
whole future as its members have to reconsider 
the tasks and objectives of the control regime 
and to whom it should be applied. 
64. Apart from the problem of revising the 
lists of proscribed categories of products a 
number of ideas have been put forward 
regarding the transformation of the Group. 
Some of them are: 
- transforming or expanding it from an 
East-West embargo organisation into a 
North-South embargo organisation in 
order to prevent high technology 
transfers to a number of third world 
countries to be determined; 
- merging Cocom with the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime (MTCR) (see 
below); 
- establishing an entirely new control 
regime within OECD or the United 
Nations; 
- creating a " permanent conference " of 
all industrialised nations devoted to 
arms export controls; 
- transforming Cocom into a European 
export regime in order to harmonise 
mainly national export legislation. 
65. It appears that in the framework of 
Cocom, too, present concerns are concentrated 
first and foremost on the problem of preventing 
the transfer of nuclear, biological and chemical 
material for military purposes to the third 
world. It is difficult to predict whether the 
Cocom member countries at their next high-
level meeting in Paris on 1st and 2nd June 1992 
will be able to reach an agreement on the future 
mission of the regime. So far, Cocom was the 
most restrictive regime compared with other 
arms exports regimes and there might be a 
future task in harmonising the various control 
lists established by different organisations and 
39. Cf. in particular the report on Cocom presented by Mr. 
Atkinson on lOth November 1989 (Document 1207) and the 
report on the defence industry in Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Poland presented by Mr. Atkinson on 8th November 
1991 (Document 1289). 
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those established at national level. Cocom might 
be given a mandate to elaborate and supervise a 
future common agreed list. 
(c) The Australia Group 
66. In the area of chemical weaponry, which 
is also particularly topical, not only because of 
the efforts made by third world countries like 
Libya and Iraq in this direction but also because 
of the dangers of dissemination of Soviet 
expertise in the matter, the United Nations con-
ference on the ban on chemical weapons has still 
not succeeded in reaching an agreement. 
67. In 1985, therefore, under the initiative of 
Australia, a group of countries founded the Aus-
tralia Group anticipating a future chemical wea-
pons Convention (CWC) These countries are 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and the EC as an independent member. 
In December 1991, Finland and Sweden joined 
the group. Their goal is to prevent the expor-
tation of certain chemicals which can be of a 
dual-purpose nature. They have developed an 
export warning list featuring 50 chemicals. It 
should be stressed that this list is not an export 
ban list but that these chemicals need to be 
given special attention when exported. 
68. It is clear that this initiative is only 
beginning. The member states must control their 
own chemical exports and as long as there is no 
chemical weapons convention (CWC), the 
exportation of dual-purpose chemicals is legal. It 
is argued that a ewe must be a comprehensive 
treaty, otherwise it would be of hardly any use. 
There are still problems over the definition and 
verification of certain chemical weapons and 
chemical weapon plants. Chemical plants could 
be used for both civilian and military purposes, 
this is hard to verify. An agreement also has yet 
to be reached on the order of destruction of 
existing chemical weapons. At the January 1989 
Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical 
weapons, Arab countries linked the abolition of 
chemical weapons with the abolition of nuclear 
weapons by Israel. 
69. At the September 1989 Canberra Gov-
ernment Industry Conference against chemical 
weapons, the chemical industry (of the 66 par-
ticipating countries) was willing to co-operate 
with the governments concerning the ewe and 
the Conference on Disarmament. 
70. A CWC is badly needed; as long as this 
convention does not exist the exportation and 
production of chemical weapons can continue 
legally. The first step to abolish and prohibit 
chemical weapons has been taken by the Aus-
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tralia Group but there are many more steps to be 
taken. It would be a good idea to make the 
chemical list of the Australia Group a worldwide 
exportation ban list, under United Nations 
supervision, for example. 
(d) The Missile Teebnology Co11troi1Ugime (MTCR) 
71. Another crucial problem is the control of 
proliferation of all sorts of launching and mis-
siles systems and technologies since they might 
be used both for conventional and non-
conventional warfare. In this area, a number of 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, plus 
Japan, reached an agreement on the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). 
72. After five years of negotiations, the 
MTCR was signed in 1987 by Canada, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the United Kingdom ·and the United States. 
Countries such as Spain, the Benelux countries 
and Australia joined the regime later, while still 
others, like Austria, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the former Soviet Union, have adopted similar 
export regulations without acceding to the 
agreement. Israel has also now adopted the pro-
visions of the MTCR and Greece, Iceland, Por-
tugal, New Zealand and Norway have decided to 
accede soon. Meanwhile, Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden acceded to the agreement. 
73. The MTCR is not an international treaty 
but an informal agreement which prohibits the 
export of conventional and nuclear-capable bal-
listic missiles and restricts exports of related 
technologies. It is so far the only multinational 
control mechanism in the matter. 
74. The MTCR slowed down significantly the 
availability of foreign missile technology which 
is essential to rapid development of emerging 
regional ballistic missile forces and slowed their 
progress. For instance, the missile projects of 
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India and Iraq were 
slowed down by the MTCR. But there are still 
several countries which are continuing their 
missile projects. The proliferation of surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles is a truly global third 
world phenomenon, with the most intensive 
build-up in the Middle East. 
75. The MTCR consists of two categories of 
technologies: 
- Category I consists of technologies 
which are undoubtedly to be used for 
the purpose of building missiles. The 
sale of production facilities for Cat-
egory I products is forbidden under all 
circumstances. 
The ban concerns missiles with a range 
of more than 300 km and a payload of 
more than 500 kg. These are the mis-
siles capable of carrying nuclear (or 
chemical) ordnance. 
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- Category 11 concerns dual-purpose 
products and technologies which may 
be exported but it is the responsibility 
of the suppliers to make certain that 
these products or technologies will not 
be employed by the developing state to 
construct ballistic missiles. 
76. The MTCR also involves joint collection 
and assessment of intelligence information with 
regard to missile proliferation and the 
co-ordination of actions against those who trans-
gress MTCR guidelines. 
77. Though the MTCR provides in principle a 
strong base to prevent missile proliferation it is 
still not a perfect control regime: 
- There are too few participants; China, 
Brazil and other countries which 
already have ballistic missiles or space 
programmes do not participate in the 
MTCR. Countries which are refused 
these technologies by the MTCR 
members can still turn to non-MTCR 
members to proliferate ballistic mis-
siles. 
- It still allows sales of civilian rocket 
technology although this is related to 
military rocket technology. This 
threatens the agreement because coun-
tries which want to proliferate this tech-
nology can claim it will be used for 
civilian purposes only. 
- It does nothing about regional ballistic 
missile forces already in existence. 
- It is still too poorly enforced, as it is 
only an informal agreement. It suggests 
that participating members should take 
action against those who transgress the 
treaty. 
78. The Soviet Union, which was initially 
excluded from the MTCR negotiations, first 
regarded the MTCR as a second Cocom regime 
and as a " western cartel " restricting global tech-
nological co-operation. But it changed its 
attitude in 1990 and in the last stage of its exis-
tence the Soviet Union co-operated more closely 
with the MTCR. One of the must important 
tasks will be to ensure that this co-operation is 
continued and strengthened by all its successors 
concerned and by the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. It is obvious that, without their 
support and co-operation, the MTCR will never 
be able to implement effective control over 
missile technology. 
79. Another problem is the attitude of the 
People's Republic of China, which does not 
belong to the regime. Although China has given 
assurances that it will not transfer any more bal-
listic missiles to the third world, it remains an 
unpredictable actor in the area of international 
missiles supplies. According to recent press 
~I 
, 
reports China is supposedly continuing to sell 
missile technology to Syria and Pakistan 40• 
Nevertheless, Chinese authorities indicated in 
November 1991 that the country would abide by 
the provisions of the MTCR if the United States 
lifted sanctions imposed on the country in 
spring 1991 in regard to the sale of American 
satellite parts and high-speed computers. On 
21st February 1992, the United States lifted 
these sanctions against China. 
80. It is obvious that export controls alone 
cannot solve the problem of ballistic missile pro-
liferation. The MTCR agreement does not 
address the motives of proliferation. In the long 
run, the spread of ballistic missiles can only be 
brought under control through measures that 
address the causes of regional insecurity. As a 
kind of proliferation is part of the regional arms 
races, including conventional, chemical and 
sometimes nuclear weapons, they have to be 
controlled through regional arms control and 
disarmament measures. Regional confidence-
and security-building measures (CSBMs) can 
reduce the dangers of missile proliferation, espe-
cially in South Asia and South America. In the 
Middle East the problems are more compli-
cated. 
81. In Europe the members of MTCR should 
urge other European countries to join the 
regime. They should also tighten their own 
export legislation. Even better, there should be 
more co-operation and co-ordination between 
the European export legislations. This would 
iron out the differences which still exist in the 
interpretation of the MTCR agreement. 
(e) United NatioNJ embargoes 
82. Another means of preventing arms 
exports is offered by the United Nations 
Charter, which allows for the possibility of 
imposing embargoes on particular countries by 
decision of the Security Council. Recent 
examples are the embargoes imposed on South 
Mrica, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Libya. 
83. The first resolution against South Mrica 
was implemented in 1963 but it had little effect 
in stopping the selling of arms to that country. 
In 1977, a new resolution was implemented, 
Resolution 421, which was a mandatory arms 
embargo resolution and went much further than 
the first one. But this resolution, too, was not 
accompanied by any mechanism for interna-
tional implementation or law enforcement. The 
sole international control organ set up after the 
passing of Resolution 421 was the Security 
Council Special Committee. It was set up to 
study ways and means by which the embargo 
could be made more effective and to make rec-
40. International Herald Tribune, 1st-2nd February 1992. 
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ommendations to the Council. However, it was 
not provided with special powers and cannot 
demand information from individual states. It 
also has no power to impose penalties for 
breaking the embargo regulations and there is no 
international court which can deal with such an 
issue. Thus every aspect of the implementation 
of the arms embargo against South Africa 
remained within national jurisdiction. 
84. Another problem was the definition 
problem. Since there was no special list of arma-
ments there was no agreement on what consti-
tutes military technology. Exports of dual-
purpose products and technologies were there-
fore impossible to ban. National governments 
often had problems in stopping exports of arms 
and technologies due to their imperfect legis-
lation and control mechanisms. 
85. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2nd August 
1990, Resolution 661 of 6th August called for an 
embargo on any commodities or products, 
including weapons or any military equipment 
(except medicines), for that country. With Reso-
lution 665 of 25th August, law enforcement was 
implemented. This resolution allowed 
inspection and verification of suspect cargo en 
route for Iraq or Kuwait. However, it was easier 
to implement the embargo imposed on Iraq 
since it was controlled by warships from the 
United States and Western European Union 
member countries. 
86. Another example is Resolution 713 of 
25th September 1991 by which the United 
Nations Security Council imposed a weapons 
embargo on Yugoslavia on the grounds that the 
civil war there affected the security of neigh-
bouring countries. It is not yet quite clear to 
what extent this embargo was effective and con-
tributed to a provisional end to hostilities. But it 
may be said that United Nations embargo mea-
sures have shown their usefulness when they 
have been effectively controlled and supported 
by military forces. The last cases in this respect 
were the United Nations weapons embargoes 
imposed on Somalia by Resolution 733 on 23rd 
January 1992 and on Libya by Resolution 748 
which entered into force on 15th April 1992. 
(j) The United Nations Register 
of International Conrentional Arms Transfers 
87. The most important universal step so far 
for establishing a worldwide surveillance system 
for conventional armaments transfers was 
undertaken on 9th December 1991 by the 
United Nations. The United Nations General 
Assembly adopted, by a very large majority, a 
resolution on transparency in armaments, 
requesting in particular the establishment of a 
universal Register of International Conventional 
Arms Transfers. Its creation was proposed by the 
European Council on the initiative of the 
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United Kingdom in particular. There were no 
votes against with two abstentions (Cuba and 
Iraq), whereas the People's Republic of China, 
Burma, Sudan and Vietnam did not take part in 
the vote. 
88. The register, which is placed under the 
responsibility of the Secretary General, was 
established on 1st January 1992. All member 
states are requested to provide the required 
information on an annual basis by 30th April 
each year in respect of imports into and exports 
from their territory in the previous calendar 
year. The first such registration date is 30th 
April 1993 for the calendar year 1992. 
89. Even though the information to be given 
is not compulsory and not enforceable by sanc-
tions, the register may be regarded as a very pos-
itive step for achieving greater transparency in 
international arms transfers. It will be essential 
to convince all United Nations member coun-
tries to join this new regime. 
90. Furthermore, it will be important for the 
panel of technical experts set up by the United 
Nations Secretary General in order to work out 
technical procedures for the register to adopt cri-
teria for an internationally-agreed data base 
which could later be used for a compulsory 
information regime on armaments transfers. 
Y. The evolution of natioiUll arms export policies 
91. The imperfection of international rules in 
the area of armaments exports finds its equiv-
alent in the diversity of national arms policies. It 
is not the aim of this report to make an overall 
comparison of these various policies, but to 
present a number of striking examples, mainly in 
Europe, in order to demonstrate the difficulties 
inherent in bringing about greater co-ordination. 
92. The need for more harmonisation has 
been realised both in the United States and in 
Europe, particularly in connection with arms 
transfers to Iraq and with the dramatic changes 
in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former 
Soviet Union. 
93. Attention will be concentrated on certain 
major Western European countries which are 
likely to become partners in a future common 
European arms export policy, and on the United 
States as one of the leading armaments exporters. 
(a) FrtUtCe 
94. In Europe, France is the most important 
armaments exporter (third in the world) with 
fourth place in world armaments production. Its 
defence industry is largely state-controlled. 
95. France has repeatedly underlined that its 
arms export policy is a crucial and decisive 
factor in providing its industry with a sound 
basis which is necessary for its independent 
defence policy. It places all export contracts 
under the control of an intermihisterial com-
mission, the " Commission interministerielle 
pour l'etude des exportations des materiels de 
guerre" (CIEEMG). Sensitive cases may be sub-
mitted to the French President for a decision. 
TABLE 3 41 
Value of exports of major weapons by France, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values, as expressed in US $m., 
at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Iraq ................ 951 189 778 865 722 757 234 271 79 
Saudi Arabia ........ 297 264 58 184 1069 1 221 424 374 403 
India ............... 36 72 40 48 613 761 555 178 143 
United Kingdom .... 190 220 311 265 188 208 88 80 62 
Egypt ............... 76 121 363 127 151 163 484 6 0 
United Arab Emirates 166 91 41 37 0 0 13 8 617 
Spain ............... 304 252 89 15 22 147 125 175 142 
Qatar ............... 69 139 281 258 130 42 73 131 50 
Argentina ........... 231 256 275 240 138 22 0 0 38 
Greece .............. 182 0 0 0 0 0 0 395 444 
Peru ................ 315 71 78 32 11 133 243 0 0 
Jordan .............. 0 387 343 0 0 0 30 61 3 
Brazil ............... 94 30 30 47 60 82 178 90 94 
Libya ............... 20 510 140 70 0 0 0 0 17 
Nigeria ............. 122 248 0 120 119 0 6 17 15 
41. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, SIPRI 1991, page 70. 
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1990 Total 
42 4 888 
306 4600 
138 2 584 
58 1670 
16 1 507 
508 1 481 
153 1425 
29 1200 
0 1199 
81 1103 
0 884 
0 824 
61 765 
0 758 
30 677 
96. Following the Gulf war, the French Gov-
ernment admitted in March 1991, after an 
intensive parliamentary and public debate on 
France's role as one of the major western arms 
suppliers of Iraq, that the French Parliament 
should have a say in arms control matters. On 
21st March 1991, the French Defence Minister 
instructed his Secretary of State to supervise all 
French arms exports. The government promised 
to hold a regular dialogue with parliament on 
arms export matters, but the real powers of the 
French National Assembly in this respect are 
not yet very developed. 
97. France has so far not adopted very strict 
political criteria which might limit its arms 
exports. It does not export weapons to countries 
at war unless they are engaged in self-defence in 
accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. 
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(b) United Kingdom 
98. The United Kingdom has consistently 
been among the four largest arms exporting 
countries in the world, ranking fourth in the 
period 1981-90. Like France, it encourages arms 
exports in order to lower the cost of its own mil-
itary materiel procured from the British arms 
industry. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has 
four sales missions in the world, namely in the 
United States, India, Saudi Arabia and 
Malaysia, to facilitate the export of British arms. 
They are run by an organisation called DESO 
which comes under the direct authority of the 
MOD. Around three-fifths of all British arms 
exports go to third world countries. 
99. British arms exports have to be licensed 
by the Department of Trade and Industry, 
which consults the MOD and the Foreign Office. 
TABLE 4 42 
Values of exports of major weapons by the United Kingdom, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values, as expressed in US $m., 
at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Saudi Arabia ........ 0 0 8 29 
India ............... 361 529 145 137 
Oman .............. 7 60 168 105 
Chile ............... 0 266 6 224 
Indonesia ........... 45 0 38 23 
Switzerland ......... 0 0 107 214 
United States ....... 58 0 109 86 
Denmark ........... 5 0 50 50 
Nigeria ............. 7 22 44 154 
Jordan .............. 77 74 108 69 
Egypt ............... 130 218 2 3 
Turkey .............. 0 0 0 129 
Pakistan ............ 0 207 0 0 
Argentina ........... 324 0 0 0 
Finland ............. 38 38 38 . 53 
Sensitive and dual-use products also have to be 
controlled; these include certain computers and 
electronics, communication products, radars 
and civil aircraft. 
100. During the 1980s, an export embargo was 
imposed against both Iran and Iraq because of 
the Gulf war. But only products which could 
prolong the war or make it worse were not to be 
exported. The British Government also forbade 
the export of arms to Chile during the Pinochet 
42. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by Ian Anthony, 
SIPRI 1991, page 181. 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
51 174 442 452 930 814 2 898 
140 196 460 343 122 45 2 478 
78 5 120 180 100 28 851 
0 19 323 6 0 0 844 
170 230 194 102 0 0 801 
244 107 0 0 8 113 794 
151 0 39 12 188 78 720 
60 60 11 0 240 0 476 
160 30 0 0 0 0 418 
69 0 9 6 0 0 412 
3 3 3 6 6 6 381 
114 115 0 0 8 0 366 
0 0 0 125 0 0 332 
0 0 0 0 0 0 324 
83 0 0 0 40 15 304 
regime because of its bad human rights 
record. 
101. The total arms embargo against Iraq, in 
existence since 1985, is reported to have been 
violated by a number of British firms. In some 
cases the firms were punished for doing so. So 
far, British legislation concerning arms exports 
has not been adjusted. However, following the 
establishment of a United Nations conventional 
arms transfer register, the government intends to 
bring the necessary legislation before parliament. 
102. The United Kingdom, like most other 
countries, applies human rights criteria in 
making export decisions. In particular, it allows 
transfers only of items unlikely to be used for 
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the repression of domestic political opposition. 
It also makes specific mention of states which 
support terrorism as proscribed recipients of 
military equipment. 
(c) Germany 
103. In the period 1981-90, Germany was the 
sixth largest arms exporter in the world. 
TABLE 5 43 
Values of exports of major Wetlpons by FR Germany, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values, as expressed in US $m., 
at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Argentina ........... 54 115 695 764 
Turkey .............. 112 186 180 247 
Netherlands ......... 14 299 299 299 
Greece .............. 187 106 109 150 
Nigeria ............. 473 72 10 20 
Switzerland ......... 0 0 0 0 
Colombia ........... 0 0 266 269 
Malaysia ............ 0 34 67 320 
India ............... 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain ............. 10 10 44 44 
United Arab Emirates 181 0 0 0 
Indonesia ........... 144 5 5 30 
Kuwait ............. 0 0 13 189 
Norway ............. 0 0 0 0 
Chile ............... 0 0 0 180 
104. German arms export policy shows an 
example of the difficulty of harmonising a 
liberal policy of foreign trade which endeavours 
to facilitate the export of German-made 
products in general, with the implementation of 
the country's arms export legislation, which is 
one of the most restrictive in the world. Since, in 
Germany, the majority of industries concerned 
are in private hands, export controls were not 
efficient enough to prevent illegal transfers. Fol-
lowing various illegal deliveries by a number of 
German firms to countries such as Libya and 
Iraq of dual-use products in particular which 
helped these countries to develop their chemical 
and nuclear capabilities, Germany has recently 
tightened arms export controls considerably. 
105. Under the new bill, a new government 
agency has been set up to monitor exports in 
co-operation with customs officials. Investi-
gators will have the authority to open mail and 
tap telephones in pursuit of evidence against 
weapons suppliers. Firms found guilty of vio-
lating export laws will be subject to heavy fines, 
and their executives will be subject to impris-
onment. 
106. Germany's defence industry is relatively 
small compared with those of France and the 
43. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, 
SIPRI 1991, page 85. 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
185 271 125 0 0 248 2456 
173 130 240 574 208 102 2 152 
299 303 0 0 0 0 1 513 
42 0 0 146 67 4 810 
88 69 0 0 3 0 735 
0 0 123 147 147 147 564 
2 0 0 0 0 0 537 
0 10 0 0 0 0 431 
0 200 18 9 126 30 383 
0 44 44 158 0 0 354 
0 0 0 0 0 158 339 
17 44 43 1 10 14 312 
88 0 0 0 0 0 289 
0 0 0 0 88 176 264 
0 2 0 0 9 3 194 
United Kingdom, but it is of significant impor-
tance for the German economy. Approximately 
one-third of its arms exports goes to the third 
world. Germany is one of the countries that 
deny export licences for certain products to 
"areas of tension" as a general policy. However, 
there is no specific definition of what constitutes 
an area of tension. 
(d) Italy 
107. The main destinations of Italian arms 
exports are South America, Africa and the 
Middle East. Italy was the sixth largest arms 
exporter, exporting around three-quarters of its 
total arms exports to the third world. In 1990, 
Italian arms exports fell to eleventh place. The 
Italian defence industry itself has been widely 
restructured. 
108. Italy was known to be relatively easy in 
licensing arms exports but this has changed. A 
new law of July 1990 prohibits the export of 
arms when there are security risks involved for 
Italy or its allies. It is now also forbidden to 
export arms to countries in a state of war, which 
violate human rights or are subject to a partial 
or total United Nations embargo. A certificate 
of final destination is also needed to obtain a 
licence, as is in an explanation of the mode of 
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TABLE 6 44 
Values of exports of major weapons by Italy, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator values, as expressed in US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Venezuela ........... 794 524 0 28 
Libya ............... 256 361 313 174 
Peru ................ 44 60 0 174 
Ecuador ............ 0 77 232 155 
Nigeria ............. 83 0 7 
Malaysia ............ 0 0 36 
Egypt ............... 28 116 5 
Thailand ............ 0 2 257 
Saudi Arabia ........ 0 0 3 
Argentina ........... 60 0 21 
Spain ............... 9 4 0 
Iraq ................ 0 39 19 
Cyprus .............. 0 0 0 
Greece .............. 46 6 4 
United Arab Emirates 2 20 8 
transport of the arms to be exported, the route 
and in-between stops. 
109. The lnterministerial Commission for 
Trade in Arms (ISO) is to inform the Italian Par-
liament from time to time about arms exports. 
The Defence Ministry is to control arms exports. 
It has a list of companies working in the arms 
industry and only they are allowed to obtain 
export licences. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
issues export licences. 
52 
36 
21 
0 
56 
27 
0 
40 
0 
4 
26 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
100 0 0 0 0 0 1446 
86 0 0 0 0 0 1 190 
185 0 19 0 0 0 483 
0 0 0 0 0 0 465 
85 19 0 120 0 0 366 
0 240 0 8 8 8 336 
0 55 103 4 0 0 332 
0 0 21 16 7 0 303 
2 0 119 94 0 18 291 
13 19 0 10 8 0 158 
0 0 46 46 44 0 150 
23 0 4 7 0 0 130 
0 0 0 40 40 40 120 
26 25 5 4 0 0 119 
20 0 0 30 2 0 109 
(e) The Netherlands 
110. The Netherlands does not have a big 
defence industry but is still the ninth largest 
exporter of arms. More than three-quarters of its 
arms exports go to third world countries. It 
specialises in electronics and opticals, aerospace, 
naval construction, trucks and munitions. A third 
of its defence products is exported. The Dutch 
Government is also promoting the export of arms 
and European co-operation by Dutch firms. 
TABLE 7 45 
Values of exports of major weapons by Netherlands, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator Jalues, as expressed in US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
Greece .............. 303 303 41 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 669 
India ............... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 415 95 525 
Indonesia ........... 5 3 0 0 0 102 51 139 102 0 403 
Taiwan ............. 0 0 0 0 0 0 200 200 0 0 400 
Turkey .............. 41 61 41 41 0 0 0 98 58 27 367 
Peru ................ 139 139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 277 
Austria ............. 0 0 0 0 39 59 0 0 0 0 98 
Thailand ............ 0 0 0 36 0 12 12 12 8 0 80 
France .............. 0 0 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 0 50 
Cote d'lvoire ........ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 40 
Kuwait ............. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 0 35 
Venezuela ........... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 27 
Nigeria ............. 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 24 
Iran ................ 12 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 22 
Ecuador ............ 0 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 18 
44. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, SIPRI 1991, page 101. 
45. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, SIPRI 1991, page 118. 
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111. Arms exports to areas of conflict and 
politically unstable regions and to countries 
which do not respect human rights are pro-
hibited. But a number of Dutch firms were 
involved in the violation of export embargoes on 
Iraq. The Ministry for Economic Affairs is con-
cerned with licensing arms exports. It is advised 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The 
end-user and end-destination must be men-
tioned to obtain licences for arms exports to 
non-NATO members. 
112. The Netherlands Government now makes 
arms export data available to parliament. It will 
receive prior notification of major new arms 
deals; detailed information on the disposal of 
surplus conventional weapons (disposed of under 
the CFE Treaty requirements) will be published. 
(f) spa;, 
113. In the decade of 1980-90, Spain became a 
significant arms exporter, ranking tenth in the 
world from 1981-90. 
114. In 1977, a major reform of the Spanish 
defence sector was initiated and led to the ere-
TABLE 8 46 
Values of exports of major weapons by Spain, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator 'alues, as expressed in US $m., 
at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Egypt ............... 0 0 50 435 
Morocco ............ 62 62 180 
Mexico ............. 0 163 81 
Argentina ........... 0 41 163 
Turkey .............. 0 0 0 
Iraq ................ 0 38 38 
Chile ............... 13 20 20 
Saudi Arabia ........ 0 0 0 
Jordan .............. 0 0 3 
Indonesia ........... 6 6 4 
Angola .............. 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe .......... 0 0 17 
United States ....... 0 0 0 
Venezuela ........... 6 0 11 
France .............. 0 0 0 
ation of a Central Procurement Agency, fol-
lowed by an Armaments Advisory Board. On 
25th March 1988, the Spanish Cabinet approved 
the Royal Decree 480/88 which allows only 
companies registered with the Direcci6n 
General de Comercio Exterior to export defence 
material and dual use products and technol-
ogies. The Royal Decree prohibits licences in 
cases where arms exports are inconsistent with 
international agreements to which Spain is a 
party, where Spanish national security might be 
undermined or where friendly relations with 
other countries jeopardised. Exports are also 
prohibited to countries at war and/or countries 
identified with human rights violations. 
46. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, 
SIPRI 1991, page 145. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25 
0 
0 
3 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
50 50 25 50 0 0 660 
0 0 0 36 180 24 543 
0 17 11 0 0 0 272 
0 0 0 0 9 14 226 
0 0 0 0 225 0 225 
25 0 0 0 0 0 125 
0 7 14 23 4 14 115 
20 20 33 10 0 0 83 
0 0 36 27 0 0 69 
4 4 4 4 8 8 52 
11 11 0 0 11 0 33 
0 0 3 11 3 0 33 
0 0 0 0 28 3 31 
0 11 0 0 0 0 28 
0 0 0 6 9 7 22 
(g) Belgium 
115. The Belgian arms industry is smaller than 
the Dutch one and Belgium is not among the top 
fifteen arms exporters. However, it has an 
important munitions and small arms industry. 
Around three-quarters of its exports go to the 
third world, although this proportion is 
declining as is total Belgian arms production. 
116. Belgian authorities were known to be 
liberal regarding export licences, and though the 
country had a relatively small arms industry it 
was one of the centres of the arms trade. 
117. To export military materiel Belgian firms 
had to obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Defence. The Belgium MOD used to have four 
criteria for licensing arms exports: 
- safeguarding Belgium's economic interests; 
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TABLE 9 47 
Values of exports of major weapons by Belgium, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator 'alues, as expressed in US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Malaysia ............ 0 0 32 
Turkey .............. 13 62 1 
Uruguay ............ 0 15 0 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 
Total ............... 13 78 33 
- safeguarding Belgium's national 
security; 
- international embargoes; 
- general principles of law and human 
rights. 
118. In 1991, the Belgian Parliament approved 
a new bill aimed at applying stricter checks on 
arms exports. This was in response to charges 
that Belgium was alone among the major 
western arms suppliers in lacking any effective 
legislation on arms sales. 
119. The new bill covers the sale and transport 
of arms and munitions as well as any equipment 
on technology specifically designed for military 
use. Under the new legislation, contracts will be 
examined by an interministerial committee and 
suppliers must clearly identify the end-users, 
while arrival of shipments at their destination 
will be carefully monitored. At the same time, 
32 
0 
0 
0 
32 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
32 23 0 0 0 0 117 
0 0 0 0 0 0 77 
0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
32 23 0 6 0 0 215 
the government will draw up a list of all transac-
tions for parliament. Penalties for major viola-
tions of the new legislation will carry a 
maximum of five years' imprisonment. It also 
covers dual-use products. 
(h) United States 
120. In the United States, the largest arma-
ments exporter after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union, many different government 
bodies are involved in the arms export licensing 
and control system, and this creates occasional 
frictions. Political and economic interests often 
clash. The State Department, the Pentagon and 
the Department of Commerce do not always 
share the same ideas on whether a military 
product is fit for export to certain countries. In 
the late eighties, the Department of Commerce 
licensed the export of certain strategic products 
to Iraq, for example. 
TABLE 10 48 
Values of exports of major weapons by United States, 1981-90 
Figures are SIPRI trend-indicator 'alues, as expressed in US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Recipient 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
Japan ............... 1 222 1472 1 740 1 573 1 652 1 727 1 733 2 146 3 118 2049 18 434 
Egypt ............... 555 1984 1 769 1 159 871 1250 1690 229 133 169 9 811 
Saudi Arabia ........ 1 389 1 772 1048 580 283 990 615 350 94 1 646 8 767 
Israel ............... 1 743 1010 357 339 241 446 1 629 507 93 21 6 385 
Spain ............... 151 183 60 13 221 868 1 330 1 330 506 450 5 112 
Netherlands ......... 505 626 828 641 504 400 296 154 750 108 4182 
Canada ............. 370 161 666 713 817 707 696 409 168 76 4 784 
Germany FR ........ 213 354 354 391 191 360 262 247 864 1022 4 258 
Australia ............ 354 12 556 355 344 557 457 548 636 323 4142 
Korea, South ........ 230 128 248 240 380 246 573 873 996 206 4120 
Taiwan ............. 474 379 491 315 557 768 244 202 361 155 3 946 
Turkey .............. 428 68 140 88 271 78 611 520 547 1006 3 758 
Belgium ............. 668 747 312 392 93 26 26 165 181 25 2 635 
United Kingdom .... 393 460 103 556 245 178 155 108 116 238 2 552 
Pakistan ............ 6 204 150 485 485 226 163 82 454 145 2 399 
47. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by Ian Anthony, SIPRI 1991, page 36. 
48. Source: Arms export regulations, edited by lan Anthony, SIPRI 1991, page 202. 
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121. Since the beginning of the Gulf conflict, 
the United States has wanted to restrict exports 
of chemical and biological material and missile 
technologies. The scope of chemical and bio-
logical controls will be extended to include a 
broad range of enabling technologies, which, 
over and above their basic use, could be adapted 
to make weapons. 
122. In March 1991, the American Gov-
ernment announced its intention to enforce 
stricter legislation with stronger penalties for 
those violating the new legislation. Three new 
regulations are proposed: 
- a licence will be needed for the export 
of certain dual-use products to destina-
tions in 28 " high-risk " countries in 
Eastern Europe, the Middle East and 
the Far East, plus Cuba and South 
Mrica. Israel, a long-time ally of the 
United States, is also included. 
- The export licence list for chemicals 
will be raised from 11 to 50 chemicals 
(the Australia Group list). This already 
features in the German legislation and 
the Netherlands is also intending to 
adopt the list. It is expected that the 
United Kingdom and Canada will 
follow suit. 
- The American Government will be 
allowed to take action against com-
panies it judges to have contributed to 
the production of ballistic missiles in 
other countries, or which are involved 
in exporting products to help their pro-
duction. 
123. The American Government wants these 
unilateral measures to be implemented by the 
member states of the Australia Group and the 
MTCR, too. American industry has criticised 
the measures because they involve disadvan-
tages for the American industry since other 
countries will still allow the export of the 
products featured in the new American legis-
lation proposals. 
VI. The creation 
of an effective multilateral arms 
export control system and its implementation 
124. As long as there are no worldwide agreed 
moral criteria for the international coexistence 
of nations and countries it will be difficult to 
achieve common regimes for armaments 
exports. Nevertheless the charter of the United 
Nations could be used as a useful base for devel-
oping these criteria. The notion of self-defence 
recognised in Article 51, which implies that all 
United Nations member states have also the 
right to acquire arms with which to defend 
themselves, should be explained and developed 
72 
in the sense of reasonable sufficiency. This prin-
ciple means that no country should be allowed 
to arm itself beyond the level needed for self-
defence on the basis of the establishment of the 
universal armaments register. The United 
Nations is the proper organisation for elabo-
rating and adopting more comprehensive cri-
teria on self-defence. 
125. A reasonable arms export policy has to be 
found in harmonising the sometimes different 
requirements put forward by foreign and 
defence interests on the one hand, and those of 
financial, economic and trade interests, on the 
other. 
126. Such a synthesis is already difficult to 
achieve on a national level, but it is still more 
complicated when different national policies 
have to be harmonised in an international 
framework. A fundamental condition for such 
an undertaking is the harmonisation of national 
interests that differ or are claimed to differ. 
127. For Europe, problems of arms exports 
have special aspects and there are particular cir-
cumstances, characterised by the decision of the 
European Council to create a common foreign 
and security policy. This of course also affects 
arms export policy in all its aspects. 
128. At their meeting in Maastricht on 9th and 
1Oth December 1991, the European Council 
issued a declaration on areas in which they 
intend to carry out common actions. Among 
these areas, they listed 
- questions of nuclear non-proliferation; 
- control of transfers of military tech-
nology to third world countries; and 
- control of arms exports. 
129. Decisions on areas for common actions 
will be adopted by a qualified majority. The 
European Council asked the ministers for 
foreign affairs of the Twelve to begin prepar-
atory work on defining the basic elements for 
common actions up to the date when the treaty 
on European Political Union enters into force. 
These preparations will be complicated. Mean-
while, Europe may be confronted with the need 
to take decisions on current arms export 
problems. · 
130. A major condition for the planned 
common actions in arms export matters on the 
basis of decisions taken by majority voting is the 
abolition of Article 223 of the EC Treaty which 
reads as follow: 
"(a) No member state shall be obliged to 
supply information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to the 
essential interests of its security; 
(b) any member state may take such mea-
sures as it considers necessary for the pro-
tection of the essential interests of its 
security which are connected with the pro-
duction of or trade in arms, munitions 
and war materiel; such measures shall not 
adversely affect the conditions of compe-
tition in the common market regarding 
products which are not intended for spe-
cifically military purposes. " 
131. But, in fact, the Treaty on European 
Union signed by the foreign ministers of the 
Twelve on 7th February 1992 on the basis ofthe 
Maastricht summit did not leave out this article. 
Arms transfers therefore still remain under 
national responsibility. The big question is 
therefore how the European Council intends to 
carry out its plans in this area. 
132. On the other hand, harmonisation of the 
various national export control regimes and leg-
islations should be completed this year, since, as 
from 1st January 1993, all products will cir-
culate freely within the Community's territory in 
the framework of the single market. Other-
wise the country with the most liberal control 
system would become the " export centre " of 
the European Community. 
133. So far the European Commission has 
undertaken a fact-finding mission to collect 
information on the export control regime main-
tained by each member country for dual-use 
products. 
134. But the Commission's intentions of 
making dual-use products subject to Com-
munity export controls are controversial since so 
far these products have been considered to be 
covered by Article 223 and therefore under 
strictly national control. On the other hand, all 
those member countries which have tightened 
their export rules are interested in having simi-
larly strict legislation introduced throughout the 
Community in order to avoid competition dis-
advantages for their industries. 
135. But the problem of creating a common 
Community arms export policy cannot be 
regarded only from an economic standpoint. 
Article 223 of the EEC Treaty twice mentions 
member countries' "essential security 
interests". It must be realised that the funda-
mental condition for a common arms export 
policy is the harmonisation of all member coun-
tries' security interests. 
136. This is the most difficult task, for the 
essential security interests of member countries 
are very closely connected with their defence 
policies and this is the area of competence of 
Western European Union. According to the 
decisions taken in Maastricht and to the Treaty 
on European Political Union signed on 7th Feb-
ruary 1992, 
"the Union requests Western European 
Union, which is an integral part of the 
development of the European Union, to 
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elaborate and implement decisions and 
actions of the Union which have defence 
implications. " 
137. This rule should be implemented if the 
European Union intends to draw up a common 
arms export policy, since its defence implica-
tions are obvious. Without harmonising 
national defence and security interests in the 
framework of Western European Union, none of 
the efforts to carry out common actions in arms 
transfer matters within the Community, 
including the abolition of Article 223, will 
succeed. The Council of Western European 
Union should take up this subject as a matter of 
urgency. It should also study whether the subject 
might be linked with examination of the possi-
bility of creating a European armaments agency 
in the framework ofWEU and what its responsi-
bilities might be. 
138. In elaborating such a common policy, 
WEU can rely on the criteria identified by the 
European Council on 30th June 1991 such as 
respect for the international commitments of the 
member states of the Community, in particular 
the sanctions decreed by the Security Council of 
the United Nations and those decreed by the 
Community, agreements on non-proliferation 
and other subjects, as well as other international 
obligations; the respect of human rights in the 
country of final destination; the internal situ-
ation in the country of final destination, as a 
function of the existence of tensions or internal 
armed conflicts; the preservation of regional 
peace, security and stability; the national 
security of the member states and of territories 
whose external relations are the responsibility of 
a member state, as well as that of friendly and 
allied countries; the behaviour of the buyer 
country with regard to the international com-
munity, as regards in particular its attitude to 
terrorism, the nature of its alliances, and respect 
for international law; the existence of a risk that 
the equipment will be diverted within the buyer 
country or t:e-exported under undesirable condi-
tions. 
139. But WEU should also adopt a common 
policy and promote joint initiatives in broader 
frameworks such as the United Nations in order 
to contain the dangers of dissemination of 
nuclear, biological and chemical war materiel, 
technology and know-how. 
140. When the nuclear non-proliferation treaty 
comes up for renewal in 1995, it should become 
a treaty of unlimited duration and appropriate 
means of sanctions. Furthermore, it should be 
complemented by a convention preventing the 
export of nuclear know-how and technology. 
The functioning of the IAEA has to be rein-
forced on the basis of sound financial means. In 
Munich, a number of interesting proposals were 
put forward, for instance to put the Nuclear 
Control Agency directly under the authority of 
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the Security Council and the Secretary-General. 
Thought is also being given to verifying the 
Baruch project of 1948 which endeavoured to 
put all kinds of nuclear technology under the 
control of the United Nations. 
141. Since the French proposal for holding a 
conference regarding nuclear forces in the 
former Soviet Union has now been accepted by 
the United States, an early date should now be 
fixed. It would be essential for all the nuclear 
republics of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) to participate in the conference. 
142. The dangers of dissemination of chemical 
and biological know-how and material in the 
third world should also be given urgent consid-
eration. There is now a chance to reach 
agreement on a comprehensive ban on chemical 
weapons in the framework of the United 
Nations disarmament conference, but since its 
outcome is still not sure, there is an urgent need 
for emergency measures which should be 
co-ordinated by the United Nations Security 
Council. The planned conference proposed by 
the French President should also deal with 
chemical problems. 
143. At the expert meeting of member coun-
tries of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) which is to be held in Oslo in June 
1992, WEU member countries should press to 
extend the prohibition of the exportation of mis-
siles capable of carrying all types of warheads of 
mass destruction. 
VII. Conclusions 
144. Much new thinking will be necessary in 
order to achieve internationally agreed criteria 
to be followed in arms export policies so as to 
ensure that international armaments transfers 
will no longer contribute to the destabilisation of 
peace and security in sensitive areas of the 
world. In Europe such new thinking will be nec-
essary particularly in WEU as a consequence of 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
145. The continuing reluctance of the WEU 
Council to debate the problems of armaments 
transfers due to the fact that most member gov-
ernments envisage a greater roJe for the 
European Community and the future European 
Union in these matters must be overcome 
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because of the obvious implications for the 
essential security and defence interests of 
member countries. The crucial problems 
standing in the way of a harmonised arms export 
policy must be resolved in WEU and not in the 
framework of European political co-operation. 
146. Regarding the global aspects of the 
problem, the chances have never been more 
promising for providing the United Nations and 
its Security Council with effective powers and 
competence to draw up, implement and 
supervise international rules and guidelines for 
arms exports. Following the establishment of a 
universal arms register, the development of a 
comprehensive system of transparency in mil-
itary questions should be the further task of the 
United Nations in order to strengthen confi-
dence worldwide. 
14 7. The permanent members of the Security 
Council, which are at the same time the world's 
recognised nuclear powers, have a special 
responsibility to ensure future nuclear non-
proliferation. The participation in these efforts 
of all industrialised non-nuclear powers which 
have definitely renounced any plans to become 
nuclear powers is crucial. The role of the group 
of the seven most industrialised countries (G-7) 
in which both nuclear and non-nuclear powers 
are united is therefore important. At its next 
meeting in Munich under German chair-
manship, the G-7 should develop and make 
public the further initiatives they intend to take 
in the area of non-proliferation and arms export 
controls after their last declaration in July 
1991. 
148. Yet there is also a need for reflection 
within national parliaments on how to ensure 
that the transparency of information govern-
ments have to provide in the matter can be 
improved. Parliaments should make a joint 
effort to strengthen their right to be informed on 
major decisions in the area of armaments 
exports before such decisions are made and to 
debate relevant agreements before they are 
signed. There should be a minimum standard 
guaranteeing that parliaments exercise demo-
cratic supervision in a more effective manner, 
which should include clearly-defined powers for 
defence and foreign affairs committees to 
require officials to appear before them to give 
information. 
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APPENDIX I 
Declaration by the European Council on areas which could be the subject of joint action 
lOth December 1991 
(Extracts) 
The European Council hereby declares that the implementation of joint action, in accordance 
with the procedures laid down in Article C of those provisions of the Treaty on European Union 
relating to the common foreign and security policy, is proposed as from the entry into force of the 
Treaty in areas connected with security, in particular: 
- nuclear non-proliferation issues; 
- the economic aspects of security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to 
third countries and control of arms exports. 
The European Council invites the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to begin preparatory work with a 
view to defining the necessary basic elements for a policy of the Union by the date of entry into force of 
the Treaty. 
The European Council furthermore invites the Council to prepare a report to the European 
Council in Lisbon on a likely development of the common foreign and security policy with a view to 
identifying areas open to join action vis-a-vis particular countries or groups of countries. 
Article J3 
Treaty on European Union 
7th February 1992 
(Extracts) 
The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the foreign and security policy 
shall be the following: 
1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a 
matter should be the subject of joint action. 
Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific 
scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, 
and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation. 
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, 
define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. 
Article J4 
2. The Union requests Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the devel-
opment of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of WEU, adopt the nec-
essary practical arrangements. 
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the proce-
dures set out in Article 13. 
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1. At our meeting in Houston last year, we, the Heads of State and Government and the representa-
tives of the European Community, underlined the threats to international security posed by the prolife-
ration of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of associated missile delivery systems. The 
Gulf crisis has highlighted the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons and by the 
excessive holdings of conventional weapons. The responsibility to prevent the re-emergence of such 
dangers is to be shared by both arms suppliers and recipient countries as well as the international com-
munity as a whole. As is clear from the various initiatives which several of us have proposed jointly 
and individually, we are each determined to tackle, in appropriate fora, these dangers both in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. 
Conventional arms transfers 
2. We accept that many states depend on arms imports to assure a reasonable level of security and 
the inherent right of self-defence is recognised in the United Nations Charter. Tensions will persist in 
international relations so long as underlying conflicts of interest are not tackled and resolved. But the 
Gulf conflict showed the way in which peace and stability can be undermined when a country is able to 
acquire a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self defence and threatens its neighbours. 
We are determined to ensure such abuse should not happen again. We believe that progress can be 
made if all states apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action. 
3. The principle of transparency should be extended to international transfers of conventional 
weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction we support the proposal for a 
universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations, and will work for its early 
adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up 
holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all 
states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater openness about overall 
holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking 
clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure. 
4. The principle of consultation should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of 
recent initiatives for discussions among leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing a common 
approach to the guidelines which are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons. We welcome the 
recent opening of discussions on this subject. These include the encouraging talks in Paris among the 
Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council on 8th-9th July, as well as ongoing discus-
sions within the framework of the European Community and its member states. Each of us will con-
tinue to play a constructive part in this important process, in these and other appropriate fora. 
5. The principle of action requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of dispropor-
tionate arsenals. To that end all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be 
destabilising or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer 
of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of particular concern. A special 
effort should be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced weapons, to the 
transfer of which similar restraint could be applied. All states should take steps to ensure that these cri-
teria are strictly enforced. We intend to give these issues our continuing close attention. 
6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing Gulf war illustrate the huge costs to the international com-
munity of military conflict. We believe that moderation in the level of military expenditure is a key 
aspect of sound economic policy and good government. While all countries are struggling with com-
peting claims on scarce resources, excessive spending on arms of all kinds diverts resources from the 
overriding need to tackle economic development. It can also build up large debts without creating the 
means by which these may be serviced. We note with favour the recent report issued by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the recent decisions by several donor countries to take 
account of military expenditure where it is disproportionate when setting up aid programmes and 
encourage all other donor countries to take similar action. We welcome the attention which the Man-
aging Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the President of the World Bank have 
recently given to excessive military spending, in the context of reducing unproductive public expend-
iture. 
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Non-proliferation 
7. We are deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and 
expanding the non-proliferation regimes. 
8. Iraq must fully abide by Security Council Resolution 687, which sets out requirements for the 
destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its nuclear, biological, 
and chemical warfare and missile capabilities; as well as for verification and long-term monitoring to 
ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with 
relevant United Nations resolutions, we will provide every assistance to the United Nations Special 
Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that they can fully carry out their 
tasks. 
9. In the nuclear field, we: 
- Reaffirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in favour of an equitable 
and stable non-proliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and 
the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. • 
- Reaffirm the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call on all other 
non-signatory states to subscribe to this agreement. 
- Call on all non-nuclear weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, 
which are the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. 
- Urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. 
We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a full-scope safeguard with the 
IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South 
Africa to the NPT. 
10. Each of us will also work to achieve: 
- Our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the NPT regime beyond 1995. 
- A strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system. 
- New measures in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use 
items. 
11. We anticipate that the Biological Weapons Review Conference in September will succeed in 
strengthening implementation of the convention's existing provisions by reinforcing and extending its 
confidence-building measures and exploring the scope for effective verification measures. Each of us 
will encourage accession to the convention by other states and urge all parties strictly to fulfil their obli-
gations under the convention. We each believe that a successful Review Conference leading to 
strengthened implementation of the BWC would make an important contribution to preventing the 
proliferation of biological weapons. 
12. The successful negotiation of a strong, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention 
banning chemical weapons, to which all states subscribe, is the best way to prevent the spread of 
chemical weapons. We welcome recent announcements by the United States which we believe will con-
tribute to the swift conclusion of such a convention. We hope that the negotiation will be successfully 
concluded as soon as possible. We reaffirm our intention to become original parties to the convention. 
We urge others to become parties at the earliest opportunity so that it can enter into force as soon as 
possible. 
13. We must also strengthen controls on exports which could contribute to the proliferation of bio-
logical and chemical weapons. We welcome the measures taken by members of the Australia Group 
and by other states on the control of exports of chemical weapons precursors and related equipment. 
We seek to achieve increasingly close convergence of practice between all exporting states. We urge all 
states to support these efforts. 
14. Our aim is a total and effective ban on chemical and biological weapons. Use of such weapons is 
an outrage against humanity. In the event that a state uses such weapons each of us agrees to give 
immediate consideration to imposing severe measures against it both in the United Nations Security 
Council and elsewhere. 
15. The spread of missile delivery systems has added a new dimension of instability to international 
security in many regions of the world. As the founders of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), we welcome its extension to many other states in the last two years. We endorse the joint 
appeal issued at the Tokyo MTCR meeting in March 1991 for all countries to adopt these guidelines. 
These are not intended to inhibit co-operation in the use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes. 
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16. We can make an important contribution to reducing the dangers of proliferation and conven-
tional arms transfers. Our efforts and consultations on these issues, including with other supplier coun-
tries, will be continued in all appropriate fora so as to establish a new climate of global restraint. We 
will only succeed if others, including recipient countries, support us and if the international com-
munity unites in a new effort to remove these threats which can imperil the safety of all our peoples. 
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The European Council is deeply concerned at the danger arising from the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction throughout the world. The recent Gulf war showed the absolute necessity 
of further enhancing the effectiveness of non-proliferation systems. 
The Community and its member states support a strengthening of the regime of nuclear non-
proliferation and call for all states to become parties to the NPT. They look to an agreement in the near 
future on a convention on chemical weapons and to the strengthening of the Convention on biological 
and bacteriological weapons. 
The European Council is also alarmed by the stockpiling of conventional weapons in certain 
regions of the world. To prevent situations of instability recurring in entire regions as a result of such 
over-armament, the European Council believes that far-reaching international action is needed imme-
diately to promote restraint and transparency in the transfers of conventional weapons and technol-
ogies for military use, in particular towards areas of tension. 
The European Council notes with satisfaction that work in progress in the organs of European 
political co-operation has already, by comparing national policies on arms exports, identified a number 
of common criteria on which these policies are based, such as: 
- respect of international commitments of the member states of the Community, in particular 
the sanctions decreed by the Security Council of the United Nations and those decreed by the 
Community agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international 
obligations; 
- the respect of human rights in the country of final destination; 
- the internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of ten-
sions or internal armed conflicts; 
- the preservation of regional peace, security and stability; 
- the national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the 
responsibilty of a member state, as well as that of friendly and allied countries; 
- the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in 
particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances, and respect for international law; 
- the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or 
re-exported under undesirable conditions. 
In the perspective of Political Union, the European Council hopes that on the basis of criteria of 
this nature a common approach will be made possible, leading to a harmonisation of national policies. 
The Community and its member states attach particular importance in the framework of their 
internal consultations and within the competent international fora to transparency in conventional 
arms transfers. They will attach priority to the establishment of a United Nations register on conven-
tional arms transfers and will table a draft resolution in this sense at the next United Nations General 
Assembly. 
The European Council calls on all states to support this initiative and others which aim to 
prevent the uncontrolled spread of weapons and military technologies. 
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APPENDIX IV 
The ministers reiterated the commitment of their governments to the prevention of the prolife-
ration of weapons of mass destruction and the control of missile technology. They underlined their 
willingness to contribute to the ongoing efforts and international co-operation to this end. In this 
context, they expressed their support for the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and for 
universal adherence to it. They welcomed the intention of all those CSCE states not yet party to the 
NPT to accede to it and urged other states, who are not yet party to it, to do so as well. They also 
renewed their support for the biological weapons convention, welcomed the results of the September 
1991 review conference and called for universal adherence to it. 
They expressed their view that excessive build-ups of conventional weapons beyond legitimate 
defensive needs pose a threat to international peace and security in particular in regions of tension. 
Based on the principles of transparency, consultation and restraint, they declared their commitment to 
address the threat of excessive accumulations of conventional weapons and committed themselves to 
exercise responsibility, in particular with regard to arms transfers to states engaging in such excessive 
accumulations and to regions of tension. 
They confirmed their support for and firmly committed themselves to provide full information 
to the United Nations register of conventional arms. They called upon all other states to take the same 
action. 
They agreed that effective national control of weapons and equipment transfer is acquiring the 
greatest importance. They declared their readiness to exchange views and to provide mutual assistance 
in the establishment of efficient national control mechanisms. 
They agreed that in this connection the conversion of arms production to civilian production is 
also acquiring special importance. 
The ministers decided that the question of non-proliferation, including the transfer of sensitive 
expertise, and the establishment of a responsible approach to international armaments transfers should 
be included as a matter of priority in the work programme of the post-Helsinki arms control process. 
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Arms control: CSCE and WEU 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee 2 
by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on arms control: CSCE and WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the signing of the Maastricht Agreements which give new impetus to the building of 
the European Union and offer prospects of future joint defence; 
(ii) Aware of the challenge to WEU raised in the Maastricht agreements which make WEU an 
integral part of the European Union and, in the long run, the instrument of a joint defence policy; 
(iii) Pleased that the Maastricht Treaty and the WEU declaration confirm the role of WEU and 
therefore of its parliamentary Assembly as Europe's paramount defence body both at present and for 
the foreseeable future; 
(iv) Congratulating the Council and the Secretary-General on the various initiatives taken by WEU 
in the realm of arms control, notably over verification and for open skies, and pleased generally with 
the fuller and more constructive answers given to Assembly recommendations; 
(v) Taking into account the development of the peace and disarmament process now under way in 
Europe and in particular welcoming the 1992 Vienna document as a major contribution to this process; 
(vi) Aware of the importance of current negotiations on European security and arms control being 
held in the framework of the Helsinki meeting; 
(vii) Following attentively the process of political and military restructuring in the states of the 
former Soviet Union; 
(viii) Convinced that WEU must take part in the system of peace and security outlined by the 
organisation and operation of the new CSCE structures and that consequently our own Assembly 
should take every opportunity to support the development of the CSCE Assembly, both politically and 
practically; 
(ix) Considering that there should be much greater co-operation between the CSCE and the North 
Atlantic Co-operation Council, even to the extent of combining the two; 
(x) Recalling Recommendations 481, 513 and 514 and restating in particular two recommendations 
which it urges the Council to tackle without further prevarication: 
" Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of 
recent changes but which safeguards European interests; 
Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environ-
mental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study 
and report on avoiding this type of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this 
important domain; ", 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Pursue its' action to promote peace and disarmament in co-operation with all international 
organisations dealing with security problems, in particular by encouraging close co-operation between 
the member countries of WEU so that they may express a joint position during the negotiations at the 
CSCE conference in Helsinki and future conferences; 
2. Afford political and practical assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries in over-
coming problems linked with military and strategic reorganisation by helping to speed up the imple-
mentation of decisions essential for their full integration in the collective security system being set up 
in the framework of the CSCE; 
3. Establish contacts with the " neutral " countries applying for membership of the European Com-
munity so as to examine jointly the evolution of the present situation, the future of European security 
and progress to be made to meet the commitments entered into in Maastricht; 
4. Establish co-operation links with Central and Eastern European countries so wishing; 
5. Contribute to the adoption and application of the new confidence- and security-building mea-
sures (CSBMs) to be included in the Helsinki final document by co-ordinating member countries' 
action in this area; 
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6. Promote the ratification of the CFE Treaty and its immediate application to all the CSCE coun-
tries, in particular the new states of the CIS, by taking part in the name ofWEU in procedure for infor-
mation, control and verification of disarmament; 
7. Help to apply the Open Skies Treaty by offering the support and means available to WEU, for 
instance the Torrej6n observation satellite centre; 
8. Through its deliberations, contribute to planning the future European defence system and the 
reduction of armed forces to allow the establishment of a true security system corresponding to the new 
geostrategic situation of the European continent; 
9. Resolutely support plans to eliminate chemical and biological weapons and to reduce nuclear 
weapons, by adopting joint positions, bearing constantly in mind the strict application of the non-
proliferation treaty (NPT), encourage the establishment of a register of arms transfers by the United 
Nations and complete this initiative with measures aimed at limiting arms exports at world level; 
10. Take the following immediate steps, under the auspices of the Chairman-in-Office: 
(a) continue the WEU consultations in Vienna which have proved so effective an impetus for 
NATO action in the domain of arms control; 
(b) ensure that such consultations bring a positive approach to helping refine disarmament dis-
cussions among the Twelve in Helsinki; 
(c) further specific arms control initiatives already begun with certain CIS states, notably 
Russia; 
(d) include discussion on a possible CSCE security treaty and on open skies co-operation at the 
forthcoming ministerial meeting between the WEU Nine and the Central and Eastern 
European Eight; 
(e) consult the non-WEU members of NATO with a view to establishing the NACC as part of 
the infrastructure of the CSCE. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submiued by Mr. de Puig, Rqporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In preparing this report, your Rapporteur 
has been conscious of two special factors: 
(a) that the Defence Committee has 
shown particular confidence in its 
Rapporteur on " Arms control negoti-
ations further initiatives for 
WEU " 1 by appointing him as its 
current Rapporteur on "Arms 
control: CSCE and WEU "; 
(b) that in the six months which have 
elapsed since the last report was pro-
duced, the European security scene 
has evolved considerably, indeed 
almost beyond recognition. At long 
last there is a consensus among the 
Twelve that Western European Union 
is the organisation to carry out a 
defence role for Europe as part of 
European Union on the one hand and 
as the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance on the other. This has given 
new impetus for WEU initiatives 
which, coupled with an enthusiastic 
Chairmanship of the Council of Min-
isters, has meant that WEU's voice is 
being heard more frequently and to 
more effect. 
2. The aim of the present report is to high-
light particular developments in the arms 
control scene, as has become traditional in the 
series of Defence Committee reports dedicated 
to aspects of arms control over the last four 
years, but more particularly to focus on one 
special aspect which is currently occupying a 
considerable amount of governmental effort: the 
CSCE. 
3. This report is a follow-up to the one your 
Rapporteur presented at the thirty-seventh 
ordinary session of the Assembly in December 
1991 1• It relates to arms control and its main 
topic is the Helsinki conference and its pros-
pects. Following on the previous report, it will 
review the various aspects of the arms control 
and disarmament process and survey the 
various steps currently being taken. 
4. Once again, the timing of the session 
compels your Rapporteur to present the report 
without waiting for the end of certain important 
events which would have allowed final conclu-
sions to be drawn on matters which concern the 
committee. This is above all the case of the Hel-
sinki meeting to be held from 9th to 11th July. 
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Since your Rapporteur has to present his conclu-
sions to the committee in mid-May and the final 
draft at the June session, he will have to rely on 
the information and documentation available 
right up to the last minute so as to anticipate as 
accurately as possible the agreements that will 
most probably be concluded in Helsinki. 
5. In any event, since the report has to be 
adopted before completion of the CSCE negotia-
tions, our conclusions, and especially the recom-
mendations, may be considered as a working 
paper for the negotiations and thus available in 
particular to the representatives of the WEU 
member countries. While the Assembly's time-
table will not allow the final results of work at 
Helsinki to be presented, its recommendations 
may perhaps be able to play a part in the discus-
sions as decisions of the parliamentary 
Assembly of the Nine. 
6. The complex and delicate CSCE process 
is part of an overall situation which is also 
complex and delicate. Mter the emotion caused 
by the fall of the Berlin wall and the first enthu-
siastic steps taken by all concerned to outline an 
institutional and juridical framework that could 
·master the new situation while guaranteeing 
peace and security and moving towards wide-
spread disarmament, it is now time to assess the 
practical problems thus raised. Words are not 
enough to overcome the enormous problems of 
all kinds arising in spite of or because of the col-
lapse of the Berlin wall. 
7. Although the great political, institutional 
and strategic revolution that has taken place in 
recent years, particularly in the Soviet Union, 
means that considerable progress has been made 
towards democracy and the termination of the 
system of blocs, hitherto unthought of new 
problems and even new risks are emerging. Pre-
sumably there is no longer a threat of East-West 
confrontation; the danger of all-out war in 
Europe is therefore not now conceivable. Con-
versely, we are on unknown ground regarding 
how to control the arms - particularly nuclear -
of the CIS countries. Nor should it be forgotten 
that there are many political conflicts between 
the former member countries of the Soviet 
Union and that the risk of local clashes cannot 
be ruled out, as illustrated by the example of 
Yugoslavia. 
8. The mandate of the Helsinki summit 
meeting is therefore largely concerned with guar-
antees to be given to the eastern countries. It is 
very difficult to ratify treaties such as the Open 
Skies and CFE Treaties and to adopt 
confidence-building measures without having 
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some certainty as to who are the new interloc-
utors. There must be guarantees and accurate 
information about the control of nuclear 
weapons and the division of military forces 
between former members of the Soviet Union. 
Without a minimum definition of the factors 
involved, it is very difficult to ratify treaties 
when one does not know how or by whom they 
will be applied in a given area. P.ence the main 
problem in Helsinki is the consolidation of a 
stable, recognised situation. 
9. It is also the future of the CSCE itselfthat 
is to be decided in July. Today, the future of that 
institution is not clear. It seems evident that, 
although it proved to be a useful instrument in 
triggering off the events in the East, it cannot yet 
be given a leading role in the spectrum of 
today's institutions. Decisions will certainly be 
taken in Helsinki on the Conflict Prevention 
Centre and other bodies now being contem-
plated, but since certain states tend to give pri-
ority to other institutions such as NATO's 
NACC for organising East-West co-operation, it 
is hard to imagine the CSCE becoming the 
central organisation of the new policy between 
the West and the Central and Eastern European 
countries. 
10. Beyond the Helsinki process, with its pos-
sibilities and limits, there is an international sit-
uation which suggests that nuclear and conven-
tional arms reductions will continue and that, if 
there are no unpleasant surprises in the months 
and years ahead, a security system will be estab-
lished on the basis of political commitments, 
mutual confidence, the controlled limitation of 
armaments and a defensive concept of military 
power. Present agreements and the various 
efforts being made in Geneva, Vienna and 
Brussels should lead us towards this new 
system. 
11. It is not just a political will for peace that 
leads to disarmament, it is also the political 
opinion that the levels of military expenditure in 
budgets is no longer acceptable; it is also the fact 
that the traditional enemy no longer exists and 
economies cannot continue to maintain the 
military-industrial machine; it is also the con-
viction that, in the long run, arms sold abroad 
may be turned against those who supplied them, 
as was seen during the Gulf war. 
12. The present report will analyse present 
initiatives and the progress being made with the 
various questions arising in this vast area. The 
draft recommendation to the Council will try to 
circumscribe WEU's place in the arms control 
process by integrating our organisation in the 
mechanisms for applying the major agreements 
and associating it with thinking about the future 
of European security in accordance with the 
course set in Maastricht. 
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11. The continuing debate 
13. The last debate on arms control matters 
held in the Assembly took place at the beginning 
of December 1991. The accent was on nuclear 
disarmament and the spectacular proposals then 
emanating from Washington and Moscow. A 
short six months later these proposals are tem-
porarily forgotten as the Soviet Union's inher-
itors fight over its bones and jockey for position 
in the new world order in general and the 
unsteady CIS in particular. The originator of the 
proposals is locked into the domestic round 
where grand international gestures seem to curry 
little favour with the voters readying themselves 
for an election battle which is still more than six 
months away. 
14. The range of recommendations adopted 
by the Assembly in December, while reflecting 
the main themes of the moment, was reasonably 
well-balanced: 
"Recommendation 513 on arms control 
negotiations - further initiatives for 
WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the changes affecting 
peace and security which have occurred in 
recent years in Europe resulting in major 
progress in disarmament agreements and 
offering henceforth unprecedented possi-
bilities for greater reductions in all types 
of armaments; 
(ii) Noting the importance of the agree-
ments achieved so far for the reduction of 
conventional and nuclear armaments and 
the monitoring and verification ofthe ban 
on certain weapons of mass destruction; 
(iii) Welcoming the proposals for 
radical reductions in nuclear weapons 
recently made by President Bush and 
President Gorbachev which represent a 
major step forward in this area in both 
qualitative and quantitative terms; 
(iv) Welcoming the reduction in nuclear 
armaments agreed by NATO at its recent 
meeting in Taormina; 
(v) Convinced, however, that the prin-
ciples reiterated in The Hague platform 
remain a mainstay of European defence; 
(vi) Convinced that the CFE Treaty will 
be a milestone in the limitation of these 
armaments and expressing the wish that 
this treaty be ratified without delay by all 
countries; 
(vii) Considering that there are new 
prospects of developing conventional dis-
armament in the framework of the CSCE 
and of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(viii) Recognising the efforts made in the 
framework of the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference for a total ban on chemical 
and biological weapons; 
(ix) Aware that WEU has an important 
role to play in backing the process of dis-
armament and in taking initiatives for its 
achievement in practice; 
(x) Determined for its part to maintain 
a permanent debate on arms control 
matters in co-ordination with all appro-
priate forums, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Contribute by its action to the 
advancement of all initiatives for peace 
and detente now being taken, in particular 
by endorsing disarmament and arms 
control proposals; 
2. Act continuously to promote a con-
sensus between member countries on dis-
armament in order to draw positions 
closer together, harmonise legislation and 
take joint measures to reduce and control 
armaments, including the regulation and 
transparency of arms sales; 
3. Ensure that the organisation of 
peace at European and national level con-
cords increasingly with quantitative and 
qualitative criteria in defence matters to 
achieve reasonable minima; 
4. Actively support the Bush-
Gorbachev proposals to reduce nuclear 
weapons and efforts to avoid their prolife-
ration, in accordance with the terms set 
out in the non-proliferation treaty and to 
obtain a ban on nuclear testing; 
5. Elaborate and subscribe to a policy 
of minimum nuclear deterrence which 
takes account of recent changes but which 
safeguards European interests; 
6. Continue to press for the banning 
of the production, deployment and sale of 
chemical and biological weapons; 
7. Resolutely endorse the CFE Treaty 
by urging member states to ratify it 
without delay, thus ensuring that WEU 
sets an example in this respect; 
8. Give impetus to the verification 
agreements so as to be able to establish 
verification systems and programmes 
acceptable to all member states; 
9. Ensure that the satellite data inter-
pretation centre is integrated into the ver-
ification process to be instituted; 
10. Implement the necessary procedure 
for WEU to participate in a co-ordinated 
manner, in particular with the Atlantic 
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Alliance and with other responsible 
bodies in the necessary exchange of infor-
mation and elaboration of disarmament 
proposals. 
Recommendation 514 on arms control 
negotiations - further initiatives for WEU 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the positive results of 
the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in 
Bonn on Monday, 18th November 1991, 
namely: 
(a) the decision to establish the WEU sat-
ellite data interpretation and training 
centre at Torrej6n, in Spain, with 
effect from 1st January 1992; 
(b) the decision to form a study group in 
1992, in France, to examine the 
necessity and desirability of a 
medium- and long-term realisation of 
a European space-based observation 
system; 
(ii) Pleased that the Council has taken 
so many of the Assembly's previous rec-
ommendations on arms control verifi-
cation to heart and strongly approving the 
18th November communique on the 
subject: 
" Ministers took note of the 
progress made on co-operation 
among member states on the verifi-
cation of arms control agreements. 
In this context, they underlined the 
link between space co-operation 
and arms control verification, 
including verification of the CFE 
Treaty. 
Ministers noted with approval the 
preparatory steps taken to set up 
multinational inspection teams as 
part of the implementation of the 
verification regime laid down in the 
CFE Treaty. They approved a set of 
rules for the co-operation of multi-
national teams. 
They decided to take into account 
in their subsequent deliberations 
the possibility of co-operation with 
all CSCE member states. 
The Council welcomed the progress 
made following the resumption of 
the open skies negotiations in 
Vienna, which gives hope for their 
successful conclusion by the time of 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting. 
The ministers continue to attach 
great importance to accelerating the 
search for cost-effective solutions in 
the implementation of an open 
skies agreement. "; 
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(iii) Taking account of the new strategic 
concept defined by NATO at its Rome 
meeting and its consequences and urging 
still further practical co-operation between 
WEU member states to cover all aspects of 
arms control and disarmament; 
(iv) Concerned however that not 
enough international concertation has 
been applied to the particular problem of 
pollution control now urgently required to 
ensure the safe disposal of both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons; 
(v) Welcoming all moves towards a 
reinforcement of the missile technology 
control regime and especially the People's 
Republic of China's recent declared will-
ingness to abide by its provisions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Support the Atlantic Alliance's new 
strategic concept and show that WEU, as 
the European pillar, is ready to respond to 
current challenges by producing a specific 
initiative on arms control which would 
demonstrate our considerable political, 
legal and technical capabilities; 
2. Encourage the participants at the 
Vienna negotiations on conventional 
forces to reach positive conclusions to be 
presented at Helsinki in March 1992; 
3. Encourage member countries and 
CSCE colleague states to pay greater 
attention to the environmental problems 
linked with the destruction of both con-
ventional and nuclear weapons, study and 
report on avoiding this type of potential 
pollution, thus ensuring greater trans-
parency in this important domain; 
4. In addition to seeking progress on 
verification, satellite observation, multi-
national inspection teams and open skies, 
actively seek a greater respect for the 
missile technology control regime. " 
15. The answers to the recommendations, 
which the WEU Council is required statutorily 
to give to the Assembly and which reached us on 
18th March (514) and 9th April (513), were also 
reasonably well-balanced in their turn, perhaps 
reflecting the growing consensus amongst our 
governments: 
"Reply of the Council to Recommendation 
513 
1. The Council is convinced that the 
action of WEU member states has greatly 
contributed to the advancement of recent 
initiatives for peace and detente. WEU 
member states have individually wel-
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corned initiatives such as those mentioned 
in Recommendation 513 and in the text 
of the report " Arms control negotiations 
-further initiatives for WEU" submitted 
on behalf of the Defence Committee by 
Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur. 
2. The Council has set out its position 
in its Reply to Assembly Recommen-
dation 502: " Within the framework of the 
European Community, WEU member 
states have, together with Japan, intro-
duced a resolution at the 46th United 
Nations General Assembly calling for a 
comprehensive but non-discriminatory 
register of arms transfers in order to 
enhance and make worldwide the process 
of greater transparency in arms transfers 
with a view to contributing to. greater 
restraint ". 
3. The ultimate achievement of rea-
sonable minima in the field of defence 
remains the aim of all WEU member 
states. 
4. The Council welcomes all measures 
aimed at a reduction of the nuclear 
arsenals of the United States and the 
former Soviet Union and is fully aware of 
the need to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
5. The formulation of a policy of 
minimum nuclear deterrence is not at 
present on the agenda of the Council and 
its working groups. 
6. WEU member states are actively 
fostering a convention on a global ban on 
the manufacture, possession and use of 
chemical weapons, together with an 
appropriate verification regime. The 
Council welcomes all measures aimed at 
the banning of the production, de-
deployment and sale of chemical 
weapons. WEU consultations on pro-
posals to be introduced in the CSCE and 
alliance frameworks are taking place. 
7. Ratification of the CFE Treaty is 
now the prerogative of the respective 
national parliaments. The Council views 
as a priority the inclusion ofthe CIS states 
with territory in the area of application 
(as well as Georgia) into the CFE 
Treaty. 
8. The Council continues to attach 
great importance to the search for cost-
effective solutions in the field of arms 
control verification. 
9. In the communique adopted by the 
WEU Council of Ministers meeting in 
Bonn on 18th November 1991, ministers 
" underlined the link between space 
co-operation and arms control verifi-
cation, including verification of the CFE 
Treaty". The possibilities of integrating 
the satellite data interpretation and 
training centre into the verification 
process will be examined by the Council 
and its working groups in due course. 
10. The Council welcomes the sugges-
tions made in paragraph 10 of Assembly 
Recommendation 513 and intends to 
intensify the existing exchange of infor-
mation and the elaboration of proposals 
in the fields of disarmament and verifi-
cation which takes already place. While 
discussing the modalities for the imple-
mentation of the " Declaration of the 
member states of Western European 
Union which are also members of the 
European Union on the role ofWEU and 
its relations with the European Union and 
with the Atlantic Alliance ", the sugges-
tions will be borne in mind. 
Reply of the Council to Recommendation 
514 
1. The Council welcomes the results of 
NATO's Rome summit and subsequent 
NATO ministerial meetings. In accor-
dance with the declaration of the member 
states of Western European Union which 
are also members of the European Union 
on the role of WEU and its relations with 
the European Union but also as the means 
of strengthening the European pillar of the 
At~antic Alliance. This will help Europe's 
vmce to be heard on the world stage. The 
development of WEU also paves the way 
for WEU member states to produce " a 
specific initiative on arms control ", if 
and when deemed necessary. This would 
of course be done with due regard for the 
necessary transparency and complemen-
tarity between the European security and 
defence identity and the alliance. 
2. WEU member states have called on 
the participants at the Vienna negotia-
tions on conventional arms to further 
strengthen stability in Europe by agreeing 
on measures to limit manpower levels and 
t~ c_onclude su~ssfully the CFE 1 a nego-
tiations by the t1me of the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting. 
3. The Council is aware of environ-
mental problems linked with the 
destruction of both conventional and 
nuclear weapons and welcomes all mea-
sures for their solution. At present 
however, these issues are not on th~ 
agenda of the Council and its working 
groups. 
4. The Council is well aware of the 
need to seek greater respect for the missile 
technology control regime and for 
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progress on verification, satellite obser-
vation, multinational inspection teams 
and open skies. " 
16. A number of comments on the answers 
are called for, in the hope that a real debate 
might be possible with the Council... 
17. For example, the Council is not quite yet 
ready to act together totally: 513, paragraph 1, 
assures the Assembly that the member countries 
individually, were able to welcome the initiative~ 
mentioned in the report. Why individually and 
why not collectively, as WEU? ' 
18. Similarly, in 514, paragraph 4 the 
Council is aware of the need to seek a g~eater 
respect for the missile technology control 
regime, etc., etc. "Aware of the need" is fine 
but what action does the Council intend to take' 
if necessary with others, to make a positive con~ 
tribution to solving the problem? 
19. On two specific recommendations: 513 
(5) and 514 (3), the Council merely replies that 
the subjects are " not on its agenda ". Such a 
reply is extremely disappointing because both 
the Defence Committee and the Assembly elab-
orated these particular recommendations after 
considerable political and practical debate. 
(They relate respectively to the need for a 
European policy of minimum nuclear deterrence 
and to the environmental problems resulting 
from weapon destruction.) The intention was 
clearly to recommend that the Council does 
include the subjects in its deliberations. "Not 
on the agenda " is a non-answer, unworthy of 
true dialogue, which is why your Rapporteur has 
seen fit to include both subjects once again in 
the set of draft recommendations in the hope 
that the Council will reconsider its first 
somewhat inconsiderate answer... ' 
20. Looking back some two years, your 
Rapporteur was struck by a set of recommenda-
tions ( 481) adopted with a report presented by 
our colleague, Lord N ewall, and entitled 
" V~en~a, disa~ament and Western European 
Umon 2• As wtth many of the parliamentary 
Assembly's reports and recommendations there 
is a tendency to be ahead of one's time and these 
particular recommendations, and to an extent 
the Council's answer, were both in advance 
then. It is worth quoting Recommendation 481 
and its answer in full, to refresh our memories of 
what was discussed: 
"Recommendation 481 on Vienna, dis-
armament and Western European Union 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the recent develop-
ments in Europe which promise a dra-
matic reduction in East-West tension; 
(ii) Considering, however, that the 
establishment of lasting security greatly 
depends on decisions which have to be 
taken forthwith; 
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(iii) Aware that the democratic evo-
lution in the countries of Central Europe 
faces growing problems of internal 
argument and traditional nationalism; 
(iv) Convinced that progress in the 
Vienna talks, both on conventional forces 
in Europe (CFE) and on confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBM), is an 
essential prerequisite for stability and 
security in Europe; 
(v) Stressing the necessity to continue 
arms control negotiations immediately 
after the signing of the first CFE treaty; 
(vi) Certain that further cuts in 
weapons and force levels in Europe are 
desirable but that they must be agreed col-
lectively and not decided unilaterally; 
(vii) Noting the convergence of views on 
arms control between WEU member 
countries and a growing number of 
Warsaw Pact countries; 
(viii) Recognising that few nations, in the 
East or the West, continue to have the 
financial means to maintain defence 
spending at former levels; 
(ix) Determined that there must be 
greater European co-operation in the field 
of defence and security, especially over 
arms control in general and verification of 
agreements in particular; 
(x) Pleased that the NATO nations 
have tabled a series of measures in Vienna 
which are setting the pace for the forth-
coming CFE treaty; 
(xi) Saddened that the French Prime 
Minister's proposal of 7th September 
1989 that WEU should start a specific 
programme of immediate co-operation 
with regard to verification and disarm-
ament has not yet been taken up by the 
Council; 
(xii) Encouraged, however, by the pro-
posal on 23rd March 1990 by the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to create a centre 
for verification in Europe, which echoes 
previous French ideas on the necessity for 
transparency and reciprocal openness; 
(xiii) Recalling that Recommendation 
468 proposed the creation of a European 
observation satellite agency to assist in the 
verification measures agreed by each 
member country; 
(xiv) Welcoming the fact that the 
Council is studying a possible WEU con-
tribution to the CFE verification system 
based on the enhancement of European 
capabilities and the pooling of all member 
country's assets; 
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(xv) Convinced of the urgent need for a 
European verification centre and struck by 
the fact that the ideal nucleus for such a 
body is WEU, plus those other states (sig-
natories of the forthcoming CFE treaty) 
desiring to take part; 
(xvi) Suggesting that the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, together with the 
Secretary-General, should immediately 
begin consulting not only member states 
but other interested nations from both 
East and West which meet the necessary 
requirements with a view to their partici-
pation in the work of this centre, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Take the action necessary to create, 
under WEU auspices, a European verifi-
cation centre in which all states which 
meet the necessary requirements, from 
both East and West, be invited to partic-
ipate. 
Reply of the Council to Recommendation 
481 
Verification of arms control agree-
ments, whilst remaining a national 
responsibility, warrants co-operation 
among states in view of the substantial 
human, technical and financial resources 
that it entails. 
All states that are signatories to the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe will come together in the Joint 
Consultative Group to ensure that the 
agreed verification regime operates 
properly. 
At the WEU ministerial meeting on 
1Oth December 1990, ministers approved 
plans for co-operation among member 
states, to cover the organisation of 
inspection exercises among member 
states, the multinational composition of 
the teams to verify the Treaty on Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe and the 
priority information of member states on 
unused inspection quotas opened by each 
party state under this treaty. WEU is also 
a useful framework for an exchange of 
views on the training of inspectors. Fur-
thermore, space co-operation initiated in 
WEU could cover satellite imagery inter-
pretation for the purposes of verifying 
arms control agreements. 
This co-operation among WEU 
members, as well as projects initiated with 
their other allies, should enhance the 
overall effectiveness of the verification 
regime and thus make a positive contri-
bution for the benefit of all European 
states. 
WEU countries could also consider 
the possibility of ad hoc co-operation with 
those countries of Eastern Europe wishing 
to co-operate. " 
21. Of special note is the idea of links with the 
Central and Eastern Europeans -links which are 
being developed today and links which your 
Rapporteur feels might well be developed along 
technical lines where verification is concerned. 
Hence a certain number of suggestions for 
inclusion on the agenda of the WEU ministerial 
meeting with the eight Central and Eastern 
European countries (the " Eight ") scheduled at 
present for 19th June. 
22. The European verification centre pro-
posal is slowly gathering support and will begin 
to exist de facto when the WEU Torrej6n centre 
is operational and when the CSCE Conflict Pre-
vention Centre is given the go-ahead to do more 
than merely observe crises. A European verifi-
cation centre is a must if we are to be serious 
about the various treaties we are gaily signing 
and hoping to ratify in a very short time-
frame. 
Ill. WEU action 
23. The balance sheet on WEU action on 
arms control over the past six months is never-
theless much in credit, and the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council and the Secretary-General 
deserve particular praise for their positive 
actions in a number of forums. 
24. As we shall examine later in detail, WEU 
has been active in CFE, over CSBMs, open skies 
and in the Conference on Disarmament. With 
the setting-up of the WEU satellite centre at 
Torrej6n, near Madrid, we have our first opera-
tional contribution to make for verification. In 
fact for CFE verification in particular (multina-
tional teams, training of inspectors, etc.) and for 
open skies, a series of WEU initiatives have 
been much appreciated by both the NATO 
authorities and by the " new democracies " . 
25. As well as the informal WEU caucuses in 
Vienna, chaired by the Head of the German Del-
egations for the CSBM and CFE talks, with 
other nations included on a regular basis, a 
workshop for the directors of national verifi-
cation units was organised in Berlin in March by 
Germany in its capacity as President of the 
WEU Council and was open to all CFE signa-
tories; an in-house meeting for WEU heads of 
national verification units is planned for the 
beginning of June. The 4th WEU European 
Session of Higher Defence Studies, held at 
Ebenhausen near Munich in March, included a 
specific working group on " WEU and arms 
control" . For open skies, WEU nations met in 
Moscow on 26th and 27th March to progress 
joint ideas on the setting-up of flights, etc. 
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26. These are all very positive moves and they 
bode well for the future co-ordinating role which 
WEU is being called to play. Your Rapporteur 
can testify to the dedication of those involved in 
the negotiations, both in national capitals and 
on the spot in Vienna and Helsinki, and the 
committee as a whole was very favourably 
impressed by the atmosphere of detente and 
determination to succeed when we met in 
Vienna at the beginning of March. The focus 
now is on Helsinki and the fourth CSCE review 
conference which is why your Rapporteur has 
been asked by colleagues to highlight the CSCE 
on this occasion. 
IV. The CSCE today 
27. The subject of the present report is 
"Arms control: CSCE and WEU ",but it must 
be remembered that CSCE itself is a much wider 
set of considerations than mere arms control on 
its own. 
28. Many of us, wearing our " Council of 
Europe " hats, have been aware of, and some 
intimately concerned with, such wider consider-
ations, especially concerning human rights. 
Some of us will be participating in the CSCE 
Assembly to be held in Budapest from 3rd to 6th 
July 1992. 
29. Your Rapporteur, therefore, considers it 
appropriate to expand his comments on the 
CSCE process to set the scene for the recom-
mendations to be put before the Defence Com-
mittee and the Assembly and to shine a political 
spotlight into some of the recesses, ideally dis-
persing a few shadows and bringing a number of 
problems into full view. The aim is to put the 
specific arms control considerations into per-
spective and, by understanding the context, 
better prepare the debate for the next plenary 
session. 
30. The Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was established 
in 1975. To date its most glorious moment was 
the signature of the Paris Charter by the then 35 
members in November 1990. At the time 
opinion was widely divided on the CSCE's scope 
and future role. Now, with the CSCE review 
conference underway in Helsinki since 24th 
March 1992, there appears to be more of an 
inclination to expand the body. 
31. In fact, the first decision of this fourth 
conference was to admit three new members, 
Georgia, Slovenia and Croatia, to the CSCE. 
With this decision, the CSCE now counts 51 
members. The CSCE originated with 35 partici-
pants, dropping to 34 following German unifi-
cation and rising again to 35 after the entry of 
Albania in 1991. Membership rose to 38 fol-
lowing the admission of three Baltic states in 
1991 and to 48 following the admission of ten 
republics of the CIS (with the exception of 
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Russia, which had inherited the USSR's seat) on 
30th January 1992 in.Prague. 
32. It should be recalled that three CSCE con-
ferences have been held since the 1975 Helsinki 
summit at which the Final Act was adopted: 
- in Belgrade from October 1977 to 
March 1978; 
- in Madrid from November 1980 to 
September 1983, a meeting leading to 
the adoption of a final document 
strengthening the protection of human 
rights and providing a mandate for a 
conference on disarmament in Europe 
(the CDE, which concluded an 
agreement in September 1986 in 
Stockholm on notification and obser-
vation of military exercises); 
- in Vienna from November 1986 to 
January 1989, a conference which 
enabled adopting another document 
stipulating new commitments in human 
rights and which launched two series of 
negotiations on disarmament, the one 
which resulted in the treaty on the 
reduction of conventional forces in 
Europe (CFE) signed in November 
1990 and the one on confi-
dence-building measures (CSBM) 
whose final document now has to be 
ratified in Helsinki. An extraordinary 
summit of the CSCE in Paris in 
November 1990 led to adoption of the 
Charter of Paris, providing the CSCE 
with new institutions. 
33. Also, last November in Rome at the 
NATO summit, and in December in Brussels at 
the NATO Council meeting, greater CSCE 
co-operation in arms control, confidence-
building measures and monitoring of crises was 
envisaged. 
34. In January this year CSCE foreign min-
isters met in Prague to prepare for the Helsinki 
meeting and to discuss the admission of the 
former Soviet republics, as well as adopting 
plans to develop CSCE institutions and activ-
ities. A resume of that meeting's conclusions is 
at Appendix I; the Prague document on the 
future development of CSCE institutions and 
structures is at Appendix 11. 
35. The whole range of subjects of interest to 
the Assembly (crisis management, conflict pre-
vention, peace-keeping operations, non-
proliferation, arms transfers, arms control (CFE 
especially and CSBMs), open skies, military doc-
trine and conversion of armament industries) is 
tackled in these documents. 
36. For the first time, WEU per se has been 
invited to take part in formal CSCE meetings 
and continuing WEU participation has been 
confirmed in Chapter IX of the Prague doc-
ument (Appendix 11). 
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37. In recent months, expansion of the 
CSCE's role has been evident with the estab-
lishment of an arbitration mechanism, dis-
cussion of possible military peace-keeping forces 
and the idea of monitoring arms embargoes. The 
Office for Free Elections has expanded to assist 
in establishing democratic institutions, and 
on-site inspections and investigations have been 
carried out. (Such a mission was sent recently to 
the troubled former Soviet region of Nagomo-
K.arabakh.) 
(i) CSCE - the view from Berlin 
38. One of the staunchest supporters of the 
CSCE was the Chairman-in-Office of our WEU 
Council of Ministers, then German Foreign 
Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Speaking on 
Wednesday 1st April 1992 at the Assembly's 
symposium on "A new security order in 
Europe ", held in the Reichstag, Berlin, he had 
this to say: 
" In the past, the CSCE has played a 
major role in overcoming the division of 
Europe. Today, it forms the compre-
hensive framework for consultation and 
action for the area of co-operation from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
By convening a conference on Nagomo-
Karabakh, the CSCE has signalled its 
determination to bring its peace-making 
influence to bear in this region, too. At the 
Helsinki follow-up meeting, its capacity 
for action, particularly regarding conflict 
prevention, crisis management and the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts, must be 
enhanced. The CSCE must develop from 
a community of shared values to a com-
munity taking joint decisions and action. 
Stability in Europe means: 
- democracy and the rule of law; 
- respect for human and minority rights 
as well as for national boundaries; 
- co-operative security structures; 
- economic development and social 
peace; 
- protection of the natural sources of life. 
That goes for every state and for every 
people. The West will not fare well in the 
long term if the East lacks this stability. 
Every single European and transatlantic 
institution must contribute to this all-
European stability. In Prague, the CSCE's 
capacity to act in order to safeguard 
human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law was strengthened. In the case of 
unequivocal, grave violations of CSCE 
commitments which have not been 
redressed, appropriate measures can be 
taken by the Council or the Committee of 
Senior Officials, if necessary also without 
the agreement of the state concerned. This 
progress must now find expression in 
political practice. 
The German proposal for the estab-
lishment of a steering committee to 
support the CSCE chairmanship in Hel-
sinki has met with approval. It could be 
composed of the CSCE Chairman-in-
Office supported by his predecessor and 
successor in ·office, as well as three to four 
particularly interested states. In critical 
situations requiring urgent action, it will 
give the participating states which now 
number 51, increased scope for action. 
The CSCE instruments must be 
developed to cover the entire range from 
" early-warning " to " peace-keeping mea-
sures". 
In the field of environmental protection, 
the CSCE must be able in emergency situ-
ations to quickly mobilise the existing 
resources of its participating states. The 
CSCE needs units with both "blue" and 
" green " helmets. 
In Helsinki I proposed that the CSCE 
should in future perceive itself as a 
" regional arrangement " within the 
meaning of Chapter VIII of the United 
Nations Charter. This would demonstrate 
that the CSCE wishes itself to safeguard 
its interests within the United Nations 
framework. 
The radical changes in Europe afford us 
the opportunity to develop a new system 
of co-operative security. In this context, 
decisive importance attaches to disarm-
ament and arms control. The CFE Treaty 
must be ratified and implemented by all 
concerned, including the CIS states 
involved. The CFE la treaty on the limi-
tation of personnel strengths should be 
completed by the beginning of July this 
year. In the CSCE region, there must be 
no excessive arms build-up. This would 
thwart all efforts towards economic 
reform and development. 
The 1992 Vienna document, which 
extended the confidence- and security-
building measures of the 1990 Vienna 
document, as well as the Treaty on Open 
Skies, has established vital new founda-
tions for co-operative security. The fol-
low-up meeting must initiate a new 
chapter of disarmament as well as 
confidence- and security-building. . 
A new negotiating mandate must com-
prise: 
- further confidence- and security-building 
measures in the light of experiences 
with the 1990 and 1992 Vienna Docu-
ments; 
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- a reduction of forces in Europe to a 
level corresponding to the new political 
situation; 
- the opening of continuous dialogue on 
security issues, which is intended to 
lead to a code of new basic approaches 
to security. 
The short-range nuclear missiles and 
nuclear artillery of the United States and 
the Soviet successor states must be 
destroyed, as announced in 1991 by Pres-
ident Bush and the former Soviet Pres-
ident Gorbachev. The danger of the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction 
must now be guarded against with the 
utmost urgency. This is currently the 
greatest security risk facing mankind. 
- The non-proliferation treaty must at 
last become universally binding. 
The United Nations Security Council 
must assume the role of patron for this 
treaty. This must be an item of top pri-
ority on its agenda. 
Advantage must now be taken of the 
broad consensus on further strength-
ening the United Nations, particularly 
as regards this aspect. The same applies 
to reactor safety. 
- Together with the American and 
Russian Foreign Ministers, I have 
called for the establishment of a centre 
in Russia to enable scientists previously 
employed on the research and devel-
opment of weapons of mass destruction 
to now work on eliminating them, and 
to contribute to greater safety in the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. This 
project is now being realised. 
The CSCE member states have com-
mitted themselves to participate in the 
United Nations arms transfer register. 
This must be supplemented by an 
agreement on international arms export 
restrictions. 
The export of the East-West conflict to the 
South has ended. It must not now be 
replaced by the export of arms. The con-
clusion of a convention on a global ban of 
chemical weapons this year remains a 
high priority. " 
(ii) CSCE seen from Washington 
39. Of course there are nuances in different 
national viewpoints on the way in which the 
CSCE process should be developed and no 
attitude is more nuanced than that of the United 
States, although perhaps for rather different 
reasons, as will be examined shortly. 
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40. Speaking to the Helsinki follow-up 
meeting on 31st March 1992, the Head of the 
United States Delegation, Ambassador John 
Komblum, had this to say: 
" Our real job in Helsinki is to develop an 
entirely new definition of European 
security. This definition should be opera-
tional and should speak to the needs of all 
peoples of the CSCE. It should replace an 
essentially static concept founded on the 
existence of two blocs, with a multi-
directional and multi-layered idea which 
makes concrete use of the democratic 
principles upon which the CSCE is 
based. 
This definition must take account of the 
great diversity which now characterises 
the security debate in Europe. To look 
forward to new challenges, we must devise 
a security definition which is clear in its 
goals, but flexible in its methods. 
Above all, this new definition should 
build on the basic agreement on values 
which now exists among us. It should 
place human rights and democratic insti-
tutions at the operational centre of our 
activities. Work on the human dimension 
is not finished, as some may suggest. In 
reality, we have just moved one step 
closer to our goal. Once human rights was 
a centre of dispute among us. Now it has 
become a common principle. Our next 
task is to build on our diversity to 
translate this principle into practice. 
The very genius of our CSCE process is 
this diversity and flexibility. The CSCE 
does not proceed from the same assump-
tions as do NATO and the EC, for 
example. These organisations expand on 
the sense of security which already exists 
among their members who share common 
levels of development and approach. 
The CSCE was based upon the 
assumption that its signatories do not 
share common approaches. It seeks to 
create security by expanding areas of con-
sensus among differing points of view. 
This consensus is translated into action 
through the political will of its members 
to succeed in defining common goals. 
This underlying principle is as valid today 
as it was ten years ago. Happily, the con-
frontation of military forces and ideol-
ogies has been overcome. But it cannot be 
said that all CSCE countries share the 
same levels of development or approach. 
The potential for conflict remains real. 
The need for expanded democratic con-
sensus is more vital than ever. 
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This fact was demonstrated vividly to us 
last week with agreement on the con-
ference on Nagomo-Karabakh. The 
painful search for consensus produced a 
demonstration of political will by all 
members which brought about the first 
concrete result in mediation efforts on 
this tragic problem. 
When thinking to the future, it will be 
important to keep these examples in mind 
when considering what is really new about 
our CSCE: 
- it is not " new thinking " to build 
bureaucratic organisations; 
- it is not creative to pursue rules, written 
or otherwise, which seek to enforce con-
sensus where none exists; and 
- it is not forward-looking to seek treaties 
or agreements to legislate peace which 
has not first been achieved through the 
search for political consensus. 
These are in fact the methods of the past. 
History is filled with mutual guarantees, 
non-aggression pacts and promises of 
good behaviour. 
What is truly revolutionary about the 
CSCE process is its ability to establish a 
political process among states of diverse 
interests and backgrounds and to actually 
achieve results. 
If we wish to do something truly creative 
at this conference, we will proceed from 
the foundation provided by the values 
reflected in the Final Act, using the 
political process as an operational 
framework. 
Such a goal is much harder to achieve 
than is agreement on new bureacratic 
structures or pieces of paper. If it is to be 
reached, there must be an evolution of the 
thinking in western countries as well as in 
the new democracies to the East. 
In particular, we must all cease to view 
relations within Europe as a sort of 
zero-sum game, in which the gains of one 
group must be balanced by losses of 
another. Our goal now is to take the indi-
vidual elements of our structure and 
combine them in a way in which the result 
is greater than the pieces of the whole. 
We believe that this truly new approach to 
the CSCE should be reflected in a political 
statement by our summit leaders which 
builds upon the accomplishments of the 
past. It should include: 
- reaffirmation of the basic values to 
which the CSCE is attached and appli-
cation of these values to a new opera-
tional framework; 
- development of this framework on the 
basis of principles enunciated at 
Prague. That is that the Council of 
Ministers and the CSO central organs 
collaborate in a political process of 
increased consultation and concerted 
action; 
- support for this operational principle of 
the CSCE through strengthening of the 
institutions and methods. In this 
regard, we would support proposals for 
development of troika or steering group 
concepts and for expansion and better 
definition of the roles of the ODIHR 
and the CPC. We view our proposal for 
an economic forum in this same 
context; 
- focus the work of these institutions on 
the central task of the CSCE in the 
post-cold war world. Some persons 
describe this task as conflict prevention 
or crisis management. We would 
expand the definition to talk of the 
process of managing change. Change is 
happening and we want it to happen. 
But it must occur within certain limits. 
In the years to come, the central 
political task of the CSCE will be to 
ensure that change takes place in a pos-
itive fashion which supports the devel-
opment of democratic institutions. 
We agree with those who argue that the 
CSCE should refine and strengthen its 
structures to this end. In this regard we 
think highly of the Dutch proposal on 
early-warning indicators and welcome 
the British paper on conflict pre-
vention. We believe that a major result 
of this conference should be an inte-
grated structure, focused on the min-
isters and the CSO, which strengthens 
CSCE's ability to manage change; 
- reduce the danger of military confron-
tation and conflict through agreement 
on a comprehensive structure for dia-
logue, negotiation and co-operation in 
the field of military security. CSCE will 
become central to the on-going arms 
control process and thus should 
establish its own forum for that 
purpose. This forum should be limited 
to its specified tasks, however. It should 
neither become the focus of our 
conflict-prevention structure, nor 
should it be the seed of an overall 
structure for security. Our desire to 
keep the CPC separate from this forum 
is based on this overall concept. The 
CPC should serve all aspects of the 
council's efforts to manage change. It 
should not be tied to one segment of the 
CSCE; 
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- supplement these operational efforts 
with continued CSCE projects to attack 
the underlying causes of tensions. This 
is the reason for our proposal for a 
seminar on migration. We agree that 
further work should also be done on the 
subject of minorities. Important areas 
for co-operation exist in the areas of 
economics, science and technology and 
the environment. The fields of culture 
and press and information remain vital 
to our task; 
- deepen the expertise available to the 
CSCE by expanding opportunities for 
work with international organisations. 
Such work should include more possi-
bilities for individual presentations in 
plenaries and working groups of all 
CSCE meetings; provision for regular 
attendance at meetings as observers 
and co-ordination and co-operation of 
specific projects agreed at CSCE with 
existing organisations. We take seri-
ously the mandate of the Prague minis-
terial to expand contacts with trans-
Atlantic and European organisations. 
We wish it could be put into full effect 
now, while Helsinki is still underway. 
Since this seems not to be possible, we 
will hope for agreement by the end of 
the meeting. In the meantime, we will 
monitor the work of the working groups 
carefully to ensure that all relevant 
organisations can participate in the 
various groups which would profit from 
their experience; 
- expand the effectiveness of our work 
through increasing opportunities for 
contributions by non-governmental 
institutions and organisations. CSCE 
cannot become a club of diplomats. It 
must increasingly involve the public. If 
it does not, it will soon lose credi-
bility. " 
41. Your Rapporteur is pleased to report that 
the idea of " expanding opportunities for work 
with international organisations " is already a 
reality. WEU was invited to make an initial con-
tribution to the CSCE plenary session on Friday 
3rd April and the text of the Deputy Secretary-
General's address is at Appendix Ill. 
42. The following week the United States Del-
egation, profiting from the fact-finding mission 
of your Rapporteur at the CSCE review con-
ference, suggested that WEU should be invited 
to attend the appropriate working group to con-
tinue and expand the dialogue begun in the 
plenary. We should hope that the idea is taken 
up for it is only through specific dialogue that 
the review conference will make definite 
progress. 
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(iii) The art of caucusing 
43. In passing, your Rapporteur would like to 
draw attention to a striking aspect of the work 
methods of " western " delegations contrasted 
between Vienna and Helsinki. In the days of the 
two blocs, in spite of the official theory that the 
nations were all negotiating on an individual 
basis, there were very many " western " and 
" eastern " caucuses. With the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact arid therefore the disappearance of 
the " eastern " caucus, even the " western " 
caucus has become less homogeneous and, espe-
cially in Vienna, an informal " WEU caucus " 
has been formed. This is of course in keeping 
with what was decided and declared by WEU in 
Maastricht last year, but such caucussing has 
long been taking place de facto because of the 
desire over the years of the Defence Committee 
to consult delegations in what has become a 
regular round table session whenever the com-
mittee meets in Vienna. Not that such meetings 
have been exclusively WED-oriented. On every 
occasion the committee has also been addressed 
by United States delegations and indeed a large 
number of other major delegations (a tradition 
which we have established also in Geneva at the 
Conference on Disarmament). 
44. At our last meeting in Vienna, at the 
beginning of March, we were delighted that the 
majority of Chairmen of National Defence 
Committees from all the European NATO coun-
tries were willing and able to accept our invi-
tation to participate, thus allowing both a wid-
ening and a deepening of the discussion. 
45. Of course, the" widening" versus" deep-
ening " debate may be seen in other contexts 
also. Which brings us back to Helsinki and a 
particular problem inherited directly from 
Maastricht. Foreign policy and security matters 
are now within the purview of the European 
Community, and therefore the "caucusing" 
among Europeans in Helsinki is being con-
ducted at the level of the Twelve. This is not 
without its problems, however, and each nation 
has floated its pet idea or ideas of the moment in 
individual attempts to seize the initiative. 
46. For example, among the list of proposals 
presented for consideration by the Twelve for 
possible common presentation figure the fol-
lowing: 
- Belgium: settlement of differences and 
maintenance of peace; 
- Denmark: working procedures gov-
erning the meetings of the Council (not 
yet circulated among the Twelve); 
peace-keeping (with Nordic group and 
Canada; Sweden has proposed a CSCE 
permanent force of some 50 000); 
- France: juridical justification of institu-
tions, agreement on the status of the 
secretariat, the Conflict Prevention 
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Centre (CPC) and the Office of Demo-
cratic Institutions ·and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) ; mandate for a CSCE 
security treaty; 
- France/Germany: conciliation and arbi-
trage; 
- Germany: troika and steering com-
mittee; regional arrangement (Chapter 
VIII, United Nations Charter); 
"green" helmets (environment); 
- Italy: dialogue with non-participating 
states; 
- Netherlands: CSCE High Commis-
sioner for Minorities; CSCE and opera-
tional aspects of crisis management and 
conflict prevention; 
- Spain: replacement of follow-up 
meetings by the summit preparatory 
committee; 
- United Kingdom: resolving disputes 
which have the potential to develop 
into armed conflict; " Code of 
Practice " (human rights and funda-
mental freedoms). 
47. Most of these ideas are of course very 
worthy of further consideration but the like-
lihood is that in Helsinki there will not be time 
to develop every proposal fully. In years to come 
it is to be hoped that the mechanics of European 
Union will encourage the ordering of priorities 
and the concentrating of effort: the use of" pre-
cision guidance " rather than the " shotgun " 
approach. 
48. Hence your Rapporteur's plea for a con-
tinuing WEU caucus on matters where the 
Twelve have agreed to delegate to WEU, namely 
defence in all its ramifications (and arms control 
is now an integral part of defence rather than 
being, as in the past, a " twinkle in the eye " of 
an undefined future security structure). We are 
now to implement specifics in the new arms 
control regimes: we are talking about people, 
arms, equipment, armies, navies and air forces 
in real terms - terms which are still the prerog-
ative of national governments, of national par-
liaments and therefore of the WEU Assembly 
which is now confirmed by Maastricht as being 
the only international parliamentary instance in 
Europe with both the right and the duty to 
discuss defence matters. 
49. Where particular arms control initiatives 
are concerned (for example over verification 
methods and co-operation - observation satel-
lites, inspection teams and open skies) WEU is 
showing that it can take initiativ-es and follow 
them through. Such initiatives should be taken 
further, ideally in partnership with other CSCE 
members, and WEU should be allowed to take 
the lead for the Twelve rather than having to 
proceed at the pace of the slowest or the most 
reluctant. (Being a realist, your Rapporteur is 
aware that this problem is likely to be exacer-
bated in the future, especially when the EC is 
expanded and more and more non-NATO 
members join.) 
(iv) A CSCE treaty? 
50. Of the proposals for discussion listed 
above, a number are obviously linked to 
national stances and are perhaps likely to elicit 
little support from partners, although little 
opposition either. 
51. One proposal in particular, howe.ver, has 
already led to some polemic and should be 
examined further in the light of the many affir-
mations that the CSCE should be developed and 
given a more solid basis. This is the idea pro-
posed by France of a CSCE treaty. 
52. At present the non-treaty CSCE charter 
and declaration are not binding and therefore 
cannot fill the security vacuum in Central 
Europe to provide security guarantees. France, 
strongly seconded by Russia, has proposed that 
the CSCE establish a mandate to examine the 
idea of a specific treaty to establish the norms of 
good conduct between participant states and 
agreement on non-aggression. 
53. Some transatlantic opposition to the idea 
is already apparent, especially as such a treaty is 
perceived as being detrimental to NATO, but 
your Rapporteur believes that this might be the 
answer to NATO's problem in not being willing 
to extend its own guarantees further eastwards. 
The proposal at least merits greater consider-
ation and would be a very suitable subject for 
the forthcoming discussion between WEU and 
the Central and Eastern European " Eight ". 
54. Meanwhile, two other proposals are elic-
iting some immediate support: the United 
Kingdom's suggestions on "Resolving disputes 
which have the potential to develop into armed 
conflict" and the Netherlands' ideas on" Oper-
ational aspects of crisis management and con-
flict prevention " . The reasoning of both pro-
posals merits reading in full and the national 
papers are reproduced as Appendices IV 
(United Kingdom) and V (Netherlands) respec-
tively. 
55. Of the two ideas, the Dutch suggestion on 
" sub-contracting " CSCE action to NATO or 
WEU has specific application for our own 
organisation, especially as we move towards a 
more operational structure (see also the Defence 
Committee report "WEU: the operational 
organisation", Rapporteur: Sir Dudle~, Smith). 
56. NATO itself has been understandably 
enthusiastic about such ideas and indeed the 
NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political 
Affairs, addressing the Helsinki plenary session 
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on 2nd April 1992, said that " a thorough dis-
cussion will take place inside the alliance to 
reach a consensus among allies on the possibil-
ities of NATO to support future CSCE peace-
keeping and peace-enforcement activities by 
making available its means, such as communica-
tions, intelligence, logistics, infrastructure or 
even forces ". (The full text of the address is at 
Appendix VI.) 
57. It may, however, take some time to 
achieve such a consensus among NATO 
members, particularly given the past difficulties 
on agreement for NATO action within area, let 
alone out of area. WEU's more pragmatic possi-
bilities, politically, under Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, associating other 
CSCE nations for any given action, as suggested 
by the Dutch in their paper (Appendix V), 
would probably prove preferable. 
58. Regarding CSCE action in the future, 
there is one vital aspect which needs immediate 
consideration. Our governments must tackle the 
question of whether they continue to assign new 
roles to the CSCE while continuing to make 
available only the present meagre resources for 
its embryonic institutions. The CSCE secretariat 
in Prague has a staff of six and has to spend 
much of its small budget on language provisions. 
The Warsaw-based Office for Free Elections 
(OFE), recently renamed the Office of Demo-
cratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 
has been given increased duties and also has a 
staff of six. The Conflict Prevention Centre 
(CPC) in Vienna has a staff of seven and is now 
to function as a clearing house and data-bank for 
information on military forces, budgets and 
activities. When the Defence Committee, 
meeting in Vienna at the beginning of March, 
was briefed by the Director of the CPC, it was 
obvious that a lack of resources, both human 
and financial, was hampering the centre's work 
and potential. It is hardly possible at present to 
consider the centre as operational for the pre-
vention of any conflict whatsoever: conflict limi-
tation maybe ... A positive step by WEU in 
support of the CPC would be to make available 
the services of the WEU satellite centre at 
Torrej6n, when operational itself. This would be 
fully compatible with one of the WEU centre's 
roles: helping with crisis management through 
timely analysis of imagery. 
(v) The danger of duplication 
59. Throughout its existence WEU has been 
very careful to emphasise complementarity and 
to avoid any duplication with other competent 
institutions, especially NATO. Even with the 
present surge in recruiting for WEU (Torrej6n 
represents a 50% increase in total staft) the 
organisation will number only some 150, which 
is a great deal more than the CSCE, but consid-
erably less than the thousands employed in 
NATO headquarters and commands. A redistri-
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bution of human as well as financial resources is 
now called for and a rigorous effort made to 
avoid duplication. 
60. The greatest example of such duplication 
currently involves NATO and the CSCE, and is 
fraught with political overtones. The bone of 
contention is the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council (NACC) which is seemingly running on 
parallel tracks to the CSCE, but with a more 
powerful engine pulling the train ... 
61. Originally a United States-German initi-
ative, the NACC began life as a means to bring 
NATO and the ex-Warsaw Pact nations 
together. The problem is that it is fast becoming 
too big for its nest, like the proverbial cuckoo, 
and risks alienating those it was designed to 
reassure. In European terms, with the demise of 
the Soviet Union and with now the inclusion of 
the Asian republics, the NACC has become a 
paradox: Asia is in, while a large part of Europe 
(first and foremost the neutral and non-aligned 
states) is out. 
62. The aims of the NACC are very laudable 
and its " work plan for dialogue, partnership and 
co-operation ", issued at its meeting in Brussels 
on lOth March 1992 (see text at Appendix VII) 
is a model for all possible aspects of 
co-operation across the range of interests of each 
and every one ofthe participants. The work plan 
has been further refined as a result of the 
meeting of NACC Defence Ministers and repre-
sentatives in Brussels on 1st April 1992 (text 
at Appendix VIII) and a list drawn up of areas 
for further co-operation in defence-related 
matters. 
63. If duplication with CSCE is to be avoided 
then there must be urgent discussion between all 
concerned to agree a reasonable division of 
labour. This, however, would imply an 
alignment in membership between the two 
instances and, if ever we reach such an 
arrangement, what would be more logical than 
to merge the CSCE and the NACC? The 
problem of infrastructure for the CSCE would 
be resolved at a stroke, the seeming lack of 
political purpose for NATO also resolved for the 
longer term ... 
64. Of course there are wider considerations 
and many obstacles in the way to be overcome. 
Not least among these is the uncertain position 
of the United States. On the one hand, the 
American view is the simplistic approach of the 
Wall Street Journal Europe: "NATO has dem-
onstrated that it is an organisation in which 
diverse nations can work together in harmony 
on that most serious of all subjects, national 
security " (3rd April1992) and going on to assert 
"The United Nations, the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Western 
European Union - none of them could have 
managed this". (Of course they could not, with 
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such determined support for the NACC, not to 
mention quite a sizeable budget as an incentive 
for " success " when many of the smaller players 
are not even able to finance permanent delega-
tions to the CSCE ... ). Quite a contrast with a 
very different, rather more analytical view from 
the International Herald Tribune (7th April 
1992): 
" Europe is going through a phase of 
extreme instability. Thus, the provision of 
security remains an issue of central 
importance. To put it in simplified terms, 
there are two basic alternatives: 
Either NATO remains the western 
instrument of collective defence, in which 
case the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe has to be 
developed into an effective system of col-
lective security. 
Or NATO develops into an Atlantic/pan-
European system of collective security, in 
which case the function of collective 
defence of Western Europe has to be per-
formed by the European Community and 
Western European Union. " 
65. Whichever development is favoured, the 
United States must try to ensure that it avoids 
giving the appearance of dominance in the 
NACC, which is already causing a number of 
central and eastern (as well as western) 
European countries to shy away from a new 
United States/Russian condominium ... 
66. That being said, an environment for plain 
speaking is gradually being installed both in 
CSCE and the NACC and the latter has been 
instrumental in furthering considerations to 
ensure a reasonably rapid ratification of the 
CFE agreement (although at the time of writing 
quite a few states had not yet completed the rati-
fication process, let alone deposited that ratifi-
cation in the Netherlands). Your Rapporteur 
trusts that, as emphasised in the set of recom-
mendations adopted by the Assembly last 
December, the CFE Treaty will be fully vetted 
and agreed well before the Helsinki summit 
scheduled for 9th and lOth July 1992. The fear 
is that the Russian President's current trial of 
strength with the Russian Parliament may have 
an adverse effect on the ratification process. 
Implementing the treaty would then prove a 
near-impossibility and a massive set-back for 
any hopes of structured international arms 
control. The other brake on implementation of 
CFE is the need to share the various treaty-
limited equipments between the CIS states. Slow 
progress is being made at the time of writing. 
67. With regard to CSBMs, the 1992 Vienna 
document, agreed just before the start of the 
Helsinki review conference, shows what sub-
stantial developments there have been regarding 
the whole range of topics under consideration: 
from an annual exchange of military infor-
mation, including information on military 
forces, on plans for the deployment of major 
weapon and equipment systems, on military 
budgets, unusual military activities, etc., etc. to 
compliance and verification through inspecti~n. 
This is the way in which agreed CSBMs will be 
applied. The 1992 Vienna document marks a 
significant milestone along the road leading to a 
safer . and more secure structure for European 
secunty. Much ofthe success of the document is 
due in no small measure to the efforts of the 
Polish Delegation in Vienna in producing an 
appropriate draft and steering it through various 
minefields to general acceptance. 
(vi) Open skies 
68. The other remarkable success from 
Vienna is the agreement on open skies signed on 
the opening day of the Helsinki review con-
fe~ence .. The Defence Committee, meeting in 
V 1enna m March 1992, under the auspices of the 
German Delegation, representing the Chairman-
in-Office of the WEU Council, was able to con-
centrate on the various aspects of these negotia-
tions, where substantive progress was made in a 
comparatively brief period, with much of the 
impetus coming from WEU itself. Your 
Rapporteur is particularly grateful for the very 
clear statement of the basic principles of the 
Open Skies Treaty provided by the Head of the 
German Delegation: 
" 1. The Open Skies Treaty lays down the 
conditions for air observation of the ter-
ritory of participating states from Van-
couver to Vladivostok. For the first time 
since the division of Europe came to an 
end, it sets out in contractual form the 
new concept of co-operative security and 
is the expression of a security alliance cov-
ering Europe and also the territory of 
Russia and the whole of North America. 
The negotiations were exemplary since 
their resumption at the beginning of 
November 1991 insofar as, for the first 
time in the history of arms control, Russia 
was not treated as an enemy. Each time 
the Russian Delegation made a serious 
request, the other parties were prepared to 
follow it up constructively. 
2. In addition to the observation possibil-
ities now afforded by national technical 
means, i.e. satellites belonging to the few 
rare states having them, air observation 
by aircraft equipped with sensors means 
that co-operation can be started with the 
following advantages: 
- this system can be used flexibly 
depending on the period chosen, the 
region to be observed and the necessary 
itinerary and flight altitude, this being 
possible over great distances; 
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- it allows very effective surveillance 
thanks to sensors which take account of 
the many kinds of visibility conditions 
(optical and video cameras, infrared 
and radar sensors) and have appro-
priate resolution capability; 
- it is significantly cheaper than national 
technical means; and 
- all the states concerned can very 
quickly have identical data obtained 
from overflights. 
3. The treaty includes the following 
essential provisions: 
- states parties to the treaty agree to other 
signatory states overflying their entire 
territory subject to brief notice being 
given. Flight restrictions are authorised 
only if air security is at stake; 
- it fixes the number of overflights 
authorised each year, for instance 42 
for the United States and for Russia 
and Byelorussia combined and 12 each 
for France, Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. In the first three 
years, only 7 5% of overflight quotas 
will be filled. Signatory states may join 
together as groups of states, thus 
pooling their quotas - as in the case of 
Russia and Byelorussia - or sharing 
their active overflight rights, as in the 
case of the WEU countries. The 
breakdown of active quotas, i.e. the 
number of observation flights by each 
signatory state and their aims, is 
renewed each year by consensus; 
- as a general rule, flights must be 
effected by aircraft belonging to the 
observer state or group of states. 
However, the country to be observed 
has the right to make an observation 
aircraft available from its own country. 
Depending on the size of the country 
observed and the number of aero-
dromes recorded there, flights are 
limited to certain maximum distances, 
for instance 1 200 km for Germany and 
4 000 km for the United States; 
- sensors on board aircraft, which must 
be purchased on the market by each 
participating country without excep-
tion, must have an appropriate reso-
lution capability and, in the medium 
term, allow all-weather, night and day 
air observation of military activities 
and installations. This equipment, 
which must be procured within three 
years, must include a series of optical 
and video cameras, synthetic aperture 
radar and infrared sensors. In the 
meantime, aircraft will be equipped 
with less sophisticated sensors; 
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- data obtained from overflights will also 
be made available to other signatory 
states on payment of an appropriate 
share of the cost; 
- as a general rule, the observer country 
pays for the overflight. Howver, details 
still have to be worked out by the Open 
Skies Consultative Committee; 
- initially, the treaty will be signed by the 
states that played a direct part in the 
negotiations. Among the successor 
countries of the former Soviet Union, 
these are the Russian Federation, Bye-
lorussia and Ukraine. The treaty is 
open to signature by the other 
republics. Within six months of the 
date of entry into force, other member 
countries of the CSCE may accede. 
Finally, other countries may be invited 
to accede to the treaty. 
4. In order to contribute to openness and 
transparency, the aim of the Open Skies 
Treaty is to record military activities. Its 
use may subsequently be extended to 
include verification of arms control agree-
ments, e.g. the CFE Treaty, conflict pre-
vention and crisis management, as well as 
the protection of the environment. 
Europeans consider the Open Skies 
Treaty plays an important part in moni-
toring military equipment and activities 
linked with security outside the area of 
application of the CFE Treaty and 
confidence-building measures decided in 
the CSCE, i.e. on the other side of the 
Urals. The importance of this aspect is 
enhanced if one considers that, during the 
CFE negotiations, the former Soviet 
Union withdrew to the other side of the 
Urals large amounts of equipment limited 
by the treaty. In regard to verification, ref-
erence is made to Article XVIII of the 
CFE Treaty, according to which an air 
inspection system was to be established. 
This might now be done on the basis of 
the Open Skies Treaty. 
Open skies flights can help in crisis man-
agement. The flexibility of the aircraft 
and the launching at short notice of open 
skies flights, possibly jointly, are original 
ways of ensuring active crisis man-
agement. The treaty merely affirms that 
open skies observation flights may be 
used for this purpose. The corresponding 
provisions and decisions will have to be 
decided by the appropriate CSCE and 
other international bodies. 
Signatory states may submit to the Open 
Skies Consultative Committee proposals 
concerning the application of the open 
skies system in other areas such as pro-
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tecting the environment. Joint decisions 
would then have to be taken on the pro-
curement of the necessary special 
sensors. 
5. The Open Skies Treaty provides for 
co-operation in groups of states. The 
WEU countries, on the one hand, and the 
Russian Federation and Byelorussia, on 
the other, have opted for this method. 
Groups of states may co-operate inter alia 
by: 
- pooling their overflight quotas. For this 
purpose, they may set up a community 
of states with joint active and passive 
quotas (Byelorussia and Russian Fede-
ration) or use active overflight quotas 
jointly, while maintaining the indi-
vidual quotas of the participating states 
(see the example of WEU at 
appendix); 
- pooling aircraft and sensors; 
- sharing expenditure. 
Co-operation by groups of states is a 
major factor in reducing the cost of over-
flights. The treaty provides for other ways 
of reducing costs for countries that do not 
form part of a group: 
- participation in overflights carried out 
by another state or group of states by 
forming multilateral teams of 
observers; 
- chartering an observation aircraft from 
another state or group of states in order 
to carry out an overflight for obser-
vation purposes; 
- purchasing copies of the images taken 
during an overflight by another state or 
group of states. 
Thus, all states parties to the treaty can 
take advantage of the possibilities offered 
by air observation in the framework of 
open skies overflights. 
6. The treaty provides for the creation of 
a special body - the Open Skies Consul-
tative Committee - which will have its 
seat in Vienna and be responsible for 
implementing, completing and finalising 
the treaty. Since it was· not possible to 
solve certain essential problems in the 
treaty such as deciding on costs and 
methods of calculating the resolution of 
the sensors before the treaty was signed, 
the committee was expected to meet for 
the first time on 30th March 1992. 
7. The fact that the treaty was not com-
pleted until after the recent political 
events in Eastern Europe also shows the 
cooperative nature of the open skies 
system. In 1990, the two rounds of negoti-
ations held in Ottawa and Budapest on 
the initiative of President Bush led to no 
concrete results. The negotiations 
resumed in Vienna in November 1991 
might, on the contrary, serve as a model 
for the conduct of co-operative negotia-
tions, bearing in mind the new circum-
stances in Europe. On this basis, it proved 
possible to draw up in less than four 
months an extremely complex and highly 
technical treaty having an impact compa-
rable with that of the CSCE treaty. 
8. Taken as a whole, the Open Skies 
Treaty makes a significant, innovative 
contribution to the building of joint 
security structures in the area between 
Vancouver and Vladivostok. It is the most 
ambitious confidence-building measure 
ever drawn up. Twenty-four member 
states of the CSCE are now associated 
with it and others will follow. The Open 
Skies Treaty is a model that might be imi-
tated in other regions of the world in 
order to increase stability and security." 
69. The" WEU example at appendix" refers 
to the declaration made by the Head of the 
German Delegation at the Plenary Conference 
in Vienna on 18th March 1992, which reads: 
" On behalf of the Delegations of 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and the United Kingdom, I should like to 
state that our countries intend to 
establish, effective from signature of the 
Open Skies Treaty, a group of parties 
under Article Ill, Section 11, paragraph 2, 
of this treaty. We also reserve our right to 
transform in due course this group 
according to paragraph 3 of the section 
referred to. 
In this connection I should like to recall 
the invitation which the member states of 
WEU have extended to a number of other 
states in their declaration issued on the 
occasion of the 46th European Council 
meeting on 9th and 1Oth December 1991 
at Maastricht. " 
70. WEU is thus reserving the right to take its 
co-operation forward in specific terms; the 
various options include: 
- a commonly-funded pool of dedicated 
aircraft; 
- a pool of podded sensors to be 
shared; 
- the use of national aircraft on a rota-
tional basis. 
71. As in other contexts, WEU action need 
not be exclusive and discussions have been con-
tinuing to consider Russian proposals for a joint 
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venture on aircraft, sensors and ground-based 
processing. Again it is obvious that the WEU 
satellite centre in Torrej6n must be linked to 
open skies to ensure that maximum benefit is 
drawn from the complementary nature of the 
various aerial observation methods involved. 
72. Here your Rapporteur must issue a word 
of caution and echo one of the reservations 
made by Mr. Tummers in the report he pre-
sented to the Assembly on " Disarmament -
Reply to the thirty-third annual report of the 
Council" in December 1988 3• Verification is 
not cheap and implies considerable expenditure 
before it is possible to achieve even meagre 
results. This is yet another assault on the 
infamous "peace dividend" many of us were 
counting on with the end to the cold war. 
73. The cost of providing and equipping the 
aircraft needed for open skies is likely to be pro-
hibitive for many of the 24 signatory nations. 
WEU should ensure its practical arrangements 
provide opportunities for co-operation with 
other states, particularly those of Central and 
Eastern Europe, in efforts to find the most cost-
effective and practical solutions possible. Again, 
this would be a suitable subject for discussion 
for the forthcoming WEU/ " Eight " meeting. 
(vii) Manpower negotiations 
7 4. With matters reasonably well-advanced 
where CSBMs, CFE and open skies are con-
cerned, the " unknown quantity " in the current 
Vienna negotiations concerns the discussions on 
manpower: CFE la. 
75. A number of difficulties have been 
encountered and the deadline for agreement is 
now set for the end of the Helsinki meeting. The 
context for manpower reductions is common, 
although with no collective provisions and with 
national limitations likely to prevail. In short, 
unilateral manpower reductions are likely to 
overtake everything agreed formally. Some diffi-
culties remain over certain categories of per-
sonnel, for example, over those working for 
various para-military organisations with certain 
treaty-limited items of equipment. Delegations 
in Vienna and Helsinki are however reasonably 
optimistic about success. It will be important to 
establish agreement here: there are specific 
implications, especially for those " new " states 
considering the setting-up of their own armies ... 
Another implication will be for the proposed 
harmonisation process between the CFE signa-
tories and the other CSCE states. Countries such 
as Switzerland, Finland, etc., which have tradi-
tionally relied on reserve and mobilisable forces 
( " citizens' armies " ), will need particular con-
sideration and provision if they are not to be 
unduly penalised by a potential CFE la 
agreement on manpower reductions. 
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V. Arms control: the CSCE and WEU 
76. WEU has come a very long way in 
affirming its own identity with regard to arms 
control considerations, and your Rapporteur 
was particularly pleased to see the conclusions of 
the working group on " WEU and arms control " 
from the 4th WEU Higher Defence Studies 
Session held at the initiative of the Chairman-
in-Office of the Council at Ebenhausen near 
Munich from 23rd to 26th March 1992. The 
paper prepared by the working group (Appendix 
IX) gives an account of the progress made by 
WEU over the years; its conclusion is that there 
is no foreseeable realm of arms control where 
WEU should not be involved, if it wishes. 
77. As emphasised earlier in the report, WEU 
has had its identity reinforced as a result of the 
Maastricht declaration. Discussions in WEU on 
arms control issues aim at reaching a concerted 
European position which may serve to increase 
the impact of member states' voices in NATO 
and in the Vienna negotiations. Such an idea is 
fully consistent with the objectives of the Maas-
tricht declaration. 
78. Admission of the CIS states to the CSCE 
was essential for it now commits them to 
undertake the whole range of CSCE obligations, 
signed originally by the Soviet Union. The com-
punction is to ratify and implement the CFE 
Treaty (and it would be difficult to envisage 
further arms control measures unless and until 
the implementation process for CFE has begun). 
Another " real reason " is to apply all the provi-
sions of the Vienna document: important since 
it implies extending the geographical scope of 
the CSBM regime, thus setting a precedent for 
post-Helsinki negotiations. And regarding that 
post-Helsinki future, WEU is agreed on the 
three security functions of the CSCE: 
- negotiations to continue on different 
aspects of arms control; 
- a security dialogue amongst nations to 
lead towards greater co-operation; 
- conflict prevention, 
although not all nations are agreed on the pri-
ority of future discussions, they are all agreed on 
the need to define the substance for discussion 
first). 
79. As well as planning co-operation in the 
specific context of open skies, the WEU member 
countries are currently pursuing co-operation in 
a number of other areas, particularly where veri-
fication for the CFE Treaty is concerned: 
(a) a table has been prepared indicating 
which inspections member countries 
are prepared to open to inspectors 
from other WEU countries during the 
baseline validation period (the first 
120 days after entry into force of the 
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CFE Treaty), and which countries are 
interested in participating; 
(b) a set of rules has been proposed for 
the operation of multinational teams, 
and these are being introduced into 
the NATO Verification Co-ordination 
Committee (VCC) as a WEU contri-
bution; 
(c) the joint training of inspectors. is being 
considered; 
(d) bilateral inspection exercises (active 
and passive) are being encouraged and 
views exchanged on the results; 
(e) evaluation visits under the Vienna 
document (CSBMs) are under consid-
eration, particularly those involving 
the neutral and non-aligned. 
80. When the satellite centre in Torrej6n is 
developed it should have a special contribution 
to make on verification and the Assembly has 
always been a fervent supporter of ideas for 
future co-operation in such realms. The idea of a 
European verification centre 4 is still on the 
table, if not yet on the Council's agenda. 
81. As a first step towards setting up such a 
centre, we should consider inviting the Central 
and Eastern Europeans to take part in the 
training phases in Torrej6n. Speaking during the 
Assembly's symposium in Berlin, Mr. Fourre 
(whose report 5 for the Defence Committee in 
1988 first inspired ideas on WEU acquisition of 
an observation satellite capability), suggested 
that Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland might 
appreciate invitations to participate in the 
training of image interpreters. 
82. These ideas fit in very well with proposals 
to reinforce CSCE structures such as the CPC -
practical initiatives to reinforce the notions of 
complementarity and transparency which have 
become such important symbols of the new 
security order in Europe. 
83. Which brings us on to the philosophy for 
the future of arms control within the CSCE: 
where do we go from here? The delegations in 
Helsinki are tackling the problem now as they 
try to produce a mandate for the European 
security forum to be established this autumn in 
Vienna. The follo:wing chapter attempts to 
redefine the criteria for the way ahead and your 
Rapporteur is very grateful for the brain-
storming and paper-writing 6 which took place at 
Ebenhausen to help formulate ideas. 
VI. The new security order in Europe -
the political philosophy 
84. Past and still continuing political changes 
in Europe will significantly influence future 
security developments on the European con-
tinent. The era of confrontation as the guiding 
element of East-West relations over more than 
40 years has ended and should be replaced by a 
process of increasing political co-operation 
between all CSCE countries. This new political 
situation and the resulting fundamental changes 
of the military situation in Europe will have to 
guide the creation of a framework for the 
European process of co-operation and negotia-
tions after the CSCE meeting at Helsinki. Under 
the umbrella of the CSBM agreements, and in 
particular with implementation of the CFE 
Treaty, the danger of military confrontation in 
Europe will have largely disappeared. 
85. In view of these new political and military 
conditions, the terms security and stability in 
Europe require redefinition, emphasising overall 
political criteria to a greater extent than in the 
past. Within the future European political 
structure it will no longer be possible to quantify 
stability in Europe mainly on the basis of con-
crete military factors. The stability of future 
political relations in Europe will decisively 
depend on the quality and solidity of a compre-
hensive political network of co-operative rela-
tions and its value for the national interests of 
all participants. However, even within a func-
tioning and sophisticated system of political 
co-operation, maintenance of long-term stability 
in Europe will require establishment of clearly 
visible and credible risk levels and thresholds for 
deterring potential disturbing actions by indi-
vidual participants. But, such thresholds will 
have to be related rather with political conse-
quences than with military actions. A compre-
hensive and effective co-operative system which 
offers clear advantages to all participants will in 
itself create a serious and effective risk threshold 
for any country potentially causing instabilities 
because the resulting national damage would 
extremely exceed any possible gains. 
86. Nevertheless, a more politically accen-
tuated policy for security and stability should 
not lead to an unbalanced and dangerous under-
estimation of military components. Even in case 
of positive developments in the process of all-
European co-operation military threats within 
or against Europe from the outside cannot be 
excluded. However, possible future military sce-
narios will differ significantly from those in the 
past and, thus, may require a reorientation of 
national military strategies and concepts as well 
as structural changes within the military forces. 
This task and the development of concepts for 
security co-operation and arms control negotia-
tions require a common general understanding 
of all participants of the future needs for 
European security and military forces. 
87. Mter the end of East-West confrontation 
in Europe, in the future new types of threats 
may occur resulting from increasing tendencies 
towards nationalism and from single ethnical 
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groups and minorities fighting for indepen-
dence. (The proposal by the Netherlands in Hel-
sinki for a " High Commissioner for Minor-
ities " is a positive suggestion which deserves 
support.) Further potential threats may originate 
from widening gaps between the standards of 
life of countries in Europe particularly when 
these gaps would lead to increased waves of 
migration. Coping with these new threats would 
normally require mainly political counter-
measures while military response options could 
even be counterproductive. However, to be 
effective, political counteractions should be 
enforced by the availability of adequate and, if 
necessary, employable military options. Within 
the process of security co-operation in Europe it 
will be important to develop a broad spectrum 
of political will as well as military measures to 
assure timely and effective common reactions in 
case such new threats will occur. 
(i) Concepts for future co-operation and arms 
control 
88. Under the new political conditions and 
for meeting the ambitious political expectations 
with regard to future developments in Europe it 
is necessary to define broader and more compre-
hensive objectives and concepts for the new 
process of co-operation and arms control than in 
the past. In the case of CFE the objective was 
limited to the elimination of military threats 
and imbalances and to the establishment of 
numerical parity in most critical weapon 
systems and equipment between the two bloc 
systems in Europe. The CSBM negotiations were 
specifically directed towards confidence- and 
security-building in the military area. In con-
trast, a concept for the future process must also 
cover, in addition to far-reaching arms control 
elements, security co-operation as a second com-
ponent. It also has to observe the requirements 
for a broad and long-term political approach. On 
the basis of the new political situation in Europe 
negotiating procedures will have to differ from 
those in the past: negotiating with each other 
will have to replace the former system of negoti-
ating against each other; attempts to gain uni-
lateral advantages will be counterproductive to 
the given overall objective. In future, effective 
stability may be achieved only through balanced 
arrangements without discriminating against 
any participant. These fundamental criteria will 
not only influence structure and working condi-
tions of the new forum but also character and 
content of initiatives and proposals for the nego-
tiations. Aiming at effective European co-
operation it is important to create and structure 
the new forum in a way to provide an effective 
platform for co-operation and which would con-
tribute to stability by its mere existence. 
89. For effective implementation of the given 
political objectives it is necessary to base the 
concept for the European process of eo-
DOCUMENT 1306 
operation and negotiations after Helsinki 
1992 on the long-term requirements for far-
reaching all-European political co-operation. 
Thus, within this concept and the broad 
spectrum of tasks the establishment of effective 
co-operative structures in Europe as well as 
actions and measures focusing on stability and 
co-operation will be of special priority. These 
politically and substantially ambitious missions 
can, however, hardly be realised within a limited 
time-frame. A greater number of tasks and mea-
sures may be achieved only after favourable 
political conditions and the necessary degree of 
co-operation have been established. Therefore, 
the future process of co-operation and negotia-
tions must be based on a comprehensive and 
long-term concept allowing for a phased and 
step-by-step approach and flexible implemen-
tation during the course of the talks and negotia-
tions, but, without dictating the number and 
duration of phases in advance. More concrete 
tasks and guidelines may be defined during the 
process before entering the respective work 
phase. 
(ii) Tasks and structure of the future forum 
90. Based on the political intentions for 
future developments in European security there 
are three basic tasks guiding the structure of the 
new European forum: first, the various missions 
within the context of security co-operation; 
second, continuation and further development 
of conventional arms control negotiations; and, 
third, conflict prevention and conflict man-
agement. In addition, the special requirement to 
establish effective and permanent conditions for 
dialogue may be considered a further element. 
However, while the first three tasks will funda-
mentally influence the basic structure of the 
forum, dialogue is a more procedural com-
ponent which should guide the work in all areas 
and may have to be addressed specifically in the 
working procedures for the negotiations. Dia-
logue should be established in conjunction with 
concrete objectives and closely linked to the sub-
stance of work in the three areas. 
91. In practice and because of common 
political aims there will be numerous inter-
dependencies between the three structural ele-
ments of the new forum, i.e. security co-
operation, arms control negotiatins, and con-
flict prevention/management. The close linkages 
require inclusion of these three components into 
a common overall structure. However, they also 
open up a number of different options for sub-
structures and the distribution of responsibil-
ities within the new forum. A clear subordi-
nation of these task-oriented elements under a 
single and superior forum will secure close 
co-operation and co-ordination between these 
substructures and allow for some overlapping of 
responsibilities, thus providing some flexibility 
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for mission assignment to the different working 
bodies. This idea would allow future discussions 
to become " regionalised " or " sectorised " 
while maintaining an overall structure. WEU 
itself is beginning, for example, to pay special 
attention to the Mediterranean area where the 
proposal to institute a CSCM (Mediterranean) 
regime is gaining credence. 
92. Development of the internal structure of 
the forum should however be guided mainly by 
mission-oriented criteria. In this context, it is of 
fundamental importance to differentiate 
between tasks which require negotiations for 
binding agreements with commitments directed 
towards improving stability in the future and 
tasks which focus primarily on present and 
actual critical security scenarios in Europe. This 
second criterion applies to the specific mission 
of conflict management, at least as far as 
common reactions to actually developing or 
already existing crises are required. Therefore, 
the Conflict Prevention Centre, being the 
responsible instrument for these tasks, should be 
kept separate from bodies mainly negotiating 
future-oriented measures and commitments. 
This general organisational differentiation has 
the advantage that long-term directed negoti-
ation activities in the fields of structured 
security co-operation and arms control cannot 
be interfered and disrupted by actual crises or 
conflict situations. However, effective conflict 
prevention cannot be restricted to coping with 
actual conflict scenarios only. In addition, it is 
important to negotiate and agree on forward-
looking pre-emptive measures and commit-
ments. This requirement will have to be met by 
specific measures or by an effective interlocking 
network of commitments in the areas of security 
co-operation and arms control. Thus, while 
actual conflict management should be within the 
competence of the Conflict Prevention Centre 
the formulation of conflict preventing measures 
should fall under the responsibilities ofthe nego-
tiating bodies. 
93. There will be some substantive linkages 
between measures for security co-operation and 
those for arms control. In the past co-operative 
measures were part of arms control negotiations, 
in particular of the CSBM talks. But, under the 
new and much more far-reaching political objec-
tives and different military effects and conse-
quences there are basic conceptual differences 
between these two tasks. The overall concept of 
arms control aims at limiting and restricting 
military potentials and their activities. In con-
trast, future measures for security co-operation 
may support and organise common military 
activities and even include agreements on multi-
national military structures and potential 
employments of international forces. In view of 
these differences, for the future it cannot be 
excluded that sometimes contradictions between 
arms control interests and requirements for . 
security co-operation may occur. In this case a 
political decision with allocation of priorities 
will be necessary. 
94. In the future implementation and verifi-
cation of treaties and agreements may lead to 
additional work requirements calling for special 
working bodies within the structure of the new 
forum. This may occur in particular if the 
present work of the Conflict Prevention Centre 
and the CFE Consultative Group were to be 
combined and centralised. Under these circum-
stances it may become preferable to establish, as 
part of the forum, a separate instrument respon-
sible for all questions of implementation of 
agreements. Later, and if required, this body 
could also be tasked with planning and 
organisation of multinational military activities 
on the basis of potential agreements in the field 
of security co-operation. 
95. Security co-operation, arms control, con-
flict prevention, and treaty implementation are 
to be seen as complementary elements within a 
closely interrelated network. Priorities for work 
may be decided on the basis of the actual situ-
ation and political needs. The new European 
forum should be structured as an organisation 
entity and all its elements must provide a 
platform for co-operative work and open dia-
logue between all participants (hence your 
Rapporteur's earlier suggestion of aligning 
NACC membership with the CSCE and even of 
the NACC providing part of the formal infra-
structure for the CSCE). 
(iii) Consequences of the new political situation 
for future negotiations 
96. European negotiations after the CSCE fol-
low-up meeting 1992 in Helsinki will be an 
integral part of the CSCE process. Thus, 
organisation and working procedures for these 
negotiations will closely follow existing CSCE 
rules. On this basis, structure and procedures of 
the future process will lean more on past CSBM 
talks than on the CFE negotiations which still 
reflected the bloc-to-bloc concept. These formal 
conditions will have a particular impact on some 
key elements of future arms control negotiations 
such as quantitative reductions and limitations of 
military forces of the participants including the 
neutral CSCE countries (as discussed previously). 
Consequently, future arms control negotiations 
will require approaches focusing on national com-
mitments for each member country concerned 
and will exclude further numerical calculations on 
the basis of alliances or blocs of states. These new 
terms will fundamentally influence format and 
substance of future arms control proposals as well 
as working and negotiating procedures within the 
forum. In contrast to the bloc-to-bloc concept used 
in CFE for the new arms control process it will be 
impossible to define balance and stability on the 
basis of quantitative calculations of military forces. 
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97. Another fundamental element of the 
framework for the new European process after 
Helsinki 1992 is the question of the geographical 
area of application for future agreements. The 
ambitious political objectives and the partici-
pation of all CSCE countries in the negotiations 
would conceptually lead to the conclusion that, 
as a rule, agreed measures and commitments 
shall be applied to the whole territory of all 
member states. However, depending on objec-
tives and substance of specific initiatives or 
measures an attempt to include the territories of 
North America, the Asian part of the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Turkey may lead to 
unsolvable political and substantial problems in 
the negotiations. External political and military 
requirements of countries with territories 
outside Europe may often stand in contrast to 
European regional interests. Trying to adjust 
proposals in a way that their application to a 
wide geographical area becomes acceptable to all 
participants may finally lead to non-
effectiveness. On the other hand, it must be 
assumed that several European participants may 
accept specific measures and commitments only 
if they will be applied to the whole territory of 
all CSCE countries. Under these circumstances 
it is unlikely to reach consensus on a solution 
which will generally apply to all future agree-
ments to the total geographical area of all 
member states. But, even if such an agreement 
could be achieved, a general application of this 
wide area may lead to a significant reduction of 
the possible range of acceptable commitments 
during the future process. In contrast, a general 
limitation of the geographical area to the 
European region from the Atlantic to the Urals 
would not sufficiently meet the political inten-
tions of the new process and the requirements of 
European security. Moreover, it does not appear 
necessary to lay down formally such a restrictive 
solution for the geographical area because for a 
number of potential measures application to the 
total territory of all participants may not be 
critical and would largely enhance the effects of 
the commitments. Decisions on the geographical 
area of application could be made for each nego-
tiated measure individually by taking into 
account its specific content and objective. This 
was demonstrated particularly in the context of 
open skies. 
98. Under the premise of avoiding the iso-
lation of specific groups of countries or indi-
vidual member states only a comprehensive con-
ceptual approach aiming at balanced solutions 
for the region as a whole and for all participants 
could meet the political objectives. This funda-
mental requirement must guide the devel-
opment of a comprehensive framework for 
political and security co-operation and arms 
control for the future. The concept for the new 
European negotiations must be related to the 
entire area of application without regional dif-
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ferentiation. In this context, it is of particular 
importance to avoid a general fixation of geo-
graphic subregions and commitments which 
may lead directly or indirectly to different 
security conditions in specific European areas. 
However, this principle should not exclude 
special solutions for individual groups of states 
or neighbouring countries in case of particular 
security interests or requirements (e.g. CSCM). 
But, such agreements shall be limited to actual 
needs and must neither set a precedent for sub-
sequent negotiations nor turn out into a general 
division of Europe into a lasting system of geo-
graphical subregions. 
(iv) Terms of reference for the European forum 
99. The substance of the terms of reference 
for the new forum will be decisively directed by 
the overall political objectives for the future 
process and by conceptual preconditions 
resulting from the composition of participants. 
The ambitious and comprehensive political 
aims for developing a European system of 
staiblity and co-operation call for a long-term 
and open-ended approach. This premise will not 
allow detailed advanced formulation of sub-
stance and definitive conditions for the entire 
negotiation process. General terms of reference 
must, therefore, observe the requirement for 
phased negotiations by providing an overall 
framework which leaves sufficient flexibility for 
covering developments and needs during the 
course of a presently still unpredictable process. 
Attempts to formulate more detailed guidance 
on the basis of vague assumptions and predic-
tions carry the danger of leading frequently to a 
need for substantially revising or supplementing 
the existing terms of reference during the course 
of the process which may cause significant delay 
or even interrupt the negotiations. 
100. The terms of reference should apply to the 
entire forum and generally cover all its structural 
components. They will have to describe the 
internal organisation of the forum as well as rela-
tionship and rules for co-ordination between the 
subordinated elements responsible for structure 
security co-operation, arms control negotiations, 
and conflict prevention. In this context, it will be 
necessary to underline the importance of a close 
working connection between these three compo-
nents of the process. In addition, the terms of ref-
erence will broadly have to address objectives, 
tasks, and responsibilities of each of the three ele-
ments. By formulating the terms of reference, 
close co-ordination and adjustment of guidance 
for the two bodies responsible for security 
co-operation and arms control negotiations will 
need particular attention. 
(v) Negotiating objectives for structured security 
co-operation 
101. Agreements on effective measures for 
security and military co-operation will con-
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stitute a fundamental requirement for the devel-
opment of a co-operative political system in 
Europe. Therefore, negotiations of commit-
ments in the field of structured security 
co-operation must receive high priority within 
the post-Helsinki process. In the past, some 
measures with co-operative character were 
~eady addressed during the CSBM talks and 
new initiatives in this area may be built on this 
experience and use some of the existing agree-
ments as starting points. Measures of 
co-operation should concentrate on establishing 
effectively functioning multinational political 
and military organisations as a platform for dia-
logue and common planning and preparation for 
mutual political and military activities and 
actions. In addition to the primary effect of such 
measures of providing instruments and options 
for common political action they also contribute 
significantly to European stability not only by 
forcing intensive exchanges of views between 
participants but also by establishing interna-
tional relationships. And this is precisely the 
specific role WEU could and should be under-
taking - indeed is beginning to undertake. 
102. A concept for negotiations on structured 
security co-operation may cover a wide 
spectrum of measures. Specific initiatives could 
be directed towards formal commitments for 
international exchanges of civilian and military 
students at national political and military col-
leges and academies. Measures could aim at 
establishing and organising multinational 
schools or academies for the training of key 
civilian and military personnel in international 
affairs and in preparation for their future work 
in international European organisations. Such 
permanent European training centres could also 
be used for scientific study and research on 
international political and military problems 
and for organising and conducting high-level 
seminars and conferences. An immediate par-
allel is evident with our own WEU Institute for 
Security Studies and the Maastricht proposal to 
transform it into a European Security and 
Defence Academy. 
103. In the specific field of military 
co-operation, negotiations should aim at formal 
agreements for exchanging military personnel of 
various levels between national military 
organisations ( c.f. the Assembly's recommenda-
tions in Document 1183, " State of European 
security - intervention forces and reinforcement 
for the centre and the north " , 26th April 1989, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Speed). Establishing per-
manent liaison teams at high-level national mil-
itary headquarters may be also be considered. 
Such teams could be formed on a multinational 
basis, or, possibly more realistic, may be 
exchanged bilaterally between neighbouring 
countries, as is already taking place, notably 
between France and Germany. The spectrum of 
potential measures may also cover high-level 
multinational military staffs or headquarters for 
planning and, if necessary, organising interna-
tional personnel exchanges, common military 
training, and multinational exercises. These 
staffs could be responsible for planning, 
organising and employing multinational mil-
itary formations for specific international tasks 
such as immediate support in case of natural 
catastrophies in Europe. Multinational military 
staffs could also act as co-ordinating bodies for 
international air transport requirements and for 
the organisation and execution of larger-scale 
information visits as well as observation and 
verification missions. This is of course precisely 
what we are starting to do in WEU with the new 
operational structure. 
(vi) Areas for future arms control negotiations 
104. As for approaches in the field of struc-
tured security co-operation, the concept for 
future arms control negotiations must observe 
the implications of a long-term process. A 
greater number of important arms control mea-
sures may be realisable only in later phases of 
the process and after establishment of the 
required political and security preconditions in 
Europe. Thus, within the spectrum of measures 
for possible arms control initiatives, negotiating 
priorities should be allocated. In this context, a 
transfer of existing agreements and treaties into 
the new forum by integrating as necessary all 
participating states into these commitments will 
be fundamental for forming a firm platform for 
the continuation of conventional arms control in 
Europe. In practical terms this applies to the 
CSBM agreements, but, in particular to the CFE 
Treaty. These tasks should receive high priority 
from the very beginning of new arms control 
negotiations. Extension of application of the 
CFE Treaty to all participants of the new 
process should, however, be restricted to those 
elements of the treaty which are indispensable as 
a basis for follow-on negotiations and agree-
ments. But, these activities must not lead to 
comprehensive revisions of existing commit-
ments in which case a success may be highly 
unlikely and controversial discussions could 
result in long lasting delays of new arms control 
talks in a refusal of the CFE Treaty. 
105. Within future arms control stabilising 
measures should become a central element 
already in an early phase of the negotiations. 
These measures should be considered as contin-
uation and extension of former confidence- and 
security-building measures. Proposals in this 
field may concentrate initially on such areas 
which are not or not sufficiently covered by 
existing measures. For example, future 
stabilising measures may cover various activities 
of military forces including exercises, move-
ments and activation of reservists. They could 
also deal with peacetime deployments and sta-
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tioning of forces, potential peacetime prepara-
tions for war, and with key logistical and service 
support components. By supplementing 
numerical limitations of military forces in 
Europe these measures represent an important 
element in the course of enhancing security and 
stability in Europe. 
106. For the objective of further restraining 
potential offensive military operations arms 
control measures aiming at guiding or restricting 
critical elements of military structures should 
become another major component of a negoti-
ation concept. These measures should be 
directed towards establishing military structures 
of mainly defensive character. However, this 
task must be balanced against possible future 
requirements in the field of security 
co-operation and, particularly, against potential 
operational needs for multinational European 
forces. There are two main areas on which struc-
tural measures may concentrate. First, commit-
ments could aim at limitations on specific and 
critical offensive elements within the national 
military structures and, second, they could focus 
on controlling and restraining the grade of oper-
ational readiness of military forces in 
peacetime. 
107. Quantitative reductions and limitations 
of military forces and equipment will continue 
to play a major and indispensable part in the 
future negotiations because agreements leading 
to a visible lowering of military potentials are of 
particular political and public interest. Thus, the 
concept for the new talks will have to address 
measures or at least provide clear prospects for 
the continuation of quantitative arms control. 
However, as mentioned earlier, defining 
commonly-usable parameters for a calculation 
of numerical reductions and limitations of the 
national forces of all participants creates an 
almost insurmountable problem as long as a 
mutually-acceptable starting platform does not 
exist. A basis for calculating subsequent reduc-
tions of national force levels could be estab-
lished by using CFE national entitlements, in 
particular, when present non-signatories will 
have joined the specific parts of this treaty by 
formal limitations of their own national military 
equipment covered by CFE. Such a platform 
would open options for calculating further 
decreases of national force levels on the basis of 
equal percentages. This underlines the funda-
mental importance and high priority of initia-
tives for extending the necessary elements of the 
CFE Treaty to all future participants in the 
negotiations. In addition to equipment limited 
by the CFE Treaty other force elements may be 
covered by formal and agreed reductions and 
limitations. In this case it will also be necessary 
to establish a commonly-acceptable numerical 
starting level. This may be achieved in the most 
practical way by calling for and accepting 
national restrictions proposed by each partic-
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ipant for its own forces. Subsequent reductions 
could then follow the same rules used for 
equipment already limited under CFE. In view 
of the positive political developments in Europe 
and the time required for implementation of the 
CFE Treaty further force reductions and limita-
tions may not receive high priority within tlie 
total concept for the new process. However, in 
this context, political, conceptual, and opera-
tional criteria will have to be balanced against 
each other. But, for political and public reasons 
it seems indispensable to stress the importance 
of quantitative reductions and limitations from 
the very beginning of the new arms control 
process. The concept must at a minimum 
provide clear long-term prospects. 
108. There is an increasing interest for 
including qualitative criteria and limitations for 
military weapons and equipment in future arms 
control negotiations. On the one hand it is 
obvious that quantitative force limitations could 
be critically undermined and neutralised by 
qualitative technological improvements. On the 
other hand, definition and formulation of 
acceptable and effective criteria and parameters 
for qualitative restrictions will lead to very 
complex and often unsolvable problems. 
Options for effectively restraining qualitative 
arms developments require in most cases 
extension of control into industrial research and 
development. Technological research pro-
grammes, however, do not normally allow a 
clear identification of whether results will later 
be used for military or civilian purposes or both. 
It seems unlikely that industrial countries partic-
ipating in the negotiations are prepared to throw 
open their national technological research and 
development programmes. However, even in 
case of favourable conditions it will be 
extremely difficult to define and, in particular, 
verify qualitative technological parameters 
critical for combat effectiveness of weapon 
systems. Under these conditions it may not be 
possible to develop intrusive and effective mea-
sures for qualitative arms control. As an alter-
native and for a first step into this new arms 
control field the negotiating concept may focus 
on measures for information and notification of 
developments, production and employment of 
specific military equipment only. Such commit-
ments could contribute at least to openness and 
transparency in this area. 
VII. Conclusion: The road to disarmament 
(i) Nuclear 
109. After the major proposals already adopted 
(START, Paris Conference) and the proposals 
and counter-proposals made by President Bush 
and President Gorbachev, which were described 
in the previous report, the critical stage has now 
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been reached when action has to be taken and 
consideration given to new steps for the imme-
diate future. 
110. There now seems to be a desire to make 
considerable reductions in nuclear strength, 
perhaps down to a strict minimum, in the 
framework of a vast system of arms control and 
verification. However, the speed and magnitude 
of these reductions depend on certain guarantees 
and a solution being found to problems which 
are still only too evident. 
111. First, there will be no unilateral nuclear 
disarmament without the agreement of the 
various powers possessing nuclear weapons. One 
of the main questions relates to developments in 
the countries of the former Soviet Union. Four 
republics have strategic nuclear wearheads and 
eleven have tactical warheads. Although Mr. 
Gorbachev's proposal was very reasonable and 
was endorsed by everyone, he is no longer in 
power and the intentions of those concerned 
tend to obscure the situation. How is it possible 
today to destroy a large part of the nuclear 
arsenal? Apart from the general wish for disarm-
ament and a reduction in nuclear weapons, no 
concrete action has been recorded in this area in 
recent months: there is thus a stalemate. 
112. Account must be taken of the fact that 
nuclear reductions first require arms control, a 
highly developed technical capability (it is not 
easy to eliminate radioactive material) and an 
economic structure that can cope with the 
enormous cost of these operations. The coun-
tries of the former Soviet-Union fulfil none of 
these conditions. Arms are not under the control 
of a single authority but are, on the contrary, 
dispersed. It is doubtful (and this is moreover 
the opinion of very well-informed Russians) 
whether the countries of the former Soviet 
Union have technology that allows such material 
to be treated correctly. Nor do we yet know what 
final decisions will be taken on the sharing of 
nuclear power in that part of the world nor what 
political programmes will be adopted by those 
who can decide on the future of such arma-
ments. For the time being, the implementation 
of nuclear agreements and plans depends on the 
situation in the East. 
113. As it is suspected that nuclear weapons 
are proliferating in other countries, this too may 
hold up real reductions in nuclear arsenals. 
According to SIPRI, there are known to be other 
secret nuclear countries and there is very wide-
spread concern about transfers of nuclear tech-
nology to potentially destabilising countries. 
The danger of proliferation exists. Whether it 
stems from the hundreds of scientists who have 
left, or wish to leave, the eastern countries or 
from the disappearance - and clandestine export 
- of materials and components, this danger will 
help to delay the implementation of major 
reduction measures in the immediate future. 
114. It is nevertheless important to note that 
major unilateral initiatives have been taken 
even so. First, research and production pro-
grammes have almost stopped in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and France and it is 
assumed that, for urgent economic reasons, the 
former Soviet Union has started to withdraw 
some of its tactical warheads and that a few 
countries have also stopped nuclear tests. There 
seems to have been a general consensus on the 
decision to destroy short-range missiles and 
nuclear artillery munitions. 
115. Your Rapporteur also wishes to underline 
what Mr. Genscher said about the non-
proliferation treaty. He said it must be univer-
sally binding and that the United Nations 
Security Council must be the defender of this 
treaty. Consequently, arms reductions must be 
completed by political and juridical under-
takings allowing inspection and verification. 
(ii) Arms production and trade 
116. It is clear that substantial, real disarm-
ament will never be achieved if the production 
and sale of arms is continued. Any international 
steps to eliminate a large stock of weapons and 
any plans for a system of defensive security and 
sufficient minima depends on a radical 
reduction of production and very strict export 
controls. 
11 7. Everyone knows that the production and 
sale of arms are very profitable economic opera-
tions. For years, arms exports have been part 
and parcel of industrial or economic progress in 
certain countries. This applies to leading 
exporters such as the United States, the Soviet 
Union, France, the United Kingdom and China 
and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, 
Australia, Italy, Denmark, Brazil and Spain. 
Moreover, the production of arms for the 
domestic market, which avoided the high cost of 
imports, allowed the arms industries of many 
countries to be developed to an extraordinary 
extent. 
118. This arms race, which was apparently eco-
nomically profitable . during the years of local 
conflicts throughout the world and over-
armament resulting from the cold war have 
become disastrous for peace and for the econ-
omies of the exporting countries. There is no 
need to recall to what extent some governments 
regretted their exports to Iraq. In the end there 
was a war that we had to pay for. 
119. Furthermore, a point was reached when 
arms production showed a surplus. Once the 
cold war was over, the prospect of large-scale 
disarmament and opposition by citizens to con-
tinued arms exports to the third world led to a 
crisis in the military-industrial system. The 
problem is particularly serious because the tech-
nical sophistication of arms requires consid-
erable investment. 
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120. The days of high profits are therefore 
over. The problem to be solved as a matter of 
urgency is the conversion of a large sector of the 
military industry to a civil industry and this is 
not easy to achieve. It will lead to unem-
ployment for many workers in the factories con-
cerned. It means difficult reorientation towards 
other sectors of production and large-scale 
investment, particularly in research and 
training. It will be impossible to do all this with 
a minimum of rationalisation if market forces 
alone are allowed a free hand. A conversion pro-
gramme will succeed only if based on an 
immense effort that only a government can 
guarantee. Hence there are many reasons why 
arms production and trade should be stopped 
short, the first of which is very simple: if we con-
tinue to produce weapons, arms reduction will 
never take place. Second, as the Rome Club 
said, it is sheer madness to sell guns for imme-
diate profit to someone who may intend to kill 
the seller. Finally, our economies cannot allow 
themselves to maintain such a developed 
military-industrial sector with the permanent 
risk of bankruptcy. Naturally, too, there are 
arguments of a peaceful nature which should 
dominate. 
121. To cut back the production and sale of 
arms, control measures must obviously be taken 
in parallel with disarmament agreements, which 
have a direct, decisive influence. In Berlin, Mr. 
Genscher reminded us that states participating 
in the CSCE have undertaken to subscribe to the 
United Nations register of arms transfers. This 
register must now be completed by restrictions 
on exports of arms applicable at world level. 
122. At WEU level, information and control 
systems should be developed with a view to a 
joint strategy for reducing and limiting the arms 
trade and promoting a review of plans for the 
sale of arms in each of our countries on the basis 
of restrictive criteria. There should also be more 
controls of exports of arms and arms-related 
technology, particularly so-called dual-use 
materials that are sometimes exempt from 
control. 
(iii) Chemical and biological weapons 
123. As stressed in the first report, it took years 
for the Geneva disarmament conference to draw 
up the first agreements totally banning the use, 
production and stockpiling of these types of 
weapons of mass destruction. The text of a con-
vention exists which might be adopted. 
124. Negotiations are being continued and the 
positions of the WEU and CSCE countries in 
principle concord with these proposals. The dif-
ficulty lies in ascertaining whether chemical 
industries are producing weapons. However, it is 
apparently quite possible to carry out such con-
trols from a technical standpoint and industries 
would be very willing to have a juridical 
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instrument that might spare them suspicion 
about their production. 
125. While, on the political side, declarations 
in favour of a total ban on these weapons are 
unanimous, it should be pointed out that, in 
practice, many unilateral steps have been taken. 
At the summit meeting in May and June 1990, 
the United States and the Soviet Union signed 
an agreement on destroying 5 000 tons of 
chemical weapons over a ten-year period (1992-
2002) and ending all production as from the 
coming into force of the treaty. This text also 
recommends that states having chemical 
weapons should follow this example by 
destroying their reserves. 
126. Destroying such weapons is a very com-
plicated operation. It is expensive and raises 
technical and environmental problems. It is esti-
mated that the complete destruction of North 
American arsenals in 1997 might cost $ 3 000 
million. For the former Soviet Union, the oper-
ation would cost twice this amount. 
1. " Arms control negotiations - further initiatives for 
WEU ", Document 1288 and Addendum, 7th and 27th 
November 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. de Puig. 
2. Document 1223, 24th April 1990, Rapporteur: Lord 
Newall. 
3. Document 1158, 3rd November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Tummers. 
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127. The problem of the proliferation of such 
weapons is disturbing. They do not cost much to 
produce and it is believed that about twenty 
countries now have some types of chemical 
weapons. It is therefore urgent to speed up mul-
tilateral negotiations. In this connection, the 
German presidency has announced that the con-
clusion of a convention on the worldwide elimi-
nation of this type of weapon is a priority aim 
for this year. 
128. In the light of the above and in the 
knowledge that the negotiating process in Hel-
sinki will be at its height during the period when 
the present report is scheduled for debate (with 
the Helsinki summit still a month away, on 9th 
and lOth July 1992), your Rapporteur has for-
mulated a set of very reasonable recommenda-
tions for the WEU Council. They are corn-
mended to colleagues and to the wider public of 
our nations who are our electors and they are 
designed to help ensure a positive approach in 
our continuing search for a more stable and 
secure Europe. 
4. "Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union", 
Document 1223, 24th April 1990, Rapporteur: Lord 
Newall. 
5. "Verification: a future European satellite agency", Doc-
ument 1159, 3rd November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourre. 
6. Especially " Security co-operation and conventional arms 
control in Europe post-Helsinki ", Wolfgang Heydrich. 
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CSCE Council meeting, Prague, 30th-31st January 1992 
Summary of conclusions 
I. 
1. The Council of the CSCE held its second 
meeting in Prague on 30th and 31st January 1992. 
2. The ministers welcomed Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mol-
dova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan as participating states, following 
receipt of letters accepting CSCE commitments 
and responsibilities from each of them. 
3. The ministers granted observer status to 
Croatia and Slovenia in the CSCE process. 
4. They welcomed as guests of honour the 
representatives of the heads of the following 
international institutions and organisations: 
United Nations; United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Europe; Council of Europe; Western 
European Union; North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nisation; Organisation for Economic Co-ope-
ration and Development. 
11. 
5. The ministers had political consultations 
on the transformation in Europe - the role of the 
CSCE and the contribution of European and 
other institutions, on the strengthening of CSCE 
institutions and structures and orientations for 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting. They adopted 
with immediate effect the Prague document on 
the further development of the CSCE institu-
tions and structures. 
Ill. 
6. The ministers agreed that the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting should be an important mile-
stone in the development of the CSCE process 
and should provide a clear vision for its future 
course. Representatives to the follow-up meeting 
should, in particular, be guided by: 
- the CSCE's comprehensive concept of 
security and stability, which includes 
human rights, political, military, eco-
nomic and environmental components; 
- the important role of the CSCE in fos-
tering democratic development and 
fully integrating participating states 
into the network of shared CSCE 
values, principles and norms and its 
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role in promoting a stable security envi-
ronment in Europe; 
- the importance of a thorough imple-
mentation review, particularly in the 
area of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, which will take account of 
the new situation in Europe and the 
enlarged number of CSCE participating 
states; 
- the objective of the CSCE to prevent 
conflict and consolidate peace through 
eliminating the root causes of tensions, 
by attaining in particular full respect 
for human rights, including those 
inscribed in the CSCE provisions on 
national minorities, by building demo-
cratic institutions and by fostering eco-
nomic and social progress; 
- the need to strengthen the capacity of 
the CSCE to contribute to a peaceful 
solution of problems involving national 
and ethnic communities and minorities 
which could lead to tensions and con-
flict- both within and between states-
including possibilities for " early 
warning"; 
- the need for further development of the 
CSCE's capability for conflict pre-
vention, crisis management and 
peaceful settlement of disputes; 
- the need to strengthen the effectiveness 
of CSCE institutions by matching 
their functions more closely to the 
achievement of these objectives. 
IV. 
7. The ministers had a comprehensive dis-
cussion on the Yugoslav crisis. They welcomed 
the cease-fire agreements reached under the aus-
pices of the United Nations, which are in the 
process of implementation, and renewed their 
strong appeal for strict compliance with those 
agreements. 
The ministers also warned against any 
extension of the present conflict. 
They reaffirmed their support for the 
efforts undertaken by the Secretary-General and 
the Security Council of the United Nations, and 
reiterated the need to create the conditions for 
an early deployment of United Nations peace-
keeping forces on the basis of the resolution of 
the United Nations Security Council number 
727 on Yugoslavia. They endorsed the concept 
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of the United Nations peace-keeping operation 
and expressed their hope that it would facilitate 
the political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. 
The ministers reiterated the commitment 
of the participating states to seek a peaceful and 
lasting settlement of the crisis, in accordance with 
the commitments and provisions of the CSCE 
and the equally legitimate aspirations of all the 
peoples concerned. The ministers agreed that this 
requires from all the concerned parties: 
- respect for international obligations 
with regard to the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights; 
- guarantees for the rights of ethnic and 
national communities and minorities, 
in accordance with the commitments 
subscribed to in the framework of the 
CSCE; 
- respect for the inviolability of all 
borders, whether internal or external, 
which can only be changed by peaceful 
means and by common agreement; 
- commitment to settle by agreement all 
questions concerning state succession 
and regional disputes; 
- guarantees for the absence of territorial 
claims towards any neighbouring state 
including abstention from hostile prop-
aganda activities that would, inter alia, 
promote such territorial claims. 
The ministers reiterated the determi-
nation of their states to co-operate closely in 
search for a comprehensive solution to the crisis, 
in particular to refrain from any action 
impeding these goals. They stressed the special 
need for dialogue and enhanced co-operation 
between neighbouring states to this end. 
The ministers expressed their profound 
concern about the humanitarian aspects of the 
crisis. They insisted that all parties involved 
allow emergency aid to reach all people and 
communities in need. They declared their 
support for all efforts, in particular those by the 
humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, to 
facilitate the return to their homes of all persons 
displaced by the hostilities who desire to do so. 
They reminded all those responsible for 
acts of violence and for violations of cease-fire 
agreements that under international law they are 
personally accountable for their actions that are 
in contravention of relevant norms of interna-
tional humanitarian law. 
The ministers fully endorsed the efforts of 
the Committee of Senior Officials including 
those undertaken within the framework of the 
mechanism for consultation and co-operation 
with regard to emergency· situations. 
The ministers expressed their appreci-
ation for the activities of the monitor mission 
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and recalled their support for the Conference on 
Yugoslavia, and its Chairman, taking place 
under the sponsorship of the European Com-
munity and its member states, expressing the 
hope that agreement on a global settlement of 
the Yugoslav crisis, including all issues under 
consideration by the conference, will soon be 
reached. 
A CSCE human rights rapporteur mission 
visited Yugoslavia and submitted its report. 
Taking into account the conclusions of this 
report, the ministers expressed their view that 
the human rights situation including the situ-
ation of national minorities in Yugoslavia 
should be kept under review by the CSCE, and 
that full use should be made to that end of the 
various CSCE mechanisms, including, if nec-
essary, other missions. They requested the Com-
mittee of Senior Officials at its next meeting to 
examine the need for further action. 
V. 
8. Ministers expressed their concern over 
new signs of intolerance, aggressive nationalism, 
xenophobia and racism. They recalled the 
importance of non-discrimination and stressed 
the need to build their societies according to the 
basic values of the CSCE. 
Ministers requested the Helsinki follow-up 
meeting to address the need to ensure full com-
pliance through appropriate means with commit-
ments to protect individuals and groups from 
racial, ethnic and religious discrimination. 
VI. 
The ministers also came to the following 
conclusions: 
9. The ministers reaffirmed that the CSCE 
has a vital role to play in the building and con-
solidation of a new Europe. The contribution 
that the CSCE has to make to the fostering of 
political stability and security is indispensable. 
The CSCE, with its comprehensive mandate and 
wide participation, constitutes a unique forum 
for security negotiations. 
10. The ministers stressed that the CSCE also 
has a prominent role to play in the evolving 
European architecture and that the challenges 
facing Europe call for multi-faceted forms of 
co-operation, and a close relationship among 
European, transatlantic and other international 
institutions and organisations, drawing as appro-
priate upon their respective competences. 
They requested their representatives at 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting to study further 
ways and means of fostering such co-operation 
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with a view to enhancing its effectiveness and to 
avoid duplication. 
VII. 
11. The ministers adopted the declaration on 
non-proliferation and arms transfers. 
12. They stressed that the establishment, by 
1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting, of new negotiations on disarm-
ament and confidence- and security-building 
open to all participating states - as well as 
of a broader security dialogue and of effective 
mechanisms for conflict prevention - will mark 
an important step in consolidating a new 
co-operative order in Europe. They assessed the 
progress made so far in the informal consulta-
tions in Vienna for the new forum. They 
requested that these consultations be accelerated 
and that their conclusions be transmitted to the 
Helsinki follow-up meeting at its beginning. 
13. They agreed that the CFE Treaty forms an 
important element for stability and security in 
Europe. They called upon all signatories and all 
relevant newly independent states to take all the 
necessary steps to ensure the early entry into 
force of the treaty. 
14. They assessed the progress made so far in 
the negotiations in Vienna. 
They instructed their representatives at 
the negotiations on confidence- and security-
building measures to conclude them prior to the 
opening of the Helsinki follow-up meeting with 
a substantial new CSBM package. 
They expressed the hope that an Open 
Skies Agreement will be ready for conclusion in 
time for the opening of the Helsinki follow-up 
meeting. 
They welcomed the determination of the 
participants in the negotiation on conventional 
armed forces in Europe to conclude, in con-
nection with the entry into force of the CFE 
Treaty, an agreement limiting the personnel 
strength of their conventional armed forces 
within the area of application in time for the 
Helsinki follow-up meeting. In this context they 
stressed the need for the early participation of 
the relevant newly independent states in these 
negotiations. 
15. They took note of the discussion at the 
Second Seminar on Military Doctrine held 
within the framework of the Conflict Prevention 
Centre. 
VIII. 
16. They took note and endorsed, as appro-
priate, the results of: 
- the Geneva meeting of experts on 
national minorities; 
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- the Moscow meeting of the conference 
on the human dimension of the 
CSCE; 
- the Oslo seminar of experts on demo-
cratic institutions. 
17. They noted the report of the rapporteur 
mission to Albania. 
18. They noted with satisfaction that the 
CSCE communications network is now opera-
tional and they expressed their expectations that 
full use will be made of it. They expressed 
special thanks to the Netherlands for the key 
role which that country had played in estab-
lishing this network. 
19. The ministers agreed that, in the light of 
the conclusions of the rapporteur missions to 
new CSCE states and of any requests received 
from them, and from other states recently 
admitted to the CSCE process, informal consul-
tations under the direction of the Chairman of 
the CSO should take place at Helsinki, during 
the follow-up meeting, in order to establish the 
modalities for a programme of co-ordinated 
support to such states, through which appro-
priate diplomatic, academic, legal and adminis-
trative expertise and advice on CSCE matters 
could be made available. 
20. Ministers encouraged the establishment 
and strengthening of independent chambers of 
commerce in countries in transition to open 
market economies, to function as a point of 
contact for private business and financial 
interests, and to encourage entrepreneurial 
activity. Ministers would welcome the devel-
opment and expansion of the activities of the 
International Chamber of Commerce in this 
area in co-operation with other institutions 
undertaking similar work. 
21. Ministers took note of a proposal to invite 
a high level group of legal experts from CSCE 
participating states to elaborate a draft statute 
for a CSCE conciliation and arbitration body, 
taking into account the work already done 
within the CSCE. They welcomed the intention 
to submit this draft to the Helsinki follow-up 
meeting. 
22. They agreed that the next meeting of the 
Council will be held in Stockholm in early 
December 1992. They will seek to confirm the 
specific days for this meeting at the opening of 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting based on the 
proposal of the host country (3rd-4th December 
1992). 
23. Recalling that the heads of state or gov-
ernment decided in the Charter of Paris to meet 
on the occasion of the CSCE Helsinki follow-up 
meeting, the Council proposed that the summit 
meeting should be held over two days beginning 
on 9th July 1992. 
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CSCE Council meeting, Prague, 30th-31st January 1992 
Future development of CSCE institutions and structures 
1. The ministers reaffirmed their com-
mitment to pursue actively all the objectives set 
out in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 
and their determination to further strengthen 
CSCE institutions and structures for this 
purpose. To this end, they took the following 
decisions and established certain guidelines for 
the discussions at the Helsinki follow-up 
meeting. 
I. Oveniew and co-ordination 
2. Between meetings of the CSCE Council, 
the Committee of Senior Officials will be 
responsible for overview, management and 
co-ordination and will act as the Council's agent 
in taking appropriate decisions. 
3. In order to increase its effectiveness, the 
Committee of Senior Officials will meet more 
regularly, at least every three months. In con-
formity with the Charter of Paris and building 
on established practice, the Committee of Senior 
Officials may delegate tasks to other CSCE insti-
tutions or to open-ended ad hoc groups of par-
ticipating states with a precise mandate. 
II. Political consultations 
4. In order to further strengthen the political 
consultation process, the Committee of Senior 
Officials may set aside certain meetings, or parts 
thereof, for addressing previously agreed spe-
cific issues. Other relevant policy-level officials 
could attend such meetings. 
5. The facilities of the CSCE communica-
tions network will be made available to the 
Chairman- in-Office of the Committee of Senior 
Officials for transmission of urgent messages rel-
evant to the work of the committee. 
Ill. Human dimension 
6. The ministers agreed that monitoring and 
promoting progress in the human dimension 
remains a key function of the CSCE. 
7. Issues related to the human dimension 
will therefore be considered by the Council or 
the Committee of Senior Officials whenever 
necessary. 
8. In addition, meetings of a short duration 
may also be decided upon by the Committee of 
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Senior Officials to address clearly-defined 
issues. Results of such meetings will be sub-
mitted to the Council through the Committee of 
Senior Officials for consideration or decisions as 
required. 
9. In order to extend practical co-operation 
among participating states in the human 
dimension, the ministers decided to give addi-
tional functions to the Office for Free Elections 
which will henceforth be called the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 
10. Under the general guidance of the CSO, 
the Office should, inter alia: 
- organise a short CSCE meeting at the 
seat of the Office for Democratic Insti-
tutions and Human Rights to address 
implementation of CSCE human di-
mension commitments every year in 
which a follow-up meeting does not 
take place. The Helsinki follow-up 
meeting will work out the organ-
isational modalities for such meetings; 
- serve as an institutional framework for 
sharing and exchanging information on 
available technical assistance, expertise, 
and national and international pro-
grammes aimed at assisting the new 
democracies in their institution-building; 
- facilitate contacts between those offer-
ing such resources and those wishing to 
make use of them; 
- develop co-operation with the Council 
of Europe in order to make use of its 
data-base of such resources and ser-
vices; 
- establish contacts with non-govern-
mental organisations active in the field 
of democratic institution-building, with 
a view to enabling interested partici-
pating states to make use of their 
extensive resources and expertise; 
- facilitate co-operation in training and 
education in disciplines relevant to 
democratic institutions; 
- organise meetings and seminars among 
all participating states on subjects 
related to the building and revital-
isation of democratic institutions, such 
as a short seminar on free media and, at 
an appropriate time, one on migration. 
These meetings and seminars will be 
held in Warsaw unless otherwise 
decided. 
APPENDIX 11 
11. In order to avoid duplication of work spe-
cially in the fields enumerated above, the min-
isters directed the Office to work closely with 
other institutions active in the field of demo-
cratic institution-building and human rights, 
particularly the Council of Europe and the 
European Commission for Democracy through 
Law. 
12. The CSO will on an annual basis examine 
the need for meetings and seminars on the 
human dimension and democratic institutions 
and will establish a work programme. 
13. The ministers requested the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting to further specify the task of the 
Warsaw Office and to decide how the human 
dimension activities of the CSCE may be further 
carried forward. 
14. The Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights is designated as the CSCE 
institution charged with the tasks in connection 
with expert and rapporteur missions according 
to the Document of the Moscow meeting of the 
Conference on the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE. 
15. The Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights will be connected to the 
CSCE communications network. 
IV. Safeguarding human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law 
16. The Council decided, in order to develop 
further the CSCE's capability to safeguard 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law 
through peaceful means, that appropriate action 
may be taken by the Council or the Committee 
of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of 
the consent of the state concerned, in cases of 
clear, gross and uncorrected violations of rel-
evant CSCE commitments. Such actions would 
consist of political declarations or other political 
steps to apply outside the territory of the state 
concerned. This decision is without prejudice to 
existing CSCE mechanisms. 
17. The Council requested the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting to consider further modalities in 
applying this decision. 
V. Economic co-operation 
18. The ministers agreed on the need to con-
tinue their efforts to strengthen the focus of 
CSCE on the transition to and development of 
free-market economies as an essential contri-
bution to the building of democracy. 
19. To this end, they agreed to est3.;blish an 
economic forum within the framework of the 
CSO. The CSO would convene as the economic 
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forum to give political stimulus to the dialogue 
on these topics, to suggest practical efforts for 
the development of free-market systems and 
economic co-operation, and to encourage activ-
ities already underway within organisations such 
as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OCDE), the European In-
vestment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE). The forum will meet periodically 
in Prague and can invite contributions to its 
meetings by those European and transatlantic 
organisations relevant to the subject under dis-
cussion. It was agreed that the first meeting of 
the economic forum would be in early 1993. 
20. The ministers agreed that the Helsinki 
follow-up meeting will consider appropriate 
further measures to promote discussions in the 
framework of the CSCE on economic co-
operation and related topics. 
VI. Crisis management 
and conflict prevention instruments 
21. The Council agreed that the capabilities 
of the CSCE to engage in crisis management and 
conflict prevention and resolution should be 
improved. 
22. To this end, the Council requested the 
Helsinki follow-up meeting to study possibilities 
for improving the following instruments: 
- fact-finding and rapporteur missions; 
- monitor missions; 
- good offices; 
- counselling and conciliation; 
- dispute settlement. 
23. In this context the Helsinki follow-up 
meeting should also give careful consideration 
to possibilities for CSCE peace-keeping or a 
CSCE role in peace-keeping. 
24. Provision should be made for the further 
operational implementation within the CSCE of 
decisions by the Council or the Committee of 
Senior Officials. 
25. Tasks may be delegated to the Chairman-
in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials, 
to the Consultative Committee of the Conflict 
Prevention Centre or to open-ended groups of 
participating states of an ad hoc character. In 
each case a precise mandate and arrangements 
for reporting back should be established. 
Conflict Prevention Centre 
26. In addition to the tasks already given to 
the Conflict Prevention Centre in the supple-
mentary document of the Paris Charter and in 
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the summary of conclusions of the Berlin 
meeting of the CSCE Council, the functions and 
working methods of the CPC are enhanced as 
follows: 
27. The Consultative Committee will serve as 
a forum in the security field wherein the CSCE 
participating states will conduct comprehensive 
and regular consultations on security issues with 
politico-military implications. In this context, 
any participating state may, in order to reduce 
the risk of conflict, promptly raise an issue 
which in its view has such implications. This is 
without prejudice to later decisions on the 
structure of a new security/arms control forum 
and the relationship it may have to the CPC. 
28. The Consultative Committee will serve as 
a forum for consultation and co-operation in 
conflict prevention and for co-operation in the 
implementation of decisions on crisis man-
agement taken by the Council or by the CSO 
acting as its agent. 
29. The Consultative Committee has the 
authority to intitiate and, with the assistance of 
the CPC secretariat, execute fact-finding and 
monitor missions in connection with paragraph 
17 of the Vienna Document 1990 (mechanism 
for consultation and co-operation as regards 
unusual military activities). 
30. The Consultative Committee, with the 
assistance of the CPC secretariat, will execute 
any additional tasks assigned to it by the 
Council, or by the Committee of Senior Offi-
cials acting as its agent. This will include full re-
sponsibility in the implementation of such tasks. 
The Consultative Committee will report in an 
appropriate manner on the implementation 
of these tasks to the Committee of Senior 
Officials. 
31. The Consultative Committee will develop 
general guidelines for the implementation of its 
operational tasks including, in due time, those 
that may be assigned to it by the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting and in the future. 
32. In addition to the existing support to the 
implementation of CSBMs, the CPC will fulfil 
other functions as regards the implementation 
and verification of agreements in the field of dis-
armament and arms control, if so requested by 
the parties to those agreements and agreed upon 
by the Consultative Committee. 
33. The Consultative Committee may at any 
time draw the attention of the Committee of 
Senior Officials to a situation which it considers 
requires the consideration of the Committee of 
Senior Officials. 
34. The Consultative Committee will meet 
regularly, as a rule at least once a month. 
Working schedules should be flexible and addi-
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tional meetings may be held, in the light of cir-
cumstances and future requirements. 
35. The Consultative Committee may 
establish subsidiary working bodies, including 
open-ended ad hoc groups entrusted with spe-
cific tasks. 
36. The regular meetings of the Consultative 
Committee will be chaired in alphabetical 
rotation. The Chairmanship will rotate immedi-
ately after the last regular meeting in every 
month. 
37. The Chairman of the Consultative Com-
mittee and the Chairman of the Consultative 
Committee of Senior Officials will maintain 
contact with each other. 
38. The Chairman of the Consultative Com-
mittee or his representative will attend meetings 
of the Committee of Senior Officials which are 
relevant to the tasks of the CPC. 
39. In accordance with the paragraph on 
" CSCE relationship with international organ-
isations " , European, transatlantic and other 
international organisations, such as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Western 
European Union (WEU) and relevant United 
Nations bodies, will be invited to make appro-
priate contributions to future seminars orga-
nised by the CPC. 
40. The Helsinki follow-up meeting should 
also examine further how the CSCE could 
co-operate with other international organ-
isations in these fields. 
VII. Parliamentary Assembly 
41. In the interest of encouraging an active 
dialogue with the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council will be in 
contact with the Chairman of the Committee of 
Heads of Delegation of the Assembly in order to 
explore possible interest in the presence of the 
Chairman of the Council at the Budapest 
meeting of the Assembly in July 1992. The 
Chairman of the Council will be prepared to 
make himself available to report on the work of 
the CSCE; to answer parliamentarians' questions 
in this regard; and to take note of parliamen-
tarians' views for subsequent transmission to the 
Council. 
VIII. Non-governmental organisations 
42. The Council requests the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting to strengthen relations between 
the CS<;:E and non-governmental organisations, 
in order to increase the role of non-
governmental organisations in implementing 
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CSCE goals and commitments. In particular, the 
follow-up meeting will develop opportunities and 
procedures for meaningful non-governmental 
organisation involvement in the CSCE and possi-
bilities for non-governmental organisations to 
communicate with CSCE structures and institu-
tions, recalling inter alia the texts on non-
governmental organisations agreed by the Sofia 
and Moscow meetings and by the Oslo seminar. 
IX. CSCE relationship 
with international organisations 
43. The Council of Europe, ECE, NATO, 
Western European Union, OECD, EBRD, EIB 
and other European and transatlantic orga-
nisations which may be agreed will be invited to 
make contributions on the basis of CSCE prec-
edent and practice to specialised CSCE meetings 
where they have relevant expertise. 
44. To ensure full co-ordination, the ministers 
would welcome it if the above organisations 
would inform the CSCE secretariat annually of 
their current work programme and of the facil-
ities available for work relevant to the CSCE. 
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X. Relations with non-participating states 
45. The Council requests the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting to recommend practical ways to 
establish a flexible dialogue between the CSCE 
and interested non-participating states or groups 
of states, for example through contacts between 
the said states and the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council or of the Committee of Senior Offi-
cials. 
XI. Financial arrangements of the CSCE 
and cost-effectiveness 
46. The Council requested the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting to develop procedures which 
would ensure greater predictability and trans-
parency of the costs of CSCE meetings and other 
activities. Measures to provide for increased 
cost-effectiveness should also be examined. 
4 7. States proposing to host future CSCE 
meetings will present draft budgets along with 
their proposals. Detailed provisions in this 
respect will be developed at the Helsinki 
follow-up meeting. 
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CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki 
Address by WEU Deputy SeeretiUJI·Get~eral 
(3rd Apri/1992) 
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
It is a privilege indeed to address this 
plenary session of the Helsinki CSCE follow-up 
meeting. In this " initial contribution " on 
Western European Union, I will outline WEU's 
role and place in the new European security 
environment as well as fields of co-operation 
already existing between CSCE and WEU. 
* 
* * 
The origins of WEU date back to 194 7, 
when the United Kingdom and France signed a 
bilateral alliance against a possible resurgence of 
military threat. One year later, this alliance was 
extended to include the Benelux states and was 
given the name of " Brussels Treaty Orga-
nisation ". When Germany and Italy joined in 
1954, the organisation became "Western 
European Union". 
A short time earlier, the European 
Defence Community - and thus the first 
attempt at creating a European Political Union 
- had failed. WEU was intended to bind the 
Federal Republic of Germany to defence com-
mitments with its West European neighbours 
and provide for Germany and Italy to join 
NATO. WEU was thus one of the main founda-
tions for Franco-German reconciliation. 
In the preamble to the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the WEU member states stated as their 
principal aims: 
- to afford assistance to each other, in 
accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, in maintaining inter-
national security and peace and in 
resisting any policy of aggression; 
- to promote the unity and to encourage 
the progressive integration of Europe; 
- to associate progressively, in the pur-
suance of these aims, other European 
states inspired by the same ideals. 
In 1988, a protocol for the accession of 
Spain and Portugal was signed. Thus, the total 
WEU membership was brought to nine of the 
twelve EC member states. 
The decision-making organ ofWEU is the 
Council which at ministerial level consists of the 
Foreign and Defence Ministers of the member 
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states. The activities of the Council are sup-
ported by a Secretariat-General in London. 
The Council has its institutional coun-
terpart in the WEU parliamentary Assembly, 
which adopts recommendations to be forwarded 
to the Council, to which parliamentarians may 
also submit written questions. Thus, WEU has a 
democratic parliamentary basis with consul-
tative functions. 
* 
* * 
The dramatic changes in the European 
security environment over the past three years 
have obliged all European organisations with 
competence in the fields of security and defence 
to review their objectives and relationships to 
each other. At its Rome summit in November 
1991, the Atlantic Alliance recognised that the 
roles and responsibilities of the Europeans 
would be enhanced. The alliance thus supported 
the development of the European security and 
defence identity in both the EC and WEU 
frameworks. 
At its summit in Maastricht in December 
1991, the European Community also recognised 
that further political integration was necessary 
for the Twelve to be a pole of stability in 
Europe. It is in this dual context that the decla-
rations agreed by WEU member states at Maas-
tricht define WEU's role as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union and as the means 
to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
The Maastricht Treaty's provisions on a 
common foreign and security policy have indeed 
paved the way for the European Union to 
embrace a common defence policy which might 
in time lead to a common defence. 
In the first stages, however, it is for WEU 
as the European Union's defence component to 
formulate a common European defence policy 
and to carry forward its concrete implemen-
tation through the further development of its 
operational role. WEU will therefore elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions of the 
European Union which have defence implica-
tions. 
It is in the very nature of the relationship 
between European Union and WEU that WEU 
membership must be open to the member states 
of the European Union. Accordingly, these 
states are being invited to accede to WEU on 
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conditions to be agreed, or to become observers 
if they prefer. Simultaneously, invitations are 
being extended to other European member 
states of the North Atlantic Alliance to become 
associate members of WEU, enabling them to 
participate fully in WEU's activities. 
The approach adopted by Western 
European Union in its relations with the 
European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance 
clearly conforms to the principle of " mutually 
reinforcing institutions". Consequently, the 
respective networks of solidarity created by 
Articles V of the Brussels and the Washington 
Treaties are complementary. 
As to WEU's future relationship with the 
North Atlantic Alliance, the planned closer 
concertation of WEU member states within the 
alliance will enable Europeans to make their 
voice heard in the alliance more effectively than 
before. Efforts by WEU member states to create 
a European defence identity will also help con-
solidate the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. The transatlantic partnership requires 
co-operation between WEU and the alliance 
based on the principles of transparency and 
compatibility. The shaping of WEU's relations 
with the European Union and the Atlantic 
Alliance is now well underway. The same applies 
to the implementation of the measures to 
strengthen WEU's operational role listed in the 
Maastricht declarations of the Nine. 
Already during its period of reactivation, 
Western European Union progressively grew 
into an operational role. In two Gulf crises, it 
has proved its ability to act and to co-ordinate 
successfully member countries' military efforts. 
Progress has also been made in such significant 
fields as space and verification. A WEU satellite 
centre has been established in Spain this year 
and feasibility studies are being carried out to 
assess the possibilities for developing an auton-
omous satellite observation capability. In the 
field of verification, WEU member states are 
co-operating in the implementation of the CFE 
and Open Skies Treaties. 
In the very near future, co-operation among 
WEU member states will become even more oper-
ational in the politico-military field and in the 
military field proper. The immediate priority is to 
strengthen WEU's operational role by examining 
and defining appropriate missions, structures and 
means, including those in the military field 
proper, covering in particular: 
- the establishment of a WEU planning 
capability; 
- closer military co-operation among 
WEU member states, notably in the 
fields of logistics, transport, training 
and strategic surveillance; 
- military units answerable to WEU. 
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These arrangements will be fully com-
patible with the military dispositions necessary 
to ensure the collective defence of all allies. 
Three broad categories of mission for 
WEU member countries' forces acting collec-
tively have been identified; humanitarian, peace-
keeping and crisis management. In these fields 
WEU forces could in the future be ready to 
respond to requests from the CSCE. 
* 
* * 
In view of the radically transformed envi-
ronment, great effort is being made to include 
the Central and Eastern European states as well 
as the members of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States in a pan-European peace order. 
WEU is rising to the challenge of new forms of 
co-operation with the emerging democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe and has certainly 
not been idle as far as contacts with these 
democracies are concerned. 
The Charter of Paris marked the opening 
of a new era in Europe, an era of confidence and 
co-operation. It was in this spirit that the WEU 
Council of Ministers proposed to the new 
democracies that a dialogue be initiated. 
Together with a representative of the Presi-
dency, the WEU Secretary-General has under-
taken fact-finding missions to Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, as well 
as to the three Baltic states. Furthermore, since 
July 1991, special information links have been 
established with the embassies of the five 
Central and Eastern European states and the 
WEU Secretariat-General, as well as between 
the governments of those states and the 
respective embassies of the WEU Presidency. 
These official links have been underpinned by 
related activities of the WEU Institute for 
Security Studies in Paris. As early as 1990, the 
WEU Assembly was initiating regular contacts 
with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe by inviting observers from these coun-
tries to attend the Assembly's sessions. 
At its meeting in Bonn on 18th November 
1991, the WEU Ministerial Council decided to 
invite the Foreign and Defence Ministers of 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, as well as of the three Baltic states of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to a special 
meeting with the members of the Council. This 
will provide an opportunity to discuss and decide 
the strengthening of the existing relations. In this 
way WEU's consultation partners will be able to 
acquaint themselves with the future security and 
defence policy of the European Union as well as 
with the development of the European pillar of 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
Through its active role in strengthening 
and consolidating co-operation with the five 
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Central and Eastern European countries as well 
as with the three Baltic states, WEU is making a 
significant contribution to stability, security and 
peace on the European continent. Its activities 
in this respect, as well as those to the same end 
undertaken by the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Community, are both complementary 
and mutually supportive. Thus, these activities 
again follow entirely the pattern of " mutually 
reinforcing " institutions. 
Simultaneously, practical co-operation 
between CSCE and WEU has been initiated. 
WEU is prepared to make its collective expe-
rience available to the CSCE and exchange 
120 
APPENDIX Ill 
information and documents. WEU was also able 
to contribute last February to one of the two 
seminars sponsored by the Conflict Prevention 
Centre, namely on the topic of the role of armed 
forces in democratic societies. Working links 
have been established between the two secre-
tariats which will be further developed to 
underpin the process of co-ordination and 
co-operation. 
In conclusion, let me assure you that 
WEU as the defence component of European 
integration and as the means for strengthening 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance is 
ready for broad co-operation with the CSCE. 
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CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki 
Resolving disputes which have the potential to develop into armed conflict 
(United Kingdom Delegation) 
Introduction 
1. This paper sets out the United Kingdom's 
suggestion for handling the related issues of 
crisis management and conflict prevention at 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting. It draws on the 
Yugoslav experience, and starts from two basic 
premises: 
- mechanisms will have to be tailored for 
individual disputes/conflicts but require 
a broad political consensus about the 
circumstances in which they should be 
used; and 
- an important part of this consensus is 
the will to use (and accept) agreed pro-
cedures and mechanisms: simply 
defining new mechanisms will not nec-
essarily achieve anything. 
2. The paper looks at three aspects of the 
overall problem of resolving disputes which 
have the potential to develop into armed con-
flict: 
(a) Early warning: mechanisms for con-
flict resolution were not established 
for Yugoslavia until too late: we need 
to think more about prophylactic 
diplomacy in the CSCE or by friends 
of the disputing parties to get them to 
address their differences before they 
erupt in warfare. 
(b) Political crisis management: the key to 
resolving any dispute will be to offer a 
political framework within which the 
parties can try to settle their differ-
ences: the Carrington conference and 
associated Badinter commission have 
undertaken this role in the case of 
Yugoslavia. 
(c) Operational conflict prevention: an 
outbreak of fighting on the ground will 
frustrate the political process. A 
variety of mechanisms can be used to 
try to preserve stability, ranging from 
small fact-finding missions through to 
peace-keeping forces. These should 
not be seen as an end in themselves, 
but as a complement to the political 
process. 
3. This paper concentrates on situations in 
which the parties to a dispute are not already 
actively and constructively seeking a solution, 
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but can still be influenced by peer pressure to 
engage in a process to try to find one. It does not 
address situations in which one or more parties 
remain obdurate, despite the political and eco-
nomic pressures brought to bear: the imposition 
of solutions to essentially political problems is 
unlikely to leave the parties satisfied with the 
result, and therefore risks failing to remove the 
cause of tension. The paper also concentrates on 
disputes which have a real potential to develop 
into armed conflict: to cast the net any wider 
risks including a large number of e.g. environ-
mental and economic disputes which could 
overload the system. 
4. The paper distinguishes between " states " 
and " parties " involved in a dispute. Issues with 
the potential for armed conflict within the CSCE 
area are unlikely to be confined to state-to-state 
affairs, and the involvement of all relevant 
parties (e.g. minorities or component parts of 
states) will be important if any solution is to 
stick. But it is also difficult to see how a dispute 
resolution mechanism could work successfully 
against the wishes and without the co-operation 
of the state(s) centrally involved. The paper 
therefore proposes leaving the initiation of any 
procedures to member states of the CSCE, but 
involving all relevant parties in the resolution of 
the dispute itself. 
A comprehensive framework 
5. A comprehensive framework which will 
define the capabilities of the CSCE in conflict 
prevention, dispute settlement and crisis man-
agement should constitute the following ele-
ments: 
(a) Preventive action (early warning) 
6. The Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), 
as the principal political organ of the CSCE, 
acting under the authority of the Council of 
Ministers, should have the key position in 
dispute resolution. It should be able to address a 
situation within the CSCE area which has the 
potential to develop into armed conflict before 
it does so. The initiative for the CSO to do this 
could come from a state directly involved in the 
dispute, or from the Chairman-in-Office of the 
CSCE Council (on the basis of previously agreed 
criteria), or from a group (perhaps 12 or 13) of 
states not directly involved. The CSO could also 
consider assessments of human rights related sit-
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uations prepared by independent experts, as 
foreseen in the Moscow mechanism. The CSO 
should discuss the dispute, and identify what 
mechanisms or procedures would be best suited 
to resolving it. This amounts to using, in 
adapted form, the existing means (e.g. the emer-
gency mechanism) to call the CSO into session 
as a precursor to the flexible use of the proce-
dures available under the Valletta mechanism 
for peaceful settlement of disputes. 
7. The Consultative Committee of the Con-
flict Prevention Centre (CPC) can already 
address (as agreed at the Prague Council 
meeting) more strictly military security issues 
raised by any participating state in order to 
reduce the risk of conflict. 
8. In whichever of the two fora an issue is 
originally raised, responsibility for dealing with 
it should depend on whether the action required 
is of a political or operational character or both. 
The CSO should take responsibility for political 
activity, the CPC for maintenance of stability on 
the ground. The most effective approach would 
be to maximise the use of the CSO, on the more 
political level, before military security issues 
had begun to complicate the dispute. This might 
not, however, always be possible. 
(b) Political crisis management 
9. Once the CSO has decided that a dispute 
should be addressed, ideally before an outbreak 
of hostilities on the ground (using the procedure 
outlined in (a) above, but if not, as soon as pos-
sible after armed conflict has broken out) the 
CSO acting on behalf of the Council of Ministers 
should retain responsibility for the overall task 
of resolving the dispute. In many circumstances, 
it will be necessary to establish a tailor-made 
procedure, which would operate (like the 
Carrington conference) under the general super-
vision and oversight of the CSO, rather than 
expecting the CSO itself to direct the process 
from day to day (a task for which the CSO 
would by its nature not be well suited). The tai-
lor-made procedures might include: a round 
table conference, arbitration, conciliation, inde-
pendent rapporteur missions, etc. (in effect, a 
more imaginative use of the possibilities offered 
by the V alletta mechanism). The procedures 
chosen would have to be adapted to the par-
ticular circumstances of the dispute. Those 
acting on behalf of the CSO for directing the 
procedure chosen would, for example, have to 
retain the freedom of determining how to 
proceed, including on such key issues as which 
states or minority groups should be regarded as 
parties to the dispute. 
10. No state would be compelled to co-
operate with such missions or to accept them on 
its territory. But willingness to do so would be 
regarded as an important factor in the rela-
tionship between the state concerned and other 
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CSCE participants. Peer pressure and accept-
ability in the CSCE community of nations 
would therefore be used as important incentives 
both to participation in the early warning system 
and to keeping those involved engaged in the 
process of seeking a resolution to the dispute. 
(c) Operational conflict prevention 
11. Political dispute resolution is made much 
more difficult if there is instability on the 
ground. Monitor missions or peace-keeping 
forces rapidly become very long-term commit-
ments if the momentum towards a political 
solution to the dispute is not maintained. In the 
case of the CSCE, the overall responsibility for · 
making sure that both sides of the conflict reso- ~ 
lution framework were operating in tandem 
would have to rest with the CSO. But 
co-ordination of and authority over activities 
intended to help to maintain stability on the 
ground is better in the hands of a permanent 
body. 
12. Oversight of activities on the ground 
should retain the intergovernmental character of 
the CSCE, and should therefore rest with the 
Consultative Committee of the CPC, and not 
with a new international organisation. It is pos-
sible to envisage a variety of ways in which spe-
cific activities on the ground might be decided 
on: the CSO might request the Consultative 
Committee of the CPC to put a particular mech-
anism into effect: it might alternatively request 
the Consultative Committee to consider which 
of the various mechanisms available to it was 
most appropriate to the circumstances on the 
ground. 
13. The Consultative Committee should be in 
a position to consider a number of possibilities, 
ranging from the existing unusual military activ-
ities mechanism with the possibility of fact 
finding missions, to establishing a more per-
manent presence on the ground through 
observer or monitor missions, which might in 
turn and if necessary also be able to broker 
localised or more general ceasefires. There might 
also be a need for a peace-keeping force. 
14. For the smaller scale activities, which do 
not require a large headquarters and command 
staff, the Consultative Committee might ask the 
Director of the CPC or a single nation or group 
of nations to make the necessary arrangements. 
For larger scale activities, given that there 
already exist military structures within Europe 
with the potential for peace keeping, it does not 
seem necessary for the CSCE to create its own 
peace-keeping capability. If it were decided that 
a peace-keeping force was necessary, the partici-
pating state, through the CSO or the Consul-
tative Committee, might request an existing 
group of nations (e.g. NATO or WEU) with the 
requisite military structure or experience to 
make its resources available for the operation 
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which could also include participation by other 
CSCE countries, and to have delegated to it the 
running of the operation, under the oversight of 
the Consultative Committee. In this, as in the 
case of smaller scale activity, because the 
activity is being undertaken on behalf of the 
CSCE, costs should be shared among all CSCE 
participants. Alternatively, the Consultative 
Committee might conclude that the resources to 
mount the necessary peace-keeping force did not 
exist within the CSCE. In these circumstances 
the Council of Ministers or CSO would have to 
decide whether to refer the matter to the United 
Nations. 
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Dirision of responsibilities 
15. Maintaining stability on the ground is a 
necessary complement to the political process of 
resolving a dispute. But it requires different 
techniques and activities, and a different kind of 
political authority and oversight. In our view, it 
makes sense to place the overall task of resolving 
the dispute with the CSO acting on behalf of the 
Council of Ministers, and to leave to the Consul-
tative Committee of the CPC the task of 
co-ordinating or overseeing activities designed 
to enhance or maintain stability on the 
ground. 
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CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki 
Operationalaspeets of crisis management and conflict prerention 
(Netherlands Delegation) 
For some time now the Netherlands has 
been strongly advocating that the CSCE would 
draw upon relevant existing organisations, and 
more in particular on the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation or Western European Union, when 
considering future activities in the field of crisis 
management and conflict prevention. This back-
ground paper provides further information on 
our proposal. 
A. Peace-keeping in Europe 
The last few years have witnessed on the 
one hand the decline of the risk of large scale 
wars, but, at the same time, the emergence of 
other types of crises, which could easily turn 
into armed conflicts. Recent events in Yugo-
slavia and Nagorno-Karabakh have been regret-
table examples. It is therefore hardly surprising 
that the need to make a more effective use of 
instruments of crisis management is felt even 
stronger. The CSCE Ministerial Council in 
Prague and the opening statements of many rep-
resentatives have underlined this view, and 
stressed the need to develop adequate peace-
keeping instruments. 
Peace keeping is an instrument of crisis 
management and conflict prevention which as 
such has not often been used so far in Europe. If 
interpreted in a broad sense it includes a range 
of activities involving military personnel, such 
as monitor and observer missions, but also more 
extensive operations. It may be called upon 
more often when other instruments of early 
warning, conflict prevention or political crisis 
management have been frustrated by the out-
break of an armed conflict. 
So far the only organisation with actual 
experience in peace keeping has been the United 
Nations. Although their peace-keeping activities 
have often had a high degree of success, the 
burden of such operations becomes ever more 
cumbersome for the United Nations. While 
peace-keeping operations worldwide tend to 
increase, so do the logistical and financial con-
straints. Nor can it be taken for granted that a 
peace-keeping mandate can always be obtained 
in the United Nations Security Council. The 
need to develop a proper CSCE role in peace 
keeping in Europe along with other instruments 
of crisis management and conflict prevention, is 
therefore hardly contested nowadays. 
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B. CSCE and interlocking institutions 
The notion that the CSCE process could 
draw upon existing institutions which offer a 
comparative advantage in a particular field is in 
fact as old as the CSCE itself. Examples of this 
principle of complementarity are the ECE, the 
OECD, the Council of Europe and the EC (in 
particular concerning the monitoring operations 
in Yugoslavia). A pragmatic, problem-oriented 
approach should eventually lead to the appli-
cation of this concept of interlocking and com-
plementary institutions also in the field of 
security. It is that very same approach that has 
resulted in the decision of the Council of Min-
isters in Prague that we should examine further 
how the CSCE could co-operate with other inter-
national organisations in the field of crisis man-
agement and conflict prevention. Drawing upon 
the specific expertise of existing institutions 
would avoid duplication, make use of already 
existing infrastructures, and would thus be 
logical and (last but not least) cost effective. 
C. Why NATO or WEll! 
1. NATO 
The old perception held in some countries 
of NATO as a potentially threatening organ-
isation has disappeared over the past years. 
Instead, NATO is now widely recognised as the 
most effective military alliance in Europe (and 
probably worldwide). It has adapted its own 
strategic approach and extended the hand of 
friendship through the creation of the North 
Atlantic Co-operation Council. 
We believe that at this stage NATO is the 
only organisation which has the infrastructure, 
politico-military resources and operational capa-
bility to implement a CSCE mandate for peace 
keeping at short notice and in a really cost-
effective way. One could take advantage of some 
of the military potential which NATO has at its 
disposal in order to both mount and sustain 
operations in this field. Moreover, NATO's mil-
itary expertise could also be made use of in 
monitoring or observer missions, in controlling 
arms embargoes (imposed by CSCE) or even-
tually as interposition forces. 
In principle, its procedures and military 
structure could help to provide a basis for con-
ducting well-organised and effective missions. 
.. I 
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Thereby, preparation time would be signifi-
cantly reduced and duplication of national 
efforts could be avoided. Moreover, it would 
dispose of the necessity to set up a new inte-
grated structure on an ad hoc basis. 
From a NATO point of view any peace-
keeping operation would be considered a rela-
tively simple and limited operation. A peace-
keeping force hardly ever exceeds 10-15 
thousand men (the manpower of one division). 
Even in the case of large-scale mission, it would 
mainly involve light (motorised) infantry units 
and their support units. Neither would logistical 
support be complicated in relation to the overall 
set-up of the alliance. If so requested, NATO 
could prepare itself for both the planning and 
execution of peace-keeping missions, including 
the development of operational and support 
concepts, the development of (standard) proce-
dures in the field of operational decision-
making, command and control, communica-
tions, logistics, training, etc. 
2. WEU 
Although WEU has not developed a 
similar military infrastructure as NATO, its 
organisation may also be called upon to perform 
functions in relation to crisis management and 
conflict prevention. It would still hold a strong 
comparative advantage over strictly national 
contributions in these fields. Moreover, WEU 
has decided, in conjunction with the EC deci-
sions of Maastricht, to further develop its own 
operational capability, including the estab-
lishment of a defence-planning cell and is 
already studying ways and means to contribute 
to peace keeping. If so requested it could cer-
tainly consider to expand its activities further in 
this field. 
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D. An exclusive mandate? 
It has never been the intention of the 
Netherlands to suggest that NATO or WEU be a 
" standard peace keeper " for CSCE. A decision 
by the CSCE Council to involve interlocking 
institutions such as NATO or WEU in peace-
keeping operations (or other missions in the 
field of crisis management or conflict pre-
vention) should always be made by consensus 
and on a case-by-case basis. 
Nor would NATO or WEU operate on an 
exclusive basis. Any mission that would involve 
NATO or WEU should be open to direct partici-
pation, to any extent requested, by other partici-
pating states. The EC monitor mission in Yugo-
slavia serves as a good example of how 
co-operation with other states in such a mission 
could take place. 
On the other hand any request from 
CSCE would need the approval of the institution 
concerned. Although both organisations are 
made up by countries participating in the CSCE 
process, this concept of a double authorisation is 
important at least as far as the modalities of the 
missions are concerned. Not all NATO or WEU 
members would necessarily participate directly 
in the mission. Furthermore, peace-keeping or 
other missions should not distract the inter-
locking organisations from their own core func-
tions and therefore should be considered by the 
organisations themselves before agreed upon. 
In order for NATO and WEU to prepare 
themselves for possible missions in the field of 
· crisis management and conflict prevention, a 
decision of principle from CSCE would be 
required. On that basis a system of stand-by 
forces, earmarked and trained for peace-keeping 
missions could eventually be set up. 
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CSCE follow-up meeting, Helsinki 
Address by NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs 
(2nd April1992) 
The Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. 
Worner, has gladly accepted the invitation you 
extended to the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
isation. He has asked me to convey to you his 
greetings and best wishes for a successful 
meeting, which holds great importance for the 
future of Europe and to make as an initial con-
tribution the following presentation. 
Europe is going through a period of great 
change and transformation, a change we all 
wanted and worked for. Since December 1989, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has 
repeatedly stated that its goal is a Europe whole 
and free governed by democracy and human 
rights, by co-operation and partnership. The 
alliance has done much to bring about this new 
Europe. My presence here addressing this distin-
guished Assembly of the CSCE is one expression 
of the change and the changed environment we 
live in. 
1. The transformed alliance 
The alliance has successfully adapted to 
these changes. The process of transformation 
launched in July 1990 at the London summit by 
stretching out the hand of friendship and 
co-operation to the former adversaries of the 
Warsaw Pact, had reached an important stage at 
the Rome summit in November 1991, after only 
15 months. Our former policy of deterrence and 
of vigilant safeguarding of peace has been turned 
into a policy of maintaining stability by 
co-operation and actively shaping the new envi-
ronment. This required a dramatic change of the 
political and military concepts of the alliance. 
The transformed alliance 
- adopted a new strategic concept 
emphasising the need for enhanced 
crisis management capabilities; 
- reduced its force levels substantially 
and altered its military structures to 
more mobile and more flexible forces 
better suited to meeting their new 
tasks; 
- encouraged the creation of a stronger 
European pillar of the alliance through 
WEU and the European Political 
Union; 
- and, most importantly of all, developed 
a new and ever closer relationship with 
the countries of Central and Eastern 
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- Europe including the republics of the 
former Soviet Union. 
Through the liaison concept and the 
newly formed North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council, we have created effective as well as 
flexible instruments to further enhance consul-
tation, dialogue and co-operation. It is the goal 
of the alliance to give those countries practical 
advice and assistance in areas where the alliance 
has a special competence and expertise, to help 
them overcome the difficulties of transition, and 
to provide them with a security forum. 
As in the past, NATO will be first and 
foremost an organisation that provides for the 
common defence of its members. If it could not 
continue to do this effectively, it would have less 
to offer its new partners in Central and Eastern 
Europe. NATO is a source and an anchor of sta-
bility. It projects stability well beyond its 
borders. The strength and vitality of the alliance 
derives from its effectiveness as a group of 
nations with shared values and interests and a 
long track record of co-operation. The four core 
functions of the alliance remain: 
- to provide one of the indispensable 
foundations for a stable security envi-
ronment in Europe; 
- to serve as a transatlantic forum for 
allied consultations on any issue that 
affects its vital interests; 
- to deter and defend against any threat 
of aggression; 
- to preserve a strategic balance within 
Europe. 
More than ever NATO's strategy stresses 
the co-operative dimension of security. The path 
of co-operation which NATO has chosen has the 
potential for further evolution. We are in a 
dynamic process. 
NATO is a central part of an emerging 
Euro-Atlantic security architecture. It provides 
the essential transatlantic link as demonstrated 
by the significant presence of North American 
forces in Europe. 
2. The concept of mutually 
reinforcing institutions 
The dissolution of the bipolar order of the 
cold war era has led to an increased importance 
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of international organisations. The challenges 
we face and we will have to face in the times 
ahead in this new Europe cannot be comprehen-
sively addressed by one institution alone. The 
transition of the Central and Eastern European 
countries to democracy and to market economy 
is proving to be more difficult, protracted and 
painful than many had expected. Therefore, 
unrest and instability are likely to be with us for 
many years to come. The tasks of building a 
co-operative and peaceful Europe are too 
complex to be handled by one organisation. 
Therefore, the heads of state and gov-
ernment of the NATO member countries 
decided at their meeting in Rome on 7th-8th 
November 1991 to work towards a new 
European security architecture within a 
framework of interlocking, mutually reinforcing 
institutions which complement and support 
each other. The CSCE, NATO, the EC, WEU 
and the Council of Europe should all be part of 
this architecture. At the North Atlantic Council 
meeting on 19th December 1991, ministers 
expressed their determination to ensure that the 
alliance will play its full part in this frame-
work. 
The CSCE has a central role to play in this 
development. As stated also in paragraph 9 of 
the summary of conclusions of the CSCE 
Council in Prague, it provides the necessary 
overarching pan-European structure. Today we 
have a real opportunity to make the CSCE a 
timely, effective pan-European forum for 
security dialogue, co-operation and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes. But if we are to help 
build democratic institutions, prevent economic 
collapse and continue to reduce tensions in 
Europe, we need a co-ordinated, mutually rein-
forcing division of labour among the CSCE, 
NATO, the EC and WEU. What we have to aim 
for is a coherent approach that enables us, in any 
given situation, to determine from a broad and 
flexible range of instruments the most suitable 
one to achieve our objectives. These organiza-
tions must all contribute to promote co-oper-
ation and provide the stability we need. They 
should be able to co-operate in a way which 
allows them to compensate for one another's 
deficiencies and draw on one another's assets. 
Institutional rivalries and restrictive interpreta-
tions of individual roles can only delay rather 
than accelerate and simplify the achievement of 
specific objectives. 
It is already apparent that our views are 
more and more converging. The CSCE Council 
concluded in Prague " that the challenges facing 
Europe call for multi-faceted forms of co-
operation and a close relationship among 
European, transatlantic and other international 
institutions and organisations, drawing as 
appropriate upon their respective compe-
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tences ".What we have to do today is to see how 
we can make this concept more operational. It 
will not work if its member institutions are com-
patible only in theory but have no day-to-day 
interaction or regular practical co-operation. 
The alliance is also establishing closer 
links with the European Community institutions 
and with WEU as the future defence component 
of the European Union. The alliance welcomes 
the objective of developing WEU as a means of 
strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
3. NA.TO's relationship with the CSCE 
Both organisations, NATO and the CSCE, 
have served different purposes in the past; but 
they always had a common goal: a democratic, 
free and co-operative Europe. 
NATO has always considered the CSCE 
the overarching framework of Europe's archi-
tecture and has actively contributed to its 
shaping and its work. The CSCE is the only 
forum that brings together European and North 
American states under one common code of 
human rights, fundamental freedom, democracy, 
rule of law, security, and economic liberty. 
The alliance has actively contributed over 
years to the arms control and disarmament 
process. It has actively carried forward the nego-
tiations through well defined concepts and pro-
posals. The unified approach of NATO member 
countries was to a large extent instrumental for 
the successful conclusion of agreements like the 
CFE Treaty and the CSBM Agreements. 
Throughout the last years, the alliance has 
acted as source of ideas and of diplomatic initia-
tives for strengthening the CSCE. The CSCE 
institutions established at the Paris Summit of 
November 1990 were precisely those the allies 
had advocated in the London summit decla-
ration of 5th-6th July 1990: 
- the Conflict Prevention Centre; 
- the Committee of Senior Officials; 
- the Office of Free Elections; 
- the CSCE Secretariat in Prague. 
At the Rome summit in November 1991, 
the heads of state and government of NATO 
countries stressed again their deep commitment 
to strengthening the CSCE process and their will 
to intensify their efforts to enhance the role of 
the CSCE. They called for a consolidation and 
further development of the abovementioned 
institutions and structures to help ensure full 
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, the 
Charter of Paris and other relevant CSCE docu-
ments and thus to permit the CSCE to meet the 
new challenges which Europe will have to face, 
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in particular with a view to effective action in 
line with its new and increased responsibilities 
for crisis management and peaceful settlement 
of disputes. They adopted initiatives to rein-
force the CSCE emergency mechanism by giving 
a more permanent role to both the Committee of 
Senior Officials and the Conflict Prevention 
Centre and by suggesting that more means be 
given to implement CSCE decisions. 
We are now establishing a more practical 
co-operation between NATO and the CSCE. 
Last December, alliance foreign ministers 
agreed to exchange information and documents 
with the CSCE and declared their readiness to 
make the collective experience of the alliance 
available to the CSCE. Following the conclu-
sions of the meeting of the CSCE Council in 
Berlin, they looked forward to the alliance con-
tributing to future CSCE meetings on subjects in 
which it has relevant expertise. On these lines, 
NATO was able to contribute in February to two 
seminars sponsored by the Conflict Prevention 
Centre on the topics of defence conversion and 
the role of armed forces in democratic societies. 
Working links have also been established and 
are to be further developed between the NATO 
international staff and the CSCE secretariat 
to assist the process of co-ordination and 
co-operation. 
The North Atlantic Co-operation Council, 
which brings together the North Atlantic 
Council and 19 states formerly belonging to the 
Warsaw Pact, has opened a new era of part-
nership and is contributing to the achievements 
of the objectives of the CSCE without prejudice 
to its competence and mechanisms. The pro-
gramme of consultation and co-operation which 
the alliance has developed with the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe will reinforce the 
CSCE and not erode it, as some suggest. Consul-
tations and co-operation in this framework will 
focus on security- and defence-related issues 
where NATO members can offer their expe-
rience and expertise. These activities are 
designed to aid in fostering a sense of security 
and confidence in these countries and to help 
transform their societies and economies, making 
democratic change irreversible. This in turn will 
strengthen their ability to fulfil their CSCE com-
mitments. The security gains which we will 
achieve through the NACC process will be for all 
members of the CSCE. This process - even 
admitting some overlap - neither competes with 
nor duplicates the CSCE. The work plan which 
we have recently adopted illustrates this clearly. 
It focuses on the co-operation partners' needs, 
and the alliance's ability to help in such areas as: 
- the civilian control of armed forces; 
- the military doctrines and budgets; 
- the defence conversion; 
- the conceptual approaches to arms 
control. 
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4. NA.TO's contributions 
to the follow-up meeting 
and to the CSCE in the future 
(a) Contributions to arms control, disarmament 
and the broad security dialogue 
The establishment of new negotiations on 
arms control, disarmament and confidence and 
security building as well as of a broader security 
dialogue and of effective mechanisms for con-
flict prevention and crisis management at the -r' Helsinki summit, will mark an important step in 
consolidating a new co-operative order in 
Europe. f 
As in the past, the North Atlantic Alliance 
is determined to play its full part in support of 
this process and in shaping the new co-operative· 
order. The Helsinki Meeting will offer, as the 
alliance heads of state and government stated at 
their meeting in Rome, a unique opportunity to 
move this process energetically forward. The 
preparatory negotiations started at this fol-
low-up meeting are therefore of the greatest 
importance. NATO has followed closely and 
contributed actively to the informal preparatory 
consultations in Vienna. The Norwegian draft 
proposal for a mandate for future negotiations 
reflects broad elements of consensus among 
allies as they have emerged from the consulta-
tions. 
At the North Atlantic Council meeting in 
December, foreign ministers set out broad 
policy objectives for the new process and a work 
programme for the first phase. All this suggests 
that NATO, through its internal consultations 
and its common proposals, will be a source of 
initiatives and actively involved in the weeks 
leading up to the Helsinki CSCE summit and 
thereafter. A High Level Task Force of experts 
of our member nations is fully engaged in 
working on the substance of a work programme. 
We therefore look forward to continued NATO 
contributions to the relevant working groups 1 
and 2 in order to participate as much as possible 
in their work. 
Besides contributions through jointly 
developed new conceptual approaches and new 
common proposals, the alliance is actively con-
tributing: 
- to a hopefully timely ratification and 
implementation of the CFE Treaty by 
the successor states concerned of the 
former Soviet Union through an 
informal High Level Working Group 
which resulted from the inaugural 
NACC meeting in December 1991; 
- to the control and elimination as well as 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 
the republics of the former Soviet 
Union by monitoring the situation 
and by co-ordinating the individual 
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assistance of allies through a newly set 
up ad hoc group; 
- to the delivery of humanitarian aid to 
republics of the former Soviet Union 
and the Baltic states by making 
available the transport co-ordination 
capabilities in the Senior Civil Emer-
gency Planning Committee; 
- to improving mutual understanding on 
defence issues by offering special 
courses, open to all CSCE states, at the 
NATO schools in Rome and Oberam-
mergau. 
NATO's most important contribution to 
the goal of a co-operative order is of course its 
contribution to stability and security in 
Europe: 
- by being an effective alliance and an 
anchor of stability capable of projecting 
stability beyond its borders; 
- by security-related dialogue and part-
nership in the North Atlantic Co-
operation Council. 
(b) Contributions to conflict prevention and crisis 
management 
There is a general consensus that the con-
flict prevention and crisis mangament capabil-
ities of the CSCE need to be improved and ren-
dered more effective. Conflict prevention is key 
to a peaceful, prosperous development in 
Europe, to the success of our goal of a 
co-operative Europe whole and free. The 
alliance has pronounced itself at the Rome 
summit in favour of strengthening the institu-
tions of the CSCE, including the Conflict Pre-
vention Centre. It stands ready to support them. 
It will be important for the CSCE to be able to 
manage potential crises so as to prevent them 
from developing into conflicts. 
NATO is ready to contribute further to 
special seminars of the Conflict Prevention 
Centre in areas where it has relevant expertise. 
We were happy to be able to meet, through the 
contribution of the Canadian Government, a 
request by the present Chairman of the CSCE 
for a plane to assist a CSCE rapporteur mission 
in Nagorny-Karabakh. 
The issue of further contributions to the 
Conflict Prevention Centre has not yet been dis-
cussed within the alliance. Possible contribu-
tions through the sharing of information, 
through communication facilities, through mon-
itoring of missions of unusual military activities 
or through assistance in the field of verification 
by linking the common database, inspection 
co-ordination and support elements of NATO's 
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Verification Co-ordinating Committee and 
NATO's Verification Support Staff with the 
Conflict Prevention Centre, would have to be 
considered on request of the CSCE. 
NATO has gained over the years expe-
rience in crisis management. It had to handle a 
number of crises of a different kind. The alli-
ance's new strategic concept, which was adopted 
at the Rome summit last November, defines 
risks to allied security as multi-faceted in nature 
and multi-directional, resulting in the first 
instance from adverse< consequences of instabil-
ities that may arise from serious economic, 
social and political difficulties, including ethnic 
rivalries and territorial disputes, the same kind 
of crises and risks with which the CSCE is today 
confronted. NATO can contribute to help 
manage those crises by political means through 
the intense consultation process and joint 
approach in the North Atlantic Council. But 
also the North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
could effectively serve as a forum for crisis man-
agement through dialogue and consultation. In 
fact, this is one of the purposes behind its cre-
ation. 
Last week, at the ministerial opening 
session of this meeting, several ministers 
expressed the idea that the CSCE should turn to 
other organisations, among them to NATO, to 
draw on their capabilities for crisis management 
and peace keeping. These suggestions were 
followed in Brussels with great interest and 
attention. Similar views have been expressed at 
NATO by some member nations in the past 
months. A thorough discussion will take place 
inside the alliance to reach a consensus among 
allies on the possibilities of NATO to support 
future CSCE peace-keeping and peace-enfor-
cement activities by making available its means, 
such as communications, intelligence, logistics, 
infrastructure or even forces. 
Let me conclude by reassuring you that in 
this as well as other tasks raised by the con-
ference, we will keep in mind the Rome Decla-
ration on Peace and Co-operation containing 
the following principal statement: " The chal-
lenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be 
comprehensively addressed by one institution 
alone, but only in a framework of interlocking 
institutions tying together the countries of 
Europe and North America. Consequently, we 
are working toward a new European security 
architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the 
European Community, WEU and the Council of 
Europe complement each other... This inter-
action will be of the greatest significance in pre-
venting instability and divisions ... ". Four weeks 
before the Helsinki summit, the North Atlantic 
Council will meet in ministerial session in Oslo. 
This issue is likely to be on the agenda. 
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APPENDIX VII 
NACC work plan for dialogue, partnership and co-operation 
(lOth March 1992) 
Introduction 
1. The ambassadors of the countries repre-
sented in the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council (NACC), in fulfilment of the request by 
ministers at the inaugural NACC meeting in 
Brussels on 20th December 1991 to develop a 
more institutional relationship of consultation 
and co-operation, have agreed to the following 
work plan beginning in 1992. The number and 
levels of activities to be implemented in 1992 
are approved. The topics and activities listed in 
this plan reflect a dynamic process which will 
evolve through practice. The work plan could, if 
necessary, be revised by the ambassadors or 
under their authority .. 
2. Our work will encompass two aspects: 
intensified consultations on the part of the 
Central and Eastern European countries with 
the North Atlantic Council, NA TO's various 
specialised committees, and the Military Com-
mittee; and a range of co-operative activities. 
Both aspects are designed to promote dialogue, 
partnership and co-operation on security and 
related issues. The topics we have listed for 
political consultation are described in general 
terms to permit all participants to raise political 
and security related issues of concern or interest 
to them. 
3. In both aspects of our work, we will base 
ourselves on the NACC declaration of 20th 
December 1991, as well as the Rome declaration 
of the NATO heads of state and government of 
8th November 1991 and the communique of 
NATO foreign ministers of 19th Dec~mber 
1991. The focus of our consultations and 
co-operation will be on security and related 
issues, such as defence planning, conceptual 
approaches to arms control, democratic con-
cepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military 
co-ordination of air-traffic management, the 
conversion of defence production to civilian 
purposes and enhanced participation in NATO's 
"third dimension" scientific and environ-
mental programmes. We will also co-operate 
actively in disseminating as widely as possible 
information about NATO in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, inter alia through 
diplomatic liaison channels and embassies of 
NATO member countries. 
4. NATO allies have committed themselves 
to providing appropriate resources to finance 
our co-operative activities. NACC co-operative 
activities are agreed by the NACC partners; they 
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may involve the participation of all or only some 
of them. Accordingly, some activities may be 
funded by individual nations. 
Politieal and security-related matters 
Topics: 
- Political and security-related matters; 
- Conceptual approaches to arms control 
and disarmament. 
Activities: 
- Consultations of the Political Com-
mittee with co-operation partners, 
including as appropriate with experts, 
as a rule every two months. 
Defence planning issues and military matters 
Topics: 
- Principles and key aspects of strategy 
including crisis management, defen-
siveness, sufficiency and flexibility; 
- Issues of defence planning; 
- Force and command structures; 
- Military contribution to conceptual 
approaches to all arms control and dis-
armament issues; 
- Views on military exercises; 
- Democratic concepts of civilian-mili-
tary relations; 
- Planning, management and analysis of 
national defence programmes and 
budgets; 
- Concepts and methods of training and 
education in the defence field. 
Activities: 
- Consultations of the Military Com-
mittee in a co-operation session at chief 
of staff level, and other MC meetings 
with the co-operation partners and con-
sultations in other appropriate forums; 
- Military contacts including high-level 
visits, staff talks and other exchanges; 
- Participation by co-operation partners 
in special and/or regular courses at the 
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NATO Defence College and at the 
NATO School (SHAPE) at Oberam-
mergau. 
Defence conversion 
Topic: 
- Defence conversion, including its 
human dimension. 
Activity: 
- Defence conversion seminar organised 
by the Economic Committee, inter alia 
with a view to identifying the possi-
bility of further co-operation in this 
field. 
Economic issues 
Topic: 
- Inter-relationship of defence expend-
iture and budgets with the economy. 
Activities: 
Topic: 
- Consultations of the Economic Com-
mittee in sessions reinforced by experts 
with co-operation partners every three 
months; 
- Economic colloquium on external 
economic relations of co-operation 
partners; 
- Defence economics workshop. 
Science 
- Enhancement of participation of 
co-operation partners' scientists in 
NATO science programmes. 
Activities: 
- Meeting of the Science Committee with 
counterparts from co-operation 
partners' countries once a year; 
- Attendance at advanced study insti-
tutes and advanced research workshops 
(800 scientists from co-operation 
partners' countries); 
- Participation in the collaborative 
research grants programme (40 grants); 
- Proceedings of NATO's scientific 
meetings to a central library in each 
co-operation partner's country; 
- Intensive courses in co-operation 
partners' countries (30 courses); 
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- Visits of experts to co-operation 
partners' laboratories (8 visits); 
- Linkage between NATO and co-opera-
tion partners' laboratories (10 grants); 
- Science Committee seminar on the 
mobility of scientists. 
Challenges of modem society 
Topics: 
- Defence-related environmental issues; 
- Pilot studies of interest to co-operation 
partners. 
Activities: 
Topic: 
- Meeting of the Committee on the Chal-
lenges of Modern Society with counter-
parts from co-operation partners' coun-
tries once a year; 
- Seminar on the military role in environ-
mental protection; 
- Participation of co-operation partners' 
experts in pilot study meetings; 
- Pilot study on defence base clean-ups; 
- Pilot study on protecting civil popula-
tions from toxic material spills during 
movements of military and other dan-
gerous, defence-related goods; 
- Pilot study on existing cross-border 
environmental problems emanating 
from defence-related installations and 
activities. 
Dissemination of information 
- Dissemination of information about 
NATO in the countries of co-operation 
partners. 
Activities: 
- A meeting of the Committee on Infor-
mation and Cultural Relations (CICR) 
with co-operation partners; 
- Information about NATO will be dis-
seminated as widely as possible in the 
countries of co-operation partners, 
inter alia through diplomatic liaison 
channels and embassies of NATO 
member countries; 
- Visits to NATO by selected groups (46 
groups); 
- Sponsorship of a number of co-oper-
ation partners' representatives to attend 
seminars in allied countries (50 repre-
sentatives); 
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Topic: 
- eo-sponsorship with co-operation part-
ners of one major seminar; 
- NATO speakers' tours to co-operation 
partners' states (9 tours); 
- Limited expansion to 60 fellowships of 
democratic institutions fellowships pro-
gramme; 
- Special issue of NATO Review with 
focus on co-operation partners; 
- Increased dissemination of NATO doc-
umentation in co-operation partners' 
states. 
Policy planning consultations 
- A mid- and long-term foreign and 
security policy issue; such an issue 
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might include the formulation of 
foreign policy in a democratic state. 
Activity: 
Topic: 
- A meeting of NA TO's Atlantic Policy 
Advisory Group with co-operation 
partners. 
Air traffic IIUUUigement 
- Civil/military co-ordination of air 
traffic management. 
Activity: 
- A seminar with participation of 
co-operation partners to follow up the 
October 1991 CEAC seminar, inter alia 
with a view to identifying the possibility 
of further co-operation in this field. 
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Statement issued after the meeting of NACC Defence Ministers, 
Brussels, 1st April 1992 
1. We NATO Defence Ministers and Repre-
sentatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, the United States, and the 
Defence Ministers and Representatives of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine 
and Uzbekistan met today in Brussels for the 
first time 1• We considered how we could deepen 
dialogue and promote co-operation between us 
on issues that fall within the competence of 
Defence Ministers. 
2. Much has already been done to develop 
the partnership between our countries. The 
Rome Declaration of the North Atlantic 
Alliance and the work plan for dialogue, part-
nership and co-operation of the North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council as well as bilateral con-
tacts and exchanges in the defence field provide 
an excellent basis for further progress. Today, in 
a spirit of friendship and goodwill, we discussed 
the contribution which we, as Defence Min-
isters, can make to this process in order to 
promote our common objectives. 
3. The positive changes in the security envi-
ronment of recent years have major implications 
for the organisation of our defences. In this 
context, we are determined to achieve early 
entry into force without renegotiation and full 
implementation as soon as possible of the CFE 
Treaty and expect to see the treaty in force by 
the time of the Helsinki summit in July. In the 
interest of further strengthening security and 
stability in Europe, we also support the determi-
nation ofthe participants in the CFE la negotia-
tions to reach, in connection with the entry into 
force of the CFE Treaty, an agreement to limit 
the personnel strength of their conventional 
armed forces in time for the Helsinki summit at 
the end of the CSCE meeting. We welcome the 
Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna CSBM Doc-
ument 1992 as major new steps towards greater 
openness and confidence-building in the 
security field. Complementary bilateral and 
regional efforts aimed at achieving enhanced 
confidence and security can also make a positive 
contribution. 
1. Kazakhstan attended as an observer. Turkmenistan, 
although unable to be represented, has indicated that it 
wishes to be associated with this statement. 
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4. We all agree on the importance of the 
safe, responsible and reliable control of the 
residual nuclear arsenals. We took note of the 
assurances given in this regard with respect to 
the reliability, security and single control of the 
nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union. 
We equally took note of the intention of the 
states concerned to join the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as soon as 
possible as non-nuclear weapon states. We 
confirm the need to ensure full respect for the 
treaty and to contribute in all possible ways to 
efforts aimed at preventing proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction. 
5. Many of us are faced with major restruc-
turing of defence efforts and some are 
addressing basic issues of defence organisation 
and planning for the first time. All of us can 
benefit from an intensification of contacts and 
co-operation. It is therefore with satisfaction 
that we note the progress which has already been 
achieved through an extensive visits pro-
gramme, discussions, courses and frequent mil-
itary contacts at all levels. But more can and will 
be done. To this end our chiefs of defence staff 
will meet on 1Oth April 1992 in the framework 
of the first meeting of the Military Committee in 
co-operation session. It will be the beginning of 
a regular series of meetings at the highest mil-
itary level. 
6. Furthermore we have agreed that: 
- a high level seminar on defence policy 
and management will be held covering 
the role and constitutional position of 
armed forces in democratic societies, as 
well as strategic concepts and their 
implementation; a key purpose will be 
to identify specific issues to be pursued 
during subsequent co-operation in 
defence-related matters; 
- an initial workshop will address prac-
tical aspects of defence management 
and the reform and restructuring of 
armed forces. This will be followed up 
by several panel tours to capitals con-
ducted by small groups of experts 
as well as by participation of co-opera-
tion partners in relevant NATO trai-
ning; 
- a workshop will be held to provide an 
opportunity to share experiences and to 
identify the most suitable practices and 
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work methods for the environmental 
clean-up of defence installations; 
- small teams of civilian and military 
defence experts, drawn as appropriate 
from several alliance countries, could 
be sent, on request, to countries 
desiring advice. These teams will be 
made available as quickly as possible to 
assist in ministries of defence or other 
areas in the defence establishment and 
will be prepared to stay in place as nec-
essary. Detailed arrangements for 
meeting the needs of co-operation 
partners can be pursued in the Group 
on Defence Matters; 
- further agreed activities of mutual 
interest in our field of responsibility 
will be organised in the framework of 
the Group on Defence Matters and 
reported to us or our representatives on 
a regular basis. The Group on Defence 
Matters could also act as a clearing 
house for proposals for co-operation in 
the defence field, including bilateral or 
multilateral activities not necessarily 
involving all of us. 
The aim is not only to increase mutual under-
standing and confidence among us, but also to 
provide practical assistance on defence-related 
matters at a time of profound transformation 
and transition. NATO members have promised 
to make available for this purpose the consid-
erable expertise and experience they have 
developed in defence-related issues. The list at 
annex, which is not intended to be exhaustive, 
provides an initial basis for discussion of areas 
for co-operation in defence-related matters. 
7. We have entered a new era of partnership 
amongst our states. The resulting improved 
understanding and transparency will help 
develop patterns of co-operation and create con-
ditions that encourage peaceful solutions to 
political problems. We are determined to grasp 
this opportunity to deepen our relationships, 
enhance security and contribute to the evolving 
process of a Europe whole and free. In our 
capacity as Defence Ministers we shall therefore 
play a full part in dialogue, partnership and 
co-operation. We shall meet to review the 
progress of work in the defence field annually or 
more frequently should circumstances warrant 
it. 
ANNEx 
Areas for further co-operation 
in defence-related matters 
The following is a list of possible areas for 
co-operation in defence-related matters. There 
are various ways in which they could be 
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addressed: seminars, workshops, panel tours, 
courses, bilateral or multi-lateral co-operation. 
Some topics will be most suited to military con-
tacts, others dealt with primarily through civil 
channels; many will involve joint activities. As 
well as acting as a clearing house for proposals 
for co-operation, the Group on Defence Matters 
could also help organise activities in the fol-
lowing areas. The list is not intended to be 
exhaustive, but it could form the basis for a 
future work programme including practical 
activities. 
- Military strategies: including discussion 
of concepts such as defensive suffi-
ciency, stability, flexibility and crisis 
management. 
- Defence management: the planning and 
management of defence programmes 
in democratic societies, to include 
accountability, financial planning, pro-
gramme budgeting and management, 
research and development, equipment 
procurement procedures, personnel 
management. 
- The legal framework for military forces: 
the establishment of a constitutional 
framework, the position of armed 
forces in a democracy, the democratic 
control of armed forces and civil-
military relations, parliamentary 
accountability. 
- Harmonisation of defence planning and 
arms control: the consequences of arms 
control for defence planning, the role of 
military forces in verification, prolife-
ration, resource implications of CFE. 
- Exercises and training: the philosophy, 
format, requirements and standards of 
training and exercises. 
- Defence education: organisation of 
education for both military and civilian 
defence personnel. 
- Reserve forces: mix of active and reserve 
forces, force structures, training. 
- Environmental protection: the military 
and the environment, protection, con-
servation, clean-up of facilities. 
- Air traffic control: military contri-
bution to air traffic management. 
- Search and rescue: military contri-
bution to search and rescue activities. 
- Military contribution to humanitarian 
aid: practical experiences, planning, co-
ordination, civil-military co-operation. 
- Military medicine: organisation and 
practical issues (occupational health, 
preventive measures, hospital man-
agement, medical supply, education). 
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Fourth WEU Session of Higher Defence Studies 
(Ebenhausen, 23rd-26th March 1992) 
Conclusions of Working Group on WEU and arms control 
(a) The past 
1. The working group began by considering 
the extent to which arms control has figured in 
the history of WEU. From an introductory 
paper presented by its Chairman, the group 
noted that protocols on arms control and force 
levels had been included in the original 1948 
Brussels Treaty and that the modified treaty of 
1954 contained stipulations regarding, for 
example, the minimum force l~vels whi~h t~e 
United Kingdom would be required to mamtam 
in Europe. 
2. The group noted that WEU had, 
throughout its history, had a procedural and 
substantive interest and involvement in arms 
control matters. It was not, however, until the 
Rome Declaration of 1984 that arms control 
appeared on the WEU agenda in its own right. 
The reaction of the United States to this devel-
opment was sceptical and unwelcoming and it 
was partly this, perversely, which pushed WEU 
into greater involvement in arms control 
matters. An even greater impetus for the devel-
opment of a European opinion on arms co!ltr~l 
matters came in response to the ReykJavik 
summit of 1986. 
3. The WEU platform of 1987 cited arms 
control and disarmament as a WEU policy 
objective. Significantly, WEU made no attempt 
to play an operational role in arms control 
matters, preferring instead to remain a forum 
for the harmonisation of the security policy 
interests - arms control among them - of the 
member countries. 
4. The Newall report of April 1990 recom-
mended the creation of a " European verifi-
cation centre". Although there is still some way 
to go in this area, the establishment of the sat-
ellite centre is one achievement which should be 
borne in mind. 1 
5. The contribution to be made by WEU to 
the arms control work of the CSCE, NATO, the 
Twelve and the CSCM has been noted in a 
number of documents produced over the last 
year or so 2• 
1. "Vienna, disarmament and Western European Union", 
Document 1223, 24th April 1990, Rapporteur: Lt>rd 
Newall. 
2. See letter Genscher/Dumas, February 1991; Document 
1271, 13th May 1991. 
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6. Although WEU is interested and active in 
arms control matters, it has to be said that there 
is no independent WEU arms control agency. 
Arms control work completed under the aus-
pices of WEU is dependent upon the contribu-
tions of member states. 
(b) The present 
7. The latest and most explicit initiative was 
that made at the autumn session of the WEU 
Assembly on lOth December 1991: Follow.ing 
the initiative of Mr. de Puig (Spam), 
Rapporteur, the Assembly made four clear rec-
ommendations on arms control matters to the 
Council: 
" 1. To take action to encourage con-
sensus among member countries on this 
subject and to take joint measures of arms 
reductions and control, including mea-
sures ensuring the regulation and trans-
parency of arms sales; 
2. To prepare a policy of minimum 
nuclear deterrence; 
3. To ensure that WEU's satellite data 
interpretation centre is integrated into the 
verification process; 
4. To enable WEU to participate in the 
preparation of disarmament projects 3." 
8. The Rapporteur continues to exert 
pressure on behalf of the Assembly, and it is 
now highly likely, the group felt, that arms 
control and disarmament will remain on the 
agenda of the WEU Council. In this respect, the 
group felt that the following comments from Mr. 
Holthofrs paper on the previous day were rel-
evant here: 
" A clear link exists between the 
co-operation of WEU member states on 
space and their co-operation on arms 
control. With the growing importance of 
arms control and verification in the new 
security environment, it is only logical for 
WEU to be increasingly used by member 
states as a forum for concertation and 
3. See " Arms control negotiations - further initiatives for 
WEU ",Document 1288, 7th November 1991, Rapporteur: 
Mr. de Puig. 
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co-operation on verification. This has 
resulted in practical arrangements for 
co-operation within WEU on imple-
menting the CFE Treaty verification 
regime. 
Moreover, a set of rules for co-operation 
among multinational inspection teams 
under the verification regime laid down in 
the CFE Treaty has been approved and 
have been introduced as a contribution to 
NATO discussions. The search for cost-
effective ways of implementing an Open 
Skies agreement remains high on the 
agenda. The possibility of co-operating 
with all CSCE member states is 
envisaged. " 
(c) The future 
9. As far as WEU's involvement in arms 
control in the future is concerned, the group 
worked its discussion around four questions. 
10. It is unreasonable to pretend that arms 
control is entirely a practical matter. Some 
thought has to be given to the abstract, theo-
retical aspects of the subject if only to 
acknowledge that the context in which arms 
control has been thought to operate and which 
legitimised arms control, has changed funda-
mentally, if not disappeared. It is important, 
also, to have some clear idea of what we expect 
arms control to provide. The first question, 
therefore, is " Is there a future for arms control 
in and for Europe? ". The group found several 
reasons for continuing an arms control process, 
and these fell into three groups. 
11. The first group, which might be called 
" cold war residual tasks ", would involve such 
things as the ratification, entry into force and 
verification of CFE, and the promulgation of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty - "traditional" arms 
control which still has a role. 
12. The second group, "alternative arms 
control ", could involve such things as ra-
tionalising arms control by improving co-
operation between those states involved in, say, 
a verification regime; making arms control more 
cost-effective. There could be emphasis on man-
power ceilings, following the German example 
of a 375K ceiling, unilaterally implemented. 
There could be work on the reduction on mil-
itary budgets, on public awareness and on arms 
exports. 
13. The third and final group, " old pro-
blems revisited ", was in response to doubts 
that although the cold war might be over, the 
threat of a massive conventional, chemical and 
nuclear war in Europe might not be. The CIS 
republics are discovering the joys of having their 
own armed forces - these must be observed and 
controlled. In other words, there still seems to be 
scope for arms control to contribute to enhanced 
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security and stability in an inherently unstable 
environment; the familiar tasks of arms 
control. 
14. The second question we addressed was 
" Should WEU have a role in arms control at 
all? ". The main aim of this part of the dis-
cussion was to tackle the possible problem of 
duplication of institutions and of effort. We 
began by noting the vast array of institutions, 
initiatives, binding treaties, loose arrangements 
and so forth. We noted that there was hardly any 
common ground as far as membership of these 
bodies, etc., is concerned. There is, clearly, a 
danger of duplication. 
15. Our first observation was slightly casuis-
tical inasmuch we noted that if WEU is to con-
tinue as an institution with a voice of its own 
(i.e. not simply as the sum of its parts), con-
cerned with security matters, and if we have 
agreed that arms control - a " security matter " 
- is here to stay, then it is inconceivable that 
WEU should not have an arms control role. 
16. We noted that, ifWEU is to live up to the 
promises of Maastricht, then it must anticipate 
an arms control role since there are initiatives -
such as the EC Working Group on Conventional 
Arms Exports - which WEU will be expected to 
absorb or at least become involved in. 
17. We· felt that, if we changed our expecta-
tions of arms control, we might find that it 
would contribute to constructive dialogue with 
the CIS and would therefore be worth main-
taining in its own right. 
18. We noted that NATO cannot do every-
thing and that there was scope for the prepa-
ration of a specifically European response to a 
given issue which could then either inform 
NATO or even prompt it into action. The 
danger of caucusing would have to be resisted 
but NATO is big - and likely to get bigger - and 
there is a case for sub-regional work of this sort. 
19. The East-West confrontation has gone 
and it is important that Europeans take the 
opportunity to ensure that their interests are 
secured as a new balance is devised. 
20. We felt that involvement ofWEU in arms 
control matters - representing an " old guard " 
in a new Europelworld - could act as a mode-
rating influence and as a means of protecting 
our countries' int~rests in possibly irresponsible 
times ahead. 
21. Having established that WEU does have 
an arms control role, at least for the foreseeable 
future, the next question was " How should 
WEU's work in arms control be organised?". 
We felt that the object of WEU should not be to 
create a kind of caucus within NATO or CSCE, 
for example, but should be a mechanism for 
co-ordinating WEU members' views where it 
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was felt that these views could add something to 
the debate or where there seemed to be a danger 
of overlooking WEU members' interests. We 
envisaged two roles for WEU where arms 
control is concerned: first as a European pillar 
complementing and strengthening NATO; 
second as a permanent " inner ring " or " ginger 
group " to push arms control matters and to take 
the lead where specifically European interests 
were involved. 
22. Where security matters are concerned -
arms control included - WEU cannot challenge 
the primacy of NATO, it should be comple-
mentary. There may, of course, be arms control 
and security issues which concern WEU but not 
NATO, and there would in such cases be no con-
flict between the institutions. 
23. The final question we addressed was 
" Which arms control and disarmament subjects 
should WEU concentrate upon or specialise in?". 
24. It will come as no surprise that the group 
could not think of an arms control subject, 
where Europe was concerned, which WEU 
should not become involved in. The proviso, 
however, was that WEU should only make a 
contribution or become involved in those cases 
where the interests of the WEU member states 
were not being pursued in, for example, the 
CSCE or NATO. 
25. On one level- the verification of the CFE 
Treaty - the group had no doubt that WEU will 
continue to have constructive involvement. 
WEU contributes to three levels of the verifi-
cation process. First, as far as satellite verifi-
cation is concerned, we have already seen that 
the satellite centre has a part to play. Second, in 
terms of CFE aerial inspection and, subse-
quently, open skies, WEU is already working 
towards greater co-operation and cost-effec-
tiveness. Finally, WEU is also contributing to 
the rationalisation of ground inspection efforts. 
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In all, this is an excellent rationalisation for a 
WEU arms control effort which the EPC, for 
example, does not offer. 
26. We felt that WEU could usefully be 
involved in the arms control aspects of the new 
CSCE mandate and of the CSCM mandate. At 
51, the CSCE is beginning to become unwieldy 
and there is certainly scope for regionalisation 
and specification - WEU is in an ideal position 
to assist in this way. 
27. We felt that WEU could become involved 
in consultations to establish mutually-acceptable 
and lower force levels - in the CIS for example. 
Where necessary, where it was felt that a specifi-
cally European contribution could be made, 
WEU could, for example, act in an advisory 
capacity to the NACC. 
28. We saw that WEU could contribute to the 
subject of reconstitution and build-up of forces, 
by instituting some sort of formal dialogue. 
29. We noted the importance of various 
United Nations arms control regimes and we felt 
that WEU could have a valuable role in pro-
moting, in relations with the CIS and the third 
world, for example, the United Nations Register 
of Conventional Arms Transfers, the United 
Nations Standardised Reporting System on Mil-
itary Expenditures and the exchange of 
Objective Information on Military Matters, cur-
rently being debated at the Conference on Dis-
armament. In this vein, WEU could turn its 
attention to wider matters such as transparency 
and openness in all military and security 
matters, to technology transfers, to armaments 
production, conversion, and to the contentious 
issue of qualitative disarmament. 
30. Finally we saw a prime role for WEU in 
ensuring that WEU members' interests and 
opinions on arms control matters were heard 
and respected in bilateral discussions between 
the United States and the CIS. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on WEU: tile operatioiUll orgflllisation 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming and endorsing the WEU declaration made at Maastricht on lOth December 1991, 
whereby member states agreed on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence 
identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters; 
(ii) Pleased that member states are decided to strengthen the operational role of WEU in the 
longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time 
lead to a common defence; 
(iii) Delighted at the reaffirmation, therefore, of WEU's paramount role as the unique instrument to 
express Europe's defence identity, and determined to continue to provide the parliamentary dimension 
required to oversee WEU's operational responsibilities; 
(iv) Confident that the setting up of the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrej6n will enable WEU to play a 
fuller operational role in co-operation with all other bodies concerned with verification, crisis man-
agement and environmental control; 
(v) Recalling recommendations: 
- 456 on naval aviation; 
- 469 on the state of European security - intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre 
and the north; 
- 488 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf; 
- 493 on the consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region; 
- 498 on the Gulf crisis: lessons for Western European Union; 
- 502 on arms control: force reductions and the role of multinational units; 
- 505 on the rOle of women in the armed forces; 
- 512 on operational arrangements for WEU- the Yugoslav crisis, 
as well as Written Question 294 put to the Council by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on 17th December 1991; 
(vi) Gratified that so many of its recommendations above have been accepted by the Council, at least 
in part, and trusting that all its recent recommendations, touching on the operational aspects ofWEU, 
will now be re-examined with a view to implementation within WEU's new operational context; 
(vii) Conscious that as long as a minimum nuclear deterrent is to be maintained by any WEU 
member state it should remain effective and credible; 
(viii) Considering that Europe's arms procurement needs would be best served by creating a European 
Armaments Agency which would associate all European countries so wishing, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Take the necessary decisions at the next ministerial meeting to give substance to the WEU 
declaration at Maastricht by: 
(a) agreeing the arrangements for setting up a WEU military planning cell with appropriate and 
detailed terms of reference; 
(b) deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport 
and training, and giving the necessary mandate for action to the relevant WEU bodies; 
(c) confirming the need for a committee ofWEU chiefs of defence staff and considering the cre-
ation of a WEU military committee; 
(d) progressing the idea of earmarking certain forces for WEU and giving particular consider-
ation to the creation of a European rapid action force to comprise elements of the future 
European corps and airmobile units from those WEU member nations possessing such 
forces; 
2. Investigate as a matter of priority the various areas for possible WEU action once an operational 
organisation is in place; 
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3. Define the status and responsibilities of associate members and observers to include the possi-
bility of participation in WED's operational activities (notably the work of the Torrej6n Centre) and 
also give due consideration to including other NATO states or European Community associates in 
WEU operations on an ad hoc basis; 
4. Ensure that the WEU satellite centre in Torrej6n establishes firm links with: 
(a) the WEU military planning cell to be established in Brussels; 
(b) NATO's Verification Co-ordinating Committee; 
(c) the CSCE's Conflict Prevention Centre; 
(d) the Open Skies Consultative Committee; 
5. Set up a defence representatives procurement sub-group to examine ways to bring WEU and 
IEPG closer together, instituting a special liaison with the IEPG secretariat in Lisbon; 
6. Include co-operation on armaments production on the agenda for discussion with the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe; 
7. Encourage France and the United Kingdom in co-operation if possible to maintain an effective 
and credible minimum nuclear deterrent and, in parallel, consider the desirability of instituting a WEU 
" nuclear consultation group " to give practical expression to the principles of nuclear deterrence reite-
rated in the Hague Platform as well as helping to define a European opinion on nuclear disarmament 
and anti-proliferation measures; 
8. Ensure that all arrangements aimed at giving a stronger operational role to WEU are discussed 
with the Atlantic Alliance to make them fully compatible with present and future military dispositions 
designed to safeguard allied collective defence and institute channels of communication to maintain 
such transparency and complementarity between NATO and WEU. 
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Explautory Memorandum 
(submined by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rllpporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. It was clear well before the Maastricht 
summit that the member countries of Western 
European Union were prepared to develop 
WEU as an operational organisation. A number 
of very positive decisions were taken at the 
WEU Ministerial Council on Monday 18th 
November 1991 and it was this set of decisions 
which enabled WEU to make its declaration at 
Maastricht on 1Oth December in response to the 
call by the Twelve in the Treaty on European 
Union. 
2. If there were any doubts in the minds of 
our governments and Council on the need to 
create an operational organisation for WEU, 
they were certainly dispelled by the reports and 
recommendations prepared for the plenary 
session of the Assembly and the debate held in 
Paris in the first week of December. First and 
foremost among the reports dealing with opera-
tional matters was that presented on behalf of 
the Defence Committee by our colleague, Mr. 
De Hoop Scheffer 1, and it was this set of spe-
cific recommendations, building on the 
remarkable series of reports produced during the 
Gulf crisis 2, which the Council has most taken 
to heart, both in formulating the declaration at 
Maastricht and in its work subsequently. 
3. As the foremost European parliamentary 
Assembly concerned with foreign policy and 
security matters in the particular realm of 
defence, we must congratulate the WEU Council 
and the Secretary-General for seizing the initi-
ative in this way and producing a very positive 
state of affairs with the present consensus 
amongst our nations. Thereby, we have main-
tained the strength of the principles enunciated 
in the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 and 
their restatement in the Hague Platform of 
1987. We must be vigilant that our countries, 
which together are the most committed to such 
strong principles of security and defence, do not 
allow these principles to become diluted. 
II. A sovereign defence 
4. In the important speech he made on 24th 
March 1992 to open the fourth WEU European 
Session of Higher Defence Studies held in 
Ebenhausen near Munich, Mr. Charles Goerens, 
former President of the Assembly, alluded to the 
fact that defence is still the first sovereign duty 
of the state. Our colleague, Mr. Fernando 
Amaral, in his forthcoming report for the Com-
141 
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 3, 
asserts: 
" clearly, security and defence responsibil-
ities in our countries are the sole responsi-
bility of the central authorities and 
national parliaments ". 
5. The first and most crucial move of many 
of the newly-independent states of the CIS, not 
least the Ukraine, has been to set up a national 
army to demonstrate and help preserve that 
independence. The idea of a common army, 
answerable to a number of masters, has 
foundered right from the start. 
6. It is clear that our own governments are 
generally in agreement with such sentiments and 
that the prospect of a European Defence Com-
munity acting in parallel with the Economic 
Community is still as distant a prospect as 
ever ... Or is it? There are some signs that maybe 
chinks are appearing in the hitherto solid 
armour of sovereignty over defence. For some 
years now there has been talk of 
rOle-specialisation in Europe, although few 
countries have been willing to give up specific 
capabilities in the hope that an ally would come 
to the rescue in the event of an emergency. 
7. Of course multinational and bilateral 
units have been set up, mobile forces created, 
especially under the authority of the Atlantic 
Alliance. But the alliance is only the sum of its 
parts and when it has been a question of 
engaging those forces, (e.g. for the possible 
defence of Turkey, by sending the Allied Mobile 
Force (Air) (AMF(A)), or sending the NATO 
AWACS aircraft (registered in Luxembourg) 
forward), it has been a question of purely 
national approval for action, with national par-
liaments particularly vociferous in defence of 
their own self-interest. 
8. Can matters be otherwise? Mr. Relus Ter 
Beek, the Dutch Defence Minister, says maybe 
they can. Addressing the International Relations 
Society of the Netherlands on Tuesday 31st 
March, he painted a picture of a Dutch army 
which would no longer be " national ", " auton-
omous " or even " whole ". According to Le 
Monde of 4th April 1992, Mr. Ter Beek said that 
the idea of national sovereignty was outdated 
and that growing internationalisation and 
Europeanisation had to be taken into account. 
This meant that the Netherlands would never 
have to act alone, (unless perhaps in Aruba or 
the Dutch Antilles), but always with and as a 
complement to others - which meant no further 
need for an army comprising all arms nor large 
mobilisable reserve forces. 
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9. At first sight, this seems a remarkable 
example of forward thinking and indeed in a 
sense it is. But, of course, the statement must be 
seen in context and that context is economic. 
The Minister went on to say that extensive 
reductions in the forces would be announced in 
the autumn and also that national service itself 
might be abolished. (A parallel was evident in 
Belgium in 1989 when General Charlier pro-
duced his far-seeing plan to structure Belgian 
force reductions.) 
10. Economic imperatives are producing 
pressures on all our national defence budgets 
and provide much of the rationale behind the 
new-found need to co-operate. Only now 
however are some governments beginning to 
accept the recommendations 4 the Assembly has 
been making, urging consultation and co-
operation rather than unilateral measures when 
it came to reductions in budgets. 
11. Of course the pressures for force reduc-
tions are not only economic - the international 
context is very different from that when, say, the 
Lisbon force goals or the size of the British 
Army of the Rhine (BAOR) were agreed. And 
with the transforming of " threat " into " risk ", 
longer warning times, increased security as a 
result of arms control agreements, greater possi-
bilities for mutual verification and the various 
confidence-building measures which have been 
decided, we may be assured of a more secure 
Europe. 
12. To go further and assert that national 
defence is no longer necessary and that we may 
all entrust our defence to others is a quantum 
leap which Maastricht did not even attempt to 
tackle, beyond affirming that: 
" The common foreign and security policy 
shall include all questions related to the 
security of the European Union, including 
the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time lead 
to a common defence. " 
three countries, as well as Switzerland, have 
assured the Defence Committee on its recent 
visits that neutrality is either in the process of 
being abandoned or would be abandoned given 
the necessary vote in national parliaments. 
15. In spite of these changes and the fact that 
another hitherto "neutral" country, Ireland, is 
already in the Community and technically .eli-
gible therefore for full membership of WEU 
(provided the strong principles of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and the Hague Platform are 
accepted), a number of our nations seem to be 
indicating that applicant states for the EC, as 
well as being obliged to accept the Rome and 
Maastricht Treaties, must declare themselves 
willing to abandon not only their " neutrality " 
but any pretence at an independent status on 
defence. This, if true, is a particularly para-
doxical position given the inability of the 
present Twelve to go any further at Maastricht 
on defence than the limited consensus which 
obtained. 
16. It should also be remembered that if 
Austria, Finland and Sweden are members of 
the EC according to plan by the beginning of 
1995, they will play a notable part in the review 
of Maastricht scheduled for 1996. An eminent 
Finnish parliamentarian and expert on interna-
tional relations, Mr. Paavo Lipponen, speaking 
at the Assembly's symposium on a new security 
order in Europe in Berlin in March 1992, as well 
as reminding his audience that with Finland's 
accession the Community would gain 1 300 kms 
of border with Russia, said that in 1996 his 
country would doubtless have its own opinion 
on what the Community's defence policy should 
be. Such a thought should be very salutory for 
the present members who should also be aware 
that the doors of WEU are in the process of 
being opened for the first time to a number of 
countries who are not, nor are ever likely to be, 
members of NATO ... 
IV. The nuclear future 
111. No neutrality? 17. One of the main reasons why a number of 
countries will be most unlikely to subscribe to 
13. It is particularly important to realise that WEU in the immediate future is the existence of 
there were such limits to what was agreed by the the nuclear principle at the heart of our defence 
Twelve at Maastricht, especially when one doctrine. In his report for the Defence 
comes to consider the implications for Committee 5, our colleague Lluis Maria de Puig, 
enlargement of the Community. Three of the rehearsed the reasoning behind the necessity to 
candidate countries for membership have maintain a policy of minimum nuclear deter-
hitherto referred to themselves as .. neutral ", rence and even develop such a doctrine in a 
although for varying reasons (i.e. Austria, European context. The WEU Council has sadly 
Finland and Sweden).; two others are .. non- put the idea into the category of" too difficult " 
aligned " (i.e. Cyprus and Malta). which is why we shall return to the charge in the 
further report for the Defence Committee which 
14. In the present international context the Mr. de Puig is also preparing, on arms control: 
notion of neutrality is not valid and indeed one CSCE and WEU. The Council of WEU must 
of the countries concerned, Sweden, is said to accept its responsibility in the matter. We are 
have banned the word from any official text. All not suggesting here that all our members should 
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possess nuclear weapons or even allow them 
necessarily to be stationed on their soil. We are 
saying that the present Western European 
nuclear powers, Britain and France, must retain 
a nuclear capacity, on behalf of Europe, and 
should explore ways together of maintaining an 
effective minimum deterrent. 
18. This has been the majority view within 
the Defence Committee and also the prevailing 
view among all the national defence committees 
with whom we have had dealings of late. The 
most recent such meeting was with representa-
tives of the Bundestag's Defence Committee in 
Bonn at the end of January 1992 when we were 
greatly impressed with the all-party consensus 
on the need to keep a minimum capability for 
nuclear deterrence within WEU. 
19. In Britain there is no move to abandon 
the strategic deterrent although, with the recent 
withdrawal of one Polaris ballistic missile sub-
marine from service some time before the 
Trident-equipped successor is to be commis-
sioned, there is at least a theoretical diminishing 
of capability. In France, the nuclear programme 
is slowing somewhat with the new government's 
decision unilaterally to cease nuclear testing in 
the Pacific, although the SSBN capability itself 
has been enhanced of late. 
20. The present conjuncture would therefore 
indicate that this is the moment for the two 
countries to tighten and rationalise their 
co-operation in the nuclear domain and indeed 
the French President, in his inimitable style, 
remarked in January of this year that it was only 
a matter of time before the nuclear question 
might have to be tackled in a European context. 
And two other French defence specialists, Mr. 
Jacques Baumel, who is a very active member of 
the WEU Defence Committee and also a 
member of the Assemblee Nationale's Defence 
Committee, and Mr. Fran~is Fillon, until 
recently a member of the WEU Defence Com-
mittee and a former Chairman of the Defence 
Committee in the Assemblee Nationale, have 
both urged that the nuclear issue be brought to 
the forefront of the debate on European 
security. 
21. Mr. Fillon has developed the Defence 
Committee's recommendation, introduced by 
Mr. de Puig in December 6, to propose a 
" nuclear consultation group ", under the aus-
pices of WEU, to discuss four themes: 
" 1. the establishment of a joint approach 
to the role of deterrence with the aim 
of defining a European nuclear 
concept; 
2. the study of the configuration of stra-
tegic arsenals and their compatibility 
with jointly-agreed concepts; 
143 
DOCUMENT 1307 
3. the study of methods of consultation 
in the event of recourse to nuclear 
weapons; 
4. the definition of a disarmament and 
anti-proliferation policy. " 
This initiative is worth pursuing if only to make 
the nuclear question, which has hitherto been a 
guiding principle of WEU, into a practical con-
sideration. However, it is highly unlikely that 
either Britain or France would ever abandon 
their sovereign right to decide the use of their 
weapons to any European organisation even if a 
" common defence " might be agreed in the 
future. 
22. In passing it should be recalled that the 
United Kingdom's strategic nuclear deterrent 
force is only " assigned " to NATO, which 
means that it is the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group which determines possible targets. The 
decision for actual use remains purely national. 
Similarly with France, except that of course the 
designation of potential targets is also purely 
national. The United States maintains both 
systems with less than half its SSBN force being 
" assigned" to NATO. 
23. Given the changes over the past three 
years, the task of designating possible targets for 
any of the nuclear powers must be increasingly 
difficult as the question of " who are we 
deterring from what? " is nearly impossible to 
answer. The idea therefore of minimum nuclear 
deterrence remains theoretical or at least " tous 
azimuts " in Europe where it is easier for us than 
for Americans or Russians to understand 
(although not necessarily condone) the desire of 
the Ukrainians to maintain their own minimum 
nuclear deterrent ... 
V. The parliamentary dimension 
(a) National parliaments 
24. Your Rapporteur has already asserted 
that defence remains a national prerogative after 
Maastricht. We therefore need to maintain a 
national parliamentary control over defence 
issues and yet at the same time develop a 
European viewpoint - increasingly so, in fact, as 
WEU assumes an operational role. 
25. Defence budgets are voted by national 
parliaments; WEU's budget emanates from 
national governments who maintain a tight 
control over it, insisting, even in the present 
climate of expansion in WEU's role 
post-Maastricht, on the strait-jacket of zero 
growth in real terms for the existing components 
(Assembly, Secretariat-General and Institute). In 
fact the advent ofthe satellite centre in Torrej6n 
implies a doubling of the total budget and it is 
hoped that over the coming years adequate pro-
vision will be made by governments to allow the 
whole organisation to fulfil its vocation. 
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26. Through the various prov1s1ons of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, the WEU Assembly 
has played a vital role in exercising strong par-
liamentary control over the whole organisation. 
That control must be linked with the rights of 
national parliaments over defence matters 
which is why the WEU parliamentary Assembly 
must remain linked to the same national parlia-
ments, as now. 
27. In fact we should be seeking even greater 
links at home with special relationships estab-
lished by our various committees (Defence, 
Political, Technological and Aerospace) with 
similar committees in national parliaments. The 
Defence Committee in the WEU Assembly has 
been assiduous in developing such links with a 
definite policy of joint parliamentary meetings 
in national capitals as well as regular invitations 
to chairmen of national defence committees to 
take part in our own meetings (such as the 
meeting held in Vienna last March to consider 
developments there in the various arms control 
forums). These invitations are usually also 
extended to those European members of NATO 
who are not yet members of WEU, so, for 
example, as well as our own national chairmen 
in Vienna in March, we were delighted to 
welcome chairmen or their representatives from 
Denmark, Norway and Turkey. 
28. Such occasions give an ideal opportunity 
for discussion on a wider basis and, in the case 
of the Vienna meeting, allowed members to 
receive a first hand account of attitudes in non-
member parliaments towards WEU mem-
bership. 
29. This national dimension is so important 
that should our Assembly, after WEU 
enlargement, find that its present premises, 
notably the parliamentary chamber, are too 
small to accommodate plenary sessions, then 
serious consideration should be given to holding 
sessions in national capitals on a rotational 
basis. This would have the particular advantage 
of putting WEU into the eye of the electorate 
(although, interestingly, for the recent na~ional 
election in Britain, mention was made in 
numerous election addresses of the fact that 
such and such a sitting member served also on 
the national delegation to Western European 
Union and the Council of Europe). 
(b) The Council of Europe (C of E) 
30. All our WEU members are of course also 
members of the Council of Europe which deals 
with a further dimension of the European ethos, 
ranging from human rights to migration 
problems to cultural matters and wider consid-
erations of democracy. The operational organ-
isation of WEU should become acquainted with 
these aspects which can influence European 
security and potentially provoke the various 
crises to which WEU may have to respond. We, 
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as parliamentarians in both WEU and the 
Council of Europe, must be alive to the possible 
benefits of such dual-membership for both 
organisations. 
(c) The North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) 
31. A small number of our members are also 
members of the North Atlantic Assembly, the 
interparliamentary body which, although not 
established by the Washington Treaty, performs 
a very effective role as watchdog on NATO. The 
great advantage of the NAA has been that it was 
until recently the only defence-related parlia-
mentary body which brought the North Amer-
icans into close contact with their European col-
leagues. Of late the NAA has opened its doors to 
the Central and Eastern Europeans and now to 
the CIS states, and has thus encouraged NATO 
itself to form the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council (NACC). 
32. Our Defence Committee has a long tra-
dition of joint meetings with the NAA's Defence 
Committee and indeed, building on the very 
successful joint meetings held last year in 
Geneva (WEU) and Madrid (NAA), it has 
recently been agreed to invite the Chairman, on 
a reciprocal and regular basis, to major meetings 
of the sister committee. This gives a parlia-
mentary dimension to the organic link with 
NATO determined in Article IV of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and goes a long way to comple-
menting the intergovernmental relationship 
between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance agreed 
at NA TO's summit in Rome last year and con-
firmed by WEU in the declaration at Maas-
tricht. 
33. The NAA has been very supportive of the 
nascent CSCE Assembly and has now made 
available the services of its own secretariat to 
help establish a CSCE Assembly secretariat. If 
NAA membership were ever expanded to 
coincide with all the countries represented in the 
CSCE Assembly, then perhaps thought might be 
given to merging the two bodies, along similar 
lines to the suggestion made by Mr. de Puig in 
his report 7 regarding the relationship between 
CSCE and the NACC. 
(d) The CSCE Assembly 
34. The WEU Assembly was invited to the 
meeting in Madrid last year when the outline 
agreement on forming a CSCE Assembly was 
decided. We trust that we shall be represented in 
Budapest at the beginning of July this year when 
the first true CSCE Assembly meets: In parallel, 
we should try and ensure that, when national 
delegations are agreed in our parliaments, a rea-
sonable number of WEU parliamentarians are 
included. In the United Kingdom for example it 
is hoped to have a delegation in the ratio: 1/3 
WEU/C of E; 1/3 IPU; 1/3 NAA. 
35. This idea will be of growing importance as 
WEU develops its operational potential as a 
complement to the CSCE itself, particularly in 
the realms of verification, Open Skies and crisis 
management. 
(e) The European Parliament 
36. The only parliamentary body with which 
our governments at Maastricht urged us to 
co-operate more closely was paradoxically the 
European Parliament. " Paradoxically " for this 
is the only body which hitherto has systemati-
cally refused any reciprocity to us, although 
during the mid-1980s the Defence Committee of 
the WEU Assembly managed to exchange 
observers for a short period. Of late we have 
accepted observers once again, this time 
admitting them to plenary sessions of the 
Assembly and according the right to speak. 
Sadly, there has still been no sign yet of reci-
procity, apart from two invitations to appear 
before the parliament's Security and Disarm-
ament Sub-committee addressed to the WEU 
Secretary-General and to an Assembly 
rapporteur. 
37. The Assembly's Presidential Committee 
has therefore decided to try and clarify matters 
at the highest level and it is very much hoped 
that success will ensue for there are many 
matters concerning European common foreign 
and security policies which now come within the 
remit of both the WEU parliamentary Assembly 
and the European Parliament and we could very 
well exchange ideas of mutual interest to mutual 
advantage. 
38. All the foregoing parliamentary relation-
ships - national, C of E, NAA, CSCE Assembly 
and European Parliament - are of growing 
importance given the operational resurgence of 
WEU and your Rapporteur intends recom-
mending that the Assembly charges the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
to keep us all regularly informed of develop-
ments. 
VI. The operational role of WEU 
39. The WEU declaration at Maastricht 
includes a specific page, entitled " Operational 
role of WEU " which reads: 
"WEU's operational role will be 
strengthened by examining and defining 
appropriate missions, structures and 
means covering in particular: 
- WEU planning cell; 
- closer military co-operation comple-
mentary to the alliance in particular in 
the fields of logistics, transport, training 
and strategic surveillance; 
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- meetings of WEU chiefs of defence 
staff; 
- military units answerable to WEU. 
Other proposals will be examined further, 
including: 
- enhanced co-operation in the field of 
armaments with the aim of creating a 
European armaments agency; 
- development of the WEU Institute into 
a European Security and Defence 
Academy. 
Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger 
operational role will be fully compatible with the 
military dispositions necessary to ensure the col-
lective defence of all allies." 
40. Your Rapporteur intends taking each 
aspect in turn to shed as much light as possible 
on what has already been agreed by the Council, 
what is in the process of agreement and what 
remains to be discussed. The first element to 
note is that these are WEU intentions as a result 
of WEU's own initiatives - these are in no way 
WEU " proposals " to ~ agreed by the Twelve 
or the Sixteen. WEU's autonomy is thus pre-
served and must be jealously guarded for the 
foreseeable future. 
(a) WEU planning cell 
41. Since the operational days of Western 
Union in the old Brussels Treaty Organisation of 
the early 1950s came to an end with the signing 
of the modified Brussels Treaty in 19 54 and all 
operational aspects were transferred to NATO, 
there have been few occasions when WEU 
needed a formal planning cell. In fact it is only 
of late, as the situation in Central Europe has 
evolved so much and lessened the need for a 
concentration of defence on our own soil, that 
WEU has had to plan anything beyond the 
realm of the verification regime we oversaw for 
some thirty-two years. 
42. When we did need to prepare operational 
plans, during the first Gulf crisis involving a 
threat to freedom of navigation as a result of the 
Iran-Iraq war in 1987-88 and then during the 
major Gulf crisis resulting from Iraq's 
attempted annexation of Kuwait, in 1990-91, we 
were reasonably content to make ad hoc 
arrangements and rely on the tried and tested 
procedures which we had developed over the 
years in NATO. 
43. As time has progressed and it has become 
obvious that WEU has a particular vocation to 
act to preserve European interests and maybe 
even on behalf of the United Nations or, poten-
tially, the CSCE, our governments have realised 
that a fully-fledged planning cell would make a 
great deal of sense to provide the most cost-
effective way of trying to foresee crises which 
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might involve WEU and planning an adequate 
response. Not that all our governments have 
progressed the idea at the same speed ... 
44. The consensus now is for a planning cell 
some thirty-five to forty strong, comprising 
active service personnel from the armies, navies 
and air forces of our countries. The peacetime 
commander of the cell is likely to be of 
three-star rank (Vice-Admiral/Lieutenant-
General) with a one-star deputy (Commodore/ 
Brigadier) as chief of staff. 
45. As active duty personnel on normal tours 
of duty (two/three years) the staff of the cell will 
be paid by national governments. The cell is 
likely to be colocated with the Secretariat-
General when established in Brussels but be 
answerable direct to the WEU Council. 
46. As a result of the declaration at Maas-
tricht, it was the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staffs 
meeting in Bonn on 27th January 1992 who 
tasked the WEU presidency with developing the 
necessary terms of reference for the military 
planning cell (MPC). 
47. The cell will be responsible for developing 
contingency plans for operations in which WEU 
forces might be involved, as agreed by the 
Council, and therefore should: 
(a) keep a list of forces likely to be allo-
cated to WEU for specific opera-
tions; 
(b) develop plans for exercises; 
(c) establish the relevant command, 
control, communications and intelli-
gence (C3I) requirements, including 
the necessary standard operating pro-
cedures (SOPs). 
48. It is not intended to give the MPC a 
command function, but instead to designate a 
military commander for any specific WEU 
action in the light of those countries who con-
tribute forces for the action and to form a joint 
headquarters (JHQ) under the aegis of the WEU 
Council. 
49. In consultation with national military 
authorities the WEU Council will give overall 
direction on planning options and priorities, 
although your Rapporteur believes that it may 
be preferable to form a Military Committee by 
appointing military representatives (MILREPs) 
to advise the WEU Permanent Council on a 
regular basis. (This is particularly important as 
United Nations and CSCE, as required, and espe-
cially with WEU's satellite centre at Torrej6n 
(plans will have to be drawn up for strategic sur-
veillance for specific operations) and with other 
WEU bodies such as those involved with arms 
control and verification, Open Skies and arma-
ments co-operation. An appropriate protected 
communications system will be a must. 
51. The cell should comprise at least five spe-
cific sections: 
- Policy and Plans; 
- Operations and Exercises; 
- Standard Operating Procedures; 
- Communications; 
- Logistics and Administration. 
52. The MPC should serve as a focus for 
WEU contingency planning among our nations, 
with NATO (especially liaising with reaction 
force headquarters and planning staffs) and 
other appropriate international organisations 
such as the United Nations or the EC. 
53. As for the intended time-scale for the 
establishment of the MPC, it is likely that the 
next meeting of the chiefs of defence staffs 
(CHODS) scheduled for 20th May 1992 in Bonn 
will approve the draft terms of reference for the 
MPC and possibly designate the first MPC 
Director and Deputy Director. This would allow 
ministerial endorsement at their meeting 
planned for 19th June and ensure that the MPC 
would be operational in October or November 
this year, with a full staff in place by next spring. 
54. In parallel with the MPC, it is intended to 
create a small military advice cell to serve on the 
Secretary-General's own staff and France in 
April has already nominated and appointed a 
Colonel to the WEU's London office. One or 
two further appointments from other countries 
may follow. 
55. When researching WEU's original opera-
tional organisation your Rapporteur came 
across an interesting detail. Apparently the 
Western Union operational planning structure 
in the early 1950s included a United States mil-
itary liaison office ... 
56. The Defence Committee has already 
proposed 8 that Canada and the United States be 
invited to nominate ambassadors to WEU. It 
might be worth suggesting that a North 
American military liaison office be also estab-
lished in Brussels to provide a link with the 
United States Central Command in particular. 
the majority of the Permanent Council will (b) Closer military co-operation complementary 
probably be special appointees, independent of to the alliance in particular in the fields of 
both NATO and the Twelve.) logistics, transport, training and strategic surveil-
lance 50. The MPC will obviously have to ensure 
close co-ordination with relevant NATO bodies 57. The Assembly has been pressing for 
and a permanent liaison with nations. In greater military co-operation within WEU and 
addition, it should establish links with both the especially in the fields mentioned here. Your 
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Chairman as Rapporteur for the Technological 
and Aerospace Committee has produced two 
reports 9 which deal inter alia with the special 
requirements and urgent need for closer military 
co-operation in the domain of military airlift (a 
crucial necessity for any largish-scale WEU 
operation). It is however in the realm of strategic 
surveillance that matters are the most 
advanced. 
58. Ever since that first report 10 for the 
Defence Committee by our colleague, Jean-
Pierre Fourre, advocating a WEU observation 
satellite agency, was adopted by the Assembly in 
December 1988, the idea has been progressed 
slowly but surely 11 until today the WEU's sat-
ellite data interpretation and training centre is 
now seeing the light of day at Torrej6n near 
Madrid. The primary purpose of the centre, as 
outlined by Mr. Barry Blaydes, the first 
Director, when he addressed the Defence Com-
mittee at its meeting in the Reichstag, Berlin, on 
Thursday 2nd April 1992, will be: 
- the training of photographic inter-
preters; 
- treaty verification; 
- crisis monitoring; 
- environmental monitoring. 
In addition, research would be undertaken with 
a view to further developing observation tech-
niques. 
59. At present a project team has been consti-
tuted to oversee a series of practical measures: 
- establishing the centre's status in nego-
tiation with the Spanish Government; 
- detailing the terms of the lease for the 
Torrej6n site; 
- carrying out the building work nec-
essary for early occupation of the site; 
- purchasing appropriate equipment; 
- staff recruiting and selection. 
A number of issues on policy and strategy 
remain to be resolved: 
- the provenance of the imagery to be 
used (the centre's terms of reference 
include various possibilities for aerial 
imagery); 
- tasking and methodology; 
- links with other agencies; 
- geographical area to be covered; 
- tasking mechanisms. 
60. It seems obvious to your Rapporteur that 
co-operation with other bodies, such as the 
WEU military planning cell, the CSCE's Con-
flict Prevention Centre, the Open Skies 
organisation (the satellite centre's terms of ref-
erence include analysis of all types of aerial 
imagery, not just satellite-derived), etc., etc., will 
be essential. In addition, as underlined by Mr. 
de Puig in his report 12, it would be a very fine 
gesture if the WEU Council invited its Central 
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and Eastern European neighbours to take a part 
in the work of the centre, perhaps even encour-
aging them to form a satellite centre of their own 
in the longer term. 
(c) Meetings of WEU CHODS 
61. These meetings were held regularly as the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee of Western Union in 
the early 19 50s. They began again in modem 
times during the French presidency of WEU as a 
result of the Gulf crisis in 1990/91. It is obvious 
to your Rapporteur that such meetings are the 
military complement to meetings of ministers of 
foreign affairs and defence. Ideally the CHOD 
meetings should come approximately a month 
before WEU ministerials, so as to allow proper 
staffing of appropriate recommendations to 
ministers. In addition, there should be ad hoc 
meetings in times of crisis (c.f. the Gulf). 
62. The Defence Committee was especially 
grateful to General Klaus Naumann, Chief of 
Staff, Federal Armed Forces, for the detailed 
debriefing given to members in Bonn on the day 
following the first CHODS meeting of the 
German presidency. 
(d) Military units answerable to WEU 
63. For the present the main unit likely to be 
" answerable to WEU " is the European corps, 
founded by France and Germany and which 
those two countries hope to have operational by 
the beginning of 1995. Other countries, notably 
Spain and Belgium, have shown interest in the 
corps, although some adjustment would be 
necessary to produce a " double batting " 
arrangement so that Spanish and Belgian forces 
could serve in both NATO's rapid reaction 
corps and in the European corps. 
64. To begin with the European corps will 
comprise the original Franco-German Brigade 
and a French and a German division with 
France's contribution being the 1st Armoured 
Division, which under original plans was to 
have been withdrawn from Germany. The three 
brigades of each division will be constructed so 
as to offer capabilities ranging from light air-
mobile to heavy mechanised units. 
65. The corps will have its headquarters in 
Strasbourg and three main missions: 
(a) as a contribution to WEU for peace-
keeping operations under the aegis of 
the United Nations or CSCE; 
(b) as an element of NATO forces for 
defence of the NATO area, under 
NATO's operational control but not 
command (this was already the status 
of the Franco-German Brigade); 
(c) for humanitarian tasks (perhaps 
wearing Mr. Genscher's "green 
helmets"). 
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66. On the face of it Germany is thus signing 
up for commitments it cannot fulfil, supposedly 
because of its restrictive constitution. It remains 
to be seen when and whether such a paradoxical 
situation may be remedied. 
67. The idea of a European corps is very pos-
itive and responds to the Assembly's desire to 
see specific forces earmarked for WEU. What is 
required now is an initiative by some of the 
other WEU nations to broaden the concept of 
" forces answerable to WEU ". What about the 
United Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious 
landing force, for example, as a specialist multi-
national contribution? And what is needed most 
critically is some sort of air mobile force, 
heliborne in the field with an effective attack 
helicopter capability, backed up by armour- the 
idea in fact of the European rapid action force 
long-cherished by the Assembly. 
68. It would be very remiss of your 
Rapporteur to neglect the naval element also: 
the Defence Committee will therefore be making 
a special study over the coming months of the 
possibilities for naval co-operation among the 
WEU nations. 
69. Other proposals which the WEU min-
isters have promised to examine further 
include: 
(e) Enhanced co-operation in the field of arma-
ments with the aim of creating a European arma-
ments agency 
70. The Assembly has long since suggested a 
rapprochement between WEU and IEPG to 
create a European armaments agency and this is 
now proving much more than merely a possi-
bility. Three years ago, the Assembly, noticing 
that there was no international parliamentary 
input whatsoever to oversee the work of the 
IEPG, suggested to the then President of the 
IEPG (who just happended to be eo-Chairman 
of the WEU Council, Mr. George Younger, the 
then British Secretary of State for Defence) that 
an annual report should be forwarded by IEPG 
to WEU. In spite of the slight disparity in mem-
bership between the two bodies the idea was 
accepted. Now we are talking about bringing the 
IEPG under the aegis of WEU to create the 
European armaments agency and indeed, at the 
IEPG meeting in Oslo on 6th March 1992, it 
was Norway in particular (not a WEU member) 
which was proposing that the idea be studied 
and the necessary action prepared. 
71. With other countries already starting to 
queue in the hope of being associated with such 
a European armaments agency (e.g. Sweden) the 
sooner the process begins the better. The Tech-
nological and Aerospace Committee is following 
developments very closely and will be reporting 
to the Assembly in due course. 
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(f) Development of the WEU Institute into a 
European Security and Defence Academy 
72. The WEU Assembly was enthusiastic 
about holding European Sessions of Higher 
Defence Studies right from the start (at the 
"Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Natio-
nale" in Paris in the autumn of 1988). We 
strongly seconded the then French Prime Min-
ister, Mr. Michel Rocard, when at the opening of 
the first session he proposed that WEU should 
create an Institute for Security Studies. The 
Institute is nearly two years old and the proposal 
to develop it into a " European Security and 
Defence Academy" might even involve creating 
a teaching body to teach higher defence studies 
on a permanent basis. 
73. While your Rapporteur would be in 
favour of such a move, the European sessions 
(there was one in Brussels in 1989, another at 
Wilton Park in the United Kingdom in 1990, 
and the fourth, although somewhat truncated 
compared with the others, has just taken place at 
Ebenhausen near Munich) should continue in 
different countries of the WEU alliance, thus 
ensuring that each country in turn is able to 
draw attention to its own security problems or 
particularities. The WEU Security and Defence 
Academy might well assume responsibility for 
the continuity of such sessions (which should be 
organised over a period of a week, ideally, to 
allow frank discussion). Shorter one or two day 
WEU seminars might be arranged as in the past 
for those who cannot spare the time to attend 
slightly longer sessions. Participation should be 
encouraged from all sectors of society and 
courses arranged both in our different nations 
and at the academy's headquarters. 
74. Running such a scheme would obviously 
be more expensive in both monetary and man-
power terms than running the present largely 
research-oriented Institute. It occurs to your 
Rapporteur that a similar scheme to the WEU 
planning cell might be envisaged for staffing the 
academy: i.e. detaching a specialist from each of 
our national " defence academies " (" Institut 
des Hautes Etudes de Defense .,Nationale ", 
Royal College of Defence Studies, etc.) for a spe-
cific period on " national " pay along the same 
lines as those serving in the WEU planning cell. 
75. As well as proving eminently cost-ef-
fective, the idea would combine the advantages 
of bringing new thinking into the WEU 
Academy as well as providing the necessary 
expertise to run seminars and short courses " at 
home and abroad " while still allowing the 
present research activities to be continued. 
76. In passing it should be mentioned that 
there is now a good deal of untapped talent 
among those who have attended the WEU 
Higher Defence Studies Sessions and the Associ-
ation of Alumni should be used increasingly to 
maintain and develop links. 
VII. Further operational considerations 
77. Over the past four years the Defence 
Committee of the Assembly has maintained the 
pressure on the WEU Council to urge greater 
operational co-operation. A plethora of reports 
and recommendations have been adopted as the 
result of careful research and detailed debate, 
both in committee and in plenary sessions and it 
is well worth revisiting some of these reports 
with an eye to reviving some of the ideas which 
were obviously ahead of their time. Among such 
reports figure: 
- Naval aviation (Rapporteur: Mr. 
Wilkinson); 
- Disarmament - Reply to the thirty-
third annual report of the Council 
(Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers); 
- Verification: a future European satellite 
agency (Rapporteur: Mr. Fourre); 
- State of European security - inter-
vention forces and reinforcement for 
the centre and the north (Rapporteur: 
Mr. Speed); 
- The future of low flying (Rapporteur: 
Mr. Klejdzinski); 
- Vienna, disarmament and Western 
European Union (Rapporteur: Lord 
Newall); 
- Consequences of the invasion of 
Kuwait: operations in the Gulf 
(Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer); 
- Consequences of the invasion of 
Kuwait: continuing operations in the 
Gulf region (Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop 
Scheffer); 
- The role of women in the armed forces 
(Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman); 
- Operational arrangements for WEU -
the Yugoslav crisis (Rapporteur: Mr. 
De Hoop Scheffer). 
VIII. Current operational problems 
78. Mention was made right at the beginning 
of the present document of the last report on 
operational matters submitted to the Assembly 
in December 1991. There are two pieces of 
unfinished business left over from that time, one 
of which, although still current, has lost its place 
in the headlines, the other always present. The 
subjects are the continuing United Nations 
embargo against Iraq, and "Yugoslavia". 
79. Regarding the United Nations embargo 
which is still continuing in the Gulf region and 
especially the Red Sea, French, Australian and 
United States ships are presently engaged in 
embargo operations and have been ever since 
the cease-fire a year ago. Both Australia and the 
United States have approached WEU to ask for 
help in the area but so far only France is con-
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tinuing to respond (the United Kingdom has 
resumed its Armilla patrol in the Gulf itself, but. 
the embargo is conducted mainly in the Strait of 
Tiran). 
80. On behalf of the Defence Committee, Mr. 
De Hoop Scheffer placed the following written 
question in front of the Council on 17th 
December 1991: 
"Urgently to ask what action the WEU 
Council intends taking to co-ordinate 
further European support for the con-
tinuing United Nations maritime 
embargo on Iraq which at present France, 
Australia and the United States (in the 
Red Sea) and Great Britain (in the Gulf) 
are experiencing difficulty in applying 
alone." 
and received the following answer on 5th March 
1992: 
"In reply to Written Question 294 put to 
the Council by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer" 
urgently to ask what action the WEU 
Council intends taking to co-ordinate 
further European support for the con-
tinuing United Nations maritime 
embargo on Iraq " , the Council would 
like to state that the issue raised by the 
honourable parliamentarian is under con-
sideration. Whenever appropriate, addi-
tional information will be made available 
to the Assembly ". 
(When would the answer have come had the 
question not been " urgent "?) 
81. Since when there has been no news from 
the Council. The Australians have extended 
their time on task but now understandably wish 
to withdraw home. Also understandably, they do 
not wish to leave a hole in the embargo arrange-
ments. The Council should respond rapidly and 
positively to this direct request which implies 
very little threat probability for any ship any of 
our nations decides to contribute. 
82. The other subject "Yugoslavia" poses 
more of a problem. WEU was of course involved 
in the planning for a possible peace-keeping 
operation before Croatian and Slovene indepen-
dence. Those plans were passed to the United 
Nations which now has a multinational force in 
place. The problem is that the United Nations 
force is not able to indulge in " active peace-
keeping " operations. 
83. Your Rapporteur understands that the 
United Nations is considering requesting WEU 
to help by organising a force for peace-keeping 
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The idea was 
discussed on 15th April 1992 by the Assembly's 
Presidential Committee which urged the 
Council to take action. To date no sign has yet 
emanated from the Council which only a short 
time ago was assuring the Assembly that the sit-
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uation in the ex-Yugoslav republics was being 
.kept under constant review ... (No sign, that is, 
apart from the announcement, on 27th April of 
the resignation of the Chairman-in-Office of the 
WEU Council.) 
84. In a related interview for the BBC's World 
Service, your Rapporteur reiterated the thought 
which he feels sure will find an echo amongst his 
1. " Operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav 
crisis", Document 1294, 27th November 1991, Rapporteur: 
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. 
2. " Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in 
the Gulf", Document 1243, 20th October 1990; "Conse-
quences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in 
the Gulf region ", Documents 1248 and 1248 Addendum, 
7th November and 4th December 1990. 
3. " Regional parliaments and the regional dimension of 
security". 
4. e.g. " Disarmament - Reply to the thirty-third annual 
report of the Council", Document 1158, 3rd November 
1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers; " Current aspects of arms 
control: the Western European position- reply to the annual 
report of the Council", Document 1182, 25th April 1989, 
Rapporteur: Mr. de Beer. 
5. " Arms control negotiations - further initiatives for 
WEU ",Document 1288, 7th November 1991, Rapporteur: 
Mr. de Puig. 
6. Document 1288. 
150 
colleagues: " Will Europe ever be in a position to 
organise itself to take positive action to assure 
its own security, even within Europe?". 
85. The present report outlines the practical 
measures currently in hand to make WEU an 
operational organisation. But such moves are 
nothing without the political will and resolve 
necessary to give them life and substance. 
7. "Arms control: CSCE and WEU ",Rapporteur: Mr. de 
Puig. 
8. "Operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav 
crisis", Document 1294, 27th November 1991, Rapporteur: 
Mr. De Hoop Scheffer. 
9. "Weaponry after the Gulf war- new equipment require-
ments for restructured armed forces", Document 1272, 14th 
May 1991, and" Arms and equipment for a European rapid 
action force", Document 1292, 27th November 1991, 
Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith. 
10. "Verification: a future European satellite agency", Doc-
ument 1159, 3rd November 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourre. 
11. " Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verifi-
cation by satellite - reply to the thirty-third annual report of 
the Council", Document 1160, 7th November 1988, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti; " Observation satellites - a 
European means of verifying disarmament - guidelines 
drawn from the symposium", Document 1230, 25th May 
1990, Rapporteur: Mr. Lenzer. 
12. "Arms control: CSCE and WEU ",Rapporteur: Mr. de 
Puig. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
WEU: the operational organisation 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
1st June 1992 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) and 
insert: 
" deciding the parameters for closer military co-operation in the fields of logistics, transport and 
training and considering an eventual mandate for action. " 
2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, after" production" add" and reduction". 
Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman 
l. See 4th sitting, 2nd June 1992 (amendment l negatived; amendment 2 agreed to). 
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Amendments 3 and 4 
WEU: the operational organisation 
AMENDMENTS 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mr. Moya on behalf of the Socialist Group 
3. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out parjtgraph (vii). 
4. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 7. 
l. See 4th, 2nd June 1992 (amendments negatived). 
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2nd June 1992 
Signed: Moya 
Document 1307 Addendum 2nd June 1992 
WEU: the operational organisation 
ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee 
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
RAPPORTEUR'S REMARKS 
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I. Speech by Rt. Hon. Malcolm Rifkind, QC, MP, Secretary of State for 
Defence, to the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, on 
14th May 1992 
11. Meeting of the North Atlantic Council with the Western European Union 
Council (21st May 1992) 
Ill. Declaration on the creation of a Franco-German army corps officially 
announced at the Franco-German Defence and Security Council meeting 
in La Rochelle on 22nd May 1992 
IV. Eurogroup Statement (25th May 1992) 
V. Final Communique from the ministerial sessions of the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels (27th May 
1992) 
Rapporteur's remarks 
1. In the days following the adoption of the 
main report on "WEU: the operational 
organisation " (Document 1307, 13th May 
1992) have come a series of important meetings 
and pronouncements which will all have a far-
reaching effect on the operational arrangements 
for WEU and which your Rapporteur feels 
should be brought to the attention of colleagues 
in the Assembly: hence this Addendum. 
2. On Thursday 14th May 1992 the new 
British Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm 
Rifkind, speaking at the Centre for Defence 
Studies, King's College, London, gave particular 
and positive British support to WEU's opera-
tional vocation by announcing a scheme 
whereby national units might be earmarked for 
WEU. (See Appendix I.) 
3. At their meeting under German chair-
manship in Bonn on Wednesday 20th May 
1992, the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff reached 
broad consensus both on their own role and on 
the terms of reference and staffing for the WEU 
planning cell to be established in Belgium this 
autumn. The planning cell will be responsible 
for studying contingencies for a variety of 
humanitarian, crisis-management and peace-
keeping roles. An Italian officer, General 
Marcello Cantabiano, is likely to be appointed 
Director with a French General as his Deputy. 
The CHODS also discussed the creation of a 
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military advisers group for the Council to 
provide a military counterpart to the Permanent 
Representatives. The CHODS' recommenda-
tions will be considered by ministers at the 
WEU Ministerial Council on Friday 19th 
June. 
4. Thursday 21st May saw the first formal 
meeting between the Permanent Representa-
tives of WEU and NATO, thus giving substance 
to the Declarations made in Rome (NATO) and 
Maastricht (WEU) and beginning the process of 
transparency and complementarity called for by 
your Rapporteur in the draft recommendations. 
(See Appendix 11.) 
5. The Franco-German summit, held in La 
Rochelle on 21st and 22nd May, resulted in a 
major declaration by President Mitterrand and 
Chancellor Kohl in which they formally 
announced the creation of the European Corps 
and invited other members ofWEU to participate. 
The two leaders stressed the " Eurocorps " role 
at the service both of WEU and NATO. From 
what the Defence Committee has learnt about 
the likely status and composition of the Corps, 
your Rapporteur believes that we should con-
gratulate both French and German ministries of 
defence on the practical steps being taken to 
implement the overarching political decision. 
France in particular has not received due credit 
for the significant progress made in moving 
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towards a possible reinsertion into NATO oper-
ational arrangements. (See Appendix Ill.) 
6. Monday 25th and Tuesday 26th May saw 
other significant meetings: Eurogroup ministers 
in Brussels seeking a link with WEU, NATO 
Defence Ministers in Brussels to consider 
putting NATO at the disposal of the CSCE, and 
EC Foreign Ministers in Lisbon to consider 
measures designed to help end the conflict in the 
states of the former Yugoslavia: 
(a) The Eurogroup members of the Defence 
Planning Committee were particularly 
enthusiastic about bringing the Euro-
group under the aegis of WEU and 
found a particularly felicitous formula 
to ensure " Eurogroup members who 
are not members of WEU the possi-
bility to participate fully in its activ-
ities, and to retain the same rights and 
responsibilities as they currently enjoy 
for any functions transferred to WEU 
from other European security 
organisations ". The parallel also with 
the IEPG and the likely association 
with WEU is worth underlining. The 
fact that the next Eurogroup 
Chairman, (the Italian Defence Min-
ister) from 1st July 1992, will also be 
eo-Chairman of the WEU Council 
adds to the likelihood that fusion of 
the two bodies will take place within 
the next year. (See Appendix IV.) 
(b) The Defence Planning Committee 
(France is not a member) agreed on 
the principle of making NATO's 
resources and organisation available 
for peace-keeping on behalf of the 
CSCE. However, this idea would 
require agreement by all 16 allies and 
the test will come on Thursday 4th 
June when the complete NATO 
Council meets in Oslo to examine 
such considerations as well as to 
redefine NATO's command struc-
tures. (See Appendix V.) 
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(c) The European Community's meeting 
in Lisbon on Tuesday 26th May 
decided to seek specific United 
Nations sanctions against Serbia over 
the continuing fighting in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Obviously such sanc-
tions are to be economic and political 
to begin with, but the use of military 
force has not been ruled out. Speaking 
on the BBC Newsnight programme,_ 
on Friday 22nd May, the WEU Secre-
tary-General, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, 
called for the necessary military 
planning to enforce such an embargo 
in general and in particular to keep 
open Sarajevo airport to allow humani-
tarian relief to reach its destination. 
Your Rapporteur concurs with such 
sentiments and believes that with a 
comparatively minimal engagement of 
sea and air forces it should be possible 
to bring the various belligerents to 
their senses and at the same time dem-
onstrate Europe's resolve for action. It 
will be for the Assembly in plenary 
session to decide the course of action it 
believes WEU shoUld now be pursuing 
- even before the permanent opera-
tional organisation is in place. Are we 
pragmatic enough to tackle the 
problem? 
7. On a personal note, it would be quite 
remiss of your Rapporteur not to acknowledge 
the considerable help and specific briefing fur-
nished by the German, British and French minis-
tries of defence for the preparation of Document 
1307. Bonn, holding the presidency of the WEU 
Council, has been more than punctilious in its 
courteous treatment of WEU's parliamentary 
Assembly in general and the Defence Committee 
in particular and deserves particular congratu-
lation from us all for carefully guiding ideas on 
WEU's operational organisation from conception 
to present near-realisation. 
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Speech by Rt. Hon. Makolm Riflcind, QC, MP, 
Secretary of State for Defence, 
to the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London, 
on 14th May 1992 
A. decade of change in European security 
The European scene 
Like everything else, the way we think 
about our defence is having to adapt to the 
rapidly changing political and security scene in 
Europe. I want tonight to talk about the changes 
we see. How NATO is adapting and the kind of 
contribution we think Europe - particularly 
Western European Union (WEU)- can make to 
Europe's own defence and to the common 
effort. 
Western European security 
Let me look ahead now and focus upon the 
security arrangements which we shall share in 
NATO and the future European Union. 
The intense, monolithic threat to our 
security of the cold war epoch is being replaced 
by new, more complex risks. 
At a time of change and unpredictability, 
Europe will be wise to sustain those institutions -
above all NATO- which firmly engages North 
America in collective western security. 
But at the same time it will be right also for 
European partners to play a proportionately 
greater part in securing our own defence. 
NATO 
Let me begin with changes in NATO. 
What is most striking to me is the vigour and 
vitality shown by NATO in adapting itself to 
changed circumstances over the past two or three 
years. 
With the end of the cold war there were 
many who predicted an end to NATO, or who 
claimed that its integrated military structure no 
longer had a raison d'etre. Instead, thanks to a 
process of constructive debate, involving all the 
alliance members, NA TO's policies and strategy 
have been thoroughly overhauled. 
The Rome NATO summit last November 
saw the completion of the alliance's new strategic 
concept. This published document sets out 
clearly the role which NATO will play in the 
future - a document moreover, in the prepa-
ration of which all NATO allies (including 
France - a point which strikes me as very 
welcome) participated fully, and to which they all 
put their signatures. 
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NATO has, also, overhauled its military 
strategy and force structure to meet the changed 
strategic environment and the more diverse set of 
risks now facing us all. Central to this process has 
been the creation of the Allied Command Europe 
Rapid Reaction Corps, a multinational for-
mation with a major and militarily highly 
effective European component: so far 10 
European countries are participating, as well as a 
substantial United States contribution. The 
corps, operational this autumn, will provide 
NATO with a flexible means of responding 
quickly and effectively to crises ranging from 
instability on its borders to all out aggression. 
These developments illustrate a continued 
commitment by all NA TO's 16 members to the 
future of the alliance. They exemplify the resil-
ience of NATO: its ability to adapt itself in the 
face of events and its vital importance to the 
future of defence both European and trans-
Atlantic. 
The creation of the North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council which held its first 
meeting in Brussels on 20th December, added 
an important new dimension. Now in this forum 
the 16 members of·NATO are joined by the 
countries of the former Warsaw Pact (which 
finally breathed its last in the summer of last 
year) in a new consultative institution. Nations 
once ranged against each other are now keen to 
understand and learn from each other. 
All the republics of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Baltic States and the 
five Eastern European countries which once 
belonged to the Warsaw Pact are now 
members. 
More recently, in April Defence Ministers 
and their Chiefs of Defence of these countries 
met to extend the dialogue further. 
The nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe clearly see NATO as important as a 
bulwark of stability in a changing continent and 
as a beacon of the determination of Western 
democratic countries to maintain the power of 
free democratic values in Europe. 
Let us now look specifically at Western 
European defence. I have begun with changes in 
NATO, because our European defence policy 
has two important premises: 
- First, NATO will continue to be what 
Chancellor Kohl recently called, " the 
DOCUMENT 1307 ADDENDUM 
anchor of European security". It 
remains the primary instrument of 
western collective defence for the allies. 
It is the essential forum for consultation 
and policy-making on their security and 
defence commitments under the Wash-
ington Treaty. In addition, NATO will 
increasingly play a crucial role in 
broader European security. It will be 
active in security consultations, arms 
control, and where necessary peace-
keeping efforts on the continent. NATO 
offers a means for a richer and more 
stable Western Europe to help spread 
democracy, military reform and security 
to its Eastern neighbours and the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union. As 
such, it will be at the centre of the insti-
tutions that will in future contribute to 
the peace and stability of the continent 
as a whole. 
- Second, the United States is going to 
stay in Europe. I have just returned from 
Washington and I know that the United 
States wishes to remain in Europe. The 
United States makes a vital contribution 
to European security through NATO, its 
new role in the CSCE, and through the 
leadership which it has given recently in 
the crucial area of nuclear arms 
reduction and non-proliferation. 
Role of Western European Union 
Given this, how can a stronger Europe and 
the United States work together in future to 
assure peace and security throughout the con-
tinent, and the defence of NATO members? That 
is the question I want now to focus on in the rest 
of my speech. 
It involves looking ahead as NATO did at 
its Rome summit last November. NATO leaders 
reaffirmed then that development of a European 
security identity and defence role will reinforce 
the integrity and effectiveness of the alliance. 
This approach was reflected in the Maas-
tricht Treaty which presages the emergence of a 
European Union with implications for the way 
we think about and organise defence. NATO will 
remain the corner-stone of European defence and 
ultimate guarantor of the defence of the 
European Union. Within that framework, we 
should expect a number of gradual but major 
changes ahead. 
First, it was agreed that the European 
Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy 
should include the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which must be com-
patible with NATO. 
Second, it was also made clear that the 
building up of a specifically European capability 
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in defence will be achieved gradually and must be 
through Western European Union. For those not 
familiar with it, I should explain that WEU is an 
autonomous body of European countries 
founded under its own treaty in 1948 and with 
long-standing links to NATO. It will remain inde-
pendent of both the European Union and NATO, 
but with close links to both. 
One crucial purpose of developing WEU 
must therefore be to strengthen the European 
pillar of the alliance. 
We believe that it is time for a practical 
step forward in European defence in accordance 
with what we agreed at Rome and Maastricht. 
European allies should now extend their ability 
to make a contribution to international crisis res-
olution: to peace keeping: and to help with specif-
ically European concerns where NATO is not 
involved. 
The specific roles and missions which 
would seem to be appropriate for WEU 
include: 
- responses to threats to European 
interests in Europe when NATO chooses 
not to be engaged, I must say that I find 
it hard to conceive of-significant combat 
operations in Europe where NATO 
would not be involved. More likely 
are, 
- international crisis management out-
side Europe where there are specific 
European interests to be safeguarded, 
- peace-keeping operations in Europe or 
elsewhere under United Nations or 
other bodies with the authority to act, 
- humanitarian and rescue missions, 
inside and outside Europe. 
One of the most valuable potential prizes to be 
gained through a more substantial and 
co-ordinated European Defence effort would be 
the ability to bring a more coherent European 
military contribution to the support of wider 
western security interests. This would be right in 
itself, in furtherance of European interests, and 
would be of value to our United States allies, 
with whom we would in all probability be 
working closely in such circumstances. This was 
what happened eventually in the Gulf in 
1990-91. We were lucky then to have time to 
make ad hoc arrangements: for the future we 
need to be able to move quickly if needed. 
Let me explain how we think the new 
European defence identity can be developed 
within WEU and organised so as to maintain the 
core functions of NATO, while giving impetus 
to collective European defence efforts. These 
ideas are the British contribution to a consensus 
which we hope will emerge at the WEU Minis-
terial meeting next month. 
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We think it essential that all WEU partners 
should be involved on an equal footing, and that 
the authority for deployment and command of 
European forces in cases where NATO is not 
involved should come collectively from the 
Council of Ministers of WEU. 
WEU member states should make relevant 
forces available to WEU, drawing on those with 
NATO or national roles. Missions by European 
forces where NATO is not involved - including 
any operation flowing from the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy - should be planned and exe-
cuted under the authority of WEU as a whole. 
We should therefore get ahead with planning for 
a variety of contingencies, recognising that there 
will always be a political decision of governments 
at the time whether to sanction or participate in a 
specific operation. 
WEU forces should now be drawn from 
existing assets - i.e. by " double-batting " NATO 
or other national forces for use by WEU on such 
agreed missions. This would mirror the way 
United States forces in Europe are assigned both 
NATO and national roles. It is both undesirable 
and unnecessary to rival that of NATO. Indeed it 
is difficult to see how standing forces or a 
standing command structure would be possible 
without conflicting with the primary obligation 
to NATO of those forces assigned to them. 
Forces made available to WEU should 
cover as full a range of capabilities as possible, 
including land, sea and air forces. I shall say 
more in a minute to illustrate the type of forces 
which the United Kingdom could consider 
putting at WEU's disposal. 
The contingency planning for WEU mil-
itary operations would be carried out by a central 
WEU Planning Cell located in Belgium with 
close links to the WEU Secretariat which is also 
to move to Belgium by 1st January 1993. This 
Planning Cell would, with the guidance of the 
WEU Chiefs of Staff, recommend to the WEU 
Council how the forces available to WEU might 
be packaged and commanded to carry out antici-
pated tasks. In consultation with NATO, it would 
also make plans for exercising those capabilities 
when approved by the WEU Council. 
We should make every effort to emphasise 
multinational military formations. This is 
increasingly happening in NATO, and is the right 
pattern for WEU. The United Kingdom l;las long 
sustained with the Netherlands a joint 
amphibious force. France and Germany have 
been developing a joint land force unit. NATO is 
developing multinational reaction forces with 
Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium 
as participants in a multinational division. 
Partners should be encouraged to con-
tribute according to their capabilities. Some have 
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particular expertise in deploying forces outside 
Europe. Let them work together. Some have par-
ticular naval capabilities. Some have more plen-
tiful infantry and lighter forces suited to humani-
tarian and peace-keeping tasks. There will 
probably be a need for rotation of some responsi-
bilities (for example, four countries might take on 
part of a peace-keeping force contribution for six 
months every two years). Some allies have con-
straints, which we understand, on their partici-
pation in operations outside the NATO area. A 
flexible approach making maximum use of 
existing assets, will be the most practical way of 
proceeding. 
For real work to begin it is important for 
WEU countries to identify the range of assets we 
can each contribute on which the planners in 
WEU will. then be able to draw in defining forces 
appropriate to particular contingencies. I hoi?e 
that within the next few months, all partners wtll 
declare a number of their units available to 
WEU. 
The approach which the United Kingdom 
advocates is to sustain the clear assignment of 
allies' forces to NATO while at the same time 
providing an ability to employ them for WEU 
purposes when that seems necessary. A decision 
to do so would require prior consultation with 
NATO, of course. But I am sure that we can 
devise a mechanism for " double-batting " our 
forces so that they can be used for WEU pur-
poses when they are not simultaneously required 
for their NATO assignments. We thereby greatly 
strengthen our ability to respond to security 
problems but without duplicating force struc-
tures which would be politically dangerous, 
unaffordable - and make no military sense. 
In a conflict or crisis within Europe, deci-
sions on the appropriate response will of course 
be taken in the North Atlantic Council. NATO 
would deal with threats to alliance territory 
directly, using the command structures set up 
under SACEUR and the forces assigned to him 
by the nations. However, it is conceivable that 
some situations might arise on which a con-
sensus view was reached within NATO that a 
purely European response was more appropriate 
- for example in the case of humanitarian aid in 
a natural disaster. 
In a crisis arising elsewhere where 
Europe's interests were engaged, it would be 
open to the WEU Council to determine upon a 
European response in its own right. There 
should be prior consultation within NATO both 
because this would make prudent common-
sense and to establish that any forces to be used 
were not simultaneously required for NATO 
assignments. 
It is right to set out these mechanisms for 
decision-making and consultation clearly. Even 
outside Europe, action by European states in a 
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given situation is likely more often than not to be 
in concert with a response by the United States-
because the identity of interests between Europe 
and the United States in defence and security 
matters is so strong. The Gulf conflict bears this 
out. So one should beware of emphasising separ-
ateness for its own sake. Rather, I stress again the 
potential prize of a more effective Western 
European response in any future crisis -
alongside the United States and other allies. 
Let me now say something in more detail 
about how a WEU force might be assembled on 
the basis I have described. I stress that I am 
speaking illustratively here, on subjects about 
which we are consulting closely with our allies. 
First, any WED-sponsored operation, 
whether humanitarian, peace-keeping or military 
intervention, would require a static Joint Head-
quarters (JHQ) for command and control. We 
believe that WEU should take advantage of such 
headquarters offered by a variety of nations as 
being available to meet the needs of a specific sit-
uation. For example, we in the United Kingdom 
have two locations that have already proved 
themselves in war and could be made available 
for any foreseeable WEU task. At Northwood our 
joint maritime/land/air HQ masterminded the 
Falklands Conflict, whilst the United Kingdom 
contribution to the recent Gulf war was com-
manded from our other joint HQ at High 
Wycombe. Both JHQs have extensive command, 
control, communications and intelligence facil-
ities and stand ready to support any WEU oper-
ation. Our mobile Joint Forces Headquarters, 
which deploys forward for in-theatre command 
and control, was well-proven in both the 
Falklands and the Gulf conflicts and could also 
be made available to WEU if desired - such an 
arrangement would be both efficient and eco-
nomic avoiding the unnecessary cost and dupli-
cation of creating new, separate WEU HQ struc-
tures. Other countries will have similar examples 
of what they could contribute. The whole point is 
that the effort should be a common one, and led 
on different occasions by those with the resources 
most appropriate to the task. 
Turning to availability of forces, WEU 
operations may require the provision of land 
forces. Here the United Kingdom could make a 
useful and substantial contribution on the basis 
which I have described. Since our modem army 
is designed as a professional, multi-role force, it is 
ideally equipped to adapt to any of the three 
main task areas facing WEU - humanitarian, 
peace-keeping or military intervention. 
We are also involved, with our Belgian, 
Dutch and German colleagues, in the NATO 
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Multinational Division (Central), a highly mobile 
division to which the United Kingdom con-
tributes 24th Airmobile Brigade, forming up over 
the next two years. This is the kind of multina-
tional formation which might be highly relevant 
to WEU purposes where not required by NATO 
(which would, of course, have to agree to its 
release for that purpose). 
Maritime forces are an important tool in 
crisis management and are likely to feature high 
on any WEU shopping list. At the lower end of 
the spectrum they can enforce an embargo, carry 
out drug interdiction and immigration control 
operations or conduct general surveillance and 
deter and counter threats to European interests. 
Maritime forces can also be used to evacuate 
European and other nationals from a trouble-
spot. In addition to the contributions which 
could be made by a number of European navies, 
the well-practised United Kingdom/Netherlands 
Landing Force, could, for example, be a can-
didate for a range of WEU operations. 
The Gulf war vividly demonstrated the 
role of air power in a major conflict. There is a 
range of tasks in which European air forces might 
play a part. In our own case, in addition to the 
rapid deployment of peace-keeping or inter-
vention forces, our air transport aircraft have fre-
quently been to the fore in humanitarian tasks, 
for example when providing much needed food 
supplies to Ethiopia and Northern Iraq. 
The essential message here is that WEU 
should have available to it a variety of forces and 
capabilities: the Franco-German Corps may be 
one of these. There will also be many others. As 
long as they operate under WEU and are com-
patible with our NATO obligations, the alliance 
will be strengthened. 
I have set out here some views on how we 
can give real impetus and substance to European 
defence over the next five years or so. What I 
have suggested represents for us an exciting chal-
lenge and could enable Western European Union 
to make a decisive contribution to the peace and 
security within the trans-Atlantic partnership 
which we enjoy in NATO. It will give Europe 
more flexibility and capability of action without 
breaking the bonds of consultation and military 
organisation which keep NATO together. 
I hope that WEU partners will share our 
approach and will join the United Kingdom in 
responding to WEU requirements. This would 
enable us to complement NATO's strengths, and 
could contribute to a solid defence in future: a 
strong European pillar, in a strong alliance. 
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Meeting of the North Atlantic Council with the Western European Union Council 
(21st May 1992) 
The North Atlantic Council in Permanent 
Session today held its first formal meeting with 
the Council of Western European Union at 
NATO Headquarters. This meeting is part of the 
implementation of the decisions taken by the 
member states of WEU in Maastricht and 
alliance Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels 
last December. The two Councils discussed the 
current relationship between the two organ-
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isations and ways of strengthening their practical 
co-operation. Both Councils agreed that the 
establishment of closer working ties between the 
two organisations is an essential part of imple-
menting the alliance's concept of a framework of 
mutually reinforcing institutions. It will also 
strengthen the European pillar of NATO while 
contributing to the development of a European 
security and defence identity. 
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Declaration on the cmztion of a Franco-German army corps 
officially announced at the Franco-German Defence iUUI 
Security Council meeting in La Rochelle on 221Ul May 1992 1 
The strengthening and ext~nsio~ of 
Franco-German military co-operation m a 
European context, as a follow-up to th~ joint ini-
tiative by the President of the Republic and the 
Chancellor on 14th October 1991, were at the 
hub of the work at the seventh meeting of the 
Franco-German Defence and Security Council 
held in La Rochelle today, 22nd May 1992. 
On the basis of detailed proposals by the 
two ministers of defence, the Council decided to 
set up a major unit with a Europea!l vocatio.n 
and to start the build-up phase. Settmg up this 
corps will help to give the European Uni'!n its 
own military capability and shows the ~ll of 
states participating in the corps to assume, m the 
framework of a European Union that will even-
tually have a joint defen~ policy, their respo!lsi-
bilities in regard to secunty and peace-keepmg. 
In this European context, France and Germany 
invite as many member states of WEU as pos-
sible to participate in the European corps. 
l. Unofficial translation. 
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National contributions to this unit do not 
affect existing obligations to other organisations. 
The European corps will help to strengthen the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
The missions of the European corps will 
be set in the framework of the European Union 
with due respect for national constitutional 
limits and the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter. 
The corps may be used for the joint 
defence of the allies in application of Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty or Article V of the 
Brussels Treaty. It may also be given peace-
keeping or peace-restoring missions and be used 
in humanitarian operations. A headquarters to 
assure the build-up will be set up as from 1st 
July 1992. The operational availability '!f t~e 
corps, at least for French and German umts, IS 
planned for 1st October 1995. 
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Eurogroup Statement 
(25th May 1992) 
8. We confirm our support for the devel-
opment of WEU as the defence component of 
the European Union and a means to strengthen 
the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. We 
welcome the development by WEU of its opera-
tional capabilities and role in ways compatible 
with the alliance. We underline the need for 
transparency and complementarity between 
WEU and the alliance. We attach particular 
importance to arrangements to give those 
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Eurogroup members who are not members of 
WEU the possibility to participate fully in its 
activities, and to retain the same rights and 
responsibilities as they currently enjoy for any 
functions transferred to WEU from other 
European security organisations. We also look 
forward to the establishment of close working 
links between WEU and the alliance. We affirm 
our intention to assist in this process wherever 
possible. 
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Final communique from the ministerial sessions of the NATO Defence Planning Committee 
and the Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels 
(27th May 1992) 
1. The Defence Planning Committee and the 
Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial sessions 
in Brussels on 26th and 27th May. 
2. In the new political and strategic envi-
ronment in Europe, we reaffirm the need to 
develop fully the potential of dialogue and 
co-operation within all of Europe in order to 
help defuse crises and prevent conflicts, 
recognising that the allies' security is insep-
arably linked to that of all other states in 
Europe. 
3. We attach importance to the achievement 
and implementation of arms control agreements 
as a means of enhancing our collective security. 
We look forward to the CFE extraordinary con-
ference in Oslo next month providing the basis 
for ratification of the CFE Treaty and its entry 
into force in time for the Helsinki CSCE summit. 
Full and early implementation of the CFE Treaty 
is an essential element of a stable and secure 
Europe. We also look forward, in connection 
with the entry into force of the CFE Treaty, to 
early agreement on CFE lA, and to the imple-
mentation of the Open Skies Treaty. 
4. In adapting to the changing European 
security environment, the alliance has now 
entered a new era of co-operation in which we 
are playing a full and active role. A first meeting 
of NATO Defence Ministers with co-operation 
partners took place on 1st April and was fol-
lowed by a meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defence 
Staff with their counterparts on 1Oth April. 
These meetings successfully advanced the 
process of co-operation by offering practical 
advice and assistance. Preparations are well 
under way to develop an initial co-operation 
programme in defence-related matters involving 
seminars, workshops and the provision of expert 
assistance. To start our programme, we plan to 
hold a seminar on the role of armed forces in 
democratic societies early in July, with further 
activities to follow later in the year. 
5. As was agreed in Rome and Maastricht, 
NATO remains the essential forum for consul-
tation and agreement on policies bearing on the 
security and defence commitments of its 
members under the Washington Treaty. The 
alliance's core security functions remain 
unchanged, including NATO's fundamental 
responsibility for the defence of allied territory. 
The continued presence in Europe of forces 
from North America remains indispensable in 
this respect. 
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6. We reaffirm our support for the devel-
opment of WEU as the defence component of 
the European Union and a means to strengthen 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. We 
welcome the enhancement of WEU's opera-
tional capabilities in ways which will be com-
patible with and complementary to NATO's col-
lective defence arrangements, and which will 
help to ensure the necessary co-operation and 
mutual transparency between the political and 
military structures of the two organisations. In 
this context we noted that, in accordance with 
the Maastricht Declaration, the WEU member 
states are engaged in identifying forces 
answerable to WEU drawing on those with 
NATO or national roles. We stressed the impor-
tance of maintaining existing assignments to 
NATO of forces being considered for use by 
WEU, recognising that the primary responsi-
bility of these forces is to meet the collective 
defence commitments of the alliance, under the 
terms of the Washington Treaty. We agreed that, 
as the transformation of the alliance proceeds, 
we intend to preserve the operational coherence 
we now have and on which our defence depends. 
Giving all European members of the alliance the 
possibility of fully participating in WEU activ-
ities will also be an important element of the 
relationship between the two organisations. We 
look forward to the further development of the 
European Security and Defence Identity, 
strengthening the solidarity and cohesion of the 
transatlantic partnership. 
7. In the light of the current discussions con-
cerning the strengthening of the CSCE process 
through co-operation with existing organ-
isations, we exchanged views on the contribution 
that NATO might make in support of the conflict 
prevention and crisis management mechanisms 
currently being developed by the CSCE. We 
looked ahead to the outcome of the forthcoming 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the 
CSCE summit in July. We would be prepared to 
consider ways in which resources and expertise 
within the alliance might, if it so decides, be 
made available for CSCE peace-keeping activ-
ities. 
8. During our discussions we also expressed 
our deep concern over the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, and in Nagorno-K.arabakh 
and beyond, including Nakhichevan. We express 
our strong support for the various efforts of the 
United Nations, the CSCE and the European 
Community to end the fighting and bring about 
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peaceful settlements. We appeal to the parties 
involved to end the conflicts. 
9. The alliance is continuing to implement its 
strategic concept. In particular, we are intro-
ducing new force and command structures. In 
our Defence Planning Committee meeting we 
reviewed the restructuring and significant overall 
reduction of our conventional forces. Work on 
the restructuring of the main defence forces is 
well under way. Particular progress has been 
made towards establishing the alliance's new 
reaction forces. The flexibility and mobility of 
these forces make them ideally suited for rapid 
and selective employment, to assist in crisis man-
agement or to respond to aggression. Our multi-
national standing naval forces will constitute the 
core of our maritime reaction forces. Last month 
we inaugurated the new standing naval force in 
the Mediterranean which takes its place alongside 
the long-established standing naval forces 
Atlantic and Channel. The ACE reaction forces 
planning staff and the reaction force air staff will 
become operational by October 1992 and spring 
1993 respectively. The headquarters for the 
ACE rapid reaction corps will have an initial 
operational capability by October 1992, building 
up to full operational capability by 1995. The 
headquarters of the multinational division 
(central) will become operational in 1994 and 
that of the multinational division (south) in 
1995. 
10. We are streamlining existing structures 
and procedures and we will continue with our 
efforts to achieve further savings in order to 
make best use of future scarce resources. In this 
context, we approved a new command structure 
for Allied Command Europe and Allied 
Command Atlantic down to principal subor-
dinate command level. This will provide leaner 
command and control arrangements while main-
taining their effectiveness and their essential con-
tribution to the strategic unity and cohesion of 
the alliance. When these changes are imple-
mented, the reductions in the number and size of 
NATO military headquarters will achieve man-
power savings in the order of 20%. Issues con-
cerning the southern region, including command 
arrangments below the principal subordinate 
command level, are subject to further study. 
11. We noted with approval the new force 
goals, which will guide the implementation of the 
new force structure, and that current national 
plans are to a large extent in line with them. 
However, further work is needed, in particular in 
the areas of support, mobility, interoperability, 
readiness and availability and reconnaissance 
and surveillance capabilities. We expect that 
planning for the new structure will be completed 
in the 1994 planning cycle. As we implement the 
new structure, resource constraints will reinforce 
the need for an even greater co-ordination in for-
mulating priorities both nationally and within the 
alliance. 
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12. Crisis management principles and proce-
dures are being developed in line with the 
enhanced emphasis placed on crisis management 
in the strategy. Planning for the implementation 
of the new reinforcement concept, which sets out 
the requirement for selective and flexible 
build-up and draw-down of forces, is now under 
way as a matter of priority. 
13. We agreed that the equitable sharing of 
responsibilities and the effective use of defence 
resources remain key objectives. In this context, 
we discussed the progress which has been made 
in a fundamental review of the NATO infra-
structure programme. Recognising the impor-
tance of North American reinforcements in 
alliance strategy, we agreed that operations and 
maintenance costs of prepositioning to support 
such external reinforcements are in principle eli-
gible for common funding. Individual projects 
will be considered on their merits alongside other 
eligible projects in the normal manner for 
funding within available NATO budget 
resources. We noted that work is proceeding to 
ensure that armaments co-operation activities 
reflect the guidelines set out in the strategic 
concept. In order to improve further the value 
obtained from constrained resources, we are fol-
lowing through the initiative to improve the con-
ditions of NATO defence trade. 
14. In light of the risks posed by the increasing 
proliferation of ballistic missiles, we discussed 
ballistic missile defences against this potential 
threat. We agreed to intensify alliance consul-
tation in this area. 
15. In our Nuclear Planning Group meeting 
we reviewed the implementation of the decisions 
taken at our meeting in Taormina, Sicily, and at 
the Rome summit. The substantial reduction and 
restructuring of the alliance sub-strategic nuclear 
forces are progressing well. We also discussed 
progress in furthering the initiative to reduce 
strategic nuclear forces announced by President 
Bush in January 1992, to which President 
Y eltsin's response has been largely favourable. 
16. We welcome recent announcements that 
all tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet 
Union have been consolidated on Russian ter-
ritory in accordance with the Alma Ata and 
Minsk accords. We look forward to the earliest 
possible ratification and implementation of the 
landmark Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. In 
parallel we also look forward to the early 
accession of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear 
weapon states. We reaffirm the need for all coun-
tries to contribute in all possible ways to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction. 
17. The safety, security and reliable control 
under a single unified authority of the nuclear 
weapons of the former Soviet Union and the 
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storage and elimination of warheads in 
accordance with reciprocal commitments made 
by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev last year, and 
reaffirmed by President Yeltsin, are a matter of 
key concern to all of us. In this regard we have 
offered help and a number of allies are already 
actively engaged in providing such assistance. 
18. Allied security has improved significantly 
in recent years but uncertainties and instabilities 
remain in Europe and in its periphery. Our col-
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lective defence planning arrangements, together 
with the transatlantic link, political solidarity and 
strategic unity, which are the unique features of 
the alliance, are fundamental to maintaining 
future stability and security. Our aim for the 
future is to maintain these principles as we 
implement and sustain our new force and 
command structures. The success of these efforts 
is an integral part of the alliance's wider objec-
tives of promoting stability and increased 
co-operation throughout Europe. 
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Draft Recommendation 
011 WEU after MflllStricht 
THE AssEMBLY welcomes the fact that the treaty drawn up in Maastricht in December 1991 
permits the member countries of the European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing 
a European Union meeting the requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of 
developing a joint foreign and security policy; 
It wishes this treaty to be ratified by all member countries; 
It is satisfied to note that the strengthening of WEU and the development of its activities are 
taking their place in the process of setting up the union; 
It considers, however, that the wording of the declarations by the nine member countries of 
WEU is not precise enough; 
It notes that the WEU Council will consequently have to take forthwith a number of important 
decisions; 
It also notes with satisfaction that the decisions taken in Maastricht give the WEU Council the 
ability to take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters; 
It recalls that the Maastricht Agreements are but one stage in the building of the European 
Union and that priority should still be given to setting up a union with substantial powers in the area of 
external and security policy; 
It further recalls that no time-limit has been set for the validity of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
It emphasises that the modified Brussels Treaty makes WEU an instrument for maintaining 
peace throughout Europe; 
IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Implement without delay, in areas within its purview, the decisions contained in the nine-power 
declarations in Maastricht and to this end: 
l. Make it known that the modified Brussels Treaty remains one of the juridical bases of the union 
and that WEU, as it exists in its ministerial and parliamentary bodies, is, in parallel with the organs of 
the European Union, a part which will have its place in the European structure; 
2. Decide without delay the points to be considered in negotiations leading to the accession to 
WEU of each of the member countries of the European Community that apply for membership so as to 
ensure that a~cession signifies that new members adopt in full the principles guiding the joint foreign 
and defence policy, thus allowing WEU to intervene, if necessary, to apply them; 
3. Explain what is meant by the status of observer for those countries if they do not accede to 
WEU; 
4. Explain what is meant by the status of associate member of WEU for countries which are not 
members of the Community; 
5. Draw up proposals for countries associated with the European Community to be involved in 
some of WEU's operational activities; 
6. Make it abundantly clear to what extent accession to the Community may be granted to coun-
tries which do not intend to join WEU; 
7. Arrange forthwith the synchronisation of dates and places of meetings and the harmonisation of 
WEU's working methods with those of the European Union without, however, reducing the number 
and importance of specifically WEU ministerial meetings; 
8. Proceed here and now with installing the Permanent Council in Brussels and specify which 
responsibilities will then be assigned to the permanent representatives of member countries to NATO . 
and to the European Community respectively; 
9. Continue to develop a defence and security policy for WEU in accordance with the treaties in 
force; 
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10. Examine how it is possible to organise the development of effective methods for conflict pre-
vention, the restoration of peace, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes for use in 
the framework of the CSCE, the European Political Union or the United Nations; 
11. Have a directive drawn up and adopted on exports of armaments by member countries in the 
light of the decisions taken by the European Council in the context of joint foreign and security policy; 
12. Follow up quickly the intention expressed in Maastricht to set up a European armaments agency 
in the framework ofWEU, associate the activities of the IEPG closely with those ofWEU in this area 
and, with this in mind, continue to transmit to the Assembly the annual report of the IEPG; 
13. Associate the European Commission with the activities of that agency; 
14. Set all the bilateral initiatives of its members clearly in the institutional framework of WEU; 
15. Instruct a working group to examine Europe's requirements in respect of deterrence in the new 
circumstances with a view to defining a European concept of the role of nuclear weapons and devel-
oping consultations between its members on the possibility of resorting to such weapons; 
16. Seek agreement with NATO on adapting to the new European security requirements the appli-
cation of reciprocal " transparency " between the two institutions in accordance with the principles laid 
down in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in both political and operational matters; 
17. Specify the conditions for " complementarity " between WEU and NATO, in particular in regard 
to exchanges with countries which are not members of these organisations, in connection with possible 
operations designed to maintain peace inside and outside Europe; 
18. Establish procedure for consultations at an appropriate level prior to NATO ministerial 
meetings on matters on the agenda of those meetings; 
19. Pursue exchanges with those Central and Eastern European countries which so wish with a view 
to ensuring that the progressive rapprochement of those countries with the European Union is 
extended to include defence matters; 
20. Ask signatory states to correct the error in paragraph 6 of Article J .4 of the Maastricht Treaty 
noted in its reply to Written Question 297 before the text is submitted for ratification; 
21. Noting that the Assembly believes that the period of fifty years laid down in Article XII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty starts from the ratification of the 1954 Agreements while the Council con-
siders the starting date is 1948, 
THE ASSEMBLY STRONGLY URGES 
That the issue be referred to a group of independent European legal experts for arbitration. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Order 
011 co-operatio11 betw«11 ''" Assembly of WEU 
flllll ''" Europea~~ Ptll'litune11t 
Welcomes the fact that the heads of state or of government of the member countries of WEU, 
meeting in Maastricht, decided to encourage " closer co-operation between the parliamentary 
Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament "; 
Considers that such co-operation is necessary and that it can be based only on the principles of 
equality between the two assemblies, the granting of reciprocal advantages and respect for responsibil-
ities and procedure specific to each of them; 
Believes that periodical meetings between committees of the two assemblies responsible for 
political affairs would allow useful exchanges of views on matters of common interest, 
INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT 
1. To examine, with the President of the European Parliament, the conditions in which such 
co-operation might be organised by the two assemblies; 
2. To inform the Assembly of the conclusions of that exchange of views so that, accordingly, the 
Chairman of the Political Committee may take appropriate follow-up action. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(aubmiued by Mr. Goereu, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The Assembly decided to spend most of 
the first part of its thirty-eighth session exam-
ining the decisions taken at the European 
Council meeting in Maastricht on 9th and 1Oth 
December 1991, either by the Twelve or by the 
nine member countries of WEU, relating to the 
latter's special responsibilities, i.e. security and 
defence. Everything indicates that at the 
meeting of the Council of Ministers to be held in 
Germany on 19th June a large number of mea-
sures will have to be taken to implement the 
Maastricht decisions, thus making it possible for 
the Assembly, which is to meet early in June, to 
convey its views to the Council at a particularly 
favourable time. Your Rapporteur has started to 
gather the maximum amount of information for 
the preparation of this document and will 
endeavour to continue to do so throughout the 
coming weeks so as to submit a draft report to 
the committee that takes the utmost account of 
progress achieved in preparing for that 
meeting. 
2. Since certain aspects of the " Declaration 
of the member states of Western European 
Union which are also members of the European 
Union on the role ofWEU and its relations with 
the European Union and with the Atlantic 
Alliance " , adopted in Maastricht on 1Oth 
December 1991, are to be handled by other 
rapporteurs, be it in the Political Committee, 
the Defence Committee or the Technological 
and Aerospace Committee, your Rapporteur 
will concentrate more on the truly political 
aspects of the declaration. However, since he 
believes that the measures adopted in Maas-
tricht in regard to the security and defence of 
Europe form a whole, he will not rule out exam-
ining here matters that are to be studied in 
greater detail by others but whose mention 
seems essential to an overall political 
appraisal. 
3. Moreover, his examination will not be 
confined solely to the nine-power declaration on 
the role of WEU which was, in fact, adopted in 
the presence of representatives of the other three 
countries participating in the Maastricht 
meeting and probably takes account of their 
views. He notes the existence of another nine-
power declaration, entitled " Declaration of the 
member states of Western European Union 
issued on the occasion of the 46th European 
Council meeting on 9th and 1Oth December 
1991 at Maastricht " . Whereas one deals more 
precisely with the activities of WEU, the other 
addresses more specifically matters relating to 
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relations between WEU and countries which are 
not at present members. Then the text adopted 
by the Twelve, modifying the treaties setting up 
the European Community, also tackles a 
number of matters concerning either WEU 
directly, in particular Article J.4 of Title V, or 
foreign policy, security and defence, where it 
concerns the activities of our organisation indi-
rectly. These matters cannot be overlooked. 
4. There is some ambiguity about the nature 
of the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit 
meeting on security and defence matters. 
Whereas the Twelve adopted a treaty amending 
earlier treaties which is, as such, subject to 
signing and ratification, the Nine expressed 
themselves only in two declarations which do 
not necessarily seem subject to such procedure. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Genscher, receiving Assembly 
committees in Bonn on 28th January, told them 
that this declaration was part of the Maastricht 
Vertragswerk, a word which should apparently 
be translated into English by " constitutive part 
of the treaty ". He obviously wished to underline 
the existence of a juridical link between the two 
texts, but the nature of this link is far from clear. 
5. Your Rapporteur therefore put Written 
Question 295 to the Council, as follows: 
" The Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
told the Assembly committees meeting in 
Bonn on 28th January 1992 that the dec-
laration by the nine member countries of 
WEU, adopted in Maastricht on 8th 
December 1991, was part of the Maas-
tricht " Vertragswerk ". Can the Council 
say how, from a legal standpoint, the nine-
power declaration can be considered an 
integral part of the Maastricht agree-
ments?" 
6. The Council's reply to this question is rel-
atively clear, since it distinguishes between 
Vertragswerk, which relates to a series of agree-
ments " closely related politically to the Maas-
tricht Treaty" and the treaty proper. This 
should mean that these nine-power documents 
are not part of the treaty and are not subject to 
ratification since the Twelve merely " noted " 
them. Any remarks your Rapporteur, the com-
mittee or the Assembly may make about these 
documents is in no way therefore an assessment 
of the treaty itself and cannot be considered as 
expressing reservations about the ratification of 
the treaty. 
7. If, on the other hand, we consider the 
content of these declarations, it has to be noted 
that they contain no precise commitments com-
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parable to those implied by a treaty text. They 
show a certain collective will, elements of a pro-
gramme and deadlines rather than decisions in 
the strict meaning of the word and, at the 
meeting on 28th January, Mr. Genscher insisted 
strongly on the " dynamic " nature of a doc-
ument which opens the door to the future rather 
than closing negotiations. 
8. The will expressed in the nine-power dec-
larations is the will to establish a European 
security identity. This is quite obviously a major 
step forward. However, what remains vague is 
the body of this identity. The first comments 
obtained by your Rapporteur from various 
authorities responsible, in a national or interna-
tional framework, for implementing the deci-
sions taken lead him to believe that, although it 
was possible to reach agreement on the wording 
of this text, such agreement did not include a 
real consensus on certain aspects of the shape 
that should emerge when the text is imple-
mented. Everything indicates, on the contrary, 
that a series of special negotiations have been 
started or are to be started in various frame-
works on the implementation of the Maastricht 
decisions. Indications obtained by your 
Rapporteur in various capitals confirm, he 
believes, that the interpretation of the nine-
power Maastricht declaration varied noticeably 
from one country to another. There are serious 
reasons to think that, just as the evolution of the 
intergovernmental conference was deeply influ-
enced by events outside twelve-power Europe -
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the war 
against Iraq or the Yugoslav crisis- future nego-
tiations might be influenced by events yet dif-
ficult to foresee. These include the applications 
announced by several countries for membership 
either of the European Economic Community or 
ofWEU or of both, and the favourable reactions 
of member governments to these candidatures 
will be a major factor. Thus, on 20th March, 
Finland, after Austria and Sweden, applied for 
membership of the European Community. 
There was support for this candidature although 
Finland stated that it intended to maintain its 
policy of neutrality. According to an interview 
granted to Le Monde of 28th February 1992 by 
Mr. Esko Aho, Prime Minister of Finland, fol-
lowing his recent talks with Mr. Mitterrand in 
Paris he had the feeling that France would 
support a Finnish request for membership of the 
EEC and that a positive solution was possible in 
regard to neutrality and defence. He said the 
essential point of neutrality would be main-
tained: Finland wished to be free of military alli-
ances and retain an independent defence. It is 
clear that the admission of neutral countries to 
the Community places limits on the ability of 
the European Union to develop a common 
external and security policy and that its relations 
with WEU might be affected. It appears to rule 
out the early alignment of the Community and 
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WEU referred to, admittedly rather vaguely, in 
the texts adopted in Maastricht. 
9. The Maastricht decisions clearly do not 
anticipate the possible shape of the defence 
organisation of Europe in the medium or long 
term. Measures taken in this area are to be re-
examined in 1996, when everything in the treaty 
proper forms an agreement which will become 
final the day it is ratified. There is thus no need 
to extrapolate any assessments that may be 
made about the security and defence aspects in 
order to pass overall judgment on the Maastricht 
Treaty. The latter is clearly a major step towards 
the establishment of a European Union with a 
single market, likely to develop joint monetary 
and social policies, in which the powers of the 
European Parliament would be spelled out and 
increased. It gives that union considerably 
greater responsibilities and means in foreign 
policy and joint security and ratification pro-
cedure in each member country must relate 
mainly or exclusively to all these forms of 
progress. 
10. Consideration of defence-related deci-
sions led your Rapporteur to make a number of 
criticisms. The draft recommendation he pro-
poses is intended to give the Council, in the light 
of these criticisms, indications about the 
Assembly's views, not on the Maastricht Treaty 
itself, but on the guidelines it thinks the Council 
should follow in interpreting the two declara-
tions by the WEU member countries. The 
present document must not therefore be con-
sidered as discouraging ratification of the Maas-
tricht Agreements as this would correspond 
neither to the views expressed by the committee 
nor to those of the Rapporteur. It is part of 
normal exchanges between the Assembly and the 
WEU Council. 
11. WEU in the European Union 
(a) Pri~~eiples 
11. The introduction to the declaration on the 
role of WEU specifies that " WEU will form an 
integral part of the process of the development 
of the European Union". The words used leave 
considerable room for interpretation. It might 
have been thought that WEU would be part of 
the European Union, allowing its relations with 
the other organs of the union to be relatively 
clearly established. But to say that it fonils part 
of the process merely repeats what was already 
specified in the Preamble and Articles I, 11 and 
Ill ofthe 1954 modified Brussels Treaty, or even 
Articles 11 and Ill of the 1948 Brussels Treaty. 
What has changed since those dates is the Com-
munity, which did not exist in 1948, was only 
the ECSC in 1954 and then included only six of 
the nine present members ofWEU. However, by 
declaring themselves resolved "to promote the 
unity and to encourage the progressive inte-
gration of Europe ", the signatories of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty were already committing 
themselves not only to " forming an integral part 
of the process" leading to the European Union 
but to being the initiators of this process, which 
was effectively the case. Your Rapporteur 
therefore finds the wording used by the Nine in 
Maastricht quite inadequate and regrets that 
they did not say simply that WEU was an 
integral part of the union. As worded, the Maas-
tricht declaration is a wager on the future and 
wishes of the contracting parties, but not a 
juridical act. 
12. Two reasons may have deterred them 
from doing so: on the one hand, the fact that 
three of the Twelve are not members of WEU 
and, on the other, the idea some might cherish 
that the European Union should become totally 
merged with the Community. Your Rapporteur 
will examine the first consideration later but will 
deal here with the second one. 
13. Everyone is aware that the preparation of 
the Maastricht meeting was dominated by dis-
cussion about the more or less federal nature of 
the future Europe, a discussion which was con-
fused by the fact that the very word federal does 
not seem to have been understood in the same 
way in countries with different political tradi-
tions. This would appear to be why preference 
was given to the word union, which is less rich 
in historical and cultural connotations, to define 
the objective set by the Twelve. However, the 
difficulty that the diplomats were thus able to 
avoid when they had to draft texts resurfaced 
once these texts were adopted and had to be 
translated into legal acts. The real problem is 
whether the governments, and behind them the 
nations of Western Europe, are prepared to 
hand over to a common authority responsibility 
for their external and defence policies in the 
same way as they decided to do for the man-
agement of their economies. For the time being, 
they have given a clearly negative answer to this 
decisive question, but the declaration suggests 
that this might not be so in a more or less distant 
future and that, in any event, the matter would 
have to be reopened in 1996, and then in 1998, 
the date which the WEU Council has arbitrarily 
fixed as the legal date when each of the signatory 
states of the modified Brussels Treaty shall have 
the right to cease to be a member. 
14. In point of fact, the answer to any 
question about the future of European defence 
depends far less on a greater or lesser degree of 
good will on the part of the governments than on 
the overall evolution of international relations. 
If, in the coming years, a new international 
order is to be established, placing the forces of a 
large number of countries at the service of the 
law, including those countries with considerable 
military strength, as President Bush announced 
during the Gulf crisis, there will be nothing to 
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prevent envisaging the pooling of European 
armed forces, their use being determined by the 
will to maintain an international and European 
order on which there is a broad consensus. 
15. In a speech to the Netherlands Interna-
tional Relations Society on 31st March 1992, 
Mr. Relus Ter Beek, Netherlands Minister of 
Defence, referred to this prospect and under-
lined that he believed that thinking in terms of 
national sovereignty was a thing of the past, 
which led him to consider that the Netherlands 
would do well to assess the independence of its 
armed forces in the light of growing 
internationalisation and Europeanisation. In 
other words, he ruled out any special use of 
Netherlands forces which must no longer be 
seen as a complete, autonomous army but as the 
Netherlands' contribution to multinational 
operations in the framework of WEU, NATO, 
the CSCE or the United Nations. 
16. This declaration, announcing the 
launching of a specific programme in the 
autumn, is somewhat similar to the Charlier 
Plan which Belgium adopted in 1989. It is based 
on an interesting vision of the future of Europe. 
However, it leaves certain questions open, par-
ticularly when it draws a parallel between 
actions under the aegis ofWEU, NATO and the 
United Nations, since forces engaged in these 
three cases will not necessarily need to be of the 
same kind. Secondly, it seems to consider the 
disappearance of threats to Western Europe to 
be a well-established fact, although there is still 
much uncertainty about the evolution of the 
risks that Europe may have to face. Finally, it 
would appear that other WEU member coun-
tries, for reasons your Rapporteur will refer to 
later, are having great difficulty in ruling out any 
national military action of their own. The Neth-
erlands Minister himself says it must remain 
possible for the Netherlands army to be used in 
the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Mr. Ter 
Beek's speech nevertheless has the merit of clari-
fying the debate by drawing the full conse-
quences of what might be a European Union 
embracing joint defence as referred to in the 
Maastricht declaration: the option offered to 
Europe is presented clearly. The Europeans' 
answer was not given in Maastricht. 
17. If progress towards the achievement of a 
new international order were to be compro-
mised, or merely delayed, as is to be feared, the 
aim would first be to bring about unity of views 
and a joint will among the members of the 
union. The question arises whether twelve-
power Europe, or a fortiori an enlarged Com-
munity, could summon up sufficient will to 
allow rational use of the force for the sake of a 
cause about which there were differences over 
the nature of the challenge or how it should be 
countered. Events in Yugoslavia, hard on the 
heels of those in the Gulf, but also the crises in 
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Zaire, Chad and the Falklands, showed that, 
until now, only national states were capable of 
this, even if the principles underlying their 
action were more or less accepted by all and 
even if the states which so decided were pre-
pared to co-ordinate their action. Events will tell 
us whether the situation will have evolved suffi-
ciently in 1996 or 1998 to allow the achievement 
of integrated defence in a Europe which will 
probably no longer be limited to twelve coun-
tries. 
18. It seems probable that this integration will 
be necessary for everything involving the most 
advanced and expensive .technologies and it is 
gratifying that the Nine took a number of initia-
tives likely to lead to this. Presumably, however, 
certain member states will be anxious to retain a 
national military capability or the possibility of 
not participating in operations decided by 
others. Any European defence organisation will 
probably have to be arranged to take account of 
this dual requirement, as the Nine did in Maas-
tricht by leaving WEU its own features but 
developing its ability to take action. 
19. There would be no point in speculating 
here on the likelihood and rate of such an evo-
lution. What emerges from the Maastricht decla-
ration is that Europe, as it exists in the eyes of 
the Twelve, intends " in the longer term per-
spective of a common defence policy within the 
European Union " that WEU should assume 
" greater... responsibility in defence matters ", 
which amounts to saying that; in the defence 
area, the modified Brussels Treaty is still the 
cornerstone of Epropean defence. 
(b) The trtllty 
20. This is the basis on which relations 
between WEU and the European Union are 
viewed, both in the text amending the treaties 
and in the declarations concerning WEU. In the 
treaty, the European Union is no longer con-
sidered as a process but as an immediate reality, 
including institutions of which WEU is not con-
sidered to be an integral part, since the WEU 
Council has to be in agreement with those 
bodies to " adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements". It must therefore be understood 
that the documents adopted in Maastricht refer 
to two different concepts of European Union, 
one in the making, in the building of which 
WEU is participating, and the other a real one in 
which it does not participate. The Council 
throws no light on this problem when it states in 
its reply to Written Question 296 that relations 
between WEU and the European Union 
described in Article J.4 are "essentially of a 
political nature ", which means nothing. It is 
regrettable that the governments used- the same 
word to designate two quite distinct concepts: 
such a process does not help to make a public, 
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which is entitled to be properly informed, 
understand better the notion of European 
Union. 
21. At least Article J.4 of Title V ofthe Maas-
tricht Treaty tries to set out the relations which 
should, in the immediate future, be established 
between WEU and the union as it now exists, 
specifying in paragraph 1 that: 
22. (a) "The common foreign and security 
policy shall include all questions related to the 
security of the union, including the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence ". 
23. However, this paragraph is obscure 
because of the distinction it draws between 
defence policy and defence as such. How far 
does the area of the defence policy extend? It 
apparently includes the decision to resort to 
force. But is it envisaged, then, that there can be 
a decision to resort to force distinct from the 
decision to take part in such action? There was 
in fact some sign of this during the Yugoslav 
crisis when, in September 1991, a body, meeting 
in the WEU framework, drew up possible 
options for using the armed forces of certain 
member countries only. However, it is doubtful 
whether such a sharing of political and military 
responsibility can be systematised. It seems to 
have been precluded in steps taken to set up a 
Franco-German army corps, whether or not 
enlarged to include other countries. Your 
Rapporteur can but regret that the Assembly has 
received so little information on what was 
undertaken in the cases of Yugoslavia and the 
army corps, thus leaving it with few means of 
understanding that part of the Maastricht deci-
sions. It will, however, be able to note that the 
governments have entered into no commitment 
in the framework of the treaty concerning pos-
sible common defence although some parts of 
the nine-power declaration suggest this. 
24. (b) According to paragraph 2, " the union 
requests " WEU " to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the union which have 
defence implications. The Council shall, in 
agreement with the institutions of WEU, adopt 
the necessary practical arrangements ". 
25. This wording makes it difficult to grasp 
the difference between " implementing decisions 
and actions " for which WEU would be respon-
sible and the " practical arrangements " to be 
made by the union. At least, one might envisage 
a contrary, logical procedure, such as was used 
during the Yugoslav crisis, i.e. the European 
Council entrusting WEU with the implemen-
tation, in areas within its purview, of directives 
it adopts. It should also be stressed that this pro-
cedure does not rule out another, that of deci-
sions taken proprio motu by the WEU Council 
which the union does not, therefore, replace. 
26. (c) According to paragraph 3, "issues 
having defence implications dealt with under 
this article shall not be subject to the procedures 
set out in Article J.3 ". The latter article relates 
to "procedure for adopting joint action in 
matters covered by the foreign and security 
policy " in the framework of the European 
Council, thus retaining the full validity of pro-
cedure worked out in the context of the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
27. (d) Paragraph 4 lays down that "the 
policy of the union ... shall not prejudice the spe-
cific character of the security and defence policy 
of certain member states " or " the obligations of 
certain member states under the North Atlantic 
Treaty ". This provision corresponds perfectly 
to what WEU has always done, but it hardly 
seems compatible with references to " a 
common defence policy " or even " common 
defence " referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 
J .4, unless it was foreseen that in the long run all 
members of the Community will have acceded 
to the Washington Treaty or that the latter no 
longer implies any particular commitments. It is 
difficult to think that either of these possibilities 
will obtain a consensus among the Twelve. 
28. (e) The same is true of paragraph 5, which 
states that " the provisions of this article shall not 
prevent the development of closer co-operation 
between two or more member states on a 
bilateral level, in the framework of WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance, provided such co-operation 
does not run counter to or impede that provided 
for in this title ". This wording may be inter-
preted either as referring to co-operation 
explicitly carried out in the framework of the two 
alliances or as placing on the same footing 
bilateral co-operation and co-operation in the 
framework of the alliances. In the latter case, this 
article would, however, place a limit on 
co-operation resulting from the application of the 
North Atlantic Treaty since the latter must not 
" run counter to or impede " European 
co-operation, whereas the previous paragraph 
makes the freedom of the European union subor-
dinate to the compatibility of its decisions with 
those taken in the framework of this treaty. 
29. (f) Paragraph 6 says that" with a view to 
furthering the objective of this treaty, and 
having in view the date of 1998 in the context of 
Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions 
of this article may be revised ... on the basis of a 
report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to 
the European Council, which shall include an 
evaluation of the progress made and the expe-
rience gained until then ". 
30. This paragraph, at fi~t sight innocuous, 
since it is in any event for the contracting parties 
to revise any treaty whatever, is of great interest 
because of the underlying thoughts it expresses. 
These are revealed in the following words: 
31. " Having in view the date of 1998 in the 
context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty ": as 
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everyone knows, the Brussels Treaty is no longer 
in force since it was modified by the 1954 Paris 
Agreements, but the Article XII in question is an 
article of the modified Brussels Treaty taken 
from Article X of the Brussels Treaty. The gov-
ernments continue, therefore, to encourage con-
fusion between the two treaties as your 
Rapporteur has already had the opportunity to 
underline, because, if it is the modified Brussels 
Treaty that is referred to, the date indicated 
would be 2004 and not 1998. This text shows 
clearly that the governments take as a basis, for 
political reasons, a text which has not been in 
force for thirty-eight years, attributing to it para-
graphs from another text, in order to evade the 
commitments into which they entered in 
1954. 
32. Your Rapporteur thought it useful to put 
Written Question 297 to the Council, as 
follows: 
" Can the Council explain why Article J .4, 
paragraph 6, of the Maastricht Treaty 
(called D.6 in the declaration on the role 
of WEU) refers to Article XII of the 
Brussels Treaty, when that treaty had only 
ten articles and, in any event, it is quite 
clearly Article XII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty? 
Is the aim of the signatory governments 
not to make it believed that the Brussels 
Treaty is still in force so as to bring 
forward the date on which it will be pos-
sible for them to escape the commitments 
into which they entered in 1954? 
Do they consider it right to refer to a date 
(echeance in the French text) in regard to 
this treaty, whatever this date may be, when 
the article in question provides merely for 
the right of each signatory to cease to be a 
party to the treaty provided one year's 
notice has previously been given?" 
33. In its reply, the Council admits that this 
paragraph of the treaty contains what it describes 
as a " minor inaccuracy ", which is not the 
opinion of your Rapporteur. Whatever its impor-
tance, the Council must have the error corrected 
so that it is not ratified by signatory countries 
and cannot serve as an argument for those who 
are against ratification. This mistake had already 
been made in Article Y.15.4 of the draft treaty 
drawn up by the European Commission and was 
noted by your Rapporteur in paragraph 82 of 
Assembly Document 1261. It has to be deduced 
that either the mistake is a voluntary one and is a 
deliberate step to conceal the governments' true 
intentions or that not one person among all those 
who took part in drawing up the text adopted in 
Maastricht had read our Assembly's report, 
which can but give the impression that the work 
it accomplishes is of little avail in face of the 
Council's indifference. 
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34. As your Rapporteur already pointed out 
in paragraphs 76 to 81 of Document 1261, the 
change of numbering in the articles of the 1948 
treaty by that of 1954 has never been a basis for 
the Assembly's argument that the 1954 treaty 
was a new treaty. It considers that the treaty 
signed by other countries and having other aims 
(creation of WEU, establishment of relations 
between that organisation - which cannot be 
confused with the Western Union of 1948- and 
NATO, introduction of armaments control) 
cannot be considered to be just an amendment 
of the 1948 treaty. It notes that, for purely 
political reasons, the Council has decided 
otherwise. The unanimity of the nine govern-
ments allows it to take such a decision, but it 
does not authorise it to attribute to the 
Assembly arguments that it has never advanced 
in order not to answer those it does endorse. 
35. It should indeed be recalled that neither 
Article X of the Brussels Treaty nor Article XII 
of the modified Brussels Treaty fixes a deadline 
for one or other treaty but merely a date as from 
which each of its signatories shall have the right 
to cease to be a party to one and then the other 
treaty. What seems to be indicated by this 
wording is that, contrary to the declaration that 
WEU is an integral part of the process of 
European Union, it is on the winding up of 
WEU and the abrogation of the modified 
Brussels Treaty that some governments intend 
to base tomorrow's European Union. There 
might be some defence for this if they were 
determined to establish a real union in the 
security and defence area. Yet paragraphs 3, 4 
and 5 of Article J .4 show that this is not at all 
the case. Some countries seem anxious to retain 
a free national hand in this area. Others appear 
to wish to maintain NATO preponderance. Still 
others intend to limit any action by WEU to the 
implementation of orders from the United 
Nations or even the CSCE. All these attitudes 
are perfectly legitimate. What is not legitimate is 
to act as if it was the (modified) Brussels Treaty 
that was an obstacle to the achievement of a true 
union when it is the governments themselves 
that do not agree to define the European defence 
that they all declare they wish to achieve. 
36. The words " on the basis of a report to be 
presented in 1996 by the Council to the 
European Council " must be compared with the 
munity countries that are not yet members: 
Denmark, Greece and Ireland?- on the activ-
ities of WEU and that, all together, they will in 
turn report to themselves. In view of the Coun-
cil's habitual preponderance in the framework of 
WEU and that which Maastricht accords the 
Council in the framework of the European 
Union, it would indeed be a fallacy to consider 
WEU or the European Union as entities sep-
arate from the governments of which their 
respective councils are composed. 
3 7. The date of 1996 when the Council should 
report on " progress made " is also curious, since 
the Council of the Community is asked to report 
on progress along lines that are in fact to be 
found in the declaration of the Nine and not in 
that of the Twelve and which concern WEU and 
not the Community. It is true that the WEU 
Council is also instructed to present a report on 
the same subject at that date. 
38. " May be revised "obviously means 
nothing but suggests that the governments hope 
that the difficulties they are now encountering in 
establishing a European defence organisation 
will have been resolved. Would it not have been 
wiser to try to solve these difficulties in existing 
frameworks rather than to consider destroying 
those frameworks without having solved 
them? 
39. If one compares the text of that article of 
the treaty with the declaration of the Nine, one 
can but note a twofold approach on the part of 
the ministers: 
- organising WEU so as to allow Europe 
to meet the challenges facing it due to 
the new situation, at both political and 
operational level, by making WEU 
" the European defence identity ", " the 
military arm of the Community " or 
" an integral part of the process of the 
development of the European 
Union"; 
- preparing the winding-up of WEU, in 
the hope, no doubt, in some cases, but 
probably not all, of transferring to 
others the responsibilities attributed to 
WEU by the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
end of the declaration on the role of WEU: 40. Your Rapporteur considers this approach 
" WEU will re-examine the present provisions in contradictory in both form and substance. He 
1996. This re-examination will take account of would think it infinitely more reasonable to 
the progress and experience acquired and will keep to the principle that each aspect of 
extend to relations between WEU and the European Union is handled on its own merits on 
Atlantic Alliance." Nothing would seem more the basis of facts that seem difficult to evade. 
logical than this decision to instruct each insti- This would mean associating existing 
tution to report in 1996 on how the Maastricht organisations in the union, taking as a basis the 
decisions have been applied. However, taken lit- various founding treaties and not seeking to put 
erally, it means the governments of the nine an end to those treaties. This is the formula 
WEU member countries will report - to whom, adopted in Maastricht for the immediate future 
if not to the governments of the three Corn- and included in the declaration on the role of 
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WEU. However, the formula loses part of its 
value since there are vague, imprecise hints that 
it will be reviewed in the relatively near 
future. 
(c) Non-member countries of WEU 
41. It is evident that the question of a possible 
enlargement of WEU was one aspect of the 
problem, particularly as Greece, which applied 
for membership of WEU several years ago, 
seems to have brought pressure to bear on the 
Twelve by threatening not to accede to the 
Maastricht Treaty, which would have doomed 
the meeting of heads of state or of government 
to failure, if it was not admitted to the 
organisation. As a result invitations were 
addressed to the three member countries of the 
EEC that are not members of WEU to apply for 
membership. This invitation justifies the plan to 
merge WEU and the Community in order to 
achieve a European Union but seems hardly 
likely to help to prepare the common defence 
policy proposed by the Twelve in view of the 
considerable differences between these three 
countries' views of their own security and that of 
Europe and how the other nine countries view 
what they intend to carry out together. As far as 
your Rapporteur knows, neither Ireland nor 
Denmark has yet decided to apply for mem-
bership and the public seems, to say the least, 
divided in those two countries on this matter. 
42. As for Greece, whose application for 
membership was most energetic, its relations 
with Turkey already raised a problem. The 
attitude it adopted in preventing the Twelve 
from jointly recognising the Republic of Mace-
donia, as the other eleven members wanted, 
shows another major difference between Greece 
and its partners on an external policy matter. 
What is serious here is not so much the nature of 
the concern expressed by Greece as the tone of 
the words in which it is expressed. On the one 
hand, there is frequent reference to a casus belli 
in this connection and, on the other hand, there 
are suppositions concerning the machiavellian 
plots of countries reputed to be hostile to Greece 
and liable to use Macedonian irredentism 
against it. There seems to be a deep rift between 
the concepts of relations between European 
countries which are widespread in Greece and 
the concept voiced by Mr. Ter Beek of a Europe 
where " thinking in terms of national sover-
eignty is a thing of the past ". In any event, it 
may be wondered how Greece might use the 
strengthening of its international position which 
would be the result of accession to WEU. Some 
statements by its ministers in the Greek Par-
liament are not quite the same as those made to 
the Assembly by Mr. Mitsotakis, Prime Minister 
of Greece, in December 1991. The resignation 
of the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
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Samaras, in April 1992 may make the Greek 
approach more moderate, but your Rapporteur 
has not yet been able to discern any easing of 
their position. The Nine seem to be finding it 
relatively difficult, which is quite under-
standable in the circumstances, in agreeing on 
the definition of points to be discussed in the 
negotiations with Greece and it is probable that 
they will have to take a decision on this matter 
at the ministerial meeting on 19th June. 
43. The question then facing them will be 
whether they consider priority should be given 
to strengthening the cohesion and activities of 
WEU as they decided in Maastricht or rather to 
the geographical and then institutional 
alignment of WEU and the Community as they 
also decided in Maastricht. It seems difficult to 
believe that the second option would help to 
carry out the first. There is every reason to fear 
that this is nevertheless what was envisaged in 
Maastricht, even if it was not clearly adopted. 
44. According to an Agence France-Presse 
dispatch from Athens dated 4th March 1992: 
" At a meeting organised by a Greek eco-
nomic review, Mr. van Eekelen, former 
Netherlands Minister of Defence, under-
lined that WEU was going to adapt 
certain key rules such as that of military 
assistance to member countries in the 
light of commitments entered into at the 
Maastricht summit meeting, its links with 
NATO and the new international situ-
ation." 
Such a statement by the Secretary-General of 
WEU brings out very clearly the difficult situ-
ation in which the governments have placed 
themselves: they are believed to be considering 
making Greece's accession to WEU subject to 
reservations in regard to the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, and especially its 
Article V, i.e. significantly weakening the scope 
of the alliance. If confirmed, this comment 
would throw particularly disturbing light on the 
notion of the 1998 " deadline " for the modified 
Brussels Treaty, referred to elsewhere. 
45. In fact, here the governments encountered 
a series of contradictions that they solved only 
by not considering that it is for really pertinent 
reasons that Ireland and Denmark have not yet 
acceded to the modified Brussels Treaty and 
that Greece's candidature had not been followed 
up. Your Rapporteur fears that, even if Ireland 
and Denmark were induced to join WEU and 
Greece's candidature were accepted, none of the 
reasons that have kept those three countries 
outside WEU would be changed and their pos-
sible accession would therefore merely mean 
that divergences that are now outside WEU 
would move to the inside. In any event, it is 
doubtful whether this will facilitate the emer-
gence of a European defence identity. 
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46. Furthermore, according to the nine-power 
declaration concerning the enlargement of 
WEU, "states which are members of the 
European Union are invited to accede to WEU 
on conditions to be agreed in accordance with 
Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to 
become observers if they so wish ". This text 
says nothing about countries that have applied 
for membership of the Community: will they 
have to make the same choice? Will they be 
required to join WEU? Will they be asked 
nothing? Statements made on behalf of certain 
WEU member countries clearly indicate that 
those which wish to be neutral will not be forced 
to make a radical change in their external pol-
icies. But then the gap separating the Com-
munity from the defence policy pursued by 
WEU might grow and not close up, as would 
seem to be implied by the decision to proceed to 
a re-examination of defence problems in 1996 
"having in view the date of 1998 ". 
(d) Prtletieal deeisiolll 
47. It is from these assumptions that would 
seem to stem the practical decisions taken in 
Maastricht for organising relations between 
WEU and the political union. If one is to believe 
the nine-power declaration on the role of WEU, 
their aim " is to build up WEU in stages as the 
defence component of the European Union", 
wording that throws little light on the question 
whether this means the union such as it is or the 
union as a process. Conversely, it is worth 
noting that the Nine: 
(i) do not consider WEU as it now is as a 
satisfactory edifice for exercising the 
role it has to play; 
(ii) consider Maastricht as only the start 
of a process that will have successive 
stages. 
48. With this in mind, it is quite logical for 
WEU to try to develop a " working rela-
tionship " - hence not a de jure relationship -
with the European Union. The following mea-
sures were taken to this end: 
49. (a) "Synchronisation of the dates and 
venues of meetings and harmonisation of 
working methods. " It may be assumed that the 
synchronisation of meetings mainly concerns 
meetings of the Council at ministerial level as 
effectively practised during the Gulf and 
Yugoslav crises. This seems obvious when it is a 
matter of implementing " at the request of the 
European Union ... decisions and actions of the 
union which have defence implications " , in 
which case it is normal for the WEU Council of 
Ministers to meet at the close of meetings of the 
Twelve. However, it should be ensured that this 
practice does not lead to a reduction in the 
number and importance of specifically WEU 
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ministerial meetings in which the ministers of 
defence take part and which tackle matters 
relating to the working of the organisation, par-
ticularly its operational aspects. Holding two 
ordinary ministerial meetings each year, with 
the participation of the ministers of defence, 
with a specifically WEU agenda, has been one of 
the strong points of the reactivation of WEU 
which must be retained, and nothing links these 
meetings with meetings of the ministers for 
foreign affairs of the Twelve. 
50. The harmonisation of working methods is 
already a fact with the development of twelve-
power political co-operation, now common 
foreign and security policy. This was based on 
the principle of the independence of member 
states, which concerted their external policies in 
the framework of the Twelve. Insofar as Article 
J .3 of the Maastricht Treaty modified this 
practice, the question might arise of bringing 
WEU's working methods into line with the new 
procedure for political co-operation. However, 
Article J.4, paragraph 3, of the treaty, indicates 
quite clearly that such procedure does not 
concern security and defence, which is not com-
mensurate with this section of the declaration of 
the Nine. 
51. (b) "Establishment of close co-operation 
between the Council and Secretariat-Genera/ of 
WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the 
union and Secretariat-General of the Council on 
the other. " This seems perfectly logical and bal-
anced and should raise no special problem once 
the WEU Council and its secretariat have been 
transferred to Brussels. However, such 
co-operation will be meaningless if the WEU 
Permanent Council, with its new composition, is 
not a truly political organ and confines itself to 
supervising the management of the 
organisation. 
52. (c) "Harmonisation of the sequence and 
duration of the respective presidencies. "This too 
seems a sensible measure but complicated to 
apply as long as the same countries are not to be 
found in both institutions. A plan is known to 
have been drawn up to solve this problem, 
insofar as it can be solved. 
53. (d) "A"anging for appropriate modalities 
so as to ensure that the Commission of the 
European Community is regularly informed and, 
as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in 
accordance with the r6/e of the Commission in 
the common foreign and security policy as 
defined in the European Union Treaty. " This 
also seems to raise no particular problem, 
insofar as these are not obligations but legit-
imate intentions, designed to be applied in " an 
appropriate " manner and " as appropriate ". 
54. (e) "Encouragement of closer co-operation 
between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU 
and the European Parliament. " This, on the 
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contrary, rais~s a seri~s o~ questions that your hoped that the Council will manage to take a 
Rapporteur ~Ill examme m a special chapter. reasonable decision, since the Maastricht decla-
Re merely wishes to underline here that this is ration does not seem to close the debate. 
merely " encouragement " and not a decision so 
as to leave the assemblies concerned full 57. If~e att~mpt t<;> make an overall appraisal 
freedom of action and that the WEU Assembly o~WEU s ~elat10ns ":Ith the European Union, as 
is d~scribed as " parli~entary ", a fact that has laid do~ I~ the vanous documents adopted in 
untll.now not been g~ven due consideration. Maastncht, It has to be noted that there are still 
important differences of views between the gov-
55. Finally, the declaration includes a series ernments. These decisions may in fact be inter-
of " other measures " which, apart from the preted in two ways: 
transfer of the Council's seat from London to 
Brussels, refers to the composition of the Per- 58. (a) The European Union exists and has 
manent Council, indicating that " member states three distinct elements: the Economic Corn-
may draw on a double-hatting formula, to be munity, the Political Union and WEU each 
worked out, consisting of their representatives to ~th its own. bases and being subject to the 
the alliance and to the European Union ". By higher authonty of the European Council. The 
using this wording, member states leave each decisions taken in Maastricht aim to give greater oth~r full freedom to be represented as they see coherence to these elements, to co-ordinate their 
fit m the WEU Council. During the period activities and to strengthen each of them within 
leading ~P to Maastricht, they seem to have its own area of responsibilities. This interpre-
made this matter a symbolic one, some wishing tation obviously holds for the next few years. 
to ~tress the J?riority they give to the European The reference to deadlines in 1996 and 1998 
Umon by havmg the WEU Council composed of indicates that at least some ofthe Twelve do not 
permanent representatives of member countries consider it will prevail in the future. However, it 
to the Community, others being anxious to show may be thought that events - the probable 
that they consider NATO is still the principal enl.argement of the Community, a less rapid evo-
Euro.pean security organisation by having it lutlon of pubbc and governmental opinion than 
consist of permanent representatives to that was thought, not to speak of the considerable 
organisation. The result has been a disagreement n.umb~r ~f unforeseeab~e factors in the present 
that !he Franco-German proposal, taken up in ~Itua~I<~n Il! Europe - Will make very relative the 
the mne-pow.er declaration, ~ried to solve by this decision to take on those dates decisions that 
rather unsatisfactory wordmg which may not could not be taken in Maastricht. The reply to 
allow the WEU Permanent Council to play the Written Question 295 suggests that the Council 
role that might be expected of it. has ruled out this interpretation. 
56. ·Both these solutions would have had a 59. . (b) The European Union will exist only by 
number of advantages and a few drawbacks. If mergmg the Community, the Political Union 
the Council is composed of representatives to and ~U ~n a single federal-type institution. 
the EEC, and mor~ precisely those taking part in M~astncht Is then merely a stage, in the end 
the common foreign and security policy, this quite a modest one, in the process which should ~ould have allowed WEU to be more firmly lead up to it, and the deadline for decisions 
lmked to the Community institutions and would which might have been taken there has been 
have probably ensured proper liaison between postponed until 1996 and 1998. However this 
!he comm~m foreign and security policy and concept runs into three difficulties: se'veral 
Implementmg measures taken in the framework countries do not appear to endorse it, the 
of WEU, but it would not have given the same proba~le enl~rgement of the Community will 
guarantees of what the declaration calls the del~y Its achiev~ment still further - just as its 
" operational role of WEU ", while the NATO achieve~ent will make further enlargement 
representatives would have introduced the ele- more difficult - and, above all it would very 
ments necessary for achieving the openness the probably be achieved at the ex~nse of the corn-
governments intend to establish between WEU m unity nature of Europe and to the benefit of a 
and the common foreign and security policy. To ~nfederal-type system, becau~e the weight of 
compose the Council of representatives to the ~ntergovernmental bodies would inevitably be 
former in some cases and the latter in others mcreased at the expense of that of more inte-
would not be satisfactory because WEU's mil- grated bodies.; 
itary activities would then be too divorced from 60. It is just as if the Maastricht negotiators 
its political activities and the management of the managed to dress up, in acceptable terms for 
~rgani~tion. In the solution adopted, the word everyone, two different interpretations of what 
and IS completely ambiguous, particularly by they intend to achieve in Europe. This did not 
not specifying whether it is for each country to prevent them taking several effective and useful 
choose which of its representatives should take practical decisions to strengthen Europe in gen-
part in each type of meeting. It might thus eral and WEU in particular. However, they 
combine the drawbacks of all the systems deferred until better times the definition of a 
without offering the advantages. It is to be true European programme, with no guarantee 
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that such time would ever come at least within 
the limits they set themselves. Y~ur Rapporteur 
has everr reason to think that the arguments for 
and agamst a federal Europe, which were a 
feature of 1991, considerably weakened the 
negot!ators' ability to strengthen Europe in the 
secunty and defence area, where Maastricht 
expressed more or less specific intentions rather 
than decisions. 
61. While the respective responsibilities of 
WEU and the Community in security and 
defence are clearly separate, thus leaving little 
doubt about the limits of the mandate given to 
the Commission to take immediate " common 
action ", this is not so for armaments matters. 
Indeed, the establishment of the single market 
on 1st January 1993, with the abolition of fron-
ti.ers and ~nternal. co~trols, forces thought to be 
given to Its application to strategic items and 
armaments. 
62. ~f strategic items n;t~an items of any kind 
that might be used for military purposes it may 
be considered that they are not covered by the 
exception made in Article 223 of the Rome 
Treaty. Just as the Commission had to draw up 
a list of chemical products whose export the 
Community would limit, it seems logical that it 
should have to draw up a list of strategic items 
whose ~xport it would reserve the right to 
control m order to ensure that Europe did not 
become a purveyor to countries that might use 
them either for maintaining order at home or to 
back up their foreign policy. The case of Iraq 
showed how much responsibility Europe bore in 
~ot regulating or controlling the export of such 
Items. 
63. On the other hand, Article 223 is obvi-
o~sly valid for " armaments ", i.e. items used 
du~c!lY an~ normally by armies, without any 
decision bemg taken on the question of their sale 
on external markets. It must therefore be ascer-
tained ~hethe~ member countries are prepared 
to restnct their freedom of action in this area 
and to hand over to the Community the right to 
~ra~ up a l!st of items whose export would be 
limited, subJect to political and military consid-
erations and, finally, controlled by the Com-
munity. It should be recalled that, to date such 
exports have been limited and controlled only 
by indivi.dual mem~er states and not by the 
Commumty or an mternational organisation. 
Even for nuclear items, controls by the Vienna 
agencr are.co~fined. to civil activities that might 
have Implications m the military sector. It is 
clear that any progress towards drawing up a 
~ommon foreign and security policy must 
mclude the preparation of common directives 
on the export of armaments, otherwise it would 
be purely rhetorical. The only question arising is 
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wheth~r it is for the Commission to draw up 
such hsts or whether the Council, on the basis of 
Article 223, intends to have them drawn up by 
another body. 
64. In industrial policy matters the Com-
mission takes considerations of q~ite another 
kind as a basis for claiming responsibilities. 
Since circumstances in general make it necessary 
to convert part of the armaments industries, it 
now has a number of levers that it can use to 
intervene, be they financial instruments 
regional policy or using the special fund. Thi~ 
question was tackled by the Ministers of 
Industry of the Twelve in Lisbon on 21st March. 
They noted that almost none of the armaments 
industries of member countries were in regions 
targeted by Community aid, which would have 
meant, for conversion assistance for some of 
them, taking decisions that the ministers were 
not prepared to take. 
65. The ~O~J?unity nevertheless has good 
re~sons for msistmg on the fact that many indus-
tnes produce for both the military and the civil 
sector. Consequently, in the open European 
market effective in 1993, they will benefit from 
the fact that, on their national armaments 
markets, they have guaranteed outlets which 
~ve th~m an unfair advantage over purely civil 
mdustnes on the European market and which 
may, as has sometimes been the case, enable 
them to escape the financial consequences of ill-
advised options made in the civil sector. In a 
nutshell, the fact that armaments industries are 
outside Co.mmll;nity. jurisdiction is a major 
factor of distortiOn m the common industrial 
policy. 
66. The problem is further complicated by the 
question of relations between Europe and the 
United States. In the armaments sector, the 
balance of trade between Europe and the United 
States is permanently tipped in favour of the 
latter. This does not prevent it bringing strong 
pressure to bear on the European members of 
the Atlantic Alliance to maintain and if pos-s~bl~, increase this advantage by fr~quently 
hnkmg the presence of American forces in 
NATO which guarantee European security with 
the opening of the markets of European coun-
tries to American armaments. In other words 
GATT principles are applied in this area to th~ 
benefit of !he U.nited States, whose arms pro-
curement IS quite naturally drawn from its 
national ~ndustries, whereas these principles are 
not apphed to armaments within the Com-
munity. Inter alia, this was the purpose of the 
proposal submitted to NATO at the end of 1991 
by the United States Permanent Representative 
Mr. Taft, which aimed at establishing a code of 
good conduct for public procurement. 
~7. The problem thus facing the Community 
IS .tw<;>fold. On the one hand, it must make the 
pnnciple of Community preference prevail at 
the expense of national preference, by making 
countries give up certain habits such as relying 
on the complex relations between their national 
institutions in the defence area and their 
national industries. It must also give valid 
reasons for this Community preference vis-a-vis 
the outside world in order to safeguard Europe's 
specific character. In short, it is a matter of 
transferring to the Community national prac-
tices that are particularly well rooted in coun-
tries with a strong armaments industry, in par-
ticular France and the United Kingdom. 
68. The Commission of the Community is 
particularly badly placed to achieve this because 
its refusal, for reasons that it is not for your 
Rapporteur to judge, to allow the French firm 
Aerospatiale and the Italian firm Alenia to buy 
the Canadian firm de Havilland in November 
1991 aroused strong doubts about the Com-
mission among a number of continental 
European industrialists as they suspected it, 
rightly or wrongly, of giving priority to consider-
ations of free competition rather than to others 
which laid greater emphasis on the defence of 
European industries and their ability to expand. 
Those industries, many of the largest of which 
have links with their countries' political author-
ities, have since been even more careful than in 
the past not to come under the thumb of supra-
national authorities having no responsibilities in 
defence matters. There is no doubt that they 
have a considerable influence on their govern-
ments and, in particular, their defence minis-
tries. 
69. This aspect of the problem has clearly not 
escaped the European Commission, which 
seems to have given up considering armaments 
policy as part of the common industrial policy 
but seems determined to seek more subtle ways 
of associating them with it. Thus, the decision 
taken by the Nine in Maastricht on " enhanced 
co-operation in the field of armaments with the 
aim of creating a European armaments agency " 
might give the Commission a means of having a 
say in this matter without claiming to dictate it. 
It is therefore particularly regrettable that, in 
this area, the European governments have been 
so incoherent since, after setting up the WEU 
Standing Armaments Committee in 1955, then 
NATO's Eurogroup and then the Independent 
European Programme Group, they abolished the 
Standing Armaments Committee in 1988 only 
to return, in 1991, to the idea of setting up a 
European armaments agency, without defining 
the nature of its relationship with the IEPG. 
70. The IEPG ministerial meeting held in 
Oslo on 6th March 1992 underscored the need 
to avoid duplication between that group and the 
future WEU agency and also the need to 
co-ordinate efforts. " Ministers agreed that the 
IEPG's role and place in the future European 
security architecture needed to be examined in 
depth and tasked National Armaments 
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Directors (NADs) to continue their work in this 
area, and to report accordingly." From this 
point of view, it seems evident that the WEU 
agency will have to be open to all IEPG member 
countries, as the Maastricht declaration on the 
association of the European member countries 
of NATO seems to indicate, and that, on the 
other hand, the IEPG will have to continue 
along the path it embarked upon in 1991 by 
transmitting its annual progress report to the 
WEU Assembly. In other words, it must affirm 
itself more as part of a European security archi-
tecture. It seems prepared to do this. A merger 
of the two bodies for co-operation in armaments 
matters should not therefore run into any great 
difficulties. 
71. Yet information that your Rapporteur has 
been able to obtain about what the governments 
expect of this agency suggest that it will be a long 
time before there is unanimity on its role. 
According to Mr. Sillard, Delegue general pour 
l' Armement at the French Ministry of Defence, 
writing in the December 1991 issue of the mag-
azine Armements, although admittedly on the 
eve of Maastricht: 
" The desirable evolution of the institu-
tions is simple: common action in arma-
ments matters must at one and the same 
time be given political legitimacy and 
made an instrument for action. 
Political legitimacy because, at European 
level, we must not set up uncontrolled 
bureaucracy whose action would not 
proceed from instructions from respon-
sible political authorities nor be included 
in the framework of defence and indus-
trial policies negotiated between 
European nations. 
An instrument for action, for instance in 
the form of an agency on the lines of the 
European Space Agency, since experience 
has shown us that, in the absence of such 
an instrument and of a common financing 
mechanism, some joint actions, such as 
Euclid in the framework of the IEPG, may 
find it hard to take off. 
In practice, a three-level organisation, 
placed under WEU, should, in the 
framework of the common foreign and 
security policy of the European Union, 
allow European action in armaments 
matters to be decided and managed: 
- the first level would be that of the min-
istries of defence; 
- the second would be that of the national 
armaments directors (in the form now 
used by the IEPG); 
- the third would be that of an agency, 
which should also be as light as possible 
and, according to the principle of 
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subsidiarity, itself manage only affairs 
that could not be attributed to existing 
national agencies. " 
72. Conversely, other countries apparently 
wish to set up as soon as possible, in the 
framework of WEU, an armaments agency with 
strong authority allowing it to avoid state 
authority and going. as far as exercising a 
monopoly in arms procurement for member 
countries' armies. 
73. It therefore seems that wording used in 
Maastricht, in this sector as in many others, is in 
any case inadequate to guide a European 
security and defence policy properly. It is quite 
clear that, in an area in which the Commission 
has a say under the texts in force, its role and 
place have not been defined sufficiently. There 
would seem to be infinitely more grounds for the 
Commission, in the framework of the responsi-
bilities .it already exercises, to be required to 
take its place, alongside the governments, in any 
European body, ev.en if based on the modified 
Brussels Treaty, tackling questions relating to 
the procurement of armaments, than for Com-
munity bodies to claim to intervene in defence 
matters. It is difficult to understand why the 
Maastricht negotiators did not admit this. 
(f) The nuclear quution 
74. Finally, Maastricht did not tackle an 
essential aspect of Europe's defence policy, i.e. 
its nuclear dimension. It seems impossible to 
consider a European security identity without 
including the nuclear dimension in one way or 
another. It is integrated into the NATO 
framework but not into that of WEU, since the 
United Kingdom has no commitments in regard 
to its armaments not stationed on the mainland 
of Europe, and France has eluded its commit-
ments in this connection from the very start of 
its nuclear force. Furthermore, one can hardly 
expect these two countries to hand over to 
others, including a European organisation of 
which they may be members, the right to decide 
on the use of these weapons obtained at great 
cost and the use of which they have mastered, 
which is not at all the case of their partners. 
75. Your Rapporteur therefore wishes to 
quote a proposal by a French parliamentarian, a 
former member of our Assembly, Mr. Fran~is 
Fillon, in an article published in Le Nouvel 
economiste of 6th March 1992: 
"The only realistic course is to envisage 
real Europeanisation of our nuclear per-
sonality. This would consist - together 
with our British allies - of giving our 
partners an ultimate security guarantee in 
conformity with the new perception of 
our essential interests in Europe. 
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In concrete terms, on the initiative of 
France Europeans might agree to create a 
nuclear consultation group. The insti-
tution designated to receive this new 
forum would be Western European 
Union. Four topics might be discussed: 
1. establishment of a joint approach to 
the rOle of deterrence with the aim of 
defining a European nuclear concept; 
2. study of the configuration of strategic 
arsenals and their compatibility with 
jointly-agreed concepts; 
3. study of methods of consultation in the 
event of recourse to nuclear weapons; 
4. definition of a disarmament and anti-
proliferation policy. " 
This proposal is worthy of attention since it 
seems likely to meet the twofold requirement of 
integrating the nuclear aspect into a European 
defence system and retaining specific national 
features which now seem difficult to cir-
cumvent. 
76. Here, too, WEU seems to be the only 
instrument capable of meeting Europe's defence 
requirements. The Maastricht negotiators pre-
tended to ignore this essential question and 
referred to a 1998 " deadline " for the modified 
Brussels Treaty. But is this not tantamount to 
condemning an institutional edifice that ignores 
such an important dimension of the problem of 
European defence? 
77. To conclude this chapter on relations 
between WEU and the Community, your 
Rapporteur will therefore voice a series of 
regrets, accompanied by a few proposals. The 
regrets include: 
(i) the fact that the governments failed 
to choose between two concepts of 
the European Union, making neb-
ulous the picture they give of the 
future of that union, at least in the 
security and defence areas; 
(ii) the fact that the governments did not 
recognise that the modified Brussels 
Treaty was already one of the bases 
of the European Union; 
(iii) the fact that the enlargement ofWEU 
was envisaged solely from the stand-
point of aligning WEU with the Com-
munity, no account being taken of 
the specific requirements of a 
European defence organisation; 
(iv) the fact that differences over the 
concept of the nature of the European 
Union did not allow them to define 
clearly the relationship between WEU 
and the other bodies of the European 
union; 
(v) the weakness of the nine-power decla-
ration in regard to co-operation in 
armaments matters; 
(vi) the fact that the nuclear aspect was 
not tackled. 
78. In the main, his proposals are as 
follows: 
(i) without prejudice to what the 
European Union will be in a future, 
the timing and content of which 
cannot yet be fixed, it should be con-
sidered that it is already a reality and 
that WEU is one element of it, even 
if all the member countries of the 
EEC are not members; 
(ii) defence matters must be examined in 
their own light and not in that of the 
image of a European Union one 
might dream about; 
(iii) the enlargement of the Community 
must consequently be handled in 
terms ofthe ability of the candidates 
to accede to the Rome Treaty and 
the enlargement of WEU in terms of 
the possibility of their acceding to 
the modified Brussels Treaty. This 
must not rule out the prospect of 
countries which could at present 
accede to only one of the treaties 
acceding to all the activities of the 
European Union; 
(iv) relations between WEU, common 
foreign and security policy and the 
EEC must be based on 
treaty-imposed commitments and on 
the need to develop exchanges 
between these elements of the 
union; 
(v) WEU must set up an agency for 
co-operation in the production of and 
trade in armaments that takes 
account of the current European situ-
ation and which encompasses the 
IEPG but allows the European Com-
mission to play a part so that it may 
ensure the interests of the common 
industrial policy; 
(vi) finally, WEU must have a framework 
in which the nuclear aspects of 
Europe's defence can be tackled, both 
by the two European nuclear powers 
and by all their partners. 
79. None of these proposals is contrary to the 
Maastricht decisions, but they all interpret them 
in what seems to be a reasonable manner likely 
to be endorsed by all. Claiming to set up, within 
a short space of time, a European Union which 
scorns these facts certainly means condemning 
WEU in the more or less long term, but 
probably also is leading Europe to failure. 
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Ill. WEU and NATO 
(a) Principles 
80. The question of relations between WEU 
and NATO is different to that of its relations 
with the European Union because they are two 
institutions of the same type, based on treaties 
which do not challenge the sovereignty of sig-
natory states and one of which, the modified 
Brussels Treaty, specifies the nature of relations 
between WEU and NATO. Article IV of the 
latter treaty describes the framework for these 
relations in a manner that would be satisfactory 
if NATO were, for its part, bound by similar 
commitments to those to which the Nine sub-
scribed since it specifies that " the high con-
tracting parties and any organs established by 
them under the treaty shall work in close 
co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation ". This article adds that 
" recognising the undesirability of duplicating 
the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its 
Agency will rely on the appropriate military 
authorities of NATO for information and advice 
on military matters". Although, in 1954, such 
information was mainly that needed for the 
control of armaments, this article applies 
equally well to military information relating to 
other matters provided NATO wishes to supply 
the information requested. NATO for its part is 
obliged, by its resolution for the implementation 
of section IV of the final act of the London Con-
ference, dated 22nd October 1954, only to ask 
WEU's agreement to possible increases in the 
level of forces of WEU member countries 
assigned to it, which is not something the gov-
ernments currently have in mind. Consequently, 
to affirm that " WEU is prepared to develop 
further the close working links between WEU 
and the alliance and to strengthen the role, 
responsibilities and contributions of WEU 
member states in the alliance " is not enough to 
confirm WEU's role as a European security and 
defence identity if, on the alliance side, a par-
allel will is not shown in respect of WEU. 
However, although the United States has several 
times expressed gratification that its European 
allies were organising themselves to increase 
their share in the common defence, particularly 
during the Gulf war, and stressed that it would 
prefer this role to be played by WEU rather than 
by the European Community, it has in no way 
committed itself vis-a-vis WEU and the least 
that can be said is that its approach in this con-
nection seems hesitant. 
81. To say that " the objective is to develop 
WEU as a means to strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance " takes up, without 
saying so, old but ambiguous wording. In a 
manner of speaking, WEU really was this pillar 
when, in 1954, it allowed the Federal Republic 
of Germany to join the alliance and subse-
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quently guaranteed that member countries 
respected their undertakings in regard to forces 
and armaments, because it thus allowed the 
unreserved participation of the European 
members of the alliance in the NATO integrated 
military system until 1967. It then ensured 
France's participation in joint security that 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty did not guar-
antee sufficiently. The notion of European pillar 
of course became far more vague once the 
NATO military system stopped being the cor-
nerstone of the western security system and 
NATO was no longer the framework for 
Europe's main actions in favour of joint 
security. Through its intervention in the Gulf 
and its study of the conditions for possible 
action to restore peace in Yugoslavia, WEU cer-
tainly helped to fulfil the common political aims 
of the members of the alliance in close 
agreement with the United States, but its actions 
were outside NATO. 
82. In truth, it seems difficult for WEU to 
affirm itself undeniably as the European pillar of 
the alliance as long as the alliance has not 
expressed the aims it intends to pursue far more 
clearly than it has done since 1989 and defined 
the means it intends to use. The NATO summit 
meeting in Rome in November 1991 admittedly 
allowed progress to be made by underlining that, 
in the military field, NATO limited its responsi-
bility to the defence of member states' territory. 
This paved the way for the development of 
WED's operational instruments whose broad 
lineS' were traced in the Maastricht declaration 
on the rate of WEU and which has since been 
started. But many aspects of NA TO's future 
political direction, its military restructuring, 
particularly in regard to the number of 
American forces to be maintained in Europe, are 
still too unclear for it to be possible today to say 
what the role its European pillar will be. At the 
beginning of 1992, its Secretary-General and 
members of several governments said that 
NATO might take action at the request of the 
CSCE, which is after all possible if all the 
member countries agree. Some even believed 
NATO might give permanent guarantees for the 
maintenance of peace in Eastern Europe, thus 
forming the military arm of the CSCE. Mr. 
Worner, for his part, has denied using this 
expression. In fact, this concept would amount 
to saying that NATO would no longer be based 
on the Washington Treaty alone, a hypothesis 
that cannot at present be endorsed. 
83. The decision taken by Canada on 26th 
February 1992 to withdraw all its forces sta-
tioned in Europe, apparently without consulting 
its allies beforehand, while reserving the right to 
redeploy them there if necessary, together with 
the large reduction in United States forces in 
Europe also make the debate difficult since it is 
just when the American participation in the 
joint military effort is being reduced that the 
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United States and Canada are saying they wish 
to turn NATO in new political directions. One 
may wonder what authority they will have to do 
this in such circumstances and, in particular, 
what would be the basis of their participation in 
the CSCE, hitherto justified by their military 
presence in Europe. 
84. Nevertheless, in Maastricht the WEU 
countries defined the nature of their relationship 
with NATO in two words:" transparency" and 
" complementarity ", which conforms perfectly 
to Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty but 
leaves room for many interpretations, as the 
committee was able to note during its visit to the 
United States in February 1992, as did your 
Rapporteur during his talks in several capitals. 
85. "Transparency" is obviously essential to 
the smooth running of the two alliances whose 
basic objective ensuring the security of Europe 
(for the Atlantic Alliance, one should simply add 
" and of North America" ) - is identical and 
which have the same members, at least as 
regards most European members of the alliance. 
But what does this notion mean exactly? Your 
Rapporteur was able to discern two different 
interpretations of what this term might cover: 
86. According to some - and no one will be 
surprised that it was in France that your 
Rapporteur learned this - transparency merely 
means that the representative of the 
chairmanship-in-office of WEU reports to the 
North Atlantic Council on discussions in the 
WEU Council. It is quite clear that this interpre-
tation is considered restrictive and not very satis-
factory by countries which are not members of 
WEU, particularly the United States, since it 
seems to foster the creation of a European bloc 
within NATO. The latter would thus perhaps feel 
forced to take note of decisions taken by only 
some of its members to which the others would 
have to subscribe or reject, which might seriously 
jeopardise the smooth running of NATO. 
87. In this sense, the creation of an opera-
tional planning cell by the military headquarters 
of the WEU countries, included in the Maas-
tricht decisions, raises a particular problem 
because it was decided to set up a small cell 
which should apparently not exceed three 
persons for each member country and probably 
fewer for the smaller countries and therefore be 
incapable, on its own, of conducting all the 
studies necessary for planning the use of WEU 
forces in a large number of eventualities. The 
effectiveness of this cell will therefore be largely 
linked with the possibility of its being able to use 
NATO information, procedure worked out in 
NATO and much of NATO planning. In this 
connection, a nine-power decision is obviously 
not binding on the other members of the 
Atlantic Alliance so they should reach 
agreement with their partners on the require-
ments of mutual " transparency ". 
88. On the American side, on the other hand, 
while the prospect of possible action specific to 
WEU seems acceptable or even, in some cases, 
desirable, it is not intended that such initiatives 
should be taken without prior agreement 
between the WEU countries and their allies in 
NATO, particularly the United States. This is 
quite conceivable since any action by certain 
members of the alliance may have serious reper-
cussions on all the allies. It is therefore con-
sidered that transparency implies direct consul-
tations between the United States and each 
member of WEU prior to any collective 
decision. The United States admittedly seems to 
prefer a European defence organisation in the 
framework of WEU to greater political inte-
gration such as the Community might wish to 
achieve, but its concept seems to leave little 
room for the establishment of a European 
defence identity, except on a case-by-case basis, 
and at execution level only. 
89. The International Herald Tribune of 9th 
March published an analysis of a broad new 
policy statement that is in its final drafting stages 
at the Department of Defence in Washington. 
This document, taking as a basis the idea that the 
United States must do all it can to prevent the 
emergence of a rival great power, is very wary 
about any European defence identity outside 
NATO and includes the following statement: 
"We must seek to prevent the emergence of 
European-only security arrangements which 
would undermine NATO. " The American 
authorities have since made a multitude of decla-
rations designed to minimise the impact of this 
document which cannot be considered as author-
itative. It is nevertheless clear that it reflects 
views which are widespread in the Pentagon. 
Such a concept makes NATO a mere instrument 
of American policy, the main aim of which would 
be to maintain overwhelming United States pre-
ponderance, which can obviously only encourage 
the Europeans, insofar as they do not a priori 
identify their security policy with that of the 
United States, to acquire their own means of 
defining and implementing this policy. 
90. In any event, it is a matter of knowing at 
what level this transparency should be set: 
between two intergovernmental institutions, 
close to each other, or between Europe and the 
United States? Both would obviously be 
desirable, but they must both be based on reci-
procity. The nine-power declaration refers only 
to transparency between institutions, which 
means that it should be fixed through agreement 
between NATO and WEU on the content of 
which the WEU Council must give its views. It 
leaves open the question of relations between a 
European Union able to define a defence policy 
of its own and the United States. 
91. The notion of " complementarity " also 
needs to be made more explicit. Article IV of the 
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modified Brussels Treaty makes WEU a com-
plement to the Atlantic Alliance but in a context 
corresponding to the situation in 1954, when the 
threat represented by the Soviet Union and its 
allies took priority over all other security consid-
erations. However, events since 1989 make it 
likely that the challenges Europe may have to 
face will be quite different: the Gulf and 
Yugoslav crises and the decisions taken by 
NATO in Rome suggest that many occasions 
may arise when WEU's role will no longer be 
only to enhance the cohesion of the Atlantic 
Alliance but to act in the light of objectives 
assigned to it either by the European Council or 
by the WEU Council. 
92. Naturally, in NATO there is a tendency to 
think that the complementarity between the two 
organisations would come into play only if 
NATO decided not to take action, as was the 
case for the Gulf in August 1990 and for Yugo-
slavia in July 1991. This would make WEU 
action subject to a case-by-case decision by 
NATO but the effect would be to reduce vastly 
the value of the instrument that WEU can offer 
the European Union and to limit its ability to 
plan specifically European action. If one takes 
account of the NATO decision to consider mil-
itary action only to defend the territory of its 
members, this, on the contrary, paves the way 
for the possibility of considering other forms of 
action in the framework of WEU: intervening to 
implement resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council or even by the CSCE and decisions 
taken by the Twelve or the Nine. Your 
Rapporteur has noted, however, that the text 
circulated by NATO in Rome is now contested 
even by some of those who adopted it on that 
occasion. 
93. WEU's subordination to the European 
Union, as outlined both in the Maastricht 
Treaty and in the nine-power declaration, means 
WEU must have the wherewithal to exercise its 
due role, i.e. use member countries' national 
forces for tasks defined by the WEU Council, 
just as NATO can call on the same forces for 
tasks on which its sixteen member countries 
have agreed. The development of WEU military 
structures will inevitably lead to a reshaping of 
the NATO command structures which should 
allow Europe, urged by the Americans to make a 
larger financial contribution to NATO, to 
exercise greater responsibilities in the alliance at 
both political and military level. Thus, in the 
future, WEU might envisage playing a role of 
European pillar of the alliance, the importance 
of which is underlined in several of the Maas-
tricht preparatory documents. 
94. Clearly, the nature of the complemen-
tarity between WEU and NATO will have con-
siderable repercussions on the operational 
aspects of WEU's activities since, if a possible 
WEU intervention were to be limited to cases 
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where NATO decided not to act, there would be 
no need to set up real permanent military struc-
tures for WEU, while a prior sharing of responsi-
bilities, in conformity with the kind of under-
takings entered into in the Washington Treaty 
and with what is allowed by Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, would open the way 
to their implementation. Such sharing might 
give priority to WEU for everything relating to 
regions outside the area defined by the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 
95. In reality, it is on the basis of decisions 
taken by the Nine in the operational field, par-
ticularly the planning cell, the creation of bi- or 
multinational units and the development of 
European co-operation in logistics, strategic 
transport and space observation and of how mil-
itary 1\eadquarters have started to follow them 
up that it may be deduced that the Maastricht 
decision implies that the Nine have effectively 
decided to create a European defence identity. 
The reality of this affirmation of identity and 
the nature of complementarity between WEU 
and NATO will depend on how they actually 
follow up these very vaguely worded deci-
sions. 
96. Conversely, NATO's activity since the 
ministerial meeting· ·in Rome suggests that, 
finding it hard to aocept the limitation of its mil-
itary role agreed by the governments, it is trying 
to compensate for this by political initiatives. 
The Washington Treaty obviously does not give 
them the necessary juridical basis to play the 
role of setting the stage for detente, entente and 
East-West co-operation that NATO seeks to 
assume in the NACC (North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council). The North Atlantic 
Council, for its part, has marked the limits of 
these initiatives by refusing any enlargement of 
NATO to include former members of the 
Warsaw Pact that had applied. It is certainly 
qUite understandable that NATO did not agree 
to shoulder new commitments towards them 
and that it did not wisb.' to appear to be taking 
advantage of the dismantling of the pact to 
extend its area of deployment eastwards, which 
could have led to hostile reactions on the part of 
the Soviet Union's successor republics, which 
might have felt threatened. However, some of 
Mr. Warner's remarks seem to indicate that 
NATO might offer the Eastern European coun-
tries security guarantees without clearly speci-
fying their nature or the basis for commitments 
by member countries. However, it is to be feared 
that the development of an active NATO policy 
in areas not covered by the Atlantic Alliance 
may weaken NATO in its own sector - its guar-
antee for the security of member countries - and 
jeopardise its strongest point: the cohesion of 
the allies. This came about on the basis of a 
treaty of defensive alliance. It may be wondered 
whether it will be able to continue for long if the 
allies intend to base it on the swings and rounda-
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bouts of a policy stretching from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok in the conditions resulting from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
97. In these conditions, the political and insti-
tutional decisions taken by the Nine in Maas-
tricht to improve the cohesion of the Atlantic 
Alliance seem inadequate to meet present 
requirements. 
98. (i) To say that " WEU member states will 
intensify their co-ordination on alliance issues 
which represent an important common interest 
with the aim of introducing joint positions 
agreed in WEU into the process of consultation 
in the alliance which will remain the essential 
forum for consultation among its members and 
the venue for agreement on policies bearing on 
the security and defence commitments of allies 
under the Washington Treaty" evokes, in what 
are admittedly hardly comprehensible terms, a 
position which it seems difficult to reconcile 
with the views of Washington. If this sentence 
can be given any meaning, it would be that 
WEU would be made responsible, before NATO 
gives its views, for defining the requirements of 
a European defence policy. There are very 
serious reasons to doubt whether many govern-
ments would abide by such an intention from 
the moment the United States Government seri-
ously made known its opposition which it did 
little to. conceal from the Political Q>mmittee 
during its recent visit and that it might intervene 
in many cases. 
99. (ii) To say that "where necessary, dates 
and venues of meetings will be synchronised and 
working methods harmonised " with those of 
NATO will be difficult to reconcile with the 
similar declaration made about meetings of the 
European Council. 
100. (iii) To say that "close co-operation will 
be established between the Secretariats-General 
of WEU and NATO " would imply that details 
should be given about what such co-operation, 
which has existed since 1954 for matters relating 
to WEU's control activity, should henceforth 
cover. It is, in particular, regrettable that there is 
no reference to the nature of relations between 
the WEU planning cell and NATO. 
101. (iv) The words used in the declaration 
concerning WEU's external relations leave room 
for many interpretations. After inviting 
members of the Community to accede to the 
modified Brussels Treaty, it says that " simulta-
neously, other European member states of 
NATO are invited to become associate members 
ofWEU in a way which will give them the possi-
bility to participate fully in the activities of 
WEU ". This seems to mean that the ministers 
drew a distinction between participation in the 
activities of WEU and unreserved accession to 
the modified Brussels Treaty, which they had 
never openly envisaged before. Your 
Rapporteur himself proposed that such a 
solution be sought, not for the member countries 
of NATO but for three Central European coun-
tries associated with the European Community 
to which he regretted WEU had offered nothing. 
To his way of thinking, the purpose should be to 
organise ad hoc co-operation with those coun-
tries on matters for which both sides considered 
this would be beneficial. The text adopted in 
Maastricht refers to an as yet undefined status 
and to participating "fully" in the activities of 
WEU none of which would therefore still be 
linked with the application of Article V of the 
treaty which, in present circumstances, seems 
possible but would no longer be so should the 
day ever come when NATO no longer fulfilled 
its own military role of ensuring the defence of 
the territory of member states. However, in view 
of Iceland's strong strategic dependence on the 
United States, it should be recalled that only two 
countries seem really concerned by these pro-
posals, i.e. Turkey and Norway. However, the 
former has constantly stressed, inter alia when 
Minister Inan addressed the grouped committee 
meeting in Palermo in April 1991 and when 
President Ozal addressed the session of the 
Assembly in June 1991, that it was applying 
only for full, complete membership of WEU. 
When the committee visited the United States, 
the American authorities warned it about the 
possible dangers for the cohesion of the alliance 
of any solution that gave Turkey a different 
status from that granted to Greece. 
102. One way or another, any enlargement of 
WEU, any association of a non-member country 
and any guarantee that WEU wishes to give to a 
collective security system, or to any state 
whatever, would mean WEU actually having the 
logistic and operational capabilities that it now 
lacks. It is certainly contemplating this, but it is 
still far from having achieved it. Can it be 
thought that any country would be prepared to 
enter a system of close military co-operation 
with countries that did not really guarantee its 
security? Would it not have to seek co-operation 
with other, more reliable allies? The question is 
at least worth raising. It seems highly unlikely 
that WEU can play the role of federator of 
Europe in defence matters if it does not develop 
its operational capabilities accordingly. 
103. Your Rapporteur believes, however, that, 
where relations between WEU and NATO are 
concerned, while the governments started, in 
Maastricht, through the operational decisions 
they took, along the road to real complemen-
tarity between the two organisations, their 
concern to handle in a parallel, if not identical, 
manner relations between WEU and NATO and 
between WEU and the European Union made 
them try to solve extremely complex political 
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and institutional problems with texts that are 
too lacking in detail, without taking due account 
of difficulties of which they were nevertheless 
well aware. To claim that "treaties and agree-
ments corresponding with the above proposals 
[i.e. concerning the enlargement of WEU and 
granting the status of associate member] will be 
concluded before 31st December 1992" makes 
even more difficult negotiations which have not 
yet started and which are to deal with statuses 
that have not yet been defined and which, in any 
event, will be extremely delicate. This is tanta-
mount to not leaving the time or means to tackle 
the real problems and to solve them, insofar as 
possible, at the level of hard facts. 
(c) The political and institutiolllll dimensioiiS 
of operatiolllll metiSures 
104. It is not your Rapporteur's task to deal 
here with the operational aspect of the decisions 
taken by the Nine in Maastricht, but he wishes 
to mention the political and institutional dimen-
sions of some ofthem and, in particular, the one 
that has been criticised the most: the creation, 
on the basis of a Franco-German initiative, of a 
European corps open to those WEU member 
countries wishing to take part. The question 
raised in that connection is whether the creation 
of such a corps really came within the 
framework of WEU and whether it was destined 
to effect a rapprochement between France and 
the NATO integrated military command or the 
contrary. 
105. The rare information your Rapporteur 
has been able to glean on the first contacts 
between military headquarters in connection 
with this army corps makes him think that these 
questions are not pertinent since: 
106. (i) A distinction should be drawn between 
a direct military command and forces assigned 
to a command in time of crisis. In fact, SHAPE 
does not exercise direct command over the 
forces assigned to it but, in particular through 
exercises, provides for the use of forces effec-
tively under national command if the govern-
ments so decide. The creation of integrated mil-
itary commands does not, in fact, replace Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty which created no 
automaticity for the possible intervention of 
member countries' armed forces. These military 
headquarters are simply intended to show that, 
if they decide to act together, the signatory coun-
tries of the alliance are prepared to do so, hence 
the deterrence exercised by NATO towards the 
Warsaw Pact until 1989, because the Soviet 
Union had no doubt that all the allies would 
decide to intervene in the event of aggression. 
The presence of their armed forces on German 
territory meant that any major attack against 
Western Europe would involve the forces of all 
these countries. 
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107. (ii) In the new situation, this deterrence 
has diminished because the evidence of such a 
decision has diminished. NATO has tried to 
remedy this weakening by advocating the cre-
ation of multinational forces, i.e. by accentu-
ating the multinational aspect of the corps 
assigned to it, without this changing the condi-
tions for using the national contingents of which 
these units are composed. From this point of 
view, the Franco-German decision fully con-
forms with the wishes expressed by NATO, but 
France is absolutely entitled to underline that it 
follows the line of the French concept, while Mr. 
Stoltenberg, then German Minister of Defence, 
was equally right to affirm in The Hague on 26th 
February that Germany and France agreed that 
the future European army corps should be able, 
in certain conditions, to serve the alliance 
defence concept and play a role within NATO 
forces. 
108. (iii) Assigning this corps to a possible 
WEU command would be like assigning it to a 
NATO command and would not call this in 
question since Article IV of the modified 
Brussels Treaty rules out the two command 
systems competing with each other. 
109. (iv) Mr. Stoltenberg said the decision on 
the final structures should be taken only after 
discussion with the other members of WEU. In 
this case, WEU intervention does not concern 
the operational assignment of the corps but only 
its organisation. It is intended to underline 
WEU's military cohesion but does not create 
obligations different from those set out in the 
modified Brussels Treaty. Thus, cases might be 
foreseen, such as those of certain forces assigned 
to NATO during the Gulf crisis, when partici-
pating countries would take out units of this 
force for a specific action in the context of 
national policy or of WEU. 
110. Moreover, your Rapporteur wishes to 
recall that the idea that the WEU Institute for 
Security Studies would become an " academy " 
is still very unclear as long as its new duties have 
not been spelled out. Would it be a training 
establishment? Intended for whom? It would 
certainly not be without interest to set up, in the 
framework of WEU, an institution to prepare 
those responsible for national defence in 
member countries to tackle the problems they 
will have to handle in their European 
dimension. However, the ministers' decision on 
this point should be made more explicit. 
111. As can be seen, the nature of co-operation 
between WEU and NATO raises no questions of 
principle. However, it must be thought out again 
to take account of the new international situ-
ation and the wording of the nine-power decla-
ration, be it " transparency ", " complemen-
tarity " or " academy ", is not enough. The 
Council will have to be more precise and give 
them real content, which it cannot do without 
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agreement with NATO. The prevailing uncer-
tainty about NATO's new guidelines might well 
delay such an agreement. 
IV. The WEU Assembly 
and the European Parliament 
(a) Present ambiguities 
112. The declaration of the nine member coun-
tries of WEU adopted in Maastricht on 9th 
December 1991 includes the decision that: 
" WEU will take the following measures 
to develop a close working relationship 
with the union: 
- encouragement of closer co-operation 
between the parliamentary Assembly of 
WEU and the European Parliament. " 
113. Receiving Assembly committees in Bonn 
on 28th January 1992, Mr. Genscher, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, said he 
would welcome any initiative the Assembly 
might take in this sense. 
114. There is every reason to welcome the 
intentions expressed by the Nine because they 
meet the concerns constantly voiced by the 
Assembly since the adoption of its Order 55 in 
December 1981 and the nature of their 
approach since their decision is expressed in 
terms that leave the Assembly full latitude to act 
as it sees fit. 
115. The operative text of Order 55 (Doc-
ument 894) included the following paragraph: 
" The Assembly, 
1. INVITES the President of the Assembly 
to contact the President of the European 
Parliament to ensure 
(a) that invitations are sent regularly to 
observers from the European Par-
liament to attend sessions of the WEU 
Assembly and to observers from the 
WEU Assembly to attend sittings of 
the European Parliament when the 
agenda includes debates on matters 
affecting Europe's security; 
(b) that a standing committee drawn from 
both assemblies is set up by the most 
appropriate means to ensure 
harmonisation of their work; " 
116. This document was transmitted by Mr. 
Fred Mulley, then President of the Assembly, as 
a result of which Mr. Piet Dankert, then Pres-
ident of the European Parliament, sent him, on 
31st March 1982, the decision taken by the 
-~ 
': 
enlarged Bureau of the European Parliament on 
28th January 1982, which read as follows: 
" The enlarged Bureau, 
- having regard to the respective respon-
sibilities of the two assemblies; 
- considered that it was not necessary to 
institutionalise relations with the 
Assembly of WEU, but 
- considered that observers could be sent 
by either assembly whenever the 
debates in the European Parliament or 
the Assembly of WEU were of interest 
to either institution; " 
117. This answer limited significantly the pos-
sibilities of co-operation between the two assem-
blies since, as President Mulley stressed to the 
Presidential Committee, commenting on Mr. 
Dankert's answer on behalf of the European Par-
liament: 
" ( 1) the latter held far more 'meetings; 
(2) its rules of procedure precluded 
observers speaking; 
(3) members of the Assembly would 
hardly be inclined to attend meetings 
of the European Parliament if they 
could not take part in its debates. " 
118. The Presidential Committee therefore 
"agreed to invite the European Parliament to 
arrange to be represented by two observers at 
the next session, quite apart from any observers 
the political groups might appoint". This invi-
tation was repeated for each session of the 
Assembly. Until1990, the European Parliament 
rarely answered but, since then, has done so reg-
ularly. There were no reciprocal invitations, 
however. The European People's Party Group of 
the European Parliament has also sent a dele-
gation to some of the WEU Assembly's ses-
sions. 
119. Conversely, the creation of a Security and 
Disarmament Sub-Committee of the Political 
Committee of the European Parliament allowed 
its Chairman to invite the President of the WEU 
Assembly to attend its meetings twice. He was 
represented by Mr. De Decker on 26th April and 
19th December 1985 and by Mr. Pecriaux in 
1988. They were able to explain the WEU 
Assembly's views to the sub-committee, while 
Mr. Pierre Bemard-Reymond, member of the 
sub-committee, was invited to attend meetings 
of the WEU Assembly's Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. However, the 
decision taken in 1985 to instruct Mr. De 
Decker and Mr. Bemard-Reymond to organise 
permanent liaison between the two assemblies 
was not followed up. 
120. On 18th April 1991, Mr. Pontillon, Pres-
ident of the WEU Assembly, wrote to Mr. Baron 
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Crespo proposing a meeting intended to lead to 
an agreement on introducing exchanges between 
the two assemblies on a reciprocal basis, but cir-
cumstances prevented such a meeting taking 
place and, on 11th December 1991, President 
Baron Crespo wrote to Mr. Pontillon asking him 
to postpone any new initiative until after the 
Maastricht agreements. Mr. Pontillon's state of 
health prevented him taking any further initi-
ative during the first quarter of 1992. 
121. In February 1992, your Rapporteur was 
invited to take part, as an Assembly rapporteur, 
in a forthcoming meeting of the Security and 
Disarmament Sub-Committee of the Political 
Committee of the European Parliament. He 
thought he should make his acceptance subject 
to a decision by the Presidential Committee so 
that the new relationship between the WEU 
Assembly and the European Parliament might 
be based on an overall decision by the Assembly 
and not on specific initiatives. At its meeting on 
15th April, the Presidential Committee decided 
to make its acceptance subject to agreement 
being reached between the presidents of the two 
assemblies on their activities overall. 
122. Apart from all the difficulties normally 
linked with co-operation between two parlia-
mentary assemblies based on different treaties, 
each with its own rules of procedure adapted to 
its nature and specific vocation and elected by 
different means, there is in fact a fundamental 
difference that affects relations between the two 
assemblies. 
123. The European Parliament, elected by uni-
versal suffrage, willingly considers that it is the 
only parliamentary assembly capable of 
speaking in the name of the European Com-
munity and that its task is to handle all ques-
tions likely to come within the purview of a 
European Union of which the Community 
would be the only basis. In other words, it 
intends to handle matters relating to the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
functioning of WEU. Thus, on 25th March 
1988, after hearing Mr. Pecriaux, Mr. 
Poettering, Chairman of the Security and Dis-
armament Sub-Committee handed a declaration 
to the press that included a proposal in regard to 
the WEU Assembly, asking why should the 
present WEU national representatives not be 
joined by the members of the European Par-
liament elected by member countries. One may 
wonder what the reaction of the European Par-
liament would have been if the WEU Assembly 
had proposed that the members of the European 
Parliament should be joined by the representa-
tives of the parliaments of the WEU member 
countries responsible for representing them in 
our Assembly. 
124. In reality this proposal was tantamount to 
contesting the justification of Article IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and, if followed up, 
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would have meant the representativity of 
members of the WEU Assembly being based on 
two distinct principles, which would have 
removed the Assembly's democratic legitimacy. 
In the mind of the person who made the pro-
posal, such a move was just a step towards the 
pure and simple annexation of the WEU 
Assembly by the European Parliament. 
125. In spite ofMr. Dankert's proposal in 1982 
on exchanges of documents between the two 
assemblies, the European Parliament sent only 
to the Secretary-General of WEU, and not to its 
Assembly, two texts it had adopted, one on 9th 
October 1990 in which it asked that WEU not 
be reactivated and the other on 6th November 
1991 which: 
" suggests that in the meantime transi-
tional measures should be taken in order 
to prepare the ground for a smooth and 
gradual incorporation of WEU activities 
into the scope of the European Com-
munity competences; " 
126. The European Parliament's response to 
approaches made on behalf of the WEU 
Assembly, the procedure it uses for communi-
cating texts it adopts and the content of its reso-
lutions leave little doubt about its ideas. This is 
a perfectly coherent attitude of refusing to 
recognise the WEU Assembly as a body com-
petent to handle matters relating to the security 
of Europe. 
127. This is confirmed by Resolution 
A3-0123/92, adopted on 7th April 1992, in 
which the European Parliament " draws 
attention to the following major shortcomings in 
the new treaty which... provides f9r defence 
matters to be delegated to WEU without pro-
viding for appropriate parliamentary control of 
the activities of this organisation". This quite 
clearly means that the WEU Assembly does not 
provide " appropriate parliamentary control ", 
either because it does not apply the modified 
Brussels Treaty or because the latter is con-
sidered irrelevant. In the light of this resolution, 
ohe can well understand why the European Par-
liament finds it so distasteful to establish, with 
the WEU Assembly, the exchanges advocated in 
the nine-power Maastricht Declaration on a 
basis acceptable to our Assembly. It is not so 
easy to understand the juridical basis underlying 
this attitude. 
128. It is to be feared that the Maastricht deci-
sions may provide further arguments for those 
who want our Assembly to disappear. In Written 
Question 296, our colleague, Mr. De Decker, 
gave an excellent definition of the problem they 
raise, as follows: 
" Title V of the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union contains 'provisions on a 
common foreign and security policy'. 
Article J.4, paragraphs 2, 5 and 6, refer to 
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the activities of WEU. According to 
Article J.11, paragraph 1, the provisions 
referred to in Articles 137, etc., 'of the 
treaty establishing the European Com-
munity shall apply to the provisions 
relating to the areas referred to in this title 
[V]'. However, according to Article 137, 
the European Parliament 'shall exercise 
the ... powers which are conferred upon it 
by this treaty'. 
Can the Council say, t):lerefore, what 
powers the Maastricht Treaty attributes to 
the European Parliament in regard to the 
application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty and how these powers can be rec-
onciled with those attributed to the WEU 
Assembly in Article IX of the latter 
treaty?" 
129. The Council's reply to this question is 
most unsatisfactory, in particular when it com-
pares the ," essentially... political nature " of 
WEU's relations with the European Union, as 
established by Article J.4 of the treaty and the 
nine-power declaration, with de jure relations. 
One may wonder about the purpose of a treaty 
which does not establish a right. Furthermore, 
while it recognises that " the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union does attribute certain 
powers to the European Parliament in regard to 
its application ", the Council says that " in the 
opinion of the Council, this does not in any way 
impair the role attributed to the WEU parlia-
mentary Assembly by virtue of Article IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty ", which is obvious. 
Why then, does it make the reservation implied 
by its use of the word "opinion"? It does not 
say, as Mr. De Decker had asked, what are these 
powers or, a fortiori, how they can be reconciled 
with those the modified Brussels Treaty attri-
butes to the WEU Assembly. By not answering 
this essential question, it does not make it easier 
to encourage closer co-operation between the 
two assemblies as it advocates in this reply since 
such co-operation can be based only on a clear 
picture of the powers and responsibilities of one 
and the other. 
130. Mr. De Decker's question was particularly 
pertinent since some governments appear to be 
considering, when the deadline of 1996 or 1998 
is reached, not a merger of WEU and the 
European Community which they realise has 
little chance of being feasible, but an approach 
that seems to advance towards the European 
Union without really committing them. The 
WEU Assembly might thus be sacrificed on the 
altar of an emerging European Union and its 
responsibilities transferred to the European Par-
liament. This would mean revising the modified 
Brussels Treaty. However, by referring to a 1998 
time-limit for the treaty, the governments have 
paved the way for making such a transfer on that 
date without revising a treaty that would 
become null and void without their having to 
take any particular decision. 
131. Obviously, such an attitude on the part of 
these governments and of the European Par-
liament is not likely to facilitate co-operation 
between the two assemblies. On the one hand, 
the WEU Assembly considers that, in Article IX 
of the modified Brussels Treaty, it was given an 
unchallengeable mandate and, on the other, it 
believes it has an important role to play in estab-
lishing a European Union which is in 
accordance with the letter of the texts adopted in 
Maastricht. In particular, it should be recalled 
that its responsibilities concern the full appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty and not 
just the 'activities of the WEU Council, which 
gives it the right to receive from the govern-
ments of member countries information on the 
application of the treaty, even if this is carried 
out by bodies not dependent upon the WEU 
Council. This would be the case for any body set 
up by the Twelve to handle defence, security or 
armaments questions, without this affecting the 
right of the European Parliament to supervise 
such bodies within the framework of its own 
responsibilities. 
132. The WEU Assembly has always been per-
fectly aware that it could not remain isolated 
from the other European parliamentary bodies. 
This is due to its own Charter, the modified 
Brussels Treaty, by which, in 1954, the high con-
tracting parties laid the foundations for what 
was to become the European Economic Com-
munity by declaring, in Article I, that they " will 
so organise and co-ordinate their economic 
activities as to produce the best possible results, 
by the elimination of conflict in their economic 
policies, the co-ordination of production and the 
development of commercial exchanges ". The 
WEU Assembly welcomed the strides since 
made by the European Community and has 
strongly encouraged all attempts to establish a 
European political union. This means that, far 
from considering as competitive steps taken 
since 1973 to develop a twelve-power foreign 
policy, it has unreservedly welcomed all that has 
been done in this sense right up to the Maas-
tricht agreement in which it saw, in spite of 
certain weaknesses referred to in this report, an 
extension of responsibilities and improvement 
in the procedure of the Europ~an Union in 
perfect conformity with its own views. 
133. It is of course aware that there are still 
obstacles to WEU coming fully into line with 
the European Union, including the fact that 
three of the member countries of the Com-
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for the governments to call for this before 
inviting parliamentary observers from the 
member countries of the Community to its ses-
sions with the right to speak if they so wished. 
Moreover, everyone knows that not all the 
member countries of the Community have the 
same view of the possibility of resorting to force 
to safeguard peace inside or outside Europe and 
that the role they attribute to nuclear weapons in 
a strategy based on deterrence is far from iden-
tical. Now that the Twelve have decided to 
tighten Community links in areas within the 
purview of the Economic Community, these 
considerations preclude any thought of handling 
defence questions without taking into account 
the fact that control of the policy of sovereign 
states can be exercised only by the parliaments 
of those states. 
134. These are the facts on which any thinking 
about the parliamentary organisation of twelve-
power Europe must be based since it is not 
enough to note that the latter has a democratic 
deficit and to advocate strengthening the powers 
of the European Parliament in order to correct 
this. This approach is fully valid in areas that are 
clearly the responsibility of the Community. It 
would not be very effective in areas that are a 
matter for member states' prerogatives and deci-
sions, as is the case of defence. Only the parlia-
ments of those countries can exercise essential 
democratic control over their governments, 
inter alia by voting budgets, which are still 
national. It is the delegations from those parlia-
ments that are able usefully to scrutinise the 
requirements of joint security and to echo rel-
evant European requirements in the national 
political dialogue. 
135. Taking note of these facts and drawing the 
consequences for parliamentary activities does 
not mean setting aside the prospect of a wider, 
more united Europe. On the contrary, endeav-
ouring to have each assembly retain its own pre-
rogatives now that the speed of developments 
rules out risky wagers about the future means 
that account is being taken of the impetus that 
the various European assemblies have managed 
to give to the establishment of a union in the last 
few decades. However legitimate it may be, the 
concern to co-ordinate or even unify parlia-
mentary Europe would probably lead only to a 
weakening of parliamentary authority, even in 
the framework of the Twelve and, a fortiori, in 
an all-European context. 
(b) Tile WEU Assembly in the Europe~~~~ Union 
munity do not yet play a part in WEU. 136. Looking towards the future of the 
However, it noted that, in Maastricht, the nine European parliamentary system, it would appear 
member countries expressed their intention to that only the development of European political 
hold negotiations with the other three members unity will allow coherent parliamentary activity 
of the Community to allow them to join WEU in to be organised, which does not m~an that it 
1992 if they really wish to do so. It did not wait must be concentrated in the hands of a single 
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assembly. Following the Maastricht decisions, 
there will be a progressive rapprochement 
between countries that are not yet members and 
the European Union which seems, more than 
ever, to be the hub round which Europe's unity 
can be achieved. There are also signs that a new 
line is about to be drawn between areas that are 
the direct responsibility of the Community and 
those which remain a matter for member states 
but where co-ordination of national policies will 
be increasingly essential. 
137. It is evident that the decision really to set 
up a European Union with its own constitution 
might call in question all of today's European 
institutions, be it those of WEU or those of the 
European Community. Neither the WEU 
Council nor the Assembly, in their present form, 
would have a place there. But in that case the 
European Commission as it is now constituted 
and operates would have to make way for a true 
European government, with all the responsibil-
ities that implies, and the European Parliament 
should be given new powers but also be elected 
in a uniform manner throughout the territory of 
the union. 
138. We have of course not reached that stage 
and the union, as it now exists and seems likely 
to be for a long time to come, can only be a jux-
taposition of separate institutions, each with its 
own legal basis. At parliamentary level, the 
concern shown by the governments in Maas-
tricht to anticipate what such a union might be 
can be given effect by the juxtaposition of two 
assemblies, giving a picture of what a European 
Union might be, as it will, in any event, not be 
able to avoid a bicameral type of parliamentary 
supervision. The main task of one of the 
European assemblies, elected by direct universal 
suffrage, should be to supervise the European 
executive in areas within its purview. The other, 
drawn from state parliaments, should first work 
to co-ordinate national policies. These priorities 
devolving upon each of the assemblies in no way 
detract from the existence of a vast area, in par-
ticular that of foreign and joint security policy, 
where two-level supervision will remain 
desirable. 
limit the right of each assembly, in accordance 
with its own procedure, to express its views on 
all aspects of European affairs but to give it 
instruments for a dialogue with the executive 
authority that are the best suited to its vocation. 
In present circumstances, application of the 
treaties in their present form is the only basis for 
the process of European Union to which the 
Maastricht decisions refer. 
141. It is in the light of such a concept of the 
European parliamentary system that the WEU 
Assembly, as part of the only European 
organisation with defence responsibilities, is 
now tackling problems linked with the pro-
gressive unification of Europe. Determined to 
encourage the opening of WEU's door to all 
European countries which wish to join it and 
have decided to guide their external policy and 
internal evolution in a direction that allows the 
security guarantees offered by the modified 
Brussels Treaty to be extended to them, the 
WEU Assembly wishes to play an active part in 
all exchanges designed to promote the parlia-
mentary dimension of the new order of peace 
and security now being established in Europe. 
142. Confirmation by the governments repre-
sented in Maastricht that WEU is part of the 
European unification process alongside the 
Community gives its Assembly the firm con-
viction that it has a major role to play in devel-
oping a parliamentary system that meets the 
needs of a Europe that is to respond to the 
appeal from the East. 
143. For these reasons, the WEU Assembly 
cannot, as matters now stand, approach its rela-
tions with the European Parliament other than 
on a basis of equality and reciprocity. It can but 
note that the European Parliament does not give 
observers from any other parliamentary 
assembly the right to speak. It should give 
observers from the European Parliament a 
status corresponding to the one that that 
assembly can give its own. However, while the 
more or less symbolic presence of observers is a 
sign of the mutual interest of each assembly in 
the work of the other, it is not a real 
exchange. 139. In due time, procedure must be worked 
out for establishing a bicameral system that is 144. In view of the differences between the 
not confined to a sharing of responsibilities context of the European Parliament and that of 
between the two assemblies. However, the the WEU Assembly, if relations between the two 
European Union of future years, and probably assemblies are to be limited to necessarily 
future decades, will have to remain under dual unequal participation in public sittings and if 
parliamentary supervision which might give the fundamental problems are not tackled as 
each of the two assemblies the right to express a frankly as possible, they can but lead to inci-
qualified opinion on matters within the purview dents and hostile or ambiguous declarations det-
of the other. rimental to the future of the European Union. 
140. It is on this basis that we should, here and 145. Account must be taken of the fact that 
now, seek to bring about co-operation between each of the two assemblies derives its existence 
the WEU Assembly and the European Par- and legality from the treaty or treaties that gave 
liament, as advocated in Maastricht. The aim of birth to it. This was usefully spelled out by the 
a bicameral system would obviously not be to French Constitutional Council in its decision of 
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9th April 1992, in which it considered that the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty relating to 
the European Parliament were compatible with 
French constitutional law, basing its conclusion 
in particular on the following considerations: 
(i) according to Article E of the treaty on 
the European Union, the European 
Parliament exercises its attributions 
in the conditions and for the pur-
poses foreseen, on the one hand in 
the provisions of the treaties setting 
up the European Communities and 
subsequent treaties and acts modi-
fying and completing them and, on 
the other hand, in the other provi-
sions of the treaty on the European 
Union; 
(ii) it is laid down that the European Par-
liament, like the other Community 
institutions, acts within the limits of 
the attributions conferred on it by 
each of the abovementioned 
treaties; 
(iii) furthermore, the treaty on the 
European Union does not have the 
consequence of changing the juridical 
nature of the European Parliament, 
that the latter is not a sovereign 
assembly with general responsibilities 
and the vocation to compete with the 
exercise of national sovereignty and 
that the European Parliament 
belongs to a juridical order of its 
own. 
These preambular paragraphs have the merit of 
clarifying a legal situation that public opinion 
seems to find rather vague. Insofar as they corre-
spond to the views of the other member coun-
tries, which is not yet expressed clearly enough, 
these views place the European Parliament and 
the WEU Assembly on the same footing. In 
these conditions, while exchanges of views are 
desirable for both, they must be confined to 
keeping each other informed and lay no claim to 
establishing a system of joint decisions. 
146. On this basis, it would seem that the only 
way to allow a true dialogue to be developed, 
while respecting each other's prerogatives, 
would be to hold joint meetings between the 
committees of the two assemblies that deal with 
matters concerning both WEU and other parts 
of the European Union, which is the case for the 
Political Committee and Technological and Aer-
ospace Committee of the WEU Assembly and 
the Political Committee and Industrial Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament but, at 
the present juncture, not for the Defence Com-
mittee. These meetings might be held once or 
twice a year, alternating between the seats of the 
two assemblies, with an agenda agreed in 
advance by both parties. Without dealing 
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directly with reports prepared by one or other 
assembly, this agenda might include documents 
prepared by one or other of the committees con-
cerned covering questions being examined by 
both of them, so that the exchange of views is 
held between knowledgeable parliamentarians 
and leads quickly to reports being prepared by 
each of the committees. A typical example today 
would be a joint meeting between the com-
mittees to examine the action to be taken on the 
Maastricht decisions concerning security and 
armaments questions. These meetings might be 
the subject of a press communique adopted by 
joint agreement by the two committee chairmen 
concerned. 
147. Such a proposal would have the advantage 
of satisfying the governments by showing that 
the Assembly is prepared to follow their encour-
agement and, for its part, to give substance to 
the Maastricht decisions. It would also be a test 
of the good will of the European Parliament and, 
in any case, leave it the onus for a possible 
failure, and prepare a future for the European 
Union in which the WEU Assembly would have 
its place. 
V. Conclusions 
148. Close examination of the texts adopted in 
Maastricht leads to the conclusion that the nine 
WEU governments, or even the twelve Com-
munity governments, did not take sufficient 
account, in the case of matters relating to 
security and defence, of the juridical bases on 
which they intend to organise the European 
Union to which they constantly refer nor the 
realities of today's Europe which, in the years 
ahead, will probably not evolve in a direction 
likely to facilitate the establishment of a true 
union. They will, of course, find an excuse in 
view of their uncertainty when the extremely 
rapid transformations that have been taking 
place in Europe in the last three years have to be 
taken into acoount. They are having to face up 
to contradictory necessities such as enhancing 
the cohesion of Community Europe and 
enlarging it and ensuring the security of part of 
the land mass extending from Cadiz to Vladi-
vostok, if not the whole of the northern hemi-
sphere, without letting the smaller organisations 
which have guaranteed Europe's security in the 
last half-century be swallowed up. It should be 
no surprise that, faced with the immensity of the 
problems to be solved, under pressure from the 
proliferation of crises arising in the Middle East, 
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, they 
were unable to present a really satisfactory plan. 
149. The divergences between the views of 
those concerned obviously mean reaching com-
promises and no government can be blamed for 
not having been able to impose its own views. 
Each step towards the European Union will 
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inevitably require compromises. However, in 
Maastricht, they do not always seem to have 
been real compromises, that is to say, the 
adoption of joint positions where each country 
renounced some of its requirements in order to 
have others accepted. In many cases, they con-
cealed opposing views without any real attempt 
to overcome them. The references to deadlines 
such as 1996 or 1998 were then mainly intended 
to postpone decisions that the governments were 
unable to take in 1991. It is just as if some 
thought they could commit others more than 
they wanted by choosing ambiguous words such 
as " union " or by a labyrinth of references from 
one article to another, from one document to 
another or even from one institution to another. 
If this is really so, these are shabby and illusory 
procedures. Who can believe that serious 
progress will be made towards European Union 
on the basis of misunderstandings and vague 
words? In certain areas, particularly in regard to 
relations between WEU and NATO, it was pos-
sibly wise to postpone any real decision for a few 
years, on the one hand because NATO has not 
yet clearly defined its future role and, on the 
other, because certain orientations with opera-
tional implications should allow WEU to gain 
more grist in the next few years. 
150. This is not so for relations between WEU 
and the various aspects of the European Union, 
including the parliamentary aspect, since here 
the governments do not seem to have been able 
to take a real decision on what they intended to 
achieve in the framework of the European 
Union when that would have been possible. 
Everyone knows that there was a debate in 1991 
about the more or less federal nature of the 
union. No decision was reached and it would 
appear that it is here that the most conflicting 
reservations were wrapped in the most obscure 
wording. 
151. The real question seems to be: do the gov-
ernments intend, in 1998, to create a federal 
European system embracing all the responsibil-
ities that normally belong to a federation? Are 
they prepared, at that time, to set up the 
federation's political institutions, i.e. a respon-
sible government? If so, this means that, 
between now and then, they must refuse negotia-
tions on further accessions to the Community, 
start without delay to draw up constitutional 
texts and warn the public of the magnitude of 
what they are undertaking. 
152. If, as your Rapporteur thinks, this is not 
the true position, it seems essential for Europe 
to adapt existing organisations to its new situ-
ation, as the Community has done with the asso-
ciation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
and as the Nine have started to do by increasing 
WEU's operational activities and also allowing 
each parliamentary assembly to exercise its own 
responsibilities. It is by applying the treaties that 
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the governments can give Europe as it now is the 
possibility of taking its due place in the world. 
153. The idea that Europe might indefinitely 
progress solely by means of dynamic movements 
and institutional mechanisms, or by the contam-
ination of ill-defined responsibilities no longer 
corresponds to the realities of today. The reso-
lution already quoted, adopted by the European 
Parliament on 7th April 1992 (A3-0 123/92), 
includes the following passage: 
" The European Parliament ... instructs its 
responsible committee to complete its 
preparation of a draft constitution as set 
out in its resolution of 11th July 1990 on 
the European Parliament's guidelines for 
a draft constitution for the European 
Union through procedures involving the 
national parliaments as provided for in 
the final declaration of the conference of 
the parliaments of the European Com-
munity of November 1990 in Rome. " 
This means that the European Parliament sees 
the need to give the future of the European 
Union a true constitutional basis. The WEU 
Assembly can but endorse this view and it 
should be its task to prepare, if possible in con-
sultation with the relevant committee of the 
European Parliament, the bases for such a con-
stitutional plan for the area within its 
purview. 
154. However, where WEU is more specifically 
concerned, the way the governments have put 
forward the " 1998 deadline " is difficult to rec-
oncile with their proclaimed will to " strengthen 
WEU ". This would mean revising the modified 
Brussels Treaty, as the Assembly proposed in 
Recommendations 490 and 504 which the 
Council has never answered properly. The gov-
ernments preferred to act as if this revision was 
superfluous because of the "1998 deadline". 
However, there is no reason to assunie that, 
during the present decade, the situation will be 
more favourable to establishing a federal Europe 
than it was in December 1991. On the contrary, 
everything points to increasingly strong pressure 
for a rapid enlargement of the Community and 
to the fact that the new accessions will slow 
down the strengthening of Community Europe. 
Because the governments did not unhesitatingly 
seize this opportunity, it is to be feared that, 
rather than advancing towards defence Europe, 
in this area Maastricht paved the way if not for 
diluting the European security system guar-
anteed by the modified Brussels Treaty, at least 
for a long period during which the notion of 
European Union will lack a firm structure. 
155. Indeed, it cannot be hoped that the opera-
tional measures decided upon or mentioned in 
Maastricht will be able to replace a firm 
juridical framework for ensuring Europe's 
security, particularly if- as the Council admits 
is possible in its reply to Recommendation 511 
in regard to the Central European countries, and 
as the Maastricht declaration suggests in regard 
to NATO member countries, as certain neutral 
countries envisage today, countries that are not 
members of WEU are asked or allowed to take 
part in some of WEU's operational activities in 
the framework of the subsidiary bodies of the 
Council. It is more than ever clear that the 
security of Europe as a whole is part of WEU's 
vocation. In the uncertain circumstances that 
may be expected sooner or later, a sound 
alliance between nine countries which, with no 
particular ambition in Europe, can devote their 
efforts solely to maintaining peace, inter alia by 
providing backing for the CSCE or the United 
Nations, is an important guarantee for peace 
and security throughout Europe, just as the exis-
tence of a prosperous Economic Community 
brings hope of development and prosperity 
throughout the European continent. 
156. The Maastricht Treaty proper seems to 
meet this second requirement. The declarations 
by the Nine do so only in part for the first, and 
the future of defence Europe, at least in the 
present decade, will depend on how the WEU 
Council implements them, in particular at its 
ministerial meeting on 19th June. The aim of 
the draft recommendation included in this doc-
ument is to allow the Assembly to say how it 
intends the Council to do this. 
VI. The discussion in committee 
157. Your Rapporteur submitted a working 
paper to the Political Committee in Berlin on 
2nd April 1992 and then a draft report in Paris 
on 15th April. Without refuting his arguments, 
the committee expressed the wish that he tone 
down his criticism so that, in adopting the 
present report, the committee would not appear 
to be supporting those who, in certain countries, 
are opposed to the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Your Rapporteur, who for his part has 
campaigned actively for ratification of the 
treaty, made two successive revisions of his 
initial text to take account of the committee's 
concern, which he shares. However, he was 
careful to ensure that these revisions did not 
mean leaving out any critical remarks that he 
considered well-founded and which, moreover, 
relate mainly to the nine-power declarations 
alone, which are not required to be ratified. He 
did not wish to bow to the arguments of those 
who held that it was not always good to tell the 
truth or to conceal the problems that he thought 
were raised by the nine-power decisions. He has 
endeavoured to present these questions in such a 
way as to appear not as obstacles to ratification 
but as a basis for the recommendations he pro-
poses to address to the Council. 
158. Most of the questions put to the ministers 
relate to the vagueness of their declarations 
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about the structures of WEU and the role it 
should play. In other words, these are matters 
normally to be found on the WEU Council's 
agenda concerning which the Assembly has the 
right and duty to make recommendations to the 
Council. It has the opportunity to do so prior to 
the ministerial meeting planned for 19th June 
and would be quite wrong not to do so. Your 
Rapporteur has therefore endeavoured to guide 
his thinking, as the committee requested him, 
towards positive conclusions intended for the 
Council. 
159. The same is true ofwhat he says about the 
Assembly's relations with the European Par-
liament. The purpose was not to conceal the dif-
ficulties in the way of the necessary dialogue 
between the two assemblies but to set out, in a 
draft order, which moreover corresponds to the 
decisions taken by the Presidential Committee 
on 15th April, how the WEU Assembly intends 
to solve them in order to achieve the exchanges 
desired by the ministers and which the Assembly 
has always wanted. 
160. Moreover, some committee members 
stressed, rightly in your Rapporteur's opinion, 
the urgency of WEU responding to the problems 
now facing the organisation of European 
security and considered the recommendation 
proposed by the Rapporteur should allow the 
Assembly to help to overcome them. Others 
underlined that WEU as it exists could offer 
Europe, at the appropriate time, the means of 
overcoming difficulties which might not be 
solved in the framework of the European Union 
as set up in Maastricht. One member said the 
word" Western" in WEU's title made it inap-
propriate for meeting the needs of security that 
should concern the whole of Europe. Your 
Rapporteur willingly accepts this remark but 
believes it is difficult here and now to set the 
limits of territories to which it is possible and 
desirable to extend in the near future the 
security system offered by WEU. Titles can 
always be changed once agreement is reached on 
the nature and content of this system, which will 
still take some time. 
161. The present report can be read only if it is 
borne in mind that the Maastricht Treaty is a 
step towards the establishment of a European 
Union and as such must be ratified. However, 
considerable progress still has to be made and 
this cannot be confined to a sharing between 
systems now operating: it must lead to the 
rational organisation of Europe and a new 
division of responsibilities between member 
states and the union and between the various 
parts of that union. It is because we know that 
Europe is faced with a long and difficult test 
that, in applying the decisions taken in Maas-
tricht, the WEU Council should be asked to 
show determination and rigour which, in areas 
within the purview ofWEU, were lacking during 
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the preparatory period. Your Rapporteur 
therefore submits to the committee an analysis 
of the defence-related texts adopted in Maas-
tricht that he has tried to make as detailed as 
possible, together with a draft recommendation 
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and draft order which seek to convey to the 
Council the Assembly's views on how the nine-
power declaration should be implemented so as 
to meet the present requirements of European 
security. 
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Draft Recommendation 
011 a lleW security order in Europe 
The Assembly, 
(i) Concerned about the revival of ethnic, territorial, nationalist and other conflicts in Central and 
Eastern Europe; 
(ii) Aware that the young and still fragile democracies in this region are all encountering serious eco-
nomic crises resulting from the transformation of their societies and economies; 
(iii) Recalling the principles of the November 1990 Charter of Paris in which all signatories con-
firmed their intention to maintain freedom of expression for all and respect for the rights of minorities; 
(iv) Regretting the failure of CSCE attempts to solve conflicts, but noting the efforts being made at 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting to enhance the- capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention, crisis 
management and the peaceful settlement of conflicts; 
(v) Welcoming the Treaty on European Union which should allow the member countries of the 
European Community to take a decisive step towards establishing a European Union meeting the 
requirements of an economic and monetary union and capable of developing a joint foreign and 
security policy, which might in time lead to common defence; 
(vi) Noting that the decisions taken at the Maastricht summit give the WEU Council the ability to 
take initiatives in external and joint security policy matters; 
(vii) Underlining that the common foreign and security policy, and the accompanying further defi-
nition of WEU's role and the development of a common European defence policy will in the future ~ 
also help to prepare Europeans to assume their responsibilities and contribute to the management of 
international crises and contingencies in which military assets could be required; 
(viii) Recalling that the positive aspect of the two Gulf exercises in 1987-88 and 1990-91 has demon-
strated that WEU can act as an effective European forum for establishing political concertation and 
practical co-operation among member countries in crisis situations in which their security interests are 
affected; 
(ix) Considering that Western Europe has a vital interest in present developments in Central and 
Eastern Europe insofar as the foundations are now being laid for parliamentary democracy and a 
market economy in nations which should eventually be able to join the European Union, in order to 
give greater assurances of peace and security for the whole of Europe; 
(x) Recalling Recommendation 500 on the consequences of developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe for European security, adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1991, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Starting this year, associate the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland with 
WEU; 
2. Conclude a peace-keeping agreement with those countries and accordingly hold, at least twice a 
year, a meeting of the Council enlarged to include their ministers for foreign affairs and defence; 
3. Also hold, at least once a year, consultations at ministerial level extended to the Baltic countries, 
Bulgaria and Romania; 
4. Establish in WEU an automatic mechanism for mobilising politico-military consultation in 
order to react to serious crises in Central and Eastern Europe; 
5. Endow WEU with the permanent structures it needs to reach joint decisions in consultation and 
co-operation with NATO and, where necessary, effectively to implement ad hoc contingency plans, tai-
lored to possible theatres of operation, including those within Europe; 
6. Take all preparatory measures needed to provide WEU peace-keeping and peace-restoring forces 
at short notice if they are required for CSCE or United Nations operations on European territory and ! 
for WEU operations in the framework of agreements as mentioned in paragraph 2 of this recommen-
dation. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submined by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Little more than a year ago, the Political 
Committee adopted a report on the conse-
quences of developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe for European security. Since then, the 
wind of change has not calmed down but has 
turned rather into a tornado and even violence 
has become more routine than exception. 
2. After a failed coup in Moscow on 19th 
August 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 
December of last year, making way for inde-
pendent states which became associated in a 
commonwealth that was a pallid reflection of the 
former centralised state. Since then, however, 
many mutual rivalries between the different 
republics have prevented the CIS from becoming 
a coherent body with a consistent policy and it 
appears to be little more than a mechanism for 
controlled disintegration. Within the different 
independent republics, ethnic strife, mixed with 
religious conflicts and emerging nationalist 
movements have caused the further implosion of 
the former Soviet empire. A third of the former 
Soviet Union, or seven million square kilom-
eters, supporting 30 million people is in 
turmoi1 1• There is bloodshed in regions which 
are hardly known in Western Europe, such as in 
Ingusethia, Abkhazia and the Ferghana Valley. 
Other regions are only too well known because of 
outright war with armed units, such as in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, South. Ossetia and the 
Trans-Dniestr Republic. 
3. Yugoslavia is being tom to pieces in one 
of the most repugnant outbursts of violence that 
Europe has witnessed, powerless, on its own ter-
ritory. In spite of the efforts of the EC, the CSCE 
and the United Nations, the drama is continuing 
unabated with its succession of death, human, 
economic and social disaster. 
4. Together with the old and new nations on 
the territory of the former Warsaw Pact, NATO 
has established the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council which has already met in a constructive 
atmosphere, establishing a work plan for dia-
logue, partnership and co-operation. At the 
CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki, discus-
sions are being held to reinforce this 
organisation's conflict-prevention and peace-
keeping capability. The Maastricht Treaty is 
preparing for the European Union with a joint 
foreign and security policy of which WEU will 
be the defence component. 
5. A symposium on a new security order in 
Europe organised by the WEU Assembly 
allowed an assessment to be made of the present 
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situation. The WEU Institute for Security 
Studies kindly provided a document on security 
and defence in Central and Eastern Europe 
which focused specifically on the situation in 
Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. 
6. The present report tries to draw lessons 
from this symposium, which was held in Berlin 
from 31st March to 2nd April 1992. Opinions 
expressed at the symposium on the fundamental 
conditions for a new security order in Europe, 
security concerns and needs in Central and 
Eastern Europe and general views on the future 
security structure are summarised in the 
appendix to this report. 
II. The structures of European security 
7. In the following section, an effort is made 
to examine succinctly the specific contribution 
each of the three ·circles· of institutional activity 
can make to the progressive development of 
security in Europe. 
A. The Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (CSCE) - Opinions expressed at the 
symposium and review of the situation 
8. The CSCE covers the widest circle 
including all the nations, from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok, which have solemnly declared to 
share common values and principles. 
9. The CSCE started its work in 1973 with 
an agenda covering a wide range of issues 
including security, economic and technological 
co-operation, human rights, culture and infor-
mation. A major event in its existence was the 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 197 5, in 
which the participating states agreed to keep the 
abovementioned issues under review by means 
of periodic follow-up meetings, the last of which 
is currently being held in Helsinki from 24th 
March until 9th July. 
10. After the revolutions of 1989, a summit 
was held in Paris in November 1990 to reorient 
the CSCE's work and provide a framework for 
more intensive political consultation. The agree-
ments reached at this summit were laid down in 
the Charter of Paris. 
11. The Paris summit decided that foreign 
ministers should meet at least once a year and 
that a Committee of Senior Officials should 
support their activity. It also set up three small 
institutions to support the work of the CSCE: 
- the secretariat, based in Prague, which 
supports meetings of the foreign min-
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isters and senior officials and which at 
the same time is a repository for infor-
mation from the participating states; 
- the Conflict Prevention Centre in 
Vienna, which promotes implemen-
tation of agreed confidence- and 
security-building measures. 
- the office for free elections in Warsaw, 
which disseminates information on 
elections in participating states, and 
helps to arrange useful contacts such as 
observer missions from parliaments. 
12. Meanwhile, the CSCE has steadily 
expanded its membership. While the Helsinki 
Final Act was signed by thirty-five states, this 
number dropped to thirty-four after German 
unification and rose to thirty-eight with the 
admission of Albania and the three Baltic states 
in 1991. Russia inherited the USSR's seat and 
ten newly independent republics of the former 
Soviet Union increased the number to forty-
eight in January 1992. The admission of 
Georgia, Slovenia and Croatia on 24th March 
last brought total membership of the CSCE to 
fifty-one and the end may not yet be in sight 
with more new republics in Eastern Europe 
declaring their independence. 
13. It is a well known fact that from the 
beginning the CSCE has operated with two basic 
rules. One is that all its documents and agree-
ments represent political commitments, not 
legal obligations. The other is that it can decide 
only by consensus. 
14. Obviously, when the CSCE started in the 
1970s, there was no other way to make it work. 
Since the end of the cold war, however, these 
basic rules are increasingly experienced as 
obstacles on the way towards great efficiency in 
ensuring peace and security in Europe. 
15. As regards the consensus rule, a number 
of incursions have already been made. 
16. At the Vienna follow-up meeting, which 
was held in 1986-89, it was agreed that one state 
could enquire of another about questions 
" relating to the human dimension of the 
CSCE " , such as human rights, family reunifi-
cation, freedom of information etc. and that the 
other would respond. In addition, states could 
agree to bilateral meetings to discuss such issues 
and could inform other participating states of 
the situation, permitting subsequent discussion 
at an appropriate CSCE meeting. This became 
known as the conference on the human 
dimension (CDH or" Vienna") mechanism. 
17. This conference on the human dimension 
procedure was completed in September 1991 
when the participating states decided to allow 
independent experts to be involved. A state 
which has a relevant problem can invite these 
experts to establish facts and give advice. If 
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another state suggests that such experts be 
invited, and the suggestion is not acted upon, it 
can then initiate a mission itself with the 
support of five other states. Moreover, if a par-
ticularly serious and urgent threat to CSCE com-
mitments on human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law has arisen, a mission is established if 
ten states call for one. 
18. In 1990, a procedure was agreed 
according to which one participating state can 
ask for an explanation of unusual military activ-
ities in another state and, if necessary, call for a 
meeting of interested participating states to be 
held within 48 hours. The state on whose ter-
ritory the activity is occurring cannot block such 
action. 
19. In 1991, the participating states agreed on 
procedure for the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes. This procedure can be activated whenever 
required by all the parties. However, in some 
limited cases of disputes it can be activated by 
just one party, or another CSCE state, which 
wishes to promote a settlement. 
20. An important new procedure was decided 
when the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers 
agreed in June 1991 that meetings could be 
called at short notice to discuss matters of 
urgent concern. Such a meeting can be held if 
the state calling for it has the support of twelve 
others. At the same time, however, reference 
was made to the principles set out in the Hel-
, sinki Final Act, among which is the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of a par-
ticular state. Still, decisions can be made only by 
consensus. 
21. Finally, it should be mentioned that at 
their Prague meeting in January 1992, the CSCE 
Foreign Ministers confirmed that a single state 
cannot block CSCE decisions regarding the pro-
tection of fundamental values. 
22. In order to obviate the lack of legal obliga-
tions, France has now proposed to prepare the 
adoption of a " security treaty of the CSCE " 
which would provide a legally binding basis for 
the obligations taken in the framework of the 
CSCE. 
23. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs 
also said the negotiations should cover three 
other points, i.e. the juridical shape to be given 
to the CSCE's security undertakings, the defi-
nition of supplementary rules of conduct and 
the search for more security guarantees for all 
participating states in liaison with the CSCE's 
conflict prevention mechanisms. 
24. At the symposium, Mr. Genscher pointed 
out that at the Helsinki follow-up meeting, the 
CSCE's capacity for action, particularly 
regarding conflict prevention, crisis man-
agement and the peaceful settlement of conflicts 
must be enhanced. He ventured that the CSCE 
,j 
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must develop from a community of shared 
values to a community taking joint decisions 
and action. 
25. Germany has now proposed to establish a 
steering committee to support the CSCE chair-
manship, to be composed of the CSCE 
Chairman-in-Office, supported by his prede-
cessor and successor in office as well as three to 
four particularly interested states. This would 
provide increased scope for action in critical sit-
uations. 
26. Mr. Genscher said that the CSCE instru-
ments should be developed to cover the entire 
range from " early-warning " to " peace-
keeping " and even environmental protection. 
He repeated his proposal, made in Helsinki, that 
the CSCE should in future perceive itself as a 
" regional arrangement " within the meaning of 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. 
27. Mr. Egon Bahr noted that the CSCE was 
lacking the military instruments which it might 
need to guarantee previously agreed cease-fires or 
other agreements between conflicting parties 
brokered under its authority. He said that 
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, to 
which Mr. Genscher had referred, could not be 
read without Chapter VII, which had never been 
implemented. This chapter contained articles to 
establish a Military Staff Committee with 
regional sub-committees and obliged all United 
Nations members to make troops available to the 
Security Council. Now that the East-West con-
flict was over, Mr. Bahr hoped that the United 
Nations would set about implementing the possi-
bility of creating regional arrangements and 
agencies as mentioned in Chapter VIII with the 
provisions set out in Chapter VII. It would mean 
that Europe would have a collective system of 
security before a global system was established. It 
would also mean having a general staff for this 
system and all the member countries providing 
troops under a joint supreme command. 
28. Mr. van Eekelen argued that the CSCE 
should now be endowed with appropriate mech-
anisms for conflict prevention and resolution, 
especially with regard to minorities and border 
disputes, but also with such mechanisms for 
negotiations on arms control measures on an 
equal footing. The definition of a statute for 
minorities in the framework of the CSCE was 
one indispensable element which could form the 
basis for international reaction to stifle ethnic 
conflicts. He said that the advantage of the 
CSCE with its broad mandate as set out in the 
three baskets was that it offered two related 
assets: it could respond to non-military threats 
and it reflected the common interest of 
European security. It could play a significant 
role in the control of arms exports. 
29. The Secretary-General stressed that the 
CSCE's mission could not be entirely fulfilled 
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unless the relationship between the CSCE and 
the United Nations was defined so that it could 
be known when and how the CSCE could be 
entrusted with peace-keeping operations. NATO 
and WEU could be given specific mandates by 
the CSCE in that respect. Being the only 
structure with the political legitimacy to 
intervene across the territory of the now defunct 
Warsaw Pact, it should quickly be endowed with 
the necessary resources to perform its role. 
30. Mr. Skubiszewski agreed that the CSCE 
should be able to call on other organisations to 
take up specific tasks for and on behalf of the 
CSCE as well as in collaboration with the CSCE. 
31. Finally, Mr. van Eekelen made it clear 
that a successful extension of CSCE competence 
in the future had to go hand in hand with 
strengthening the partnership between Western 
Europe and North America. 
32. Indeed, it should be noted that in the 
framework of the Helsinki follow-up meeting, 
many constructive and positive proposals had 
been made in order to reinforce the CSCE and 
on which the Helsinki summit, to be held from 
9th to 11th July 1992, would decide. 
33. Apart from the abovementioned pro-
posals, reference should be made here to a pro-
posal by the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van 
den Broek, supported by both Mr. Genscher and 
the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kozyrev, to 
appoint a CSCE High Commissioner for Minor-
ities, who could be called in by parties in case of 
tension, with the possibility of accomplishing 
missions on the spot. The High Commissioner 
should provide early warning and early action to 
prevent conflicts. 
34. France and Germany have proposed 
establishing a Court of Arbitration in the CSCE 
framework which could play an important role 
in preventing or solving conflicts and differ-
ences. 
35. At the opening session of the Helsinki fol-
low-up meeting at the end of March 1992, 
Foreign Ministers of all the CSCE nations 
already agreed on the principle that the CSCE 
should be given a peace-keeping capability, but 
there is still no consensus on the peace-keeping 
forces which should enable it to play this role. 
Suggestions for NATO or WEU to make such 
forces available are now being examined. 
36. Of late, a new development has been set 
in motion, laying the foundations for further 
enhancement of the CSCE's role as an 
organisation which can provide stability, peace 
and security. 
37. While in the Helsinki Final Act one of the 
cornerstones and principles was the sovereignty 
of its member states and non-interference in 
internal affairs of states, this is now increasingly 
open to doubt and pertinent questions. Recent 
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events in Eastern Europe have demonstrated 
that there is tension between the sovereignty of a 
state and rights of minorities if they are not suf-
ficiently respected by that state. Indeed, this 
issue is the main cause of tension, civil war and 
violent conflicts in the whole of Eastern Europe 
and it needs close attention. 
38. At the Moscow meeting of the Conference 
on Human Dimension in September 1991, the 
Foreign Affairs Minister of the Soviet Union, 
Boris Pankin, stated that the principle of non-
interference had to be reconsidered. The same 
conference decided to establish new procedures, 
as said earlier, which can be initiated without 
consensus and even without the agreement of 
the state under challenge. It was also established 
that human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
democracy and the rule of law were an interna-
tional concern. 
The Rapporteur's conclusions 
39. The CSCE should apparently be the most 
appropriate organisation to take further steps 
for protecting minority rights. It should 
determine compatibility between the rights of 
minorities and their protection with state sover-
eignty. It should also define clearly under what 
circumstances the CSCE can intervene in the 
internal affairs of a member state in order to 
prevent disputes leading to open conflict or even 
to stop violence. 
40. A policy seeking to encourage the prin-
ciple of self-determination for all minorities 
could but contribute to a deterioration of 
already disturbed relations in many parts of 
Eastern Europe. As Mr. Egon Bahr said, there 
are two pillars to CSCE policy: the principle that 
existing national frontiers must not be changed 
and the rights of minorities and individuals. 
41. The European Community is the 
optimum example of how different nations, each 
with its own culture and minorities, can 
co-operate and exercise their sovereignty with 
others. It is therefore perfectly justified to 
encourage newly-independent nations to settle 
internal differences by peaceful means. 
42. Your Rapporteur strongly favours an 
enhanced role for the CSCE in the maintenance 
of security in Europe for a number of reasons. 
First and foremost because the CSCE covers a 
territory from Vancouver to Vladivostok and 
includes virtually all the nations concerned, also 
the traditionally neutral Western European 
nations. 
43. Next, because it is essential for the CSCE 
to retain its original political feature that it has 
managed to assert in spite of political or ideo-
logical disputes among its members. The fact 
that these disputes have disappeared in no way 
means the CSCE, drifting towards demagogy 
stemming from the new geopolitical situation, is 
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becoming a European gadget whose worthwhile 
spin-off still has to be demonstrated. As for the 
NACC, it has to be ascertained that the risks of 
overlapping with the CSCE do not call into 
question its proclaimed usefulness. 
44. Third, because intervention by the CSCE 
based on its legitimate authority can strengthen 
the chances of success of any measures designed 
to avoid or settle conflicts. 
45. It was in this spirit that several speakers at 
the symposium said a number of procedures in 
the CSCE would have to be tightened in order to 
enhance its ability to prevent conflicts, manage 
crises and settle conflicts peacefully, but there 
seems to be wide agreement to do this. The Hel-
sinki follow-up meeting is bound to provide pos-
itive results in this area. 
B. NATO and the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council 
46. At the symposium, relatively little 
attention was paid to NATO and the North 
Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC). Do 
speakers as a matter of courtesy adapt their 
addresses to please the host organisation? 
Whatever may have been the case, there is 
reason to examine the role of NATO and NACC 
in the framework of Europe's security because 
they have an important role to play. 
4 7. In the absence of convincing answers, it 
would not seem essential for the Council to 
grant the NACC any more than a limited role in 
the framework of responsibilities outside the 
NATO area. 
48. The " arms of peace " acquired by Euro-
peans have been completed, as already stated, by 
the NA TO-instigated NACC. What will be the 
usefulness of this new organisation, how will it 
be geared into the present institutional system, 
what sharing of or increase in responsibilities 
will ensue and, finally, last but not least, what 
guarantee will it possibly be able to give of 
active eo-responsibility on the part of the United 
States? These questions spring to mind and were 
raised by some of the participants in the sym-
posium. 
49. The declaration on peace and co-
operation issued at NATO's summit in Rome in 
November 1991 sealed a process in NATO to 
transform the military alliance into a more 
political organisation, adapting it to the changed 
geostrategic situation. One important decision 
was the proposal to establish a North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council in order to develop a 
more institutional relationship of consultation 
and co-operation -On political and security issues 
with Central and Eastern European nations. 
50. Initially, NACC's most important role as 
seen by NATO's member states was to discuss 
with all the nations concerned the control of the 
former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and to 
support the process of ratification and imple-
mentation of the CFE Treaty. To this last 
purpose, a working group composed of NA TO's 
high level task force and representatives of the 
former Warsaw Pact countries was established. 
At the same time it was thought that NACC 
could give the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe a sense of improved security through 
dialogue with the Atlantic Alliance. 
51. This new body met for the first time in 
Brussels in December 1991 at the level of min-
isters for foreign affairs. In an official sta-
tement after their meeting, the ministers said 
that it was their " common objective to con-
tribute to the enhancement of European security 
by promoting stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe. " They also confirmed that " security is 
indivisible and the security of each of our coun-
tries is inextricably linked to that of all states 
participating in the CSCE." 
52. The NACC agreed on a framework of 
co-operation and consultation, including annual 
ministerial meetings, bimonthly meetings 
among ambassadors, and other meetings when 
these are warranted. The NACC also agreed to 
focus on security and related defence planning, 
conceptual approaches to arms control, demo-
cratic concepts of civilian-military relations, 
civil-military co-ordination of air traffic man-
agement and the conversion of defence pro-
duction to civilian purposes. 
53. An extraordinary meeting ofthe NACC at 
Foreign Ministers level was held on lOth March 
1992 in order to include newly independent 
republics of the former Soviet Union among its 
participants, bringing the total number of 
members of NACC to 35. The ministers agreed 
to a comprehensive work plan for dialogue, part-
nership and co-operation, including an ambi-
tious list of topics and an indicative list of activ-
ities. 
54. As regards the CFE Treaty, the NACC 
ministers issued the following statement 
reflecting their genuine and justified concern for 
this important issue: 
"4. We are committed to early entry into 
force without renegotiation and full 
implementation as soon as possible of the 
CFE Treaty and fully endorse the efforts 
underway in the informal High Level 
Working Group to this end. We believe 
that the CFE Treaty will be an important 
milestone in the enhancement of stability 
and improvement of security in Europe 
and that, therefore, it will open the way to 
future arms control within the CSCE and 
to co-operative security in Europe. Min-
isters concerned expect to see the treaty in 
force by the time of the Helsinki summit 
in July. An important step towards 
201 
DOCUMENT 1309 
achieving this result will be an extraor-
dinary conference, to be held in con-
nection with the next NACC meeting in 
Oslo, among all parties, providing the 
basis for the entry into force. 
5. In the interest of further strengthening 
security and stability in Europe, we also 
support the determination of the partici-
pants in the CFE la negotiations to reach, 
in connection with the entry into force of 
the CFE Treaty, an agreement to limit the 
personnel strength of their conventional 
armed forces in time for the Helsinki 
summit at the end of the CSCE 
meeting." 
55. The ministers called on the Foreign Min-
ister of Czechoslovakia, Jiri Dienstbier, holding 
the rotating presidency of the CSCE, to hold 
talks with his counterparts from Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to try to mediate the dispute over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. 
56. On 1st April 1992, a first meeting was 
held of the NATO Defence Ministers with their 
NACC counterparts from Central and Eastern 
Europe. France, which is not a member of 
NATO's Defence Planning Committee, did not 
participate in this meeting. At that meeting, the 
United States Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney, 
made a number of proposals which went even 
beyond the ambitious first co-operation pro-
gramme agreed upon at the 1Oth March minis-
terial meeting of NACC. 
57. At the symposium, Mr. Robert Hunter 
did not expect any security guarantees to be pro-
vided by NATO through enlargement of mem-
bership in the foreseeable future for the fol-
lowing reasons: 
- it would be difficult to gain political 
support in Western Europe for 
enlarging NATO because there is little 
likelihood of aggression from the 
former Soviet Union; 
- most of the NATO allies do not want to 
risk weakening the strength of the co-
operation they have developed or 
NA TO's capacity to take decisions by 
taking in new members; 
- some West Europeans believe that 
adding new members to NATO without 
including republics from the former 
Soviet Union could create tensions with 
these republics that do not now exist; 
- the people of the United States are not 
prepared to accept the enlargement of 
NATO, especially at a time when there 
seems to be little or no military threat. 
58. Altogether it may be concluded that there 
are more political risks than advantages in 
trying to enlarge NATO at a time when there is 
no compelling security need to do so. 
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59. Mr. Hunter, admitting that the desire of 
Central and Eastern European nations to join 
NATO would be difficult to deal with, argued 
that there would be a solution for these nations' 
problem if their motives were understood. He 
argued that there was more than just their 
concern about security and that their primary 
concern was to be part of the western family of 
nations and people. They wished to share pol-
itics and the culture of ideas. This could be done 
by bringing them formally into NATO, but he 
thought that the Central and Eastern European 
countries could be more firmly and more clearly 
brought into the West by making them members 
of the European Community. This would also 
mean bringing them into WEU while at the 
same time developing WEU into a much more 
mature and robust institution. 
60. Mr. van Eekelen pointed out that for the 
time being, NACC provided Central and 
Eastern European nations an association with an 
organisation offering a security and collective 
defence guarantee. He added that NACC was 
the appropriate body for mitigating the effects of 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, particularly in 
arms control. NACC was also providing val-
uable assistance in transforming the defence 
establishment and making it compatible with 
democratic society. He continued, however, that 
the existence of NACC should not dilute the 
security commitment, for it was precisely that 
aspect that Central and Eastern European coun-
tries wished to see maintained. Nor should it 
weaken the relationship between the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and North 
America. NACC's main role was to complement 
the CSCE process in creating a zone of stability 
from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
61. Your Rapporteur agrees that the NACC 
can play a very useful role in maintaining a con-
tinuous dialogue between its participants on a 
number of issues as mentioned in the work plan 
_adopted by the foreign ministers. It can certainly 
offer NATO's experience and expertise to all 
partners as they face the difficult task of 
reorganising their defence efforts along demo-
cratic lines. It should take great care not to 
duplicate the work already being done in the 
CSCE. 
62. There are, however, two questions where 
NATO cannot provide a positive answer to 
Central and Eastern European nations: mem-
bership of NATO and firm security guar-
antees. 
63. The American attitude as regards security 
guarantees was clearly expressed by the United 
States Secretary of State, James A. Baker, when 
on 28th April, he declared that the United States 
was not willing to extend a formal security guar-
antee to Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the event of 
a nuclear crisis. Asked whether the United 
States would promise to defend these republics 
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with military force, he replied: " No ". He said 
that the United States would bring the issue to 
the United Nations Security Council if Ukraine 
or Kazakhstan was ever threatened with a 
nuclear attack after they relinquished their 
nuclear weapons. 
64. Another indication of American reluc-
tance to be involved in European conflicts is the 
recent United States refusal to support a pro-
posed new peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
65. The NACC itself, in its statement of 20th 
December 1991, provided the key to its concept 
of pan-European security by saying: " As stated 
in the joint declaration of Paris, security is indi-
visible and the security of each of our countries 
is inextricably linked to that of all states partici-
pating in the CSCE. " 
66. Your Rapporteur takes the view that at 
this stage the CSCE is the only really pan-
European organisation able to provide an insti-
tutional framework for security for the entire 
territory from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
67. It should not be forgotten that partici-
pation in the NACC is limited to member states 
of NATO and to those nations situated within 
the territory of the former Warsaw Pact. Of 51 
CSCE member states, 15 do not participate in 
NACC, and there is little chance or need for 
these nations to seek such participation. 
68. Finally, it should be repeated here that for 
more than forty years NATO has played an 
indispensable and primordial role in providing 
peace and security for the territory of all the 
member states. Even if the main threat that was 
the reason for its creation has disappeared, there 
are still too many residual risks for the transat-
lantic allies not to continue their long-standing 
partnership in NATO. The Rome declaration on 
peace and co-operation is a perfect guide for 
transatlantic partnership in the years to come 
and every single paragraph is once again fully 
endorsed here. 
69. In this, your Rapporteur is in full 
agreement with Mr. van Eekelen when, at the 
symposium, he said: 
" Any temptation to dilute the Euro-
Atlantic relationship must be desisted. 
One of the legacies of the welcome revo-
lution of 1989 is the unknown, the uncer-
tainty and unpredictability of develop-
ments. With an American presence, 
Europe will be more stable and secure 
than without it. Western Europe and 
America must stay together and rely on 
their community of values and purpose, 
their joint success in facing both the man-
ifest challenges of today and the 
unforeseen challenges of tomorrow. The 
stronger our ties remain in the West, the 
more effective our common Ostpolitik 
will be and the more realistic our 
ambition to create a pan-European 
security architecture. " 
C. The Western European circle - Opinions 
expressed at the symposium and review of the 
situation 
70. The Western European circle consists of 
the European Council, European Communities, 
European Political Co-operation and Western 
European Union which, according to the deci-
sions taken at the Maastricht summit in 
December 1991, are all part of the process 
leading to the European Union now being 
developed. Apart from further developing eco-
nomic integration, which will now be completed 
with the establishment of a monetary union, the 
Treaty on European Union has also established 
a common foreign and security policy with pro-
visions for a common defence policy, making 
WEU an integral part of the development of the 
union, responsible " to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the union which have 
defence implications. " 
71. Article J4, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on 
European Union reads as follows: "The 
common foreign and security policy shall 
include all questions related to the security of 
the union, including the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence ". 
72. For a detailed discussion of WEU after 
Maastricht and its relations with the European 
Union and NATO, reference is made here to the 
report "WEU after Maastricht ", submitted by 
Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Com-
mittee. 
73. Suffice it here to say that the European 
Union represents the most complete and closely 
knit framework for co-operation between states 
and it is gradually extending its influence and 
control to almost all areas of administrative 
concern in a modem state. 
74. There can be no doubt that the Western 
European circle is the pre-eminent pole of sta-
bility, prosperity and democracy in Europe. For 
most, if not all Central and Eastern European 
countries, it is a shining example, also because it 
combines a market economy with sufficient 
state controls and social legislation to blunt the 
sharp edges of unlimited economic liberalism. 
The fact is that the decisions to develop a 
common foreign and security policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence makes 
the European Union the ideal framework to 
satisfy virtually all the needs felt by the Central 
and Eastern European nations. 
75. There can be little surprise therefore that 
many of these nations have made it clear that 
they wish to conclude association agreements 
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with the EC in the foreseeable future, with a 
view to being admitted as full members of the 
European Union if the conditions are met. 
76. At the symposium, Mr. Zdenko Pirek, 
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, left no 
doubt that the EC had a key role to play. He said 
that the EC, being a pole of attraction for all new 
European democracies, must lay down the 
norms of democracy and economic openness 
which no Central or Eastern European nation 
could afford to ignore. 
77. Mr. Pirek indicated that in the past, the 
EC had admitted Greece, Portugal and Spain 
as members, notwithstanding the high cost, 
because it was considered necessary to consol-
idate democracy in these countries. Something 
similar should be done now for specific coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe without nec-
essarily providing immediate admission to the 
EC. He warned that the establishment of a 
European Union with relative economic sta-
bility and peace could not be accomplished if at 
the same time the rest of Europe was prey to 
instability or even serious disturbances. 
78. Mr. Pirek recognised that, in view of the 
great differences in economic levels, the EC 
would not be able to admit all the other countries 
of Europe within the foreseeable future. Pre-
mature admission would not be in the interest of 
these countries and it would be harmful for the 
EC both institutionally and structurally. In order 
to be able to cope with its all-European responsi-
bility it must be developed and strengthened 
internally. On the other hand, it should not at the 
same time relegate its European neighbours 
behind an invisible welfare wall but on the con-
trary should integrate them into the European 
whole through cO-operation in the economic, 
political, monetary, scientific, cultural, environ-
mental, transport and security fields. 
79. As regards the European Community, Mr. 
Genscher pointed out that growing integration 
towards a European Union must go hand in 
hand with further extension. There was no 
longer room for any separate development in 
Europe. He therefore called for: 
- immediate consideration of the Aus-
trian, Swedish and Finnish applications 
for admission; 
- the conclusion of association agree-
ments with Bulgaria, Romania, the 
Baltic states and all states which emerge 
from the former Yugoslavia, along the 
lines of those with the Central 
European states, in principle including 
the possibility of subsequent mem-
bership of the European Community; 
- the development of a new instrument 
for shaping the relations of the Euro-
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pean Community with the CIS states. 
Such agreements must go beyond the 
customary trade and co-operation 
agreements and include political dia-
logue. They should also envisage close 
co-operation in ~he energy, transport 
and communications sectors. In the 
medium and long term, co-operation 
with these states would also benefit the 
Community. It was indispensable for 
European stability. 
80. As mentioned earlier in the present 
report, Mr. Robert Hunter, Vice-President of 
the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington, believed that the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe could be 
firmly and clearly brought into the West by 
making them members of the European Com-
munity. Indeed, when that happened, he 
thought they would be less concerned to become 
full members of NATO. This also meant 
bringing new EC members, including Central 
and Eastern European states, into Western 
European Union- the security partner of the EC 
- while also developing WEU into a much more 
mature and robust institution. 
81. Mr. Skubiszewski argued that because of 
the complexity of the problems involved, the 
Central European countries associated with the 
EC wished to co-operate closely with WEU at 
the earliest possible stage. One possible step 
would be to grant them - if they so wished - a 
special status with WEU, which could be the 
status of observer or associate member as men-
tioned in the Maastricht declaration of the nine 
WEU member states. This would be in complete 
accordance with the preamble of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, where the contracting parties 
state their resolve "to associate progressively in 
the pursuance of these aims other states inspired 
by the same ideals and animated by the like 
determination ". 
matic relations should be established while the 
existing parliamentary links with the WEU 
Assembly should be developed further. 
83. Mr. Genscher said that in the wake of the 
radical political changes taking place in Central 
and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet 
Union, WEU had now also made contact with 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria and the Baltic states. Regular contacts 
had been established between the ambassadors 
of these countries in London and the WEU 
Secretariat-General. He added that the German 
presidency intended to develop these 
approaches further at an extraordinary Council 
meeting before this summer with the partici-
pation of the Central and Eastern European 
states. Under the German presidency, immedi-
ately after Maastricht, WEU had started prepa-
rations for the implementation of the decisions 
taken there. The partners were agreed that these 
must be advanced as quickly as possible inde-
pendently of the ratification of the treaty on 
European Union. 
84. Mr. van Eekelen pointed out that in a 
potentially volatile context, WEU had to show 
that it was aware of the security concerns of its 
new Central and Eastern European partners. 
Dialogue was no longer enough; WEU should be 
ready to go further, pondering on the political 
feasibility and desirability of a special rela-
tionship with those countries. He also made it 
clear that the European Union in the making 
would not be a closed shop. Managing its 
enlargement would be a major concern for its 
member states during the 1990s. All applicants 
would have to accept in full the Maastricht 
" acquis " , including the prospect of a common 
defence. The association agreements with the 
Visegrad countries were a move in this 
direction. 
85. The Secretary-General further said that 
for the time being, WEU seemed to have 
82. The Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Joo, reached the outer limits of its circle of relations 
made it clear that indeed the three Central with the countries of Central and Eastern 
European countries intended to draw closer to Europe. Geographical extension would not be 
WEU, first through observer status, and later as consonent with WEU's European perspective 
associate members, which eventually might and at the same time would duplicate what 
meet WEU's endeavours to widen its mem- NACC had set out to achieve. WEU member 
bership. A regular dialogue and co-operation countries intended to develop further their mul-
with WEU was needed on crisis prevention and tilateral consultation and co-operation, building 
resolution, arms control and proliferation, while on the fact-finding missions and regular 
co-ordinating with WEU the implementation of exchanges of information now taking place 
the CFE Treaty, possibly with special emphasis through the presidency. WEU could provide a 
on verification and monitoring activities. Mr. function in parallel to the political dialogue 
Joo proposed the regular participation of planned under association agreements with the 
Central and Eastern European representatives European Community, which were of a new 
and experts in the working groups and other kind and contained a political charter. This 
parts of WEU in order to promote the principle could be done in the framework of more specific 
of civilian oversight of the armed forces and to bilateral "special relationships". The next sub-
strengthen military professionalism in the stantive step would be a joint meeting with 
region. In order to contribute to genuine part- foreign and defence ministers. Joint seminars 
nership and bring full integration closer, diplo- under the auspices <;>f the WEU Institute for 
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Security Studies, as well as meetings of experts, 
were becoming a regular feature of the new 
links. 
86. It was crucial not to disappoint the 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe, but to 
invite them to join us in defining a new common 
approach to the solution of all their security-
related problems. 
The Rapporteur's conclusions 
87. In your Rapporteur's opinion, the Euro-
pean Union, offering gradual association with 
and membership of Central and Eastern 
European nations is the most valuable asset for 
future peace and security in Europe. It has 
unique features which no other international 
organisation can offer. The combination of an 
integrated internal market, common economic 
interests and a common foreign and security 
policy with a defence component guarantee the 
protection of common values and of virtual 
common interests in accordance with a common 
European political agenda which will increasingly 
be homogeneous. Of course, extension of the 
structures now being developed to become the 
European Union should not be accomplished if 
the consequence is to weaken and dilute them in 
an entity that would not be homogeneous enough 
to agree on a common cause. 
88. Western Europe should therefore proceed 
cautiously and progressively, taking fully into 
account the will shown by new partners to play a 
full part in the work we have undertaken. 
89. Nations that are aspiring to become part 
of the Western European family of democratic 
nations should take into account that apart from 
meeting a number of economic conditions, they 
will also have to agree upon conditions which 
are considered essential in a community of 
civilised and stable democratic nations. 
90. In the first place, they will have to accept . 
the political map of Europe as it now is and with 
all the injustices it includes. On the other hand, 
they must accept the existence of minorities on 
their territory and guarantee their rights, 
including cultural rights, so that this political 
geography may be tolerable to all. 
91. Secondly, they will have to adapt their 
legitimate national interests to the common 
requirements of peace and co-operation in 
Europe. 
92. Thirdly, they will also have to agree the 
exercise of their sovereignty in other fields. 
93. Finally, what conclusions should it draw 
from the abovementioned for its policy 
regarding Central and Eastern European coun-
tries? In view of the close relationship created by 
the Treaty on European Union between WEU 
and the European Community, a member 
country of the union can no longer be neutral. 
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94. In practical terms, your Rapporteur takes 
the view that enlargement of the EC should go 
hand in hand with enlargement of WEU. In the 
same way, association agreements with 
European countries concluded by the EC should 
be completed by similar agreements between 
those countries and WEU. Here, it can only be 
deplored that, as a result of horse-trading at the 
Maastricht summit, associate status has been 
reserved for non-WEU European states which 
are members of NATO, thus opening the door 
for confusion from the outset. This being so, 
your Rapporteur prefers to speak of association 
with WEU, wording already used in Recommen-
dation 500. This association should first be 
established with the three Visegrad countries: 
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. It should include 
co-operation with WEU at all possible levels, 
similar to the associate status offered to 
European NATO member states shortly to be 
defined and it should be formalised by the end 
of 1992 at the latest. The next step would be to 
follow the same procedure as regards the three 
Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania as soon as 
the EC has concluded association agreements 
with these countries. 
95. In the meantime, both the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies and the WEU Assembly will 
have to play their role as bridges towards the 
establishment of formal special relationships 
with these nations, along the lines of activities 
which are by now familiar to all of them. 
96. Ultimately, this process will logically have 
to lead to full membership of the European 
Union, including both EC and WEU, with the 
far-reaching and binding security guarantees for-
mulated in the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Ill. Conclusion 
97. It has been rightly pointed out that the 
end of the cold war also heralded the end of the 
era of hegemonic defence systems and the 
beginning of a new one with decentralisation 
and complementarity. 
98. Russia, subject to strong centrifugal forces 
and in the middle of a long and painful process 
of economic reform, can no longer be the pivot 
of a security system and is, rather, a source of 
instability. The United States is confronted with 
relative decline and can less easily act without 
international diplomacy and co-operative 
action. 
99. In agreement with its transatlantic allies, 
the time has come for Europe to assume greater 
responsibility for its own defence and security. 
Mter so many years of voluntary - and for 
Central and Eastern European nations invol-
untary - political and military protection and 
tutelage in world affairs, it will not be easy to 
take this full responsibility, especially in the 
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current era of turmoil and revolutionary change. 
Europe as a whole will have to develop its new 
security through a learning process, but it can 
rely upon loyal friends and it does not have to 
start from scratch. There is a number of 
organisations providing a more or less structural 
framework in which to operate. The fact that 
there is overlapping and redundancy - more 
benevolently called complementarity - between 
the different organisations should be seen rather 
as an advantage. If it does not enhance effi-
ciency, it may contribute to effectiveness 
because there are more strings to the bow. 
100. For the near future, neither NATO nor 
WEU can offer full membership to any of the 
Central and Eastern European nations. They 
realise this and they have shown their compre-
hension. 
101. In the foreseeable future, three mutually 
reinforcing circles will have to provide a 
framework for security for the whole of Europe 
by marshalling their efforts: first, the CSCE, 
reinforced with an enhanced capability for con-
flict prevention, crisis management and peaceful 
settlement of conflicts; second, the NACC, 
offering NATO's experience and expertise to all 
partners in their task to reorganise their defence 
efforts along democratic lines with NATO pro-
viding the classical protection of the area 
covered by the Washington Treaty; third, WEU 
with possible support from other allies in pro-
viding military forces to support CSCE activities 
in conflict prevention, peace-keeping and pos-
sibly even peace-enforcing in Central and 
Eastern Europe, at the same time providing a 
special relationship for those nations in Central 
and Eastern Europe which are on their way to 
full membership of the European Union through 
association agreements with the EC. 
102. It is well known that the issue of security 
guarantees is pivotal for a number of Central 
and Eastern European countries. Here, WEU, 
l. Moscow News, No. 14, 1992. 
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especially because of its position as the defence 
component of the European Union, will have to 
accommodate at least the most urgent concerns. 
In the framework of the association with WEU 
of certain Central and Eastern European coun-
tries, WEU should conclude a peace-keeping 
agreement with those countries having con-
cluded an association agreement with the EC. 
This peace-keeping agreement should contain 
provisions for regular and urgent consultations 
at the level of senior officials and the Council of 
Ministers on all questions relating to the internal 
security of the WEU non-member states which 
have signed the agreement. It should also 
contain provisions to legitimate operations of 
WEU peace-keeping forces, always in co-
operation with national forces of the non-
member country which has asked for assistance 
in order to prevent an internal conflict or 
maintain internal peace. At the same time, 
WEU should take all preparatory measures 
needed to provide WEU peace-keeping forces at 
short notice. 
103. Security guarantees, as mentioned in 
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, can be 
provided only in the more distant future and in 
a closely knit, all-embracing framework of 
common values and interests. This framework 
must embrace not only the protection of 
common values, presupposing a high degree of 
homogeneousness in opinions on politics, demo-
cracy and the role of the state in society and 
social-economic life, but also the protection of 
common vital interests, based on the notion of 
common economic and geopolitical interests. 
104. Only membership of the European Union 
can offer this combination of shared values, 
integrated markets, common economic interests 
and a common foreign and security policy 
leading eventually to the organisation of 
European defence. Although Europeans know 
that it will take years to build this framework, 
they are determined to accomplish it. 
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Opinions expressed at the symposium 
I. Basic presumptions 
for a new security order in Europe 
1. At the symposium, Sir Geoffrey Howe 
pointed out that during the cold war, Western 
European nations did not meet the single 
existing threat primarily by their own efforts, 
but by the power and resources of a superpower 
protector, the United States. The most relevant, 
he continued, was that the peculiar conjunction 
of circumstances (American economic predomi-
nance, superpower rivalry, nuclear deterrent 
theory and the ideological division of Europe), 
which had effectively frozen the post-war status 
quo of Europe between 1945 and 1991, had now 
disappeared entirely. The" normality" to which 
Europe was now returning was one in which 
Western Europe could and would obviously 
wish to reassume greater responsibility for its 
own security. 
2. The example of the European Com-
munity, to which Central and Eastern European 
nations looked with ambition, had been suc-
cessful in taming nationalism without sup-
pressing patriotism, in sharing sovereignty 
without destroying the nation and in setting the 
market to work for a stable, democratic 
society. 
3. Referring to his own experience with 
events in the former Soviet Union, Sir Geoffrey 
Howe ventured that the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, far from being an agency for 
the effective survival of key structures of the 
Soviet Union was proving to be a mechanism 
for its controlled disintegration. 
4. He discerned six conditions for peace, 
which could be summarised as follows: 
(i) Continuing transatlantic partnership. 
Even if the shape and size of the 
United States commitment to Europe 
change, interest in each other's 
security will remain joint and 
mutual. 
(ii) Europeans must do more for their 
own defence and take more responsi-
bility for their own destiny. This 
means that a significant defence 
spending must be maintained, 
including the defence structure and 
the industrial and military base. 
(iii) The right synthesis must be forged 
between the European and Atlantic 
dimensions of Europe's defence. The 
decisions taken at the Rome and 
Maastricht summits have made clear 
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that WEU will be the vehicle for 
strengthening European defence. It 
will maintain the strategic unity of 
the alliance by welcoming all 
European allies as full or associate 
members, and develop a genuine 
operational role compatible with that 
of NATO. 
(iv) A coherent system must be estab-
lished very soon which will offer to 
the new democracies of Eastern and 
Central Europe the prospect of 
" greater security from the far from 
illusory dangers of external inter-
vention by force in their territory ". 
(v) A truly effective mechanism must be 
developed for preventing, resolving 
and managing disputes short of war. 
NATO and WEU could well provide 
the necessary effective peace-making 
and peace-keeping capacity. 
(vi) Means must be found to ensure that 
the benefits of Western European 
prosperity and democracy are shared 
throughout the continent: material 
help, market access and economic 
help, association with, followed by 
membership of the EC, and for some 
maybe membership of NATO. There 
should also be teams of experts who 
could energise, instruct and enhance 
the administrative structure of 
recipient governments. 
5. Later, Mr. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, enumerated 
certain realities which should be borne in mind 
when thinking about European security: 
- The breakdown of bipolarism, which 
did not mean that benevolent domi-
nation by one power was an established 
fact. Without further elaborating the 
issue, he added that in his view, " we do 
face, under the circumstances, a debate 
on world leadership. " 
- After the cold war, contemporary 
security relations in Europe were like 
concentric circles progressing from the 
stable nucleus of the EC, WEU and 
NATO countries to the most unstable 
peripheries, a situation which was to 
last beyond the year 2000. 
- Security was increasingly built through 
co-operation and less through domi-
nance, deterrence or military force. 
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- European security could be built only 
on a system of shared values as 
expressed in the preamble to the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty:" democracy, per-
sonal freedom and political liberty, the 
constitutional traditions and the rule of 
law." 
- Through their increased and deepened 
co-operation states are interdependent, 
also for their security. 
6. Mr. Robert Hunter, Vice-President of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
Washington, pointed out that the most 
important steps to be taken to promote security 
in Central and Eastern Europe are: 
- to develop democratic pluralistic soci-
eties and governments; 
- to create successful economies based on 
market principles; 
- to contain and resolve ethnic, national 
and religious disputes and conflicts. 
7. In fact, all other speakers at the sym-
posium agreed that these were the main objec-
tives for peace and security which had to be 
ensured in Europe. 
8. Mr. Egon Bahr, Director of the Peace 
Research Institute of the University of 
Hamburg, said it was essential for Russia to be 
part of a European security system because he 
wanted the whole of its territory to remain 
under control. A Russia beyond the Urals that 
was under no obligation to limit its armed forces 
and armaments was unacceptable. If Russia 
were to remain free to have as many armed 
forces as it liked, there would be no preventing 
Ukraine and Belorus from doing the same, 
setting off a chain reaction in their neighbour 
countries. 
11. The security concerns 
and needs in Central and Eastern Europe 
9. In order to obtain a more detailed picture 
of security concerns and needs in Central and 
Eastern Europe, various speakers were asked to 
give their views on these issues with specific 
regard to their own region. These views are 
summarised in the following paragraphs. 
A. Security concerns of the Baltic states, Lith-
uania, Latvia and Estonia 
10. Mr. Audrius Butkevicius, Minister of 
Defence of Lithuania, argued that there are four 
main threats to the security of the Baltic 
states: 
- instability on the territory of inde-
pendent republics now belonging to the 
CIS which is already leading to terri-
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torial and ethnic conflicts and may in 
the future lead to disregard or violation 
of the sovereignty of the Baltic states; 
- the presence of former Soviet troops on 
the territory of the Baltic states; 
- the unstable economic situation, 
causing an unprecedented growth in 
crime rate, unemployment and possibly 
also resulting in mass migration to 
Western Europe with the Baltic states 
unobligingly fulfilling a role as transit 
states; 
- ecological disaster, more specifically 
connected with safety risks of nuclear 
power stations, built by the former 
Soviet Union. 
11. It is quite clear that the continuing 
presence of former Soviet troops on their ter-
ritory is a predominant problem for the Baltic 
states. They consider these troops to be an 
uncontrollable and an independent political 
force. Moreover, they argue that the former 
Soviet troops are a source of environmental pol-
lution, illegal arms and explosives sales and 
social problems, while they are overburdening 
the economic communications and energy infra-
structure. Mention is made of many other activ-
ities of these troops which are considered to be 
flagrant violations of the Baltic states' sover-
eignty. Negotiations between the Russian 
republic and the Baltic states on a possibly quick 
withdrawal of all former Soviet troops have 
started, but they have not yet yielded any final 
results. 
B. Security concerns of South Eastern Europe 
12. In the opinion of Mr. Adrian Nastase, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, no dis-
tinction should be made between the different 
sub-regions in Europe as regards their security 
needs. He insisted on a global approach of 
Eastern Central Europe's security problems. He 
clearly denounced implicit projects in some new 
European sub-regions to reach separate military 
agreements not only because they would run 
counter to the new spirit of dialogue, part-
nership and co-operation in Europe but also 
because their limited membership would not 
enhance the security of their initiators but rather 
induce legitimate concern among their neigh-
bours, erode transparency and favour suspicion. 
Arguing that the emergence of a new no-man's 
land in Central Europe should be prevented at 
any price, he suggested that the nations in that 
region should be related to the European Com-
munity as soon as possible and be given high 
priority in any aid programme. 
13. Instability in the former Soviet republics 
was a particular security risk and Mr. Nastase 
mentioned the situation in Moldova, where the 
state of emergency had been declared and 
t 
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fighting had broken out following the procla-
mation of a Trans Dniestr republic by the 
Russian and Ukrainian minority, living mainly 
on the left bank of the Dniestr. He hoped that a 
solution could be found through a mechanism of 
political consultation established by the Min-
isters for Foreign Affairs of Moldova, the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine and Romania, but 
at the time of writing this report, no progress has 
yet been made in finding a solution. He warned 
that it would be a great error to conceive the 
Balkans, traditionally called the powder keg of 
Europe, as being a problematic periphery that 
should be isolated from the rest of Europe. 
Europe cannot be safeguarded from the multiple 
and contradictory pressures in the Balkan area 
by endeavouring to " detach " it from the con-
tinent where it belongs. On the contrary, an 
unreluctant investment in the security of the 
Balkans with its increased geostrategic signifi-
cance as a bridge between two different worlds 
was a sine qua non for the new European 
security order. 
14. The establishment of the " Black sea eco-
nomic co-operation area " was an important 
step in the· direction of positive co-operative 
behaviour which eventually could lead to a 
" chain of stability " in the Balkans. Mr. Nastase 
thought that the time was ripe for the Balkan 
countries to start building, before the end of this 
century, an institutional framework called 
"Balkan Forum" to promote co-operation 
based on CSCE principles which, with strong 
support from the existing European and Euro-
Atlantic institutions, could help to bring all the 
nations in that area into the democratic 
European family. 
C. The security problems of Central Europe 
15. The Hungarian Under-Secretary of State 
for Defence, Mr. Rudolf Joo, noted with satis-
faction that the contacts being established in the 
military and diplomatic fields all over Europe 
might help to lay the foundations of a new 
co-operative security system. He argued that 
Central Europe was a separate geographical cul-
tural entity to be mentioned separately. The 
notion of security itself had become more differ-
entiated, comprising ever more non-military 
aspects. 
16. Among others, he stressed that most of 
the new security risks resulted from the disinte-
gration of the two multi-national states, the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and from the 
multiplication of ethnic conflicts throughout the 
region. Movements of national self-determi-
nation had entered a new stage of development 
with an unexpected impetus, which was being 
experienced most directly in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The emergence of new states 
and the redefinition of existing states 
emphasised the importance of ethnic minority 
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problems in the region. Violent ethnic clashes 
showed that respect for human and minority 
rights was an integral part of international col-
lective security and that the international com-
munity should play a greater role in dealing with 
local ethnic conflicts. 
17. The civil war in Yugoslavia had led to 
continuous violations of Hungary's airspace and 
borders and the arrival of a large number of ref-
ugees - all serious threats to the country's 
security. Refugees from Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe, but also from third world coun-
tries constituted a challenge to Central European 
countries' untested immigration policy and their 
fragile economic and social balance. The danger 
of ecological catastrophes through nuclear power 
plants and other industrial establishments with 
inappropriate safety standards presented new 
kinds of security risks in the region. In the 
former Soviet Union, disputes between some 
successor states about the exact borderlines and 
the division of the common military inheritance 
bore the seeds of serious future conflicts. It was 
of key importance for the emerging new states 
to commit themselves to the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and the treaty on conven-
tional forces in Europe (CFE), which should 
come into force as soon as possible. 
18. Mr. Joo emphasised that regional 
co-operation between the Czech and Slovak 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, the three 
Central European Visegrad countries, was based 
on extensive historical and present-day similar-
ities. In particular, they shared a geostrategic 
position between a stable and an unstable 
Europe, they had transformed their political and 
economic system in similar ways, and they had 
similar problems in facing new security risks 
and giving their armies a reasonable defence 
capability. The Under-Secretary also 
emphasised that the Visegrad co-operation was 
not directed against any other state and did not 
aim at forming a closed bloc. On the contrary, 
the three countries were interested in gradual 
integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic 
community and in the creation of a compre-
hensive security system on the continent. 
19. In more general terms, the threats to 
European security as formulated by both the 
Polish Foreign Minister, Mr. Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski and the Secretary-General of 
WEU, Mr. Willem van Eekelen, can best be 
summarised as follows: 
- the resurgence of the tendency to slow 
down the nation-building processes on 
the peripheries of Europe by the tradi-
tional techniques of military superiority 
and intimidation; 
- a revival of ethnic, territorial, natio-
nalist and other conflicts fraught with 
powerful feelings of enmity; 
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- unstable power structures and deeply-
entrenched economic crises resulting 
from the transformation of political 
systems in the new democratic states; 
- the danger of ecological disaster 
brought about by unresolved environ-
mental issues; 
- the dangers of uncontrollable migration 
resulting from one or more of those sit-
uations; 
- the threat of nuclear proliferation. 
20. The Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, 
immediately added to this that the nuclear chal-
lenge in all its aspects deserved to be high on the 
agenda. He ventured that it was in the interest of 
all Europeans to: 
- secure the withdrawal, storage and des-
truction of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, 
- eliminate the risk of proliferation both 
inside and outside the CIS; 
- thoroughly reassess the requirements of 
nuclear deterrence on the European 
continent. 
21. Speaking on the economic aspects of 
European security, Mr. Zdenko Pirek, Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic, expressed appreciation 
for the aid provided by western nations, not 
only in the framework of an association 
agreement with the EC, but also in that of the 
G-24, IMF and EBRD. He thought, however, 
that the still existing economic gap between 
Western Europe on the one hand and Central 
and Eastern Europe on the other now consti-
tuted the greatest security problem of Europe as 
a whole. Assistance should be provided by all 
existing western institutions in their specific 
field of action. 
22. In his opinion, western assistance to 
convert the arms industries of ex-communist 
countries, diminish environmental pollution 
and improve the energy and transport infra-
structure would greatly enhance economic 
security. 
Ill. Security structures to be dneloped 
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developed. In fact, co-operation between the 
various security structures had become one of 
the priority issues in the present debate, but to 
arrive at a satisfactory result, a long-term vision 
was needed. 
25. Sir Geoffrey Howe ventured that because 
of looming conflicts in the new Eastern Europe, 
common security and foreign policies towards 
the rest of the world should be developed in the 
planned European Union. Very close consul-
tation and partnership with the United States 
should be maintained and increasingly be 
developed with Japan. The new-found strength 
and sense of purpose of the United Nations 
should be sustained and supported. 
26. Mr. van Eekelen pointed out that the 
Yugoslav crisis had provided a test case that the 
CSCE, NATO, the European Community and 
WEU were not very well suited for dealing with 
a real crisis. Despite their fairly well-developed 
crisis management capability, the lack of 
political legitimacy had prevented them from 
intervening. 
27. Mr. Robert Hunter was confident that 
both NATO and WEU had important roles to 
play in European security, including the security 
of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The NATO Rome summit communique had 
made it clear that a choice need not be made 
between the two when it endorsed a " new 
European security architecture in which NATO, 
the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and 
the Council of Europe complement each 
other." 
28. Mr. van Eekelen thought it would be pre-
mature to attempt a description of the role of a 
European Union in the development of pan-
European security structures because the Maas-
tricht summit had heralded only the beginning 
of the creation of that union. He argued that 
Europeans would have to place the emphasis on 
" marshalling their efforts ", particularly in the 
three mutually-reinforcing circles of institu-
tional activity: the pan-European circle, by 
strengthening the CSCE process and institu-
tions; the Euro-Atlantic circle, through the 
Atlantic Alliance and the NACC; the Western 
European circle, evolving towards a union 
bringing together the European Council, 
Western European Union, European Political 
23. Mr. Skubiszewski rightly pointed out that Co-operation and the European Commission. 
the primary target of European diplomacy was 2 to ensure the indivisibility of security in the 9. One of the main questions Europeans 
would soon have to answer was how and when 
whole of the continent and the linkage between the Nine, Twelve or even Fourteen could 
the security of each state with that of every other influence the shaping of the European security 
state. agenda and offer common means of action to 
24. According to Mr. Skubiszewski, at the bring about respect for principles and a code of 
moment, the nature of the security relations in behaviour agreed by all the states concerned. At 
Europe was basically heterogeneous. The dif- present, conflict prevention was an overriding 
ferent existing organisms and institutions bore a priority, but at the same time there was an 
responsibility for making European security a urgent need for arbitration mechanisms as SUP-
reality and their complementarity must be porting measures. 
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Amendment 1 
A new security order in Europe 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Atkinson 
1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
1st June 1992 
"7. Urge, in the light of continuing conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, the 
leaders of the CSCE at the forthcoming Helsinki summit to review current machinery for the 
prevention of conflict and the peaceful resolution of disputes, with a view to establishing a 
process of binding arbitration and peace enforcement. " 
Signed: Atkinson 
l. See 2nd sitting, 1st June 1992 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 2 and 3 
A new security order in Europe 
AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 1 
tabktl by Mr. Hardy 
1st June 1992 
2. At the end of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add: 
"and suggesting that increased concentration should. be directed to these approaches". 
3. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "effective". 
1. See 2nd sitting, 1st June 1992 (amendment 2 agreed to; amendment 3 withdrawn). 
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New Euro-American relations 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee 2 
by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur 
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1. Adopted in committee by 10 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Stoffelen (Chairman), Sir Geojfrey Finsberg, Mr. De Decker (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, 
Alegre, Beix, Caro, De Hoop Scheffer, Fabra, Feldmann, Forni, Foschi (Alternate: Stegagnim), Goerens, Lord Kirkhill, 
MM. Kittelmann, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Martinez, Martino, Miiller, Pecriaux, Pieralli, de Puig, Reddemann, 
Rodrigues (Alternate: Mrs. Aguiar), MM. Roseta, Seeuws, Soel/, Thyraud, Ward, Wintgens. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
011 lleHI Euro-America11 relatioiiS 
The Assembly, 
(i) Agreeing that the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the 
further strengthening of the European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effec-
tiveness of the Atlantic Alliance and that the enhancement of the role and responsibility of the 
European members is an important basis for transforming the alliance; 
(ii) Noting that NATO's Rome declaration on peace and security calls for a new security archi-
tecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, WEU and the Council of Europe com-
plement each other; 
(iii) Convinced that the Atlantic Alliance will be of lasting value as long as it provides the essential 
transatlantic link, demonstrated by the significant presence of North American forces in Europe; 
(iv) Recognising that the development of WEU as the instrument for a common European security 
and defence policy is a logical and inevitable consequence of a determined effort by European coun-
tries to achieve greater integration; 
(v) Convinced that the creation of genuine multinational forces in a European framework, which 
could be deployed in both NATO and WEU operations, is the best guarantee for future security in 
Europe; 
(vi) Considering that in some quarters in the United States there is still uncertainty due to lack of 
insight into and understanding of the motivation of Western European nations for developing a spe-
cific European security and defence identity, notwithstanding the multiple exchanges and consulta-
tions taking place in the different existing organs and institutions of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(vii) Recognising the useful role being accomplished by the WEU Institute for Security Studies in 
making European views known to the foreign policy and defence community in the United States; 
(viii) Aware that, notwithstanding the repeated assurances given by the present American adminis-
tration, there is uncertainty over the level and corresponding effectiveness of American troops based in 
Europe; 
(ix) Recalling that, in Rome, all NATO member states pledged to support all steps in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and to give practical assistance in helping them to succeed 
in this difficult transition; · 
(x) Considering the apparent growing anomaly between the determination of the United States to 
exert political influence on developments in Europe and its diminishing will and ability to maintain a 
military presence and financial-economic commitments in Europe; 
(xi) Considering that notwithstanding the recent Canadian decision to withdraw all its forces from 
Europe, Canada remains committed to NATO and Europe's security by retaining the ability to send 
contingency forces and must therefore be included in the transatlantic dialogue with WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Define more clearly, in consultation with its transatlantic allies, the respective roles of the armed 
forces of NATO, WEU and the United States in maintaining security and peace in Europe; 
2. Establish with the United States more clearly-defined criteria for the maintenance of United 
States forces in Europe; 
3. Continue to support the rOle of the WEU Institute for Security Studies in making European 
views on security better known across the Atlantic, also by publishing and disseminating more widely 
the results of its work; 
4. Co-ordinate more closely the policy of allied partners on both sides of the Atlantic to satisfy the 
security needs of the new democracies in Central Europe, while recognising that, for the moment, no 
formal security guarantees can be provided; 
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5. Take account of the fact that a new concept of security means developing capabilities allowing 
the deployment at the appropriate time of political, as well as diplomatic, economic, financial and mil-
itary means for peace-keeping and peace-restoring; 
6. (a) Reinforce the joint allied political instruments in order to make sure that, in crisis pre-
vention, a joint assessment can be made as a precondition for co-ordinated action; 
(b) Establish a joint high level group consisting of political, diplomatic, economic and military 
experts in order to make up to date threat assessments and develop adequate models to respond to such 
threats. 
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Expltuultory Memorandum 
(s•bmitt«< by Mr. Soell, Rapportn~r) 
I. Introduction 
1. Especially in the twentieth century, the 
vicissitudes of history have forged a very close 
relationship between North America and 
Western Europe. The second world war with its 
aftermath, the cold war, resulted in an Atlantic 
Alliance which has proved to be the strongest 
framework ever built by nations to defend 
democracy and maintain peace and security. 
Both the United States and Canada had proved 
that no price was too high for them to re-
establish peace in Western Europe. With its 
Marshall Plan, the United States enabled the 
liberated countries and even its one-time enemy 
to restore their economies and prosperity. 
During the blockade of Berlin in 1948, it showed 
its determination to yield not one inch to Soviet 
domination. 
2. Altogether, the almost fifty years of 
Atlantic Alliance have created a lasting rela-
tionship based on mutual understanding, shared 
values and common interests which is a shining 
example of stability, peace and prosperity for all 
nations in the world. The end of the cold war, 
however, obliged the Atlantic partners to re-
evaluate their r6les and responsibilities in the 
framework of a completely new geostrategic 
environment. Meanwhile, it cannot be denied 
that in recent years this process had already 
started under the different heading of burden-
sharing, initially at the initiative of the United 
States. In both NATO and WEU, agreement has 
now been reached that Europe should shoulder 
greater responsibility for the maintenance of 
peace and security on its own territory. On 
the other hand, there is also agreement that the 
United States should continue to play an 
important r6le in the security and defence of 
Europe. It is in the common interest of all 
partners for transatlantic links to remain and 
- where possible - to be reinforced. 
3. All the partners of the transatlantic com-
munity share the opinion that only peace and 
stability are a sound basis for prosperity in the 
world. To many it may seem idealistic to speak 
of establishing a new world order, but the idea 
makes sense, especially on the basis of equal 
partnership and the common values of demo-
cracy and freedom. 
4. Now that the strategic situation in Europe 
has undergone radical changes while a part of 
the continent still is subject to political turmoil, 
there is reason enough for a positive reas-
sessment of transatlantic relations. Apparently, 
some elements of this relationship are subject to 
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tensions and they deserve close examination in 
order to see how the situation can be improved 
in an atmosphere of close co-operation between 
allies where both can win. All this is being done 
in the conviction that a strong Atlantic Alliance 
has been the foundation of peace, security and 
prosperity in Europe and that this alliance can 
only continue to thrive if there is sincere 
co-operation in equal partnership between both 
sides of the Atlantic. · 
5. After the recent NATO and EC summit 
meetings in Rome and Maastricht respectively, 
the Political Committee of the Assembly, 
attaching the greatest possible value to a con-
tinued close Atlantic partnership, therefore 
decided to focus on this subject in the present 
report, in which a number of issues considered 
of topical interest will be covered. 
6. First of all, an attempt has been made to 
determine which elements form the basis of 
American foreign policy. It will be shown that, 
through American history, it is possible to 
discern some guiding principles that have been 
crucial in inducing political leaders to take deci-
sions, the priorities obviously changing 
according to prevailing circumstances. 
7. Several current issues in transatlantic rela-
tions will then be discussed, such as security, 
trade, ballistic missile defence, aid to Central 
and Eastern Europe and developments in 
Canada. Relations with Japan will also be dealt 
with, because it is thought to be in the interest of 
both the United States and Europe to co-operate 
in these matters. 
8. Finally, conclusions will be drawn, and an 
attempt made to set out some policy guide-
lines. 
II. The United States Presitknt's comment 
on Mtlllltricht 
9. On 11th December 1991, one month after 
NATO's Rome summit and one day after the EC 
summit in Maastricht, President George Bush 
made a statement which seems to sum up every 
aspect of United States policy towards Europe as 
follows: 
" We welcome the historic steps toward 
economic and political union agreed to by 
the leaders of the European Community 
in the Netherlands ... The results of the EC 
summit in Maastricht represent a mile-
stone which we celebrate along with our 
European partners. The United States has 
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long supported European unity because of 
our strong conviction that it was good for 
Europe, good for the Atlantic partnership, 
and good for the world. I have made clear 
f~om the outset of this administration my 
view that a strong, united Europe is very 
much in America's interest. A more 
united Europe offers the United States a 
more effective partner, prepared for larger 
responsibilities. 
Europe's steps towards unity will 
strengthen our renewed Atlantic Alliance. 
NATO's endorsement at the Rome 
summit of a 'European pillar' underscores 
the additional responsibility which the 
European allies are assuming in the pro-
tection of shared vital interests and 
values. At Maastricht, the EC requested 
Western European Union whose 
members are in both NATO ~d the EC 
to serve as the vehicle for increased 
European responsibility 01;1 defence 
matters. We are pleased that our allies in 
Western European Union in turn decided 
to strengthen that institution as both 
NATO's European pillar and the defence 
component of the European Union. 
NATO will remain the essential forum for 
consultation among its members and the 
venue for agreement on policies bearing 
on the security and defence commitments 
of the allies under the Washington 
Treaty. 
~ strengt?ened EC has a vital role to play 
m assunng a stable and prosperous 
Europe and a humane world order. 
Alre~dy today, the European Community 
~d Its m~mber. states are taking a major 
role, working wtth us, to help the citizens 
of ~entr~ ~nd Eastern Europe transform 
theu societies. Our Atlantic partnership is 
equally essential in supporting the ~ove­
ment toward freedom and demoeracy in 
what we have known as the Soviet Union. 
But, our co-operation with the new 
Europe goes farther. The European .Com-
munity stands with us as a partner in the 
search for peace in the Middle East and 
against difficult odds, it continu~s to 
labour with our support for a peaceful 
solution to the war in Yugoslavia. The 
evolving monetary unity and single 
market of the EC promises new economic 
vitality for Europe. With this comes new 
investment possibilities and markets for 
American business as well as new compe-
tition. We welcome these developments, 
b~t we also expect that the new Europe 
wtll assume new responsibilities for main-
taining and strengthening the world eco-
nomic system. This means working with 
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successfully concluding the Uruguay 
Ro~nd~ and to avoid the dangers of pro-
tectiOmsm. 
America can take pride in its contribu-
tions to Europe's success. The United 
States engagement on that continent had 
yielded many benefits for the Europeans 
and for us. Those benefits remind us that 
our interests do not stop at our shores. We 
~re intimately connected to what happens 
m Europe and beyond. Now, we are 
getting an even stronger European 
partner. I therefore speak for all of 
America when I send best wishes to the 
me~bers of the European Community for 
theu new steps toward integration. " 
10.. Essentially, the statement says that 
Umted . S!ates support for a strong united 
Europe IS m the Umted States's interest because 
Europe is a more effective partner and can 
assume greater responsibilities. The United 
States is happy with the development ofWEU as 
Europe's defence arm, but NATO is the essential 
forum. for securi!Y . and defence, just as the 
Atlantic p~nershtp Is essential in the process of 
transformmg the former Soviet Union. A united 
Europe should not be protectionist and should 
favour GATT and help to bring the Uruguay 
round to an early conclusion. The United States 
has an interest in what is happening in 
Europe. 
11. In terms of congratulations, the statement 
reflects the most positive attitude towards 
Europe i~ American . foreign policy thinking. 
Even so, It does not hide certain ambiguities in 
the American attitude. In other words too often 
it ~eems that even after so many yea~s of close 
alliance between the United States and Western 
Europe there are still misunderstandings over 
e~ch other's i~tentions which in general are 
smcere as they mtend to promote the interest of 
the country or countries concerned and the well-
being of its or their population. 
Ill. Guiding principles 
of United States foreign policy 
12. Starting with the early Puritan settlers 
many Americans were, and still are, convinced 
that they have a special role to play in the world 
~nd this notion took an even stronger hold after 
~~dependence. was won in 1784. They con-
sidered Amenca and later the United States as 
the " elect nation " or " redeemer nation " 
" commissioned to bear the light of liberty and 
religion through all the earth " 1• 
13. This vision did not fade with time as tes-
tified by Woodrow Wilson, who said i~ 1919: 
us to bridge our bilateral differences, to 1 Arth M s hl · · · expand a g1 b 1 t d' b · ur . c esmger Jr., Foretgn Pohcy and the 
n open o a ra mg system Y American character (Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983). 
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" America is the only idealistic nation in the 
world " with_" a spiritual energy in her which no 
other nation can contribute to the liberation of 
mankind". 
14. Even the Vietnam war did not change 
this opinion. Still in 1982, President Reagan 
declared that he had always believed that " a 
divine plan placed this great continent between 
the oceans to be found by people from every 
corner of the earth who had a special love of 
faith and freedom ". 
15. As typical representatives of a rational 
age, the founding fathers of the United States 
such as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams 
believed that states responded to specific 
national interests. At the same time, they 
believed that international order depended on 
preserving an equilibrium among competing 
national interests. In Europe, they saw a balance 
of power, the maintenance of which they con-
sidered to be the safeguard of American inde-
pendence. 
16. During the Napoleonic wars, this idea 
made Jefferson write: "It cannot be to our 
interest that all Europe should be reduced to a 
single monarchy. " He did not at all like to see 
" the whole force of Europe wielded by a single 
hand ". His successors acted according to these 
principles of freedom and national interest when 
they liberated Europe from the Nazi do~ination 
and when they protected it against the Soviet 
threat of hegemony. 
17. Because of a strong puritan tradition, the 
United States has never claimed that it entered 
or started a war because of national interests or 
balance of power reasons. Such reasons do not 
appeal to public opinion. Both W oodrow Wilson 
and Franklin D. Roosevelt couched their 
appeals to war in terms of natural idealism. 
18. In the Guff war, the redemption idea was 
translated into the aim of" throwing the bad guy 
out". However, this aim was attained only par-
tially, and President Bush declared that he did 
not wish to imperil one American life to impose 
democracy on Iraq. 
19. The still prevailing opinion that the 
United States was born for world leadership was 
perfectly voiced by former President Richard 
Nixon in his last book Seize the Moment:" We 
are not mere passengers on the voyage of 
history. We are its navigators. We have the 
opportunity to forge a second American 
century. " 
20. Since the Declaration of Independence in 
1776, Americans have agreed that the United 
States must be the beacon of human rights to an 
unregenerate world. How this mission should be 
implemented has been subject to different inter-
pretations ever since, but in the early days of its 
existence, when the United States still had little 
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ambition and opportunity to be a world power, 
the prevailing opinion in the country was that it 
should redeem the world not by intervention, 
but by example. 
21. In 1977, Secretary of State Cyrus V ance 
made an attempt to define human rights which 
should be protected in today's world as a matter 
of priority, distinguishing three categories: 
(i) the right to be free from government 
violation of the integrity of the 
person; 
(ii) the right to the fulfilment of vital 
needs such as food, shelter, health 
care and education; 
(iii) the right to civil and political lib-
erties. 
22. Especially in recent decades, it has been 
less easy for the American administration to 
agree on the priorities in pursuing a human 
rights policy. Like many European nations, it 
soon had to admit that it is impossible to pursue 
human rights objectives in precisely the same 
way for all countries. Moreover, the propagation 
and protection of human rights is only one of 
several different elements in American foreign 
policy which at times may have to be subordi-
nated to other factors, vital interests or values. 
23. Quite naturally, the United States as a 
state is engaged in self-preservation, which 
means that its first duty is to protect its citizens 
and borders against possible threats and security 
risks or against potential enemies. Like all other 
nations, it will try to· maintain its power and 
international status. The informal American 
empire in its present form was mainly created by 
the state which was seeking to guarantee 
physical security for its citizens. Obviously, 
trade followed wherever the state established its 
power or influence, but it was not the state's first 
objective. When, in the nineteenth century, the 
United States gradually transformed itself into a 
great nation, it had to compete with the other 
existing great nations in the world in order to 
establish or maintain its position. In that 
framework," raison d'etat" has always been one 
of the main elements ofthe United States' quest 
for influence in world politics. 
24. Mter a first short-lived European 
engagement during the first world war and in the 
subsequent few years, the United States' quest 
for durable world-wide power and influence 
only really got going at the end of the second 
world war, when the cold war and containment 
policy imposed a world-wide struggle against 
communism at all levels. 
25. Especially in the twentieth century, 
United States foreign policy has always been 
influenced by two competing views of world 
order: 
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- the universalist view, by which all 
nations share common values and 
interests in all the affairs in the world. 
Here, national security would be 
guaranteed by an international 
organisation; 
- the sphere-of-interest view, by which 
each great power would be assured by 
the other great powers of an acknowl-
edged predominance in its own area of 
special interest. In this view, national 
security would be guaranteed by the 
balance of power. 
26. In fact, these two views are not completely 
incompatible, and it appears that peace has been 
maintained by a combination of the two. 
27. Even after the Yalta conference in Feb-
ruary 1945, Roosevelt, who combined Wil-
sonian universalism with a perception of vital 
strategic interests, still had great hope that 
Y alta, where foundations were also laid for a 
United Nations organisation, would spell the 
end of the system of unilateral action, spheres of 
influence, exclusive alliances, balances of power 
and so on. At the same time, the composition of 
the Security Council - the United Nations's 
main operative organ- with its five permanent 
members was an implicit recognition of the con-
tinuing existence of important regional powers 
who, through procedures chosen in the Charter, 
could maintain their influence in their own 
sphere of interest. 
28. John Foster Dulles also argued that the 
great threat to peace after World War 11 would 
lie in sphere-of-influence thinking and he 
insisted on American participation in all policy 
decisions for all territories in the world. In this 
framework, it may be mentioned that Geir 
Lundestad, a historian of the cold war that 
immediately followed has defined American 
universalism as" the effort by the United States, 
having secured its own sphere of influence in the 
western hemisphere, to discourage the estab-
lishment of equivalent spheres of influence by 
other powers ". The example of Soviet domi-
nance in Eastern Europe, which has only just 
ended, has clearly shown that the last objective 
could not be obtained during the cold war. 
29. On the other hand, it is not very difficult 
to notice a clear discrepancy between the 
American passion for universalism when it is 
applied to territory far from American shores 
and the pre-eminence the United States accords 
its own interests nearer home. 
30. Significantly enough, domestic economic 
strains and the inward-looking mood of 
American voters are at present limiting the 
range of United States foreign policy just at a 
moment when many nations are looking to the 
United States for leadership. But it could be 
observed that these nations may be wrong in still 
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seeing the United States as the rich and powerful 
nation which is willing to guarantee the security 
of any country while at the same time paying the 
cost of their economic recovery. The last 
assumption in particular appears to be wrong in 
the case of Central and Eastern Europe. 
31. The United States is no longer the world's 
paymaster-general. In some of the most urgent 
cases, such as commitments to United Nations 
peace-keeping forces and the International Mon-
etary Fund, the United States now has problems 
in meeting commitments similar to those which 
could easily be met in earlier days. Indeed, there 
is very little financial elbow room for the gov-
ernment. In the fiscal year 1993, the United 
States budget deficit is expected to reach $400 
billion. 
32. In conclusion, it should be noted that 
reasons of state, or the conviction that humanity 
can and should be redeemed from all evil, vicis-
situdes and hazards to live in a world of hap-
piness and justice, the protection of human 
rights and the notion of being the world's leader 
are still firmly rooted in the American foreign 
policy practice. 
33. At the moment, however, the United 
States is discovering that national interests even-
tually set limits to missionary passions. It no 
longer has the power to achieve great objectives 
in the world by itself. An effective foreign policy 
requires the financial, material and moral 
co-operation of allies, but there nevertheless 
remains an innate need to play the role of 
ultimate leader, as demonstrated in the Gulf war 
and at the conference on financial support to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
34. Under these circumstances, the European 
nations, in particular the member states of the 
EC and WEU should take the opportunity to 
co-operate closely with their North American 
ally in order to respond to the challenges of a 
post-cold war world. 
IV. The Pentagon's brainstorming 
ol'er a new world order 
35. In February 1992, a Pentagon planning 
document was published in the press containing 
seven different war scenarios which were meant 
to serve as the foundation for long-term budget 
planning and determining the number and kind 
of troops which should be maintained. The doc-
ument contains scenarios for hypothetical con-
flicts in the Gulf, the Korean peninsula, in both 
regions simultaneously, the Baltic, Panama and 
the Philippines and a major conflict with a 
single nation or coalition of nations which 
would emerge at the turn of the millennium " to 
adopt an adversarial security strategy and 
develop a military capability to threaten United 
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States interests through global military compe-
tition ". 
36. The Pentagon rightly pointed out that 
these scenarios, the first detailed military plans 
drafted by the United States for the post-cold 
war era, were meant to be illustrative of 
potential threats, not predictive. At the same 
time it appeared that on the basis of such sce-
narios the Pentagon will try to stall, if not to 
reverse, the downward trend in defence 
spending by the mid-1990s. 
37. At a hearing by the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee on 20th February, several sen-
ators challenged some of the scenarios and they 
announced that they would be critical when dis-
cussing the Pentagon's proposed $281 billion 
defence budget for the fiscal year 1993, 
beginning on 1st October 1992. 
38. These scenarios, even if they draw com-
ments and criticism, may be considered a rather 
harmless example of war contingencies being 
prepared in any defence ministry in the world in 
order to have a more or less sound basis for the 
planning of equipment, troop levels and 
budgets. But, at the beginning of March 1992, a 
much more revealing document came to light. 
39. The Pentagon's new defence planning 
guidance was leaked to the press, apparently in 
its final drafting stage, after having circulated 
among the Defence Secretary's principal dep-
uties. According to the covering memorandum, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Colin L. Powell, as well as all four mil-
itary chiefs of staff and the civilian service secre-
taries had read in full and responded to the draft 
and forwarded their comments on it 2• The 
document's statements were developed in con-
junction with the National Security Council 
while its drafting was supervised by Paul D. 
Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's Under-Secretary for 
Policy. The defence planning guidance is an 
internal administration policy statement pre-
pared every two years and distributed to mil-
itary leaders and Pentagon officials to instruct 
them on how to prepare forces, budgets and 
strategy. It is to be combined with the scenarios 
for possible future conflicts referred to earlier in 
this chapter. 
40. According to the draft defence planning 
guidance as reviewed by high level officials, part 
of the United States' mission would be to con-
vince " potential competitors that they need not 
aspire to a greater role or pursue a more 
aggressive posture to protect their legitimate 
interests". The draft continued that the United 
States " must sufficiently account for the 
interests of the advanced industrial nations to 
discourage them from challenging our leadership 
or seeking to overturn the established political 
and economic order ". 
2. International Herald Tribune, 12th March 1992. 
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41. A quick look at the world's advanced 
industrial nations can only lead to the con-
clusion that this statement is aimed at both 
Japan and Western Europe. 
42. The document heralds the less visible 
victory at the end of the cold war which is " the 
integration of Germany and Japan into a United 
States-led system of collective security and the 
creation of a democratic ' zone of peace ' ". 
43. At the same time, however, it suggests 
that nuclear proliferation, if unchecked by 
superpower action, could tempt Germany, 
Japan and other industrial powers to acquire 
nuclear weapons to deter attack from regional 
foes, which could start them down the road to 
global competition with the United States and, 
in a crisis over national interests, military 
rivalry. Implicitly, the draft planning guidance 
foresees building a world security arrangement 
that pre-empts Germany and Japan from pur-
suing a course of substantial rearmament, spe-
cially nuclear armament, in the future. 
44. It should clearly be said here that those 
parts of the draft planning guidance suggesting 
German or Japanese attempts to acquire nuclear 
weapons make little sense. One wonders why the 
Pentagon has officials with such unrealistic 
minds if it wishes to be taken seriously by the 
United States administration and its allies in the 
world. Did more than forty years of post-war 
history in both Germany and Japan still not 
provide enough proof that these countries have 
a deeply convinced distaste for militarism, for 
military crisis solution and even more so for 
nuclear weapons? Moreover, every well-
informed United States citizen, and Pentagon 
officials should be among the first, is well aware 
of the fact that in the post-war period both coun-
tries have counted among the most reliable 
United States allies in security questions. The 
German Government, reportedly angered by· the 
abovementioned suggestions in the draft 
planning guidance, clearly felt embarrassed that 
it had to make a statement to declare that it had 
no intention of acquiring nuclear arms, at the 
same time making an effort to minimise the 
importance of the Pentagon draft study in the 
best possible way. 
45. The draft planning guidance further 
deems important " the sense that the world 
order is ultimately backed by the United 
States ". Coalitions are said to " hold consid-
erable promise for promoting collective action " 
but at the same time it expects future coalitions 
to be ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond 
the crisis being confronted and in many cases 
carrying only genefal agreement over the objec-
tives to be accomplished. 
46. It considers that " a substantial American 
presence in Europe and continued cohesion 
within the western alliance remain vital". It 
1 
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then continues that, to avoid a competitive rela-
tionship from developing, the United States 
" must seek to prevent the emergence of 
European-only security arrangements which 
would undermine NATO ". In their quest for 
United States influence on developments in 
Europe apparently the Pentagon planners are 
not able to come to terms with the fact that in 
the longer term, the lack of United States 
financial commitment in Eastern Europe will 
logically lead to a diminishing of its political 
influence. 
47. The Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. 
Willem van Eekelen, has rightly said that 
seeking to prevent the emergence of 
European-only security arrangements would be 
in contradiction with what the United States 
and Europe had agreed in Rome, which is that 
Europe should develop a European security 
identity within NATO. 
48. To help stabilise economies and demo-
cratic development in Eastern Europe, the draft 
calls on the European Community to offer mem-
bership to Eastern European countries as soon 
as possible. Here, the Pentagon planners seem to 
ignore the proportion of the financial burden 
which full membership might impose upon the 
EC, apart from the fact that most Eastern 
European countries are as yet far from having 
reached the basic stages of a modem democracy 
and even less the degree of a fully developed 
democratic and market economy system which 
is absolutely essential for membership of the EC. 
Moreover, it should be noted that within the EC 
there is a complex debate on deepening or wid-
ening which is still at an early stage. Never-
theless it would be helpful if in the foreseeable 
future - within the next two years or so - the EC 
could provide a clear estimate of the planned 
date of full membership for the first candidates 
among the former European communist 
nations, in particular the Central European 
countries, even if that date were beyond the year 
2000. 
49. Obviously, there can be little wonder that, 
after the press publication of the draft defence 
planning guidance, officials from the White 
House, State Department and even the Pen-
tagon rushed either to criticise it or to try to 
minimise its importance. Admiral David E. Jer-
emiah, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, who recently referred to the preparation of 
this policy document in public, now stated that 
the draft was in contradiction with the common 
allied defence doctrine of the past 45 years and 
for the future and that the United States did not 
pursue a unilateral role as a superpower. 
50. The Pentagon spokesman said that the 
final document would not assert that United 
States military power should be used in the 
future to both prevent or deter the emergence of 
regional "competitors" in Western Europe, 
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Asia and·, in the former Soviet Union. Ques-
tioned further on this issue, the spokesman said 
that " we seek to prevent the emergence of a 
hostile power, a hostile superpower". Oth-
erwise, however, he said that the document's 
basic thrust mirrored the public statements and 
congressional testimony of the United States 
Defence Secretary and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
51. Here, it is important to note that there are 
also administration officials arguing for a dimin-
ished unilateral United States military role, for 
more emphasis on collective internationalism in 
the framework of the United Nations, regional 
alliances and for a strategy to engage the military 
establishments of former adversaries in such 
new collective security arrangements. 
52. Understandably, many congressmen and 
senators had difficulty in seeing the United 
States in an exclusive role as the world's 
policeman, which would also impose the main-
tenance of a large defence budget. 
53. Indeed, the most fundamental obstacle to 
the implementation of the draft document's 
objective of United States world unilateral lead-
ership is the administration's inability to pay for 
it, which is very unlikely to change in the 
coming years in view of the attitude of the 
American voters. 
54. But the draft planning guidance also 
reveals a lack of insight into the relative position 
of the United States in today's world. The cost 
of the United Nations-supported military opera-
tions in the Gulf war, where the United States 
armed forces played by far the most important 
role, was largely paid for by other nations, which 
together contributed $54 billion out of a total 
cost of $61.1 billion of the United States share 
in the operations. Some of the nations men-
tioned in the document as a possible target of 
future United States military action might be 
less prepared to pay if such action were aimed at 
themselves. It should be mentioned here that the 
United States political and military leadership 
in the first decades after the second world war 
was a direct consequence of industrial and eco-
nomic accomplishments which were unique in 
the world at that time. In a democracy, military 
power cannot impose itself for long if it is not 
backed by economic performance. 
55. President Bush put it rightly, when he 
addressed a joint session of Congress on 6th 
March 1991: " ... security does not come from 
military power alone. " 
56. While in Washington, the committee had 
a discussion with Bruce Weinrod, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for European and NATO 
Policy in the office of the Secretary of Defence, 
who, to the committee's satisfaction, made far 
more cautious statements on transatlantic 
security relations. 
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57. He assured the committee that European 
security concerns are also vital for the United 
States. Even if a massive Soviet invasion of 
Europe is no longer to be expected, NATO is 
still the United States' key security linkage with 
Europe and the United States intends to remain 
involved in Europe's security and to maintain a 
meaningful military presence in Europe as long 
as this is desired by the Europeans. 
58. The United States supports the devel-
opment of a new European security and defence 
identity, but it hopes these European institu-
tions and structures will not detract from 
NATO's cohesiveness. The United States is 
pleased with the spirit of discussion and 
openness in which this development is taking 
place. If there is to be more than one institution 
in Europe, with military responsibilities, these 
should be clearly worked out and distinguished. 
Defence forces with a dual-batted command -
one for NATO and one for WEU operations -
are not ruled out, but the solutions found should 
be workable and acceptable, both militarily and 
politically. It is important that Europeans 
develop their own military capability, but this 
should on no account undermine NATO. 
59. According to the United States, there are 
technically no impediments in the North 
Atlantic Treaty which would prevent out-of-area 
activities and the allied rapid reaction corps is 
tailored to fit such situations exactly. Here, it 
should be noted that the European allies until 
now have maintained a more restrictive inter-
pretation of the North Atlantic Treaty 3• 
60. The United States recognise that other 
possibilities for out-of-area operations are: 
(i) an ad hoc coalition, making use of 
NATO experience and capabilities; 
(ii) another institution such as WEU, 
which could borrow and utilise 
NATO capabilities. 
61. In United States eyes, the United Nations 
has developed positively, which can make it a 
useful instrument for use in certain conditions. 
However, it has still not yet reached a stage 
where the United States and other countries 
could not act without its support. 
3. It should be noted here that paragraph 13 of the strategic 
concept of the alliance, as approved at the NATO summit in 
Rome, referring to out-of-area risks, reads as follows: " Any 
armed attack on the territory of the allies, from whatever 
direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Wash-
ington Treaty. However, alliance security must also take 
account of the global context. Alliance security interests can 
be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the 
flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. 
Arrangements exist within the alliance for consultation 
among the allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty 
and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts 
including their responses to such risks. " 
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62. In some situations, vehicles other than the 
United Nations may be needed. The United 
Nations is not yet organised to carry out major 
military operations. The substantial cost of 
major operations as in Cambodia and Yugo-
slavia is not easily met by an organisation that is 
living under financial strain. 
63. The ballistic missile proliferation of 
recent years has led to an increased interest in 
SDI derivative programmes, not only in the 
United States but also in Russia and other coun-
tries. Anti-ballistic missile defensive systems are 
now being discussed between the United States 
and those countries interested, including Russia 
and other European nations, but no decisions 
have been taken yet as regards co-operation. 
64. The American Defence Secretary is still 
cautious about potential developments in the 
former Soviet Union. In that region, security 
problems have not yet disappeared. 
65. According to the NATO summit meetings 
in Copenhagen and Rome, the security of the 
Atlantic Alliance is inseparably linked to th~t of 
all other states in Europe. Mr. Weinrod said, 
however, that it is as yet too early to offer a full 
solution. NATO membership cannot be offered 
to Central and Eastern European countries at 
present. These countries should start by paying 
attention to the development of democracy and 
a market economy. If that transition is accom-
plished successfully, their security will be of 
even more concern to the West. One of the main 
concerns of the Bush administration right now is 
that American public opinion sees a clear 
linkage between economy and security engage-
ments in Europe (see Chapter V). 
66. Here, one is tempted to comment that 
some currents in the United States adminis-
tration appear to disregard the immense 
problems faced by many Central and Eastern 
European countries in their transformation to a 
market economy. Full western engagement in 
Eastern European security problems is required 
in order to prevent nations which feel at risk 
having to invest money in their defence rather 
than in their economy. 
V. Discussions at the State Department 
and the National Security Council 
67. In Washington, the committee had 
exchanges of view with officials at the State 
Department and the National Security Council 
which are highlighted in the present chapter. 
A. Discussion with Ambassador Bartholomew, 
State Department 
68. Talking about relations between NATO 
and WEU, Ambassador Bartho1omew said the 
United States had no hard rule or recipe. Prac-
t 
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ticallinks should be established at all levels. The 
idea of dual-batting - armed forces operating 
under NATO or WEU command according to 
circumstances - should now be examined in 
depth. 
69. The United States should be enlightened 
about the role and responsibilities of WEU as 
regards Europe and Eastern Europe. Flexibility 
was a standing requirement for any security and 
defence arrangement in today's world. 
70. WEU's decision to offer full membership 
of WEU to EC member states and associate 
membership to European NATO allies not 
members of the EC was not seen as the best pos-
sible solution. It was the more puzzling since 
there was one EC member not belonging to 
NATO and more such countries were to be 
expected with Austria, Sweden, Finland and 
others knocking on the door. 
71. Turkey should not be left alone, especially 
since south of the former Soviet Union a whole 
array of republics with a basically Islamic and 
Turkish culture was emerging. Exclusion of 
Turkey from a new European security frame-
work would be a very unsatisfactory arran-
gement. 
72. Ambassador Bartholomew said that with 
the development of Germany and the economy 
of Western Europe as a whole in mind and com-
paring it with a partly adverse economic situ-
ation in the United States, Europeans might well 
decide themselves how to support developments 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The problems in 
that region are too vast to be solved by one 
nation. On the other hand, the United States has 
a deep feeling of responsibility and, as is also felt 
in Eastern Europe, the massive concentration of 
assets and capabilities in the United States may 
make a difference if that nation throws its 
weight in. It may be said that the United States 
has not yet shown enough imagination in 
finding solutions for Eastern Europe's problems, 
but considerable progress is being made in 
finding new ground. More is to be done, but the 
situation requires careful handling and it must 
come naturally. 
73. The main reasons for the United States to 
remain committed to Europe and its security are 
the vast concentration of human and physical 
resources and the deep conviction that Europe 
continues to be the cultural and spiritual home 
of the United States. In the years to come there 
will be strong public pressure on resources and 
engagement, but the old days of isolationism 
will not return. 
74. In Ambassador Bartholomew's opinion, 
the fundamental conditions for maintaining a 
United States nuclear deterrence have not 
changed and there is a continuing need for 
French, United Kingdom and United States 
nuclear forces. The size of the United States and 
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CIS nuclear forces can still be reduced consid-
erably without endangering security. It is not for 
the United States to determine which nuclear 
power should remain, but the CIS should pref-
erably not be allowed to split into different 
nuclear powers. The Ambassador considered a 
complete halt to nuclear proliferation most 
unlikely. 
75. Answering a question that notwith-
standing the United States and NATO's official 
endorsement of a European security and defence 
identity, the United States remains basically ret-
icent, Ambassador Bartholomew said that there 
are fewer ambiguities in the United States 
position towards WEU than among members of 
WEU themselves. 
76. Working out the Maastricht decision to 
develop WEU as the defence and security 
branch of the European Union, many questions 
and problems will be encountered and Euro-
peans will have to solve them. 
77. The particular capability of WEU is 
recognised by the United States, but it should be 
noted that WEU is only now coming into its 
own. Under these circumstances, Ambassador 
Bartholomew concluded, both Europeans and 
Americans have questions to ask, which should 
not be considered as reservations. 
B. Discussion with David Gompert, National 
Security Council 
78. Mr. Gompert made it clear from the 
outset that the United States administration has 
no plan to disengage from Europe. Political 
events in recent years have clearly demonstrated 
that the United States engagement to Europe 
was fruitful. A healthy political debate in the 
United States on budget deficits, the state of the 
economy and the best possible use of resources 
should not be confused with a quest for iso-
lation. The only possible outcome of the debate 
is that the United States will respect its responsi-
bilities and obligations. 
79. Isolationism and protectionism are poten-
tially not necessarily connected. It cannot be 
denied that there is a serious threat of protec-
tionism if the Uruguay round fails to yield satis-
factory results, but the United States will not 
walk away from its obligations. 
80. Mr. Gompert admitted that in the 
post-war period there has certainly been a domi-
nating United States influence in Europe, 
imposed by specific circumstances, but this 
influence was not exploited in any way. With the 
cold war over, it does not match United States 
interest to continue its dominating influence in 
Europe. 
81. In 1991 a vigorous effort was made to 
restructure NATO because of the serious ques-
tions being asked about the usefulness of NATO 
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in a new era. It had to be adapted to the new sit-
uation in Eastern Europe and take on a more 
political role. The restructured NATO should 
continue to be the focal point of transatlantic 
relations and security and the United States 
thought that its allies felt as strongly about this 
and they did themselves. Mr. Gompert stressed 
that the United States does not believe that the 
restructuring of NATO precludes the renewing 
of structures outside NATO. 
82. CSCE is playing a crucial role as anchor 
for democracy in the new independent republics 
of the former Soviet Union and the principal 
vehicle for locking these nations into western 
standards in the behaviour of nations. 
Moreover, it can make a unique contribution to 
crisis management and solution. Crisis pre-
vention is supposed to be another important 
CSCE role. At the moment, CSCE has a number 
of defects, such as the right of any member to 
oppose action, and other shortcomings. The 
United States is not opposed to making it more 
responsive and an opportunity may be missed if 
that does not happen. If Europeans wish to 
develop CSCE into a full organisation, the 
United States has no objection. 
83. Mr. Gompert said that he was well aware 
of concern in Europe over a politically dominant 
United States which is the sole remaining super-
power. It should however be noted that the 
United States is eager to develop partnership 
and coalition because it is not a unilateralist. 
Problems facing the world are so vast that part-
nership is the only way to handle them. Europe 
is second to none of the United States' other 
possible partners, more specifically because they 
know each other well, there is a high degree of 
trust and a high coinmonality of interests and 
values. 
84. The United States is well aware that 
Western Europe is increasingly showing its deci-
siveness with an increasing sense of a common 
agenda. In the United States there is no aversion 
to such a cohesive agenda, but rather a strong 
affinity. 
85. Partnership between the United States 
and Western Europe is partictilarly important in 
the following issues: 
(i) the transformation of the now inde-
pendent republics of the former 
Soviet Union into democratic 
nations with free market economies; 
(ii) the instabilities along the southern 
rim of Europe, including North 
Mrica, the Middle East and the 
southern republics of the former 
Soviet Union. Weapons proliferation 
and Islamic fundamentalism in those 
areas are to be watched carefully; 
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(iii) the world economic system. The EC 
has a responsibility to ensure that the 
world trading system, offering great 
opportunities for co-operation, can 
survive. 
86. The new notion of partnership was not 
invented by the United States to associate others 
with the defence of purely United States 
interests. In the Gulf war and on other occasions 
the United States did not turn its back on 
European interests. In the Arab-Israeli peace 
conference framework, the United States has 
encouraged the EC to play a role and in discus-
sions with the EC about this and other similar 
subjects, the United States is very open. 
87. Mr. Gompert continued by saying that 
WEU fits in as the focal point for Western 
European defence co-operation. Obviously there 
is still a lot of misunderstanding about United 
States policy towards Europe's defence identity. 
If, however, Europeans could take a step back 
and look at what the United States did, they 
would see that the United States' objective was 
to create conditions for a European defence 
identity to be established. The whole issue was 
examined in order to determine what should be 
the basic principles for making it work and the 
potential obstacles that should be removed. At 
the same time NATO was being restructured to 
replace United States domination by equal part-
nership of all participants. 
88. The United States understanding of the 
Maastricht decisions is that WEU should be 
developed into a defence and security 
organisation which could act for Europe in cases 
other than provided for in the North Atlantic 
Alliance. It is not understood to be a successor 
to NATO. 
89. The United States is fully prepared to 
continue its commitment to Europe and it does 
not want to divide United States and European 
security. There is a need to sort out the 
respective responsibilities of both NATO and 
WEU. 
90. In Central and Eastern Europe, many 
problems still remain unsolved, among which 
are the security problems. The North Atlantic 
Co-operation Council (NACC) is one of the 
institutions created to respond to certain needs 
of Eastern European countries. It can help to 
reform and adapt their military structures and 
organisations. It is certainly not the Eurasian 
security structure which some have taken it for. 
91. NACC can offer some specific and 
detailed help. In the framework of NATO and 
NACC, a fruitful discussion about security guar-
antees and membership is not possible, but 
security needs and problems in general can be 
discussed. 
92. As far as WEU is concerned, Mr. 
Gompert said, it is right to make contacts with 
the new democracies and the United States 
encourages a maximum of co-operation. The 
United States does not like to see exclusive clubs 
being established. 
93. The United States has no immediate 
answer to the situation in North Mrica as it is 
developing now. For a longer-term strategy to be 
developed, it would look towards the EC. The 
United States has an interest in that area, but it 
is convinced that for a number of reasons the 
Europeans have a more detailed knowledge of 
the issues at stake such as a certain danger of 
fundamentalism and integrism, partly because 
of the poor shape of some North African econ-
omies and socio-political structures. The United 
States does furthermore not appreciate that in 
some of these countries certain parts of the pop-
ulation are being exploited for political pur-
poses. 
94. Mr. Gompert expressed special concern 
over the Libyan leader, Mohammar Kadhafi, 
who is not trusted by the United States and 
whose country is not considered to be part of the 
community of nations as long as it is under his 
exclusive leadership. 
95. Proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction in South Asia is a matter which 
received the greatest possible attention in the 
United States. Together with the EC it is trying 
to curb the proliferation and use of dangerous 
technologies in that part of the world. 
Co-operation in this area is improving. 
YI. A new world order and collecti'e security, 
dream or reality! 
96. Reporting on the situation in the Gulf on 
11th September 1990, President Bush made an 
important statement at a joint session of the 
United States Congress. Unfolding his ideas on 
United States foreign policy for the future, the 
President said that the crisis in the Gulf offered 
" a rare opportunity to move toward a historic 
period of co-operation. " He said that a new 
world order could emerge, based on the fol-
lowing principles: the rule of law, the world's 
nations' recognition of shared responsibility for 
freedom and justice, respect by the strong for the 
rights of the weak. Putting it differently, he 
stated that America and the world must and will 
" defend common vital interests.... support the 
rule of law ... (and) stand up to aggression. " 
97. In his State of the Union address on 29th 
January 1991, the President said that "the 
long-held promise of a new world order " should 
be fulfilled. He added:" The United States bears 
a major share ofleadership ... Among the nations 
ofthe world, only the United States of America 
has both the moral standing, and the means to 
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back it up. " He continued: " This is the burden 
of leadership... and the strength that has made 
America the beacon of freedom in a searching 
world. " Nevertheless, in his 11th September 
1990 statement he had already recognised the 
existence of one flaw which could stand in the 
way, when he said:" To revitalise our leadership 
capacity, we must address our budget deficit -
not after election day, or next year, but now." 
98. Now, almost two years after the new 
world order proposal, it may be asked if any 
progress has been made. Is there a chance to 
establish a system of collective security? Do 
common vital interests exist and are they the 
same for all nations of the world? How about the 
United States' leadership? These and other 
related questions will be discussed in the present 
chapter. 
99. First, the budget deficit which, according 
to the President, must be addressed now " to 
revitalise our leadership capacity". Apparently, 
here the United States failed. While in Sep-
tember 1990, the projected deficit for the fiscal 
year 1991 was $232 000 million, the Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated that the fiscal 
year 1992 deficit would be $362 000 million, the 
highest ever. The latter figure includes a $60 000 
million for the savings and loan bailout and the 
current surplus in the social security fund. 
100. The Congressional Budget Office predicts 
that the underlying deficit - without bailout 
costs - will drop from $307 billion in 1992 to 
$219 billion in 199 5 and then steadily increase 
to reach $432 billion in 2002. Little hope for 
real improvement. 
101. A Federal Reserve Bank study has mean-
while concluded that the budget deficits of the 
1980s held United States economic growth 
below what it would have been without such def-
icits. If deficits continued to depress private 
savings, the report added, economic growth 
would be held down by about 6% by the year 
2000. Currently, presidential candidates are all 
but ignoring the long-term deficit problem. The 
Congress is also not induced to cut the deficit, 
saying that such acting could hamper a recovery 
of the economy. Altogether, it can be concluded 
that in the years to come, the United States will 
face - most probably growing - budget deficits 
which will negatively influence its leadership 
capability. 
102. Is the concept of world leadership still 
valid in today's world? This question can only 
be answered in the light of the post-war devel-
opment of international relations. Immediately 
after the second world war, the world was 
subject to a bipolar system which was dynamic 
at the fringes of both spheres of influence, but 
which was stable otherwise, with security mainly 
dependent on the military dimension of the 
equilibrium. 
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103. With the accelerating process of 
decolonisation, an increasing number of coun-
tries sought to assert their independence through 
non-alignment and alongside the existing differ-
ences between East and West, discrepancies 
between North and South became apparent. The 
two superpowers remained the principal forces 
for determining the degree of stability in the 
world, but more powers were at work, to name 
only the OPEC countries, who, in the 1970s, 
managed to upset the world's economy by 
manipulating their oil exports. 
104. At the same time, both Western Europe 
and Japan with South East Asia have reached 
economic maturity and this has affected the rel-
ative strength of the United States economy. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, therefore, 
has not provoked the end of a bipolar and the 
emergence of a unipolar world where all nations 
follow the guidance of one world leader. On the 
contrary, it has brought to light a new pattern of 
international relations which was emerging grad-
ually but the influence and importance of which 
had long been overshadowed by the military 
aspects of security preoccupations of many 
nations. Since the disappearance of the Soviet 
empire, among the concerns of many nations the 
military dimension of their security has begun to 
play a less overwhelming role than their eco-
nomic prosperity and trade relations. Obviously, 
there are now three poles of attraction in the 
world with trade, economy and political stability 
based on a democratic system being the prior 
incentive for the remaining nations to establish 
or improve relations: the United States, the EC 
and Japan. There can be little doubt that sta-
bility in their own region or direct neigh-
bourhood is a priority concern for each of these 
three poles. 
105. Of these three poles, only the United 
States has a long established and adequate full 
range of instruments, both political and mil-
itary, at its disposal in its own region and else-
where in the world. Moreover, it has experience 
since it has for long exercised a practically 
unchallenged political, economic and military 
leadership role in its own region as well as in 
Western Europe and East Asia. 
106. This situation now seems to be changing 
gradually for two important reasons. First, the 
United States' ability to carry the financial 
burdens of world leadership has obviously 
diminished and is still continuing to do so. 
Second, in trying to attain its objective of a new 
world order, the United States will have to rely 
on multinational diplomacy and the financial if 
not military commitment of other nations, as 
Secretary of State J ames Baker stressed again 
recently. 
107. The next question is what the President 
meant by common vital interests. What are vital 
interests, do nations have common vital 
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interests and when are they vital enough to take 
common action? According to a widely accepted 
interpretation, the vital interests of a nation are 
threatened if a development has a direct, imme-
diate and substantial connection with that 
nation's physical survival, political indepen-
dence or domestic freedoms. The existing 
Atlantic Alliance is supposed to protect the sig-
natory nations from the threat to such vital 
interests. 
108. Protection against external threats of the 
entire area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty 
is a clearly-defined objective. NATO being a 
regional security arrangement, its European 
members understandably insist that the armed 
forces assigned to NATO can operate only 
within the area covered by the North Atlantic 
Treaty. 
109. Matters become infinitely more compli-
cated if one tries to build a world order on the 
assumption that all the nations of the world 
share common vital interests. It is quite obvious 
that at this state of history, many differences in 
economic development, religious, social, cul-
tural and political beliefs and opinions still con-
stitute as many barriers to the establishment of 
world-wide common vital interests. 
110. If the President meant to say that a 
restricted number of nations in the world, in 
particular its traditional democratic allies will 
defend common vital interests, there may even 
then still be a long way to go. For instance, the 
European allies were far less concerned with the 
situation in Nicaragua than the United States 
which saw its vital interests threatened by the 
Sandinist regime. On the other hand, the United 
States kept clear of direct involvement in the 
Yugoslav crisis which it preferred to leave to the 
Europeans to deal with, since it took place in 
their backyard. Still, many Europeans inter-
preted the American lack of interest in the 
Yugoslav crisis as a signal of the use of double 
standards in American foreign policy. In their 
opinion this lack of interest was the more aston-
ishing since the crisis occurred in a country with 
a long Mediterranean coastline and situated 
between two member states of the Atlantic 
Alliance. The early presence of the United States 
Sixth Fleet would most probably have con-
tributed to a rapid limitation of the conflict's 
scale. This criticism would not be fair if it is not 
balanced by European self-criticism. The Euro-
peans, who felt most concerned by the Yugoslav 
crisis, were themselves not capable of acting 
jointly and effectively. Early decisive action in 
the framework of the EC using political, diplo-
matic and economic means could have averted 
the open military conflict. It should be noted · 
that the deterioration of existing rivalries 
between different nationalities into open con-
flict was announced as early as 1989 by the 
events in Kosovo. 
.111. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait resulted in an 
almost world-wide coalition but it has rightly 
been pointed out that this coalition on the basis 
of United Nations resolutions was a unique case 
where the defence of different vital interests of a 
number of nations went hand in hand with the 
protection of values and principles mentioned in 
the United Nations Charter. 
112. Apart from agreed collective security 
interests, all allies involved in this operation 
against Saddam Hussein's Iraq had their own 
specific self-interests. Altogether it seems very 
unlikely that any comparable occasion will arise 
in the future. 
113. Common vital interests therefore exist, 
but the prevailing restrictive interpretation of 
this notion is not a sound basis for the mainte-
nance, even less the establishment, of a new 
world order. 
114. Did the President mean to say that at least 
common vital values are shared by the nations 
of the world? Such common values exist, they 
have been codified in the Charter of the United 
Nations and all nations having signed the 
charter recognise that respect for them should be 
promoted and encouraged. However, despite the 
existence of the United Nations and its Charter 
for more than forty years, a new world order has 
not yet come about. 
115. Another important question which still 
remains to be answered is what to do if the 
establishment of a new world order requires 
interference or enforcement, even by military 
means. 
116. Here it should be borne in mind that the 
principle of non-interference in a state's internal 
affairs was one of the great issues in negotiations 
leading to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the 
basic document of the CSCE. At that time, all 
western nations were extremely satisfied to have 
eliminated the Brezhnev doctrine. Moreover, 
both the EC countries and Japan, for constitu-
tional or other reasons, would be extremely 
reluctant to use military force for other purposes 
than the defence of vital interests. 
117. Is a new doctrine being developed 
allowing interference in a state's internal affairs 
if it is in the interest of democracy, human rights 
and free trade? Who will determine whether 
these issues are at stake? The Security Council of 
the United Nations, the CSCE? It should be 
noted that even these well respected bodies are 
partly composed of nations with an undemo-
cratic, dictatorial or authoritarian government. 
118. For the majority of the world's nations 
there is a considerable gap in signing a solemn 
charter and putting its principles into practice 
on its own territory. Moreover, different cul-
tures have a different interpretation of codified 
values and principles. Even for nations cam-
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paigning for a new world order it is not easy to 
act according to one and the same standard. 
119. Clearly, the development of a new world 
order as seen by the American President will 
take many years. But since the rule of law and 
justice in a prosperous and peaceful world is a 
common interest of both the United States and 
Europe, they should co-operate closely in every 
possible way to attain this objective, preferably 
through peaceful means. 
VII. Trade and security 
120. At the last annual Munich conference on 
security policy in February 1992, all United 
States speakers agreed that at the moment no 
issue was more important than achieving a satis-
fying agreement in the GATT Uruguay round. 
121. Vice-President Dan Quayle called trade a 
security issue, adding that an agreement in 
GATT was "absolutely critical ... to the security 
of Europe, the security of the United States and 
the security of Asia. " Indeed, while going out of 
his way to play down the importance of isola-
tionism and protectionism in American politics, 
he ventured that " Effective national and inter-
national security has to have co-ordination 
between political, military and economic 
security ". 
122. Republican senators speaking at the same 
conference were much more outspoken on a 
linkage between trade and security. Senator 
Willian S. Cohen said that the " prevailing 
view" in the United States was that NATO was 
"no longer necessary, relevant or affordable" 
and that " few are willing to pay for what they 
perceive to be another's security". He predicted 
that the alliance would become a " mainly 
European organisation ". He said there was little 
support in the United States Congress for the 
Bush administration plan to keep 150 000 
troops in Europe. A more likely figure would be 
75 000. 
123. Senator Richard G. Lugar later declared 
that in his opinion, Europeans did not under-
stand how far they had to move on trade, 
adding: " If they do not back down, it could 
undermine NATO and American participation 
in the alliance. " Secretary-General Manfred 
Warner said that if the trade issue was not 
resolved " we risk a profound crisis in the trans-
atlantic alliance ". 
124. There can be little surprise that the 
abovementioned remarks - characterised as 
"megaphone diplomacy" by the United 
Kingdom farm minister John Gummer- drew 
sharp rebukes from all over the EC, even if in 
general it may be willing to compromise at the 
GATT talks. 
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125. President George Bush understandably 
then sought to quash European agitation over 
the Munich remarks by saying that a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay round and a strong 
United States commitment to NATO were sep-
arate questions. He went further by taking 
strong exception to the view of Republican Sen-
ators that there was little support in Congress for 
the White House plan to maintain 150 000 
troops in Europe. Among other things he said 
"We have set the proper level, and we are going 
to stay with the level we have set... We have a 
disproportionate responsibility for world 
peace .... We are not going to let this be set by a 
lot of politicians. We are going to do what is 
right for the national security ". Here the Pres-
ident may have been carried away by his sincere 
convictions, but the constraints of domestic 
policy may force him to alter these views. 
126. The administration will have considerable 
difficulty in maintaining its defence planning for 
the 1990s and alternative defence budgets are 
already being worked out at the Pentagon con-
taining far more reductions. In that framework 
American troops in Europe may not be sacro-
sanct. 
127. In a first response to the Bush administra-
tion's defence planning for the 1990s, the 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, on 
23rd February 1992, proposed to cut a 
minimum of $50 billion more over the next five 
years until 1997 than the $50 billion cut now 
being proposed by the White House. Even with 
Mr. Aspin's minimum of an extra $50 billion 
budget cut, the army would lose three more 
active duty air wings and the navy about 90 
ships, including half of the attack submarine 
force. It should be noted that among Democrats, 
Mr. Aspin appears to be pursuing a centrist pro-
posal for additional military reductions and his 
plan is likely to attract substantial support. 
128. Later, the chairman of the Senate armed 
services committee, Senator Sam Nunn, Dem-
ocrat of Georgia, made a proposal to cut the 
defence budget over the next five years by $30 to 
35 billion more than proposed by the White 
House. In his proposal, Senator Nunn called for 
reducing the number of United States troops sta-
tioned in Europe to " well below " the 150 000 
in the administration's plan. He also suggested 
that the Pentagon's plan to maintain a large 
number of troops ready to go into battle at any 
time was unnecessary since a lot of these forces " 
cannot be shipped in 60 to 90 days anyway." 
129. Finally, the proposals for immediate 
sharp cuts in the 1993 defence budget were not 
adopted in Congress, primarily because of fears 
of job losses in the arms industry and divisions 
among Democrats who failed to reach 
agreement about whether to apply savings from 
military programme to domestic programmes or 
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to reduce the deficit. Nevertheless, Senator 
Nunn is still calling for military spending to be 
reduced by $30 to 35 billion more by the end of 
1997 than the administration had proposed, 
which is close to Representative Aspin's last 
target of $41 billion in additional cuts. Thus, 
although the first skirmish has been won by the 
administration, the main battle is still to come 
and, when it comes next year, it will create new 
uncertainties. 
130. In recent months, the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe, General John R. Galvin, 
has repeatedly advised against reducing the 
American presence in Europe below 150 000 
men, arguing that an army corps with all other 
supporting military is the minimum to maintain 
a credible three-dimensional air/land battle 
capability. 
131. In Washington, representative Norman 
Seisisky, Democrat of Virginia, told the political 
committee during talks in Congress that a 
minority of the House democratic caucus had 
already taken the view that Europeans should 
pay for American troops stationed in Europe. 
132. Even if the American administration is 
denying the direct link between trade and 
security, the basic message still stands. There is 
general agreement among United States tax-
payers that there is no longer a compelling need 
to bear the brunt of maintaining a large military 
alliance for the sake of Europeans who are rich 
enough to pay for their own defence. 
133. For many reasons, the American Gov-
ernment wishes to continue to have an 
important political say in determining the 
course of developments in Europe, but if a 
political presence is not accompanied by a com-
parable military and economic engagement, 
sooner or later its arguments will lose weight. 
134. It has been argued that with new develop-
ments in military technology, the United States 
will be less dependent on foreign bases for 
United States forces and that a threat to pull 
back to home bases is more credible now than 
ever in the past. But this is only partially true. 
Even for a modem high tech military force to be 
credible, numbers and local presence count. 
Space-based weapons such as a GP ALS system 
are no doubt less dependent on foreign bases, 
but theoretically this would be available in its 
first phase only in 1996 and it is certainly not a 
cure for all ills. The Gulf war has clearly demon-
strated that whatever high technological 
destructive violence is coming from the air, the 
final job has to be done by ground troops. 
135. An increasing number of Americans 
apparently finds it difficult to see a direct threat 
to the vital interests of the United States in 
Western Europe with the cold war belonging to 
the past and - according to the United States 
Defence Secretary's own words - the Russian or 
other former Soviet republics no longer able to 
mount an attack on Western Europe. 
136. However, the prevailing opinion in 
Europe still is that if the United States is pre-
pared to conduct relations with its allies on the 
basis of truly equal partnership it is not only in 
the European's but also in the United States' 
own interest to remain engaged in Europe's 
security politically, militarily and economi-
cally. 
VIII. GATT and the Uruguay round 
137. Security or no security, the Uruguay 
round has now been dragging on for almost too 
many years and increasingly it reminds one of a 
never-ending tango with as many steps taken 
forward as backward and an occasional turn of 
the partners to please the onlookers. 
138. While the United States nowadays takes 
the stance of being the promotor of worldwide 
free trade and open markets, it should be 
remembered that the United States also has had 
an impressive record of protectionism with the 
solid support of its business community and the 
approval of most farmers. 
139. Only when the Roosevelt administration 
came to power in 1933, bills were proposed to 
lower tariffs and to gain access to foreign 
markets through reciprocal trade agreements 
under heavy protest from the business com-
munity and the Republicans. Cordell Hull, then 
Secretary of State, was convinced that " unham-
pered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, 
trade barriers and unfair economic competition 
with war". 
140. This ultimately led to the signing of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on 
30th October 194 7, which came into force on 1st 
January 1948. At the moment, there are 103 sig-
natory states. GAIT's twofold mission is to reg-
ulate international trade in order to guarantee 
its security and stability and to promote trade 
liberalisation through periodical rounds of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations. 
141. In fact it was not until the 1980s that 
foreign trade assumed real importance for the 
modem United States economy, accounting for 
nearly 20% of the gross national product. 
142. The Uruguay round started in September 
1986 in Punta del Este at the initiative of the 
United States and is the eighth round of negotia-
tions since the signing of the GATT. 
143. Over the years, the EC's common agricul-
tural policy (CAP) had increasingly become a 
bone of contention for the United States. This 
growing irritation was also caused by problems 
in its own agriculture. 
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144. From the 1970s onward, there has been 
massive investment in American farming, stim-
ulated by prognoses of a future massive 
imbalance between food requirements of the 
world population and agricultural production. 
Indeed, it cannot be denied that famine has 
struck some regions, especially in Africa, but 
often the real reason was civil war and ethnic 
strife or both. 
145. In fact, the earlier pessimistic prognoses 
have not come true because agricultural pro-
duction in the third world has increased. As a 
consequence, American farmers could not 
export successfully to these predicted markets 
and what made things even worse for them, 
some third world countries became their com-
petitors on the world market. There can be little 
wonder that, for the United States, the CAP, 
which also built some high protectionist fences 
at the EC's frontiers, should be one of the issues 
of the Uruguay round. 
146. It should be noted that the debate over 
agriculture is not purely a United States whim. 
Its successful outcome is also a sine qua non for 
many other countries of both the developed and 
the developing world among whom the Cairns 
group of farm-exporting states is also prom-
inent, which has for a long time criticised the 
EC's agricultural protectionism. 
229 
147. Apart from a number of other things, the 
Uruguay round envisages bringing within the 
GATT framework agriculture and textiles and 
clothing, two long-established exceptions which 
accounted for 10.1 and 5.3% of total world trade 
in 1990. It also envisages establishing an 
agreement on trade-related aspects of intel-
lectual property rights which would, for the first 
time, provide multilaterally-agreed protection of 
intellectual property. 
148. The EC's agricultural commissioner, Ray 
MacSharry, has made proposals for reforming 
the CAP which have been under discussion for 
more than a year without any progress being 
made. Mr. MacSharry has basically proposed to 
reduce considerably the price of agricultural 
products, now far above world market prices, 
combined with a system of direct income com-
pensation for farmers, provided that they reduce 
their production. 
149. There is little doubt that agriculture is all 
important to a successful outcome of the 
Uruguay round. Three key issues are remaining: 
should the EC accept quantitative limits on its 
volume of subsidised exports, which it still does 
not accept; should the income compensation 
payments now envisaged in the Commission's 
reform proposals be put in the GATT's " green 
box " for non-distorting subsidies, on which the 
EC insists and can United States cereal sub-
stitute exports to the EC be controlled. 
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150. In many comments on GA TI negotia-
tions, one finds the impression that the EC is the 
black sheep of the free trade world community 
with an unmatched system of trade barriers and 
subsidies. For the sake of clarity, it should be 
noted here that in recent years the United States 
has also generated uneasiness with its own trade 
policy practice, not always in accordance with 
the standards of the free and open market which 
it claims to uphold. 
151. When the United States forged a bilateral 
trade agreement with Japan in January 1992, the 
EC competition commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, 
accused the United States on the grounds that 
this example would " erode " the multilateral 
world trading system so strongly advocated by 
the United States itself and that it would bolster 
trade tensions. He said that there was 
"mounting evidence that the United States is 
drifting toward a preference for managed 
trade". 
152. Indeed, the United States itself does not 
have a clean record as regards protectionism. It 
maintains a collection of quotas, tariffs and 
other barriers which reflects lobbying by dif-
ferent industries and national security concerns. 
153. The Reagan and Bush administrations 
have limited imports of steel and computerised 
factory machines, created customs processing 
fees for incoming merchandise and tightened 
controls on imports of sugar-based foods and 
natural-fibre clothing. 
154. While the United States was exerting 
strong pressure for more concessions to be made 
in the Uruguay round, GATI on 12th March 
1992 published a report which was quite critical 
of United States trade policy. The report noted 
growing concern about the erosion of basic 
GATT principles by regionalism, bilateralism, 
unilateralism as well as various forms of 
" managed trade ". 
155. GATI is particularly worried over the 
potentially adverse effects of preferential 
regional trading arrangements, such as the pro-
posed North American Free Trade Arrangement 
(NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the 
United States, which is expected to be con-
cluded in 1992, and the various deals with 
Central and South American countries 
envisaged under the " Enterprise for the 
Americas Initiative". In this framework, a pos-
sible complex network of preferential pro-
grammes could further undermine the most 
favoured nation principle. 
156. United States unilateral action is another 
problem. In the Uruguay round, the United 
States has refused to abandon its right to take 
unilateral measures as part of an accord on a 
speedier and more effective multilateral dis-
putes settlement procedure, even if it has 
pledged not to use Section 301 of its 1988 Trade 
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Act before the new GA TI procedures are 
exhausted. 
157. The United States is also accused of fre-
quently using its anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty actions, with more than 200 orders 
in force in mid-1991. Even if such actions do 
not always come into effect, they generate uncer-
tainty and have induced many trading partners 
to voluntarily restrain exports, to price their 
goods "defensively" or to conclude bilateral 
deals with the same effect. Research suggests 
that nearly half of all anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty investigations have been terminated 
by bilateral pacts. 
158. GA TI's findings obtain support in two 
recent American studies 4 which have clearly 
demonstrated that the United States does not 
always maintain its principle of a free and open 
market. 
159. It should be noted that Uruguay round 
negotiators take the general view that the United 
States has obtained a much better deal than it 
could have hoped for in the draft accord on 
intellectual property. Many nations, including 
the developing countries, have made important 
concessions which are still being criticised by 
the United States pharmaceutical and film 
industries. 
160. On the other hand, the EC says that the 
United States is seeking wide exemptions for the 
sectors of maritime transport, financial services, 
air transport and basic telecommunications, 
together - according to the EC - accounting for 
three-quarters of world service trade. On 25th 
March 1992, the United States ambassador to 
GA TI made it clear that the exemptions his 
country was seeking for maritime transport and 
civil aviation were not negotiable. 
161. A continuing dispute has opposed the 
United States and the EC over government pay-
ments to the Airbus consortium. The United 
States said that the European state subsidies 
have helped Airbus to gain a market share from 
its United States rivals. The EC counterargued 
that United States aerospace companies benefit 
from big government payments made for the 
development of military aircraft. On 1st April 
1992, both parties agreed tentatively to restrict 
subsidies to the commercial aircraft industry. 
The agreement limits both direct production 
supports and indirect subsidies such as the ben-
efits to civil aviation flowing from defence con-
tracts. Direct subsidies to Airbus would be 
limited to about 33% of total new development 
costs, while benefits from indirect United States 
Government subsidies could not exceed 5% of a 
4. James Bovard: The Fair Trade Fraud, St. Martin's Press, 
1991. Richard Boltuck and Robert E. Litan (ed.): Down in 
the Dumps. Administration of Unfair Trade Laws, 
Brookings Institution, 1991. 
company's civil aircraft sales. The tentative 
agreement, applying to all civil aircraft with 
more ~han 100 seats, still needs approval 
by Umted States authorities and EC govern-
ments. 
162. When on 13th January 1992 the 108 
n~t.ions participating in the Uruguay round con-
ditionally ac~pted a 436-page draft package of 
accords covenng all areas of negotiation the ~uropean Community said that "subst~tial 
ImJ?rovements would have to be made in the 
agnculture text calling for cuts in farm 
support". 
1.63. But there ar~ also other countries, in par-
ticular Japan, whtch are dissatisfied with the 
a~iculture text. Japan does not want to open its 
nee market and is refusing to bargain over farm 
products on the grounds that guidelines have not 
yet been fixed. 
164. Tryi~g to be more objective, away from 
the occasiOnal bellicose declarations which 
accompany many such negotiations it can be 
established that in world trade, the~e has also 
been a clear tendency towards protectionism in 
recent years. A recent study has demonstrated 
that 20 out of a total of 24 OECD member states 
are pursuing a more protectionist trade policy at 
the moment than was the case ten years ago. 
Almost 28% of all developed countries' imports 
fro!D devt:loping countries are subject to non-
tanff bamers. The UNDP estimates that only 
7% of all exports from developing countries can 
~e traded in full accordance with GATT regula-
tions. 
165. It seems of little use for the EC and the 
United States to blame each other for the 
present deadlock in the Uruguay round. It can 
be. e~tablished that in the United States public 
opm10n assumes, not without reason that Eu~ope is bec?ming increasingly indepe~dent, 
~htch makes 1t more intransigent in negotia-
tiOns. 
166. On the other hand, the United States too 
easily ignores the completely different structure 
of .agricultural P.rod~ction in Europe, where 
~octal aJ?.d ec<?l<?gtcal Issues are very important 
m _PUbhc opm10n. Obviously, the increasing 
Umted States trade surplus with the EC is 
another good reason to search for a fair com-
promise in the ongoing negotiations. 
167. It should be said that the United States 
showed it~ under~stimation of the degree of 
European mtegrat10n and Franco-German soli-
darity in these matters when it expected the 
German Chancellor to convince the French 
President of the need to compromise on agricul-
tural policy in the framework of the Uruguay 
round. Gradually there will be less chance to 
play EC member countries off against one 
another in international negotiations. Chan-
cellor Kohl, returning from his latest visit to 
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Washington, made this clear when- referring to 
the trade negotiations - he stated: " I am not 
ready to put pressure on one member of our 
Community. It is a common affair and we 
should not single out one country. " 
168. Now that all earlier deadlines have been 
!llissed th~re i~ need for a political breakthrough 
m the mam bilateral market access negotiations 
between the United States and the EC to 
unblock the talks on both agriculture and indus-
trial goods. It is hoped that both parties notwith-
standing their objections based on national or 
internal political considerations will find a 
solution, which in the longer term will benefit 
both themselves and the rest of the world. 
IX. Trade and security: United States relations 
with Japan and East Asia 
A. Trade 
169. In recent years, Japan has frequently been 
the focus of United States entrepreneurial anger. 
Str<?ng pressure has been exercised by the 
busmess world on the administration in Wash-
ington to protect the Anierican industry against 
Japanese penetration in the United States 
market. Even if the issue is well known, it may 
be .usefu~ here to recall some facts and figures 
whtch Illustrate the threatening economic 
strength of Japan. 
170. Japan accounts for two-thirds ofth~ entire 
economy of Asia and its economy is twice the 
size of that of Germany. If present trends con-
tinue, Japan's output of goods and services 
?Ould well equal that of the United States early 
m the next decade. Despite a tripling of the yen's 
value ag~inst the dollar in the last twenty years, 
!apan still has a trade surplus and, in 1992, this 
1s expected to exceed $100 billion, the largest 
ever and the twenty-fifth surplus in twenty-five 
years. 
171. From 1985 to the end of 1990, Japan 
exported $596.2 billion in long-term invest-
ments. Even if these investments are now dimin-
ishing and money is being drawn back into the 
country, it does not mean that Japan is getting 
poorer. or losing its abili~y to influence the global 
financial markets. It w1ll no doubt remain the 
world's largest creditor nation. 
172. The great Japanese firms are positioning 
themselves to profit from changes in the world's 
economy which will follow the end of the cold 
war. In 1990, the value of overseas production 
by Japanese firms was about $165 billion, equal 
to about half Japan's total annual exports. By 
the year 2000, the annual output of corporate 
Japan will exceed $1 trillion. 
173. In 1991, Japan's trade' surplus with the 
world amounted to $103 billion, and it is 
expected to grow in 1992. The United States 
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deficit with Japan is expected to total $42 billion 
for the fiscal year ending in March 1992, up 10% 
on the previous fiscal year. Automobiles and 
related products are responsible for three-
quarters of the $42 billion trade deficit. 
174. According to the United States Labour 
Department, Japanese factory workers' produc-
tivity has risen more than twice as fast as their 
United States counterparts over the past thirty 
years. 
175. A recent opinion poll demonstrated that 
almost 80% of the Americans considered the 
Japanese to be their rivals while a minority saw 
them as partners. 
176. Altogether there were many reasons for 
President Bush to do something about Japan, 
especially in a presidential election year. In the 
framework of an extended Asian tour in January 
1992, he paid a four-day state visit to Japan to 
discuss trade and security issues. When he left 
Washington for his tour, he said that his primary 
object was to " relentlessly pursue our mission 
to create jobs and restore prosperity for all 
Americans. " 
177. Originally, President Bush's visit to Japan 
was planned for November 1991, just before the 
50th anniversary of Japan's attack on Pearl 
Harbour in order to reaffirm their mutual 
dependence and shared responsibilities for 
maintaining peace and prosperity in the region. 
The President had to postpone his visit after 
strong criticism that he preferred foreign policy 
to fixing the national economy. In order to leave 
no doubt about his objective, he was accom-
panied by eighteen United States corporate 
leaders, among whom were the chairmen of the 
Ford Motor Co., Chrysler Corp. and General 
Motors. While these American companies 
together had just 0.3% of the Japanese market 
with 18 000 cars sold in 1991, Japanese car 
makers accounted for 30% of new car sales in 
the United States. In the same year, Germany 
sold 120 000 cars in Japan. The three American 
car firms are registering their biggest losses since 
1983 and in December 1991 General Motors 
announced plans to close 21 factories cancelling 
74 000 jobs. 
178. The results of the visit were meagre. 
Together, the United States and Japan signed 
the Tokyo declaration, a solemn if not grandilo-
quent text over " enhanced mutual under-
standing and shared interests " in which the two 
governments declare " to join in a global part-
nership based on these enduring values to help 
build a just, peaceful and prosperous world and 
to meet the challenges of the twenty-first 
century. " 
179. More important for the Americans was a 
down-to-earth action plan defining various 
market-opening measures. The Japanese Gov-
ernment promised to take steps to increase 
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market access in Japan for different products 
such as computers, paper products, flat glass and 
semiconductors. More specifically, nine Jap-
anese car manufacturers pledged that they 
would increase their buying of United States 
produced car components from about $9 000 
mill1on in 1990 to about $19 000 million in 
1994, up only $1 000 million as compared to an 
earlier agreement. A total of 23 Japanese com-
panies have)lrinounced that they are planning to 
iricreasetheir-tevel of imports from the world by 
$10 000 million dollars in 1993 as compared to 
1990. 
180. To all observers, the concessions now 
made by Japan appeared too meagre and 
uncertain either to affect the economy or ease 
tensions. Even United States negotiators con-
ceded that Japanese pledges of improvements in 
trade balances were either below White House 
expectations or were too murky and tentative to 
be readily measured. It seems that both Japan 
and the United States had ignored two rules 
used in many US-USSR cold war summits: 
never commit leaders to negotiations until the 
main issues have been resolved, and remember 
that broad principles are important but that the 
devil is in the details. 
181. No doubt, the United States should con-
tinue its pressure to expand market access in 
areas where it has competitive products such as 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, car parts, medical 
equipment and software. But the real problem is 
elsewhere and other solutions are needed for a 
durable improvement to take place. It is well 
known that the United States, accusing Japan of 
market access restrictions, employs protective 
measures for many of its own agricultural pro-
ducts and has extracted " voluntary restraints " 
for the export from Japan of such products as 
textiles, televisions, steel and cars. Japan's 
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa has rightly 
pointed out that there are problems with Amer-
ica's management and work ethic. 
182. American specialists have also rightly 
pointed out that the United States may have to 
restructure its tax laws and financial markets in 
order to develop strong companies able to think 
long-term. Critics note that many of the United 
States' large companies have changed own-
ership, been reorganised and laid off employees 
so often that they do not have the company 
loyalty, experienced people or capital compa-
rable to Japanese standards, which are first 
requirements to be able to compete. 
183. Understandably, the early reactions from 
the EC were critical, and a Commission 
spokesman made it known that certain elements 
in the United States-Japan agreement " might be 
discriminatory against non-signatories of the 
agreement, notably involving the purchase of 
United States cars and car parts." The Com-
mission further said that it had no problem with 
bilateral agreements, but that it wanted compa-
rable agreements with Japan. 
184. Later, when Japanese officials were in 
Brussels to provide the EC with details of 
Tokyo's recent agreement with the United 
States, the Commission warned Japan not to 
strike bilateral deals with the United States that 
might lose the EC its toehold in the Japanese 
market and raise its trade deficit with Japan. 
According to Japanese statistics, the EC deficit 
rose from $18 billion in 1990 to $27 billion in 
1991. 
185. The Commission conceded that the cause 
of the EC's rising deficit with Japan lay more 
with the nature of the goods traded and the 
structure of the Japanese market than with the 
relatively few specific tariffs and obstacles Japan 
still imposes on imports. Half of the EC deficit 
stems from Japanese exports of mass-market 
cars, telecommunications, electronic data-pro-
cessing and components. Successful EC exports 
to Japan such as luxury cars, high-value textiles 
and alcohol are much more sensitive to fluctua-
tions in the economy. 
186. It appears that in a number of their trade 
disputes with Japan, the United States and 
Europe have common interests and the best way 
out would certainly be to negotiate common 
solutions through global trade talks in the 
framework of GATT. 
B. Security in East Asia 
187. A quite different, but at least equally 
serious subject is security in the Pacific and East 
Asia, where the United States is playing an 
important role in maintaining the balance of 
power. During the cold war, with a permanent 
thr~at of communist expansion, the heavy 
Umted States presence in Asia was primarily 
based on the presumption that stability in that 
region was in the United States' own interest. 
This basic idea did not change with the end of 
the cold war, even if the security environment 
has since improved. 
188. At present, North Korea's nuclear pro-
gramme is causing concern inside and outside 
Asia. In particular, Japan has expressed uneas-
iness about North Korean ballistic missiles. No 
doubt Japan is in a position to help promote 
stabilisation in North Korea by helping it to 
develop its economy and it has contributed to 
improving relations between the two Koreas. 
189. But there is also China with a number of 
internal political problems by no means yet 
settled and unrest at its frontiers with now inde-
pendent former Soviet republics due to ethnic 
strife and migration. Moreover, the long-term 
consequences of growing Chinese economic 
power for regional stability cannot easily be pre-
dicted. 
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190. The Russian Federation with its vast ter-
ritory in Asia will continue to have an influence 
in the region and it will remain a source of 
ins~abli!Y as long as the many ethnic and terri-
tonal disputes have not been settled. Cambodia 
where a fragile peace process has been set i~ 
motion, is still a potential powder keg for the 
Indochinese region. In the whole Asian region 
the United States has still some 130 000 troops' 
deployed mainly in Japan and South Korea. ' 
191. The Defence Se~retary, Richard Cheney, 
h~s declared t~at h~ did not expect further sig-
mficant reductions ID Asia or the Pacific for the 
time being after the 12% reduction in American 
forces in Japan and South Korea untl the end of 
1992. Some adjus~ments are being made, also 
be~~use. the Amencan~ have been told by the 
PhihppiDes that they will have to leave the Subic 
Bay naval base by the end of 1992. On the other 
hand, the United States now has agreements 
with Singa:pore giving their ships and fighter air-
craft the nght to port calls for operations and 
repair. "fhe same ~ilit~ calling rights are being 
sought ID Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. 
192. The question remains what the United 
State~ really has in mind for the future, knowing 
th.at Impor:tant cuts in the defence budget are 
still ahead ID the years to come. Will it retain its 
bilateral defence agreements in that area or will 
it try to forge a multilateral security system? 
193. Most Asians consider the American mil-
itary presence as vital for security in that region. 
Nevert~eless, the present downward pressure on 
~he U ~uted States defence budget is certain to 
IDtensify the debate over United States troops 
ab.road including those in Asia and the Pacific. 
Sti~, at the moment it seems unlikely that the 
Umted States will close its military bases in 
Jap~ and. South Kore~ which are part of long-
standiDg bilateral secunty treaties. It is generally 
agreed that a United States military disen-
gagement from East Asia under present circum-
stances might create a dangerous power 
vacuum. 
194. Nevertheless, United States relations with 
Japan and its other allies in that area also need 
to be redefined because of the great changes that 
have taken place in their economic relations. 
M~intaining .redefined bilateral security com-
mit!Dents with Its ~ong-standing allies, the 
Umted States could stimulate the establishment 
of a regional forum on security, including China 
and Russia which could address issues such as 
arms limitation and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, similar to what the CSCE is trying to 
do in Europe. 
195. The United States would like Japan to be 
more helpful in international operations and in 
the Tokyo declaration both countries declared 
that in the next Gulf-like emergency the United 
States and Japan must act as fully co-operating 
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partners. But the Japanese constitution, which 
binds the self defence force strictly to the 
defence of national territory, has not yet been 
changed. In fact, the United States should be 
reluctant to stimulate the development of a 
stronger military capability in Japan. It would 
frighten other nations in that area and also be in 
complete contradiction with the general con-
viction in many nations that arms control is a 
better policy for enhancing security than 
re-armament. It would also neglect the fact that 
since the second world war Japan has con-
sciously managed to limit the role of its armed 
forces to mininimum requirements. 
196. In the 1970s and 1980s, Japan streng-
thened its military capabilities to cope with the 
perceived Soviet military threat. It did so, 
however, in close liaison with the United States, 
which, since the second world war, has had a 
considerable military presence in East Asia for 
reasons mentioned above. At the end of 1991, 
the United States had more than 40 000 troops 
stationed in Japan. 
197. Since the Japanese constitution forbids 
recourse to war unless it is to protect Japanese 
home territory against attack, it has no offensive 
weapons such as nuclear arms, long-range 
bombers, aircraft carriers or large landing ships 
in its arsenal. 
198. At the moment, it has neither the capa-
bility nor the motivation to try to achieve a mili-
tarily dominant position in East Asia. 
199. While the authorised number of military 
service personnel is 274 000, the actual number 
in 1991 was only 234 000. The navy has 170 
ships, the largest of them 60 destroyers, and 14 
diesel-electric submarines. The air force has 330 
advanced jet fighters but it has no capacity for 
in-flight refuelling. 
200. In January 1992, Japan's Prime Minister 
announced that the government was considering 
cuts in its defence forces in response to the end 
of the cold war and the reductions in United 
States and former Soviet military forces. He said 
that the defence agency had started a review of 
personnel and hardware which could lead to cuts 
in the mid-1990s. The government has proposed 
to raise defence spending in the financial year 
starting in April by 3.8%, the lowest increase in 
over 30 years. 
X. The earth summit 
201. While much attention is being paid to 
political and economic problems in Central and 
Eastern Europe, one easily gets the impression 
that the even greater problems of the developing 
countries have almost been forgotten. Yet, the 
transatlantic relationship could also be used to 
forge solutions for important problems which 
can be dealt with only at world level. One 
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example is the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) or 
Earth Summit, to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 
June 1992, where 140 nations will meet. 
202. In preparation for this summit, negoti-
ators from 143 countries have reached 
agreement on the text of a global warming treaty 
which commits the participating nations to 
reduce the amount of carbon dioxide and other 
so-called greenhouse gases emitted by their 
industries and vehicles. However, the treaty 
does not set specific targets to be met by govern-
ments because of the refusal of the United 
States, the world's largest emitter of carbon 
dioxide, to accept such targets. Together, the 
industrialised nations produce three-quarters of 
the world's carbon dioxide emissions. The 
United States is opposing quantitative targets 
and timetables as proposed by the EC for emis-
sions of carbon dioxide and other gases respon-
sible for global warming because it believes that 
stabilisation by 2000 would damage its economy 
which is heavily dependent on fossil fuels. On 
the other hand, industrialised nations are still 
reluctant to give developing countries prefer-
ential non-commercial access to technology 
which would enable them to solve pollution 
problems in their expanding industry. 
203. The UNCED estimates that the global 
action plan for environmental protection to be 
agreed upon in Rio de Janeiro will cost some 
$ 130 billion, mainly to be paid for by the 
industrialised countries in the Northern hemi-
sphere. It should however be said here that the 
same group of nations has been spending about 
70% of the world's arms expenditure. Bearing 
this in mind, it could be argued that savings 
resulting from defence budget cuts should at 
least partly be used for this global action plan. 
204. In a wider framework, there is also great 
scope for improving trade relations between 
industrialised and developing nations. As has 
been noted earlier, almost 28% of all the imports 
of developed countries from developing coun-
tries are subject to non-tariff barriers. Moreover, 
the UNDP estimates that only 7% of all exports 
from developing countries can be traded in full 
accordance with GATT regulations. 
205. For these and many other related 
problems, solutions may not come easily, but 
there seems to be no way out other than through 
positive co-operation between the industrialised 
nations where both the EC, the United States 
and Japan could give the lead if they are serious 
in their declared policy to improve living condi-
tions for the world's population. 
XI. Financial and humanitarian aid to the CIS 
206. While there can be little disagreement 
over the_ question whether the now independent 
republics which used to be part of the Soviet 
Union need help, there is no common opinion 
on what kind of help they need and even less 
about how much. It is a thorny issue for which 
the United States has been less eager than 
Eu~ope to provid~ fina!lcial. support. Clearly, the 
Umted States ts pnmanly concerned with 
security issues related to the control of nuclear 
arms on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union. 
207. The United States administration seems 
very reluctant to offer significant financial help 
to the Russian republic in its current state of 
uncertainty and economic collapse. On 12th 
March 1992 President Bush, defending his 
policy towards Russia against allegations made 
by former President Richard Nixon said that the 
United States was going through a period of con-
strained resources. He further said that he sup-
ported the idea of contributing to an interna-
tional stabilisation fund for the Russian rouble, 
but that his advisers were still reviewing the 
matter. Apparently, Washington does not want 
to spend much money in a country where 
nobody knows what is going to happen next. It 
might turn out to be a gamble which will be 
criticised at home. 
208. On the other hand, the United States has 
been very strong in public relations. On 22nd 
and 23rd January it organised an international 
conference on aid to the former Soviet Union 
republics in Washington. 
209. At the occasion of the Washington con-
ference, the European Commission published an 
inventory of foreign aid to the former Soviet 
Union republics since September 1990. Of all 
foreign non-private aid, the EC and its member 
states provided 7 5% with Germany in the lead 
position, having pledged $45.8 billion or 57%. 
The United States was providing 5. 7% and 
J~pan 3.1%. The total amount of aid promised 
smce September 1990 was $79.8 billion, which 
included all different types of public aid such as 
emergency aid (food and drugs), technical 
assistance, support for balance of payment 
export credits and credit guarantees, the two last 
accounting for almost half of all promised aid. 
210. The German total included $8.4 billion 
for the withdrawal of Soviet army troops from 
former East Germany and the construction of 
temporary housing for them back home. The 
argument used by United States officials and 
others that this part of Germany's financial 
effort should not be considered as aid because it 
was pledged in exchange for Moscow's consent 
to German unification does not seem to be fully 
justified. All nations, including the United 
States, that committed financial resources to 
help the former Soviet republics did it also for 
reasons of self interest. The purpose of all aid is 
to prevent chaos and to support a smooth tran-
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sition to truly democratic government and an 
open market economy in order to maintain 
peace in a region with a high potential of dan-
gerous crises. 
211. When, in December 1991, the United 
States proposed holding an international con-
ference to discuss how best to meet ongoing 
humanitarian needs over the course of the next 
year in the republics of the defunct Soviet 
Union, European countries reacted with mixed 
feelings. In particular Germany, by far the 
largest donor, and France were upset about what 
they saw as Washington's bid to get the political 
kudos for an aid programme mostly funded by 
others. 
212. In the EC, it had not yet been forgotten 
that the United States did not respond when its 
president proposed an international conference 
on aid to the same republics in the context of the 
Group of Seven in September 1991. It was noted 
that the EC Commission was charged two years 
ago with the co-ordination of international aid 
programmes for reforming East European 
nations but that the United States, while partici-
pating in the programme, had been slow to 
commit funds. 
213. It was also said that in July 1991, when 
France and Germany had proposed providing 
speedy international assistance in credits and 
technology to prevent a collapse of Soviet oil 
and gas production, the United States was 
reluctant to respond positively. 
214. One of the United States administration's 
objectives for the conference was to win 
approval for NATO to become a clearing-house 
for emergency aid, keeping track of aid delivery 
and trying to match donors' offers with the 
needs of different localities. This, it was thought, 
could give new political visibility to the military 
organisation. 
215. All in all, the run up to the aid conference 
was a new demonstration of the uneasiness and 
hesitation among western allies to react ade-
quately to the changes which have taken place 
since the cold war. Flexible relations, adapted to 
the new international environment are still in 
the making. The end of the cold war might well 
lead to lesser United States influence on devel-
opments in Europe and a weightier Western 
Europe with a new role for Germany in that 
framework. Presumably, it will take some time 
for such new relations to settle down. 
216. Under these circumstances, the Wash-
ington conference yielded only modest results. 
There was no agreement over which 
organisation should take the lead in the aid 
effort. At least an inventory was made of all the 
different aid operations under way and desired 
in food aid, medical aid, housing, energy and 
technical assistance. 
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217. Together with the United States, 
Germany proposed creating an international 
research centre which should employ the nuclear 
specialists of the CIS republics in order to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapon 
expertise. No decision was taken at that stage, 
but in March 1992 a firm decision, including 
financial commitments for the establishment of 
a resarch centre was taken. 
218. In order to follow up what will be done, 
after the Washington conference, a second con-
ference, organised by the EC, will ·be held in 
Lisbon in May 1992 and a third one, to be 
hosted by Japan, in the summer. 
219. Meeting in Brussels on 2nd March 1992, 
the European Community foreign ministers told 
the European Commission to allow the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to take the lead in 
organising macro-economic aid to former Soviet 
republics. 
220. Later, on 11th March 1992, the IMF 
announced that Russia alone needs about 
$12 billion in food donations, debt relief and 
other financing during 1992. Of this amount, $5 
billion are covered by existing commitments 
made by western nations. It also said that a $6 
billion rouble fund stabilisation would be 
needed with the objective of bolstering confi-
dence in the rouble and stabilising it when it is 
freely convertible. 
221. Taking the view that the IMF will provide 
too little help, and too late to prevent further 
economic and political destabilisation in key 
CIS republics, the Commission thinks that the 
EC should give the world the lead in stabilising 
the longer-term economic future of the CIS. It 
also thinks that the EC should widen the scope 
of the CIS aid conference which it will chair in 
Lisbon in May for it to deal with structural, not 
just emergency aid. 
222. Meanwhile, the EC finance ministers 
decided to let the IMF take the lead, admit 
Russia and the three larger members of the CIS 
in April and set the conditions for stabilising 
their economies. The ministers refused to soften 
their legal terms for the EC's pending food credit 
of ecu 1.25 billion to the CIS. Any CIS borrower 
must agree to submit to court action in the event . 
of default on repayment. Should Russia insist on 
its " sovereign immunity " from court action, 
the EC loan would go ahead to CIS republics 
which had agreed to waive this right. Settlement 
of the responsibility of the individual inde-
pendent republics of the CIS for past Soviet 
debt, totalling $68 billion by end-1991, was 
another EC precondition for new lending to the 
CIS republics. 
223. Early in March this year, former President 
Richard Nixon strongly criticised the United 
States administration for what he called its 
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pathetic support of the democratic revolution in 
Russia. He found the $3.75 billion in com-
mercial credits to buy American grain and a 
" photo-opportunity international conference of 
57 foreign secretaries that was long on rhetoric 
but short on action " inadequate, and the 
sending of 200 Peace Corps volunteers " mere 
tokenism " if applied to Russia. In a Senate 
hearing, the United States ambassador in 
Moscow, Robert Strauss, found it amazing that 
a subject as important as what the United States 
ought to be doing with respect to the republics of 
the former Soviet Union had not been the 
subject of an appreciable discussion at all. 
224. President George Bush, challenged by 
these declarations, responded that " we must 
find a way to square the responsibilities of world 
leadership with the requirements of domestic 
revival". He therefore preferred not to 
comment on the $1 billion United States contri-
bution to an international fund to stabilise the 
Russian rouble still being discussed in the 
administration and the $12 billion increase, pro-
posed by the administration but stuck in Con-
gress, in United States resources for the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund which would mainly be 
used for aid to Russia. 
225. At the end of March, however, the Bush 
administration had begun preparing a compre-
hensive aid package for the republics of the 
former Soviet Union, and in Congress political 
support for a major new aid programme had 
grown considerably after former President 
Nixon's outspoken comments. 
226. Germany has made serious efforts to 
reach agreement among the Group of Seven 
(G-7) industrialised nations of which it currently 
has the chairmanship on a comprehensive eco-
nomic aid programme for Russia before the next 
G-7 summit in Munich, in July 1992. Apart 
from the rouble stabilisation fund, it takes the 
view that western aid should be concentrated on 
agriculture, infrastructure and nuclear safety. At 
the same time, Germany will make a serious 
attempt to co-ordinate technical assistance in 
the G-7 framework in accordance with its con-
viction that aid competition between western 
nations should be avoided at all cost. 
227. In a dedicated attempt to win support for 
President Boris Yeltsin's economic reform pro-
gramme in Russia, the Group of Seven 
industrialised nations (G-7: Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States) announced on 1st April 
1992 that it had agreed on the outlines of a 
$24 billion aid package for Russia alone; $6 
billion for a rouble stabilisation fund and $18 
billion in aid over the next three years for Rus-
sia's balance of payment deficit. This aid pro-
gramme would be carried out by the World 
Bank, IMF and EBRD with the IMF as leading 
organisation. The new programme would be 
implemented in four phases: formal Russian 
membership of the IMF in April, final 
agreement between the Russian Government 
and the IMF on an economic adjustment pro-
gramme in May, the first credit tranches for the 
balance of payment deficit coming in June and 
the establishment of the rouble stabilisation 
fund this summer. Similar, but less expansive 
aid programmes would be offered to the other 
CIS republics in the near future. It was said that 
the United States would contribute a fifth to a 
quarter of the $24 billion, but there is uncer-
tainty over the details of this contribution. 
228. President Bush announced the partici-
pation of the United States in the G-7 and other 
aid efforts. However, the timing of his 
announcement coincided with a major 
statement on foreign policy by Bill Clinton, the 
most likely democratic candidate for presi-
dential elections. At the same time, the Pres-
ident tried to minimise the impact of the United 
States contribution on the United States budget. 
Mindful of strong public opposition to foreign 
aid, President Bush said that the new package 
was " not a tremendous amount of money " 
beyond credits which had been pledged earlier. 
Indeed, new financial engagements announced 
were said to amount to only $3 billion. 
229. A radiation leak at the Sosnovy Bor 
nuclear station near St. Petersburg on 24th 
March called attention to the major unsolved 
problem of nuclear reactors with questionable 
safety in Eastern Europe and especially in the 
former Soviet Union. Altogether, there are 58 
nuclear reactors operating in former Soviet ter-
ritory providing around 15% of the energy used 
in that region with another 27 under con-
struction. Of the 58 operating reactors, 16 are 
Chernobyl design light water gas-cooled 
reactors, called RBMKs. Some others are 
Koslody design, called VVER-230. 
230. According to the German environment 
minister, there is no alternative but to shut 
down all the RBMK reactors. Others insist that 
also the VVER-230 reactors should shut down. 
This would cause serious problems for many 
republics which have few alternative energy 
sources. 
231. The other solution would be to upgrade 
the salvageable reactors to western standards, 
while replacing those beyond repair, but the esti-
mated cost of this operation is believed to 
exceed $50 billion. 
232. Current programmes which the United 
States and EC have launched in an effort to 
reduce the danger at the most unsafe reactors 
are far too modest to even start solving the 
problem. The EC confirmed in 1991 that it 
would set aside around 50 million ecus to 
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improve nuclear safety in the former Soviet 
Union, of which 8 million ecus would be allo-
cated to the RBMKs and the rest to improving 
the VVER-230 reactors. 
233. A first worry of western allies has been to 
provide weapons scientists and engineers of the 
former Soviet Union, in particular those who 
possess the skills and knowledge related to 
weapons of mass destruction, with opportunities 
to redirect their talents to peaceful activities. 
This would also help to prevent such scientists 
contributing to the proliferation of such 
weaponry. 
234. Together with the Russian Federation, the 
EC, Japan and the United States have therefore 
decided to promote the establishment, in the 
Russian Federation, of an International Science 
and Technology Centre. Among other things, 
this centre would contribute to efforts to elim-
inate weapons of mass destruction and to 
support basic and applied research in environ-
mental protection, energy production and 
nuclear safety. While the United States and the 
EC have each pledged to contribute $25 million, 
Japan has not yet committed itself to a fixed 
amount. 
235. Some specialists in the United States say 
that the future of President Yeltsin's gov-
ernment is very uncertain, that his economic 
reform policy is not radical enough to guarantee 
positive results, or that there is still enough to be 
done at home before spending taxpayers' money 
abroad. All these ideas lead to the prevailing 
opinion that, at the moment, financial aid to the 
republics of the former Soviet Union should not 
be too generous. Even if Europeans share the 
opinion that, in the former Soviet Union, there 
is much administrative chaos and a lack of eco-
nomic reform, which has made them more cau-
tious in their aid programmes, they are in 
general less reluctant to provide financial aid for 
economic recovery. It may well be that peace 
and prosperity in that region is vital for 
Europe's security but Americans claim to share 
exactly the same opinion. 
236. The United States' plea that the West has 
a duty to respond to the historic opportunities 
created by the new Russian revolution, while 
stopping short of a commitment to substantial 
United States financial aid makes many Euro-
peans feel weary. In fact, the State Department 
prefers to call it "collective engagement". 
237. However, if there is a sincere conviction 
in the United States that it should provide sub-
stantial assistance to the former Soviet republics 
in all possible ways and if it was prepared to pay 
for it in accordance with the size of its economy 
and the scale of its political ambitions, the best 
solution for the allied countries united in the 
G-7 would be to co-ordinate their efforts to the 
full in the framework of the G-7 or of the Group 
of 10 avoiding any national competition. 
DOCUMENT 1310 
XII. NATO and European security 
238. To put it simply, NATO was invented to 
guarantee security for Western Europe, in par-
ticular to keep the Americans in, the Soviets out 
and the Germans down. With the cold war over 
and economic relations changed, these basic 
assumptions for NATO have been turned com-
pletely upside down. 
239. The Soviet Union no longer exists and 
communism has been renounced as a viable 
system for developing a modem and compet-
itive society and the ex-Soviet troops are being 
withdrawn from the territory of the ex-Warsaw 
Pact allies. Germany has become an economic 
power with world-wide trade connections and it 
is fully integrated into the European and allied 
framework. The two post-war parts of the 
country have been reunited but the financial and 
other efforts required to bring the eastern part 
up to western standards should not be underesti-
mated; they will continue to cause immense 
problems for the next ten to fifteen years. In 
general, Western European nations which have 
acquired considerable economic power through 
the increasing co-ordination of their economic 
policy through the EC are far more self-con-
fident. Meanwhile, the United States is strug-
gling with an economic recession and consid-
erable budget problems. It has decided to 
withdraw some of its troops from Europe and, 
apparently, the end of these troop reductions is 
not yet in sight. 
240. At the Rome summit in November 1991, 
a serious effort has been made to adapt NATO 
to the entirely new security environment in 
Europe. In the Rome Declaration, it was 
recognised that: 
" The challenges we will face in this 
new Europe cannot be comprehensively 
addressed by one institution alone, but 
only in a framework of interlocking insti-
tutions tying together the countries of 
Europe and North America. Conse-
quently, we are working toward a new 
European security architecture in which 
NATO, the CSCE, the European Com-
munity, WEU and the Council of Europe 
complement each other. " 
241. Regarding the European security identity 
and defence role, it was stated among other 
things: 
" The development of a European security 
identity and defence role, reflected in the 
further strengthening of the European 
pillar within the alliance, will reinforce 
the integrity and effectiveness of the 
Atlantic alliance. The enhancement of the 
role and responsibility of the European 
members is an important basis for the 
transformation of the alliance... We 
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welcome the perspective of a rein-
forcement of the role ofWEU, both as the 
defence component of the process of 
European unification and as a means of 
strengthening the European pillar of the 
alliance, bearing in mind the different 
nature of its relations with the alliance 
and with the European political union." 
242. A North Atlantic Co-operation Council 
has been established where not only Foreign and 
Defence Ministers but also officials on different 
other levels of NATO and Central and Eastern 
European countries can meet, in the first place 
to salvage the CFE Treaty. Other issues such as 
conversion, relations between military and 
civilians, defence planning and defence budget 
control are also being discussed and there have 
already been several meetings in this framework. 
All European NATO member states have fully 
and wholeheartedly agreed with the results of 
the Rome summit. This has not altered the fact 
that they will continue to follow up their logical 
desire to complete their increased economic 
power with more liberty, to take their political 
destiny in the world in their own hands and to 
determine their own future in the framework of 
the European Union. 
243. It should be noted here that recent devel-
opments after the Rome summit have raised the 
question of whether it would not be useful to 
make a new, more detailed, threat analysis and 
an adapted common assessment of the instru-
ments required to face these threats, making use 
of the full array of " interlocking institutions 
tying together the countries of Europe and 
North America" as expressed in the Rome Dec-
laration. 
244. At the moment there may be reasons why 
the traditional American engagement in Europe 
will diminish. There are sound economic con-
siderations of cost effectiveness, not isola-
tionism, which motivate both Democratic and 
Republican voters and legislators to redistribute 
economic means. The United States adminis-
tration will try to continue a long-standing 
policy of military and political engagement in 
Europe as long as possible, but if the United 
States cannot afford to continue its military 
presence and to provide sufficient economic and 
financial support to Central and Eastern Europe, 
the political influence is bound to wane since 
these are complementary elements that can be 
effective only in combination. 
245. Such a development would be a natural 
consequence of changing parameters in the 
geostrategic context. There is no reason 
therefore to perceive it as a dramatic devel-
opment in transatlantic relations which some try 
to deny or ignore and for which others, feeling 
ashamed that it may happen, are trying to find a 
culprit. It would be far better to discuss such 
possible future developments openly, without 
finger-pointing, in order to manage smoothly a 
gradual process and forestall sudden surprises. 
246. Mention should be made here of an inter-
esting development which clearly shows the pos-
itive attitude of the European allies in shoul-
dering more responsibilities and reinforcing the 
links between the Atlantic allies. France and 
Germany have now reached agreement on the 
further development of their Eurocorps project 
involving significant concessions on both sides 
which meet long-term United States objectives 
of getting France more involved in NATO and 
securing German support for multinational 
operations outside Europe. French officials have 
agreed to German demands that a binational 
force of about 25 000 soldiers should come 
under the operational control of NATO head-
quarters in the event of war in NA TO's 
European heartland. Bonn and Paris hope to 
add units from other European WEU members 
and build a defence cornerstone for European 
political unity. 
247. The new military unit would have three 
basic missions: 
- to respond to aggression against allied 
territory under Article 5 of the Treaty 
of Washington (NATO) and Article V 
of the modified Brussels Treaty 
(WEU); 
- to operate in order to maintain or re-
establish peace; 
- to provide humanitarian assistance 
abroad. 
XIII. Global protection 
against limited strikes (GPALS) 
248. In 1983, President Reagan surprised 
many specialists on nuclear strategy with his 
sensational strategic defence initiative (SDI). 
With this programme and the accompanying 
necessary research effort, the President 
envisaged forcing a technological breakthrough 
in the field of energy weapons and the high-
performance computers. The main objective of 
a partly space-based system was to provide a 
world-wide, leak-proof protective umbrella 
against intercontinental ballistic missiles. The 
President also argued that an anti-ballistic 
missile system, according to many a violation of 
the 1972 IBM Treaty, if shared by all traditional 
nuclear powers, would enhance security in the 
world. Mutual nuclear deterrence would lose its 
sense and give way to a positive protection 
against mass destruction. The United States pro-
posals to its NATO allies and the Soviet Union 
to co-operate in SDI met with a lukewarm and 
mostly negative response and international 
co-operation in this framework was a failure. As 
years went by, the SDI programme was continu-
239 
DOCUMENT 1310 
ously adjusted, inter alia for technological and 
financial reasons. Later, when the Soviet Union 
responded very positively in negotiations over 
the control of nuclear weapons and a massive 
nuclear attack appeared unlikely, the original 
scheme and objective were quietly abandoned 
while the research programme continued to 
receive funding. 
249. With the Gulf war in full operation, the 
United States administration seized the oppor-
tunity to present a detailed proposal for a newly-
adapted SDI programme, called GPALS, or 
global protection against limited strikes. At that 
time, Israel, Saudi Arabia and coalition troops 
were the target of Scud missile attacks launched 
by the Iraqi armed forces and all the frantic 
efforts made to destroy incoming Scuds with 
Patriot missiles which were then said to be 
extremely successful, subsequently appeared to 
have been successful examples of psychological 
warfare. 
250. The main reason for unveiling the GPALS 
initiative was that the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles was perceived to be a threat to the 
United States territory and also to United States 
forces stationed overseas as well as allies and 
friends of the United States. Currently, eighteen 
countries possess a ballistic missile capability 
and the United States ventures that the figure 
could be twenty-four nations by the year 2000. 
251. At an initial total estimated cost of $45 
billion and an estimated operational cost of $5 
billion a year, GPALS would consist of three dif-
ferent layers: the first dedicated to defence 
against theatre or tactical ballistic missiles, the 
second against strategic ballistic missiles and the 
third against ballistic missiles with ranges 
greater than several hundred miles. The dif-
ferent elements of the system would be: 
- a mobile system of ground radars and 
antimissile missiles, called theatre 
missile defence which can be deployed 
temporarily or permanently in crisis 
areas all over the world; 
- a system of 7 50 missiles, of two dif-
ferent types, £21 or GB 1, deployed on 
United States territory to protect the 
United States against a limited strike of 
100 or 200 nuclear warheads at the 
most; this system will be supported by 
ground radars, optical sensors and 
" Brilliant Eyes " satellites; 
- a system of 1 000 space-based weapons, 
called " Brilliant Pebbles ", which will 
destroy automatically any missile in 
space within their reach. 
252. The Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, has 
already declared that his country is prepared to 
participate in the GP ALS programme and that 
Russia, while wishing to maintain the ABM 
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Treaty, is prepared to consider changing the 
treaty if such changes could reinforce stability in 
the world. It is said that Russian participation 
could indeed make a positive contribution to the 
programme, among others in the field of space-
based nuclear power reactors, which the United 
States badly needs for its ballistic missile 
defence systems. 
253. This was confirmed when the United 
States authorised the purchase of a Russian 
Topaz 11 space nuclear reactor, together with 
some kilogrammes of plutonium 238 for space 
power supplies and four thrusters for 
manoeuvring space vehicles to a total amount of 
$14.3 million. The reactor would be bought by 
the Department of Defence and located at the 
University of New Mexico for experiments. In a 
comment on the purchase, the White House 
spokesman said - ironically or not - " these 
transactions clearly signal our desire to 
normalise trade with the new states ", adding 
that the Topaz 11 "will give us access to new 
technology at a significantly lower cost than if 
we were to try to develop it ourselves. " 
254. At the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich 
in February 1992, Vice-President Quayle urged 
the European allies to co-operate actively in the 
development and deployment of GP ALS 
because ballistic missiles constitute a greater 
potential threat for Europe than for the United 
States. According to United States estimates, at 
the end of this decade some fifteen third world 
countries would be able to produce their own 
nuclear weapons. This estimate may be slightly 
exaggerated, but it should be admitted that there 
is a proliferation of ballistic missile technology 
and it is extremely difficult to establish a leak-
proof world-wide regime to stop or control this 
proliferation. In that framework, it should be 
examinedd whether GP ALS could be one of the 
cornerstones of a non-proliferation policy. 
255. It should be noted, however, that enthu-
siasm in the United States Congress for costly 
strategic and theatre missile defences is fast 
diminishing. According to the General 
Accounting Office, using estimates of the SDI 
organisation, it has been found that the cost of 
building GP ALS and continuing related 
advanced technology work would be $110 
billion until 2005, of which $20 billion have 
been spent prior to 1991. It is very unlikely that 
the proposed 31% increase for SDI and related 
theatre and tactical missile defence programmes 
as asked by the administration for the fiscal year 
1993 budget will be granted. Important budget 
cut proposals have already been put forward in 
both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate (see chapter V, paras 108 and 109). 
256. Congress will certainly question the 
administration on the effectiveness of the tech-
nologies being developed and on the cost-benefit 
ratio. It will also wish to assess how serious the 
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ballistic missile threat is compared to others. In 
the budget debate, the GP ALS programme will 
have to compete with many other major defence 
programmes which are under threat. 
257. In response to United States efforts to sell 
participation in the GP ALS programme to its 
European allies, France was the first to give a 
straight answer. 
258. Mter initial talks in Washington, France 
announced that it will increase its co-operation 
with the United States in military space ques-
tions, but it stressed that this decision has 
nothing to do with GP ALS, which France con-
siders to be the result of a still not well-defined 
strategic concept. 
259. France is opposing OPALS, saying that 
the development of such a system will sharpen 
the differences between North and South or 
between the developed and the developing coun-
tries. Another argument, used less openly, is that 
OPALS might be capable of neutralising the 
French strategic nuclear force and thus consid-
erably diminish France's influence and credi-
bility as an independent leading country with its 
own policy in the Middle East and Mrica. 
260. Other NATO countries have reacted cau-
tiously and most of them have asked for more 
information. 
261. Questions are being asked which sound 
familiar from earlier SDI discussions. What is 
the use of a limited protection which offers little 
defence against missiles launched from subma-
rines, requiring full control of complicated high 
technology or against poor man's delivery 
systems such as the "suitcase"? Will it really 
reduce the risks caused by proliferation and, if 
only partial, would that justify the high cost of 
the system? Will allies be prepared to pay large 
amounts for the development of high technol-
ogies if they are not to be allowed to share the 
key technologies of a new system? Will partners 
of the United States in the programme have full 
and instantaneous access to GP ALS data on 
missile activity? Whose interests will be served 
first in a global system with participants who do 
not always agree on objectives and solutions? 
262. If GP ALS is meant to prevent emerging 
countries from developing and building a 
missile system to guarantee their own security, 
what can be done to satisfy the legitimate 
security requirements of these nations? Would 
the ultimate solution be to try to convince 
nations which are now developing their own bal-
listic missile system to participate in multilateral 
or world-wide agreements to eliminate such mis-
siles? Or would the only way be to knock out 
their capabilities in such areas by military force, 
as Israel once did when it destroyed Iraq's 
Osirah reactor in 1981 and as is being con-
sidered once again regarding Iraq? 
263: ~he existing non-proliferation treaty will 
expire m 1995 and early negotiations have been 
start~d f~r renewing it. This will not be easy if 
the. aim IS to ~ave an effective non-proliferation 
regime. The mterests of all nations concerned 
will have to be re-examined. In that framework 
it may be useful to recall here some parts of the 
proposal made by Bernard Baruch, United 
States representative to the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission, at the first meeting 
of that Commission on 14th June 1947. Mr. 
Baruch announced that the United States Gov-
ernment would propose the creation of an inter-
national Atomic Development Authority (ADA) 
to which would be entrusted all phases of the 
development and use of atomic energy. Among 
other things, he said: 
"We must provide the mechanism to 
assure that atomic energy is used for 
peaceful purposes and to preclude its use 
for war. To that end we must provide 
immediate, swift, and sure punishment of 
those who violate the agreements reached 
by the nations. Penalisation is essential if 
peace is to be more than a feverish 
interlude between wars... When an ade-
quate system for control of atomic energy 
including renunciation of the bomb as ~ 
weapon, has been agreed upon and put 
into effective operation, and condign pun-
ishments set up for violations of rules of 
control, we propose that (1) manufacture 
of atomic bombs shall stop; (2) existing 
bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to 
the terms of the treaty; and (3) the 
Authority shall be in possession of full 
information as to the ' know-how ' for the 
production of atomic energy ... There must 
be no veto to protect those who violate 
their solemn agreements not to develop or 
use atomic energy for destructive pur-
poses." 
At present, these words still are topical. 
264. The last question to be asked here is if 
Europe should consider to build its own limited 
anti-ballistic missile capability in order to 
protect its southern flank? 
265. In June 1991, the Assembly adopted Rec-
ommendation 501, in which it recommended 
that the Council 
" Instruct the Committee of Chiefs of 
Defence Staff of WEU to examine in 
detail the consequences of future allied 
force structures and the lessons of the 
Gulf war for European military co-
?peration, in particular with a view to study-
mg (among other subjects) the ballistic 
missile threat on Europe's southern flank 
and a possible subsequent common Euro-
pean requirement for an anti-ballistic mis-
sile capability." 
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266. In its reply to the recommendation com-
municated to the Assembly on 12th November 
1991, the Council stated: 
"The Ministerial Council on 27th June 
1991 in Vianden tasked the WEU 
Defence Representatives Group to 'spell 
out and assess, in liaison with the Special 
Working Group, proposals to make 
co-operation more operational both in the 
politico-military field as well as in the mil-
it~ry field proper, covering among other 
thmgs tasks and the requirements for 
co-ordination and planning structures'. In 
this framework, the structures and the 
lessons of the Gulf war will be con-
sidered." 
267. Since then, the Assembly has received no 
further news regarding the Council's opinion on 
the ballistic missile threat to Europe's southern 
flank and a possible subsequent common 
European requirement for an anti-ballistic 
missile capability. In view of the United States 
invitation to p~icipate in GPALS, it may be 
useful to establish a common European opinion 
and response in the WEU framework. 
XIV. Canada 
268. In a major statement in September 1991 
the Canadian Minister of National Defence' 
Marcel Masse, announced the result of Canada'~ 
Defence Policy Review, which led to consid-
erable reductions in Canada's armed forces. The 
minister said that his country would continue to 
adhere to its long-standing priorities in the 
defence field, in particular: 
- defence, sovereignty and civil responsi-
bilities in Canada; 
- collective defence arrangements 
through NATO, including Canada's 
continental defence partnership with 
the United States; 
- international peace and security 
throu~ stability and peace-keeping 
operations, arms control verification 
and humanitarian assistance. 
269. He gave assurances that there was no 
question of contemplating a less than total com-
mitment to NATO and he hoped that Canada 
would continue to participate in the collective 
defenc~ an:angements emerging across the 
Atlantic. With regard to developments in the 
international situation it was considered both 
necessary and possible to reduce the number of 
Canadian troops in Germany, but a limited 
number of forces would be maintained there. 
270. As the Prime Minister declared in Berlin 
on 14th June 1991: "Canada will not be with-
drawing completely from Europe. Canadian 
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forces will remain as long as there is a residual 
threat to European and Canadian security and 
as long as we are needed and welcome. " At that 
time, Canadian forces in Europe had a military 
strength of approximately 6 600 and a civilian 
work force of approximately 4 400 employees, 
of which about 2 600 were paid from public 
funds. Of the 4 400 civilians, approximately 
3 100 were Canadians and the remainder were 
Europeans. 
271. The 1991 Defence Review directed that, 
before 1995, Canada would reduce its military 
force in Germany to approximately 1 100. The 
withdrawal of Canadian forces in Europe was to 
be a two step process whereby Canada's com-
mitment of land ana air divisions would first be 
reduced to a brigade and an air group with an 
interim strength of approximately 2 500 to 3 500 
in 1992-93. Major combat units would be with-
drawn by 1994. Thereafter, the Canadian forces 
base in Baden-Soellingen will close in 1994 and 
the Canadian forces base in Lahr in 1995. 
272. According to the Prime Minister, Canada 
would maintain in Europe a task force of 1 100 
troops, whose role and location would be deter-
mined after consultations with allies and NATO 
authorities. 
273. Only a few months later, the 1992 federal 
budget brought new reductions in defence 
expenditure with consequences for Canada's 
commitments in Europe. The budget brings 
forward by a year the closure of two military 
bases in Germany: the Baden-Soellingen base 
will now close in 1993 and the Lahr base in 
1994. In addition, the budget has cancelled the 
undertaking to maintain a task force of about 
1 100 troops in Europe. However, Canada will 
retain the capability to send contingency forces, 
stationed in Canada, consisting of a brigade 
group and two squadrons of CF-18s, anywhere 
in the world, including to Europe, should the 
need arise. At the Defence Ministry, it was 
stressed that all Canada's other commitments to 
NATO and Europe will be respected: a battalion 
of Canadian forces will be prepared to deploy 'to 
Norway with the Allied Command Europe 
mobile force (Land) or the composite force, 
Canadian aircrew will continue to serve aboard 
the AWACS ofNATO's airborne early warning 
force, Canadian destroyers and frigates will con-
tinue to sail with the standing naval force 
Atlantic, other Canadian maritime forces will 
still patrol the North Atlantic and support of 
allied training in Canada will continue. 
274. Finally, it was stressed that Canada would 
continue its strong support of ongoing peace-
keeping operations and observer missions. It 
would also continue to maintain standby forces 
for participation in other multilateral peace-
keeping tasks. These standby forces, which nor-
mally would be in addition to personnel already 
involved in ongoing peace-keeping activities, 
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include a battalion, along with associated com-
munications and air transport elements. It was 
noted that Canada has served in every United 
Nations peace-keeping operation to date, and is 
currently serving in 13 peace-keeping missions, 
plus the CSCE-sponsored, EC-led, monitoring 
mission that is currently underway in Yugo-
slavia. 
275. As could have been expected, NATO was 
concerned about this new strain on transatlantic 
relations. It has asked Canada to drop its plans 
to withdraw all its troops from Europe. Failing 
this, NATO believed it should agree to earmark 
certain home-based forces for the defence of 
Europe in case of crisis. However, NATO had 
little hope that any positive results would be 
achieved. 
276. This can only be confirmed by the com-
mittee's experience in discussions with 
Canadian parliamentarians, who were far more 
concerned with problems in fishery and agri-
culture than with defence and security. All 
political parties represented in parliament 
agreed on the withdrawal of Canadian troops 
from Europe but they argued that this should 
not be seen as disengagement from NATO, to 
which they still feel strongly committed. It was 
thought that apart from NATO, a useful role in 
maintaining peace in Europe could be played by 
WEU, CSCE and the United Nations while 
many important changes were taking place in 
Central and Eastern Europe. Ideas were not very 
articulate about complementarity, co-ordination 
and how each of these organisations should play 
its own role. Europe would certainly have to 
take more responsibilities in guaranteeing its 
own security but that should not lead to the 
exclusion of its transatlantic partners from the 
discussion on these issues. 
277. Both parliament and government in 
Canada stressed that the process of deepening 
and widening European co-operation and inte-
gration could not replace the transatlantic ties. 
The opportunity NATO offered for sitting at the 
same table with European nations to discuss all 
important security issues was highly valued in 
Canada. 
278. At. the Ministry of External Affairs it 
was stressed that transatlantic relations were 
extremely important for Canada in order to 
prevent the emergence of a world with different 
inward-looking continents. Constructive multi-
and bilateral relationships should therefore be 
maintained. In particular, Canada's links with 
NATO, CSCE and the EC are important. At the 
end of the cold war, Canada recognised at an 
early stage that the balance in NATO's activities 
would shift from military to more political activ-
ities and it claims to have played a leading role 
in the negotiations which led to NA TO's 
London and Rome declarations. It strongly sup-
ports the NACC, which is closely attending to 
the process of ratifying and implementing the 
CFE Treaty. Canada considers the development 
of a European defence identity to be a logical 
consequence of Europe's efforts towards inte-
gration. It understands that this should lead to a 
stronger and more coherent European voice in 
NATO, but at the same time it hopes that this 
development will always be complementary to 
and not competitive with NATO. In this respect, 
Canada was satisfied with the decisions taken in 
Maastricht, where transparency and comple-
mentarity were key words for relations between 
NATO and WEU. Finally, the view was 
expressed that Canada is strongly in favour of 
improving conflict prevention instruments in 
the framework of CSCE. 
279. In trying to draw a conclusion from 
Canada's current attitude, it is difficult not to be 
critical, notwithstanding the conviction that 
Canadians have been deeply involved in liber-
ating Europe from fascist rule. During the 
second world war and the cold war Canada dem-
onstrated its close commitment to Europe's 
security. It seems, however, that the current 
painful budget problems have caused an illogical 
change in its long-standing direct link with 
Europe's security. With a full retreat of 
Canadian troops, it no longer makes much sense 
for Europeans to maintain the supporting infra-
structure for a long time. Under such circum-
stances, even the minimum level of symbolic 
presence no longer exists notwithstanding · 
pledges that contingency forces stationed in 
Canada could be sent anywhere in the world, 
including to Europe, should the need arise. One 
cannot but think that the determination not to 
be excluded from discussions and decisions on 
security in Europe is not matched by the same 
degree of military engagement. Sooner or later, 
this kind of anomaliy undermines the credibility 
of a country's policy. 
XV. Conclusions 
280. In the present report, an effort has been 
made to examine a number of issues which are 
at the moment pl~ying a role in relations 
between the transatlantic partners. Some of the 
issues, such as the role of different alliances and 
institutions for security in Europe, are discussed 
in more detail in the report on a new European 
security order by Mr. Caro, also on behalf of the 
Political Committee. 
281. It should be noted that the task of the 
rapporteur has not been facilitated by the fact 
that 1992 is a presidential election year in the 
United States, which has a strong impact on the 
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political debate. Even foreign and security 
policy issues are often reduced to marginal 
items, only to be assessed on their consequences 
for purely domestic policy and for the taxpayers' 
burden. This factor does not contribute posi-
tively to a balanced debate and the Rapporteur 
is aware of this. On the other hand, the com-
mittee has been able to discuss transatlantic 
relations with officials who are less exposed to 
the direct heat of the domestic political debate, 
which enabled them to provide a more balanced 
and thoughtful opinion on the current state of 
transatlantic relations. 
282. A false note in the committee's visit to 
Washington was, as usual, the lack of a serious 
discussion with Congressmen. Especially now 
that many of them are making sensational state-
ments on the links between trade and security, 
the American military presence in Europe and 
other related issues, an exchange of views at par-
liamentary level would have been useful. 
283. At this juncture in history, an intensive 
debate between the Atlantic partners on the 
development of their relationship is needed 
more than ever. The dust of more than forty 
years of cold war thinking should be brushed off 
and, in close co-operation, innovative solutions 
should be found for the many problems we are 
facing together. 
284. Although in this report, the approach to 
some issues may be frank, it should not be inter-
preted as being negative. On the contrary, it is 
thought that possible tensions in the long-
standing Atlantic relationship can be averted or 
neutralised only if the causes, possible conse-
quences and related issues are discussed in an 
atmosphere of openness and without mutual 
recriminations. 
285. The main conclusion of the report should 
be that there is vast scope for co-operative 
action among the transatlantic allies. It is 
emphasised that this co-operative action should 
not be limited to military matters. In the 
post-cold war era, the importance of other areas 
of action is greatly increased, in particular 
political, diplomatic and economic activities. 
Concerted action by the Atlantic allies in dif-
ferent, complementary fields can greatly 
enhance their success in trying to establish a 
more peaceful and prosperous world. 
286. Moreover, transatlantic co-operation should 
not be limited to NATO and NACC. At present, 
no single international organisation can handle 
all the world's problems alone. There are vast 
opportunities for the allies to act together in all 
the different international institutions. 
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Amendment 1 
New Euro-American relations 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ward 
1st June 1992 
1. At the end of paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add: 
" insisting in this connection that, in accordance with the Maastricht Agreement, the Franco-
German Eurocorps must be placed under WEU authority and that its arrangements must 
strengthen the alliance military structure. " 
Signed: Finsberg, Ward 
1. See 5th sitting, 3rd June 1992 (amendment agreed to). 
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Composition of political groups 
Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Pririleges 2 
by Mr. Thompson, Chairman and Rapporteur 
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Political groups 
Draft Order 
on the composition of politkal groups 
The Assembly 
15th May 1992 
INVITES the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to examine whether there should be 
a change in the minimum number of representatives or substitutes required to form a political group, 
bearing in mind the ratio to be established between this number and the total number of representa-
tives to the Assembly. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman); Mr. Amaral (Vice-Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Jesse/, 
Ottenbourgh, Lord Kirkhil/, MM. Cuco (Alternate: Mrs. Guirado), Junghanns, Mrs. Aguiar. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(11ubmitted by Mr. Thomp11on, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Role and means of political groups 
1. Representatives and substitutes to the 
Assembly, initially members of national delega-
tions, may form political groups. 
2. As stated in the report by Sir Geoffrey 
Finsberg (Document 1133, paragraph 7): " The 
aim of political groups is to co-ordinate the 
action and representation of the ideas of parlia-
mentarians who share certain political views. " 
3. Under the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, 
the only rule relating to the composition of 
political groups is a quantitative one: a group 
must have at least nine members. There is no 
requirement for several nationalities to be repre-
sented. 
4. At present, the Assembly has four political 
groups which have the de jure right to be repre-
sented in the Presidential Committee by a 
delegate who is generally the chairman (see 
appendix). 
5. A motion tabled by Mr. Pannella with a 
view to setting up a joint group of all representa-
tives and substitutes not belonging to a political 
group was negatived by the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges because such a 
group, being essentially heterogeneous, could 
hardly adopt a joint position on problems 
raised. 
6. Since 1960, the political groups have had 
a budget in order to exercise their duties. The 
funds allocated to them are included in the 
Assembly's overall budget. These funds consist 
of a fixed amount for each group plus a further 
sum calculated on the basis of the number of 
members belonging to each group. 
7. The accounts of the political groups 
are subject to a verification procedure which 
ensures the autonomy of the political groups in 
the Assembly and guarantees the autonomy of 
the Assembly's budgetary management in WEU. 
Each group's budget is therefore verified by the 
auditors appointed by it in accordance with its 
own legal criteria and then transmitted to the 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly for inclusion 
in the Assembly's overall accounts. 
II. Minimum number of members 
of political groups 
8. A political group would not be able to 
make effective use of the means placed at its dis-
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posal if it did not have enough members. The 
Rules of Procedure therefore set a minimum of 
nine members. It may seem paradoxical to ask 
for this minimum to be lowered a few years after 
an increase in the number of representatives to 
the Assembly following the accession of Portugal 
and Spain. 
9. However, the Unified European Left 
political group represents a trend in the 
Assembly which has its specific features and is 
anxious to retain the means of action and 
expression at its disposal. It therefore proposes 
that the minimum number of members of 
political groups be reduced to six. 
10. This seems a tiny figure if compared with 
the number of members of the other three 
political groups. It would nevertheless ensure 
that the members of the group, even if reduced 
to six, have the essential advantage of being rep-
resented in the Presidential Committee. 
Ill. Conclusion 
11. Democracy requires that any tendency 
and opinion, even sparsely represented, may 
voice its views. However, a minimum number of 
members must continue to be required for -a 
group, through its representation in the Presi-
dential Committee, to be able to play a de jure 
part in the organisation of the Assembly's work 
and, through its budget, to have practical facil-
ities. 
12. It would seem difficult to reduce this 
number. If a tendency or opinion is not 
endorsed by more members, the corresponding 
views must be expressed in the Assembly or 
in committee through the normal channels of 
democracy, i.e. by the individual right to 
intervene and table amendments and motions in 
the Assembly or in committee. There can be no 
claim to play a de jure part in running the 
Assembly's affairs. Its influence would be mea-
sured by the force of its arguments and its ability 
to convince its supporters. 
13. After discussion, the committee reached 
the unanimous conclusion that the motion 
before it should be negatived and the draft order 
in this report presented to the Assembly. 
APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
Political groups 
(A.pri/1992) 
1. Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats 
Chairman: Mr. Caro 
Members: 93 
2. Liberal Group 
Chairman: Mr. De Decker 
Members: 29 
3. Socialist Group 
Chairman: Mr. Stoffe1en 
Members: 74 
4. Unified European Left Group 
Chairman: Mr. Pieralli 
Members: 13 
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Document 1312 25th May 1992 
Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee 
by Mr. Caro, former President of the Assembly 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Political action 
11. Administrative action 
1. In spite of the illness of the President of 
the Assembly, and then his death, the Presi-
dential Committee was able pursue its action 
unfailingly and with no break in continuity 
because, with courage to which tribute should be 
paid, Mr. Pontillon, to the very end, imparted 
his energy and European convictions on our 
work and Mr. Sinesio, when the time came, 
adroitly assumed the duties of Acting President 
in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. It 
was in these exceptional conditions that the 
Presidential Committee accomplished its 
twofold political and administrative task. 
2. In political matters, the Presidential Com-
mittee had two main aims. One was to allow the 
Assembly to make its voice heard in the debate 
about the Maastricht agreements. The second 
was to enable it to propose to Western Europe, 
in the process of unification, a policy that 
allowed it to play its new role in the context of 
greater Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and the 
complex system of European and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. 
3. In administrative matters, the Presi-
dential Committee had to take account of the 
Council's rejection of the Assembly's budgetary 
proposals and to seek new procedures allowing a 
more harmonious dialogue to be developed with 
the Council in the future on the financial condi-
tions in which the Assembly has to carry out its 
tasks. 
I. Political action 
4. Within the framework of its responsibil-
ities, the Assembly intends to direct its political 
action towards establishing the European 
Union. It is for the Presidential Committee to 
give it the means to do so. We therefore made 
major changes in the initial agenda for the 
present session and postponed until the second 
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part of the year reports which did not directly 
relate to measures to be taken following the 
signing of the Maastricht agreements. In 
accordance with the twofold concern that I have 
just mentioned, it first had to be ensured that 
problems raised by the new shape of Western 
Europe could be examined. This is the aim of 
the reports by the Political Committee on WEU 
after Maastricht, by the Defence Committee on 
WEU: the operational organisation and by the 
Technological and Aerospace Committee on the 
development of a European space-based obser-
vation system. The debates then had to be 
organised in the new context surrounding the 
emerging European Union: the Political Com-
mittee has examined the security problems of 
the Central and Eastern European countries and 
the organisation of new relations between 
Europe and the United States, the Defence 
Committee has defined the respective contribu-
tions of the CSCE and WEU to arms control and 
the Technological and Aerospace Committee is 
reporting on arms export policy. 
5. In this way, the Presidential Committee 
has endeavoured to ensure that the Assembly's 
contribution to the post-Maastricht debates is 
clearly defined and that its conclusions form as 
coherent a whole as possible. 
6. In preparation for these debates, the 
Assembly decided in June 1991, following a 
report that I had the honour to present to it, to 
organise a symposium bringing together leading 
authorities in order to pinpoint the hopes that 
the Central and Eastern European countries may 
place in our institutions and to assess the nature 
of the assistance we can give them and in what 
conditions. 
7. Convinced of the need to deepen relations 
with those countries, Robert Pontillon expended 
his remaining strength on organising the sym-
posium on the new conditions for European 
security which was held in the building of the 
,. 
,. 
~ 
former Reichstag in Berlin from 31st March to 
2nd April. 
8. He died a few days before the symposium 
was opened. This event, which he should have 
presided and which, it is generally agreed, was 
a great success, was seen as a tribute to his 
memory. 
9. The Assembly is particularly grateful to 
the eminent speakers who took part. They were 
generally ministers for foreign affairs or defence, 
chairmen of parliamentary committees or very 
high-level experts. Their ideas, observations and 
proposals were brilliantly summed up by our 
General Rapporteur. 
10. If I may make a personal comment, I will 
say that, as Rapporteur on the new security 
order in Europe, I had the valuable advantage of 
benefiting from the mass of information that 
emerged from the symposium. The wealth of 
views expressed is a source to be exploited for a 
long time to come. 
11. There will be a sequel to this symposium 
since there must be a response to the interest it 
aroused in the eastern part of Europe. 
12. The Presidential Committee wished to 
give priority in the programme of work for the 
second half-year to the visits planned by the 
Defence Committee to Central and Eastern 
Europe. Our fruitful, cordial relations with the 
government authorities and our parliamentary 
colleagues in those countries win certainly be 
enhanced by this visit. Other initiatives must 
be taken vis-a-vis the countries of Central 
Europe. 
13. However, the policy guiding our 
Assembly's relations must not be limited to 
organising bilateral meetings. We must also 
make our views known to international bodies 
that share our concerns and ensure that we 
co-operate with them in order to attain our 
common aims. 
. 14. Thus, the Presidential Committee 
examined the relations that should be estab-
lished, following the Maastricht agreements, 
between our Assembly and the European Par-
liament, the North Atlantic Assembly and the 
new Assembly of the CSCE that is to meet in 
Budapest in the first week of July. 
15. Where the European Parliament is con-
cerned, the Presidential Committee believed the 
nature of the Assembly's relations with it should 
be examined closely in the light of the Maas-
tricht agreements and that, for this purpose, 
contacts should be established at the highest 
level. Our Assembly's Political Committee was 
instructed to deal with this matter in Mr. 
Goerens's report on Europe after Maastricht. 
The Political Committee set out its views in a 
draft order which will be submitted to the 
Assembly for approval. Thus, such a crucial 
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question as the organisation of parliamentary 
scrutiny of the security policy of the bodies that 
will make up the European Union will be the 
subject of a debate in plenary session during 
which the members of the Assembly will be able 
to compare their views. 
16. The Presidential Committee also 
examined relations with the North Atlantic 
Assembly. The Chairman of the Defence Com-
mittee recalled his committee's relations with 
the latter's Defence and Security Committee. 
The Acting President of the Assembly thought 
the principle of regular meetings between the 
Presidents of the two assemblies should be 
maintained and asked the Chairman of the 
Defence Committee to travel to Canada to rep-
resent the Acting President at the meeting of the 
North Atlantic Assembly and, on his behalf, to 
invite the President of that Assembly, Mr. Rose, 
to attend our forthcoming session as an 
observer. 
17. Finally, the Presidential Committee made 
the necessary arrangements to promote close co-
operation between our Assembly and the future 
Assembly of the CSCE. Mr. Pontillon had 
explained O\lr views on this matter at the prepar-
atory meeting held in Madrid in April 1991. The 
Presidential Committee has instructed its Acting 
President to recall them. 
18. The Assembly, which is responsible for 
participating at parliamentary level in the estab-
lishment of a European security and defence 
identity, is anxious to make known to all the 
appropriate bodies its positions on problems 
linked with the establishment of an order of 
justice and peace throughout Europe and on the 
role WEU might play in this connection. Aware 
of the importance that the Assembly of the 
CSCE cannot fail to achieve once instituted, we 
believe the two assemblies should keep each 
other regularly informed of the topics and 
results of their discussions and that exchanges of 
views should be held between their steering 
bodies on each other's plans. Our joint aim 
should be to allow the two assemblies to 
organise, as effectively as possible, the conver-
gence of the action they take in the framework of 
their respective responsibilities. 
19. Our relations with the Assembly of the 
CSCE will necessarily be based on joint con-
cerns relating to the situation in the Balkans. 
The Presidential Committee was extremely dis-
mayed by developments in the ethnic conflicts 
in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. At its 
meeting on 15th April, it expressed the wish that 
the WEU Council set up as soon as possible a 
force to carry out peace-keeping operations in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It proposes to continue, in 
the interval between sessions, to follow atten-
tively developments in the unfortunate regions 
at our door where Western Europe has so far not 
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measured up either to its ambitions or to its 
responsibilities. 
20. The Presidential Committee did not 
confine itself to following Eastern European 
problems. In application of Order 79, it 
instructed the Political Committee to try to 
strengthen relations with the United States and 
Canada because, while one of our political com-
mittees is received in the United States each 
year by a few members of the Administration 
and Congress, it is a long time since anyone 
from either body has agreed to address the 
Assembly. The Chairman of the Political Com-
mittee informed the Presidential Committee of 
the meagre attention apparently paid to the 
letter which the late President of the Assembly 
sent to the leaders of the two houses of Congress. 
The Canadian parliamentarians should be 
thanked for the warm welcome they extended to 
our delegates, but their preoccupation with 
fishing and agriculture diminish somewhat the 
attention they pay to European security 
problems since Canada's decision to withdraw 
its armed forces from Europe. 
21. Nevertheless, the Chairman of the 
Political Committee said he hoped the Assembly 
would manage to establish a better relationship 
with the United States Congress and deepen its 
dialogue with the Canadian Parliament. It is in 
this sense that the Political Committee will con-
tinue its endeavours. 
22. Finally, it should be recalled that, at the 
Petersberg on 28th January 1992, the Presi-
dential Committee met Mr. Genscher, then 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council. The topics 
covered related to the application of the deci-
sions taken at the Maastricht conference, 
problems raised by the disintegration of Yugo-
slavia and the establishment of a new security 
order in Europe. 
23. Mr. Genscher answered as fully as pos-
sible the many questions put to him. The con-
clusions we drew from these talks are set out in 
the committee reports. 
II. Administrative action 
24. At the last session, the Presidential Com-
mittee approved the position adopted by the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration and the Assembly and adopted an 
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amended budget that contained no requests to 
create the posts intended to adapt the Office of 
the Clerk to the new tasks incumbent upon it. 
However, it was agreed that the Assembly 
reserved the right to renew its initial proposals 
in its budget for 1993. The increase in the tasks 
assigned to WEU is necessarily reflected in the 
work of the Assembly. 
25. The Presidential Committee is therefore 
preparing to examine with the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration the 
financial implications of the inevitable increase 
in the burdens stemming from its activities. The 
budget for next year will have to allow the 
Assembly to develop its relations not only with 
the member countries of the European Union 
but with many NATO and Central and Eastern 
European countries and with various interna-
tional bodies. 
26. In application of Order 80, the Presi-
dential Committee instructed the Chairman of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration to contact the Secretary-General 
to try to obtain the Council's agreement to new 
procedure for approving the budget that would 
be more rapid and based on an examination of 
political aims and not just technical arrange-
ments. It is to be hoped that the budgetary dia-
logue with the Council will soon relate to the 
political considerations underlying our budget 
and not to details of financial estimates set out 
under the various headings covering the various 
activities of the Assembly. 
* 
* * 
27. In endeavouring to provide the Assembly 
with the best conditions for tackling its debates, 
the Presidential Committee was aware of the 
importance of what was at stake. The Assembly 
is to give its views on the organisation of 
Western Europe on the eve of the WEU and 
NATO ministerial meetings, at a time when the 
European defence identity is developing a new 
outline and when violent crises in neighbouring 
countries are forcing us to re-examine the condi-
tions of European security. 
28. The conclusions drawn by the Assembly 
from the debates that are about to start will 
guide the work of the Presidential Committee 
until the December session. 
'· 
Document 1313 25th May 1992 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 506 to 515 and Resolution 84 
RECOMMENDATION 506 1 
on Europe and the Yugoslav crisis 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Deploring the constant worsening of the civil war that is tearing Yugoslavia apart; 
(ii) Considering that pursuit of the war is endangering peace throughout Europe; 
(iii) Considering that it is for WEU, under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
to help to restore peace in Yugoslavia to the best of its ability; 
(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Community and member states have called on the WEU Council to 
implement the military aspects of the policy defined by the Twelve; 
(v) Considering that the commitment of the European Community, in agreement with the CSCE 
and with the subsequent support of the Security Council, allowed the peace conference to be convened 
in The Hague in which all the parties to the conflict are taking part and which may lead to a political 
solution to the Yugoslav crisis; 
(vi) Deploring, however, that this co-ordination has not yet allowed a real, lasting cease-fire to be 
achieved as a prelude to a return to peace in Yugoslavia; 
(vii) Expressing the hope that the mission assigned to Lord Carrington will succeed in the near future; 
(viii) Gratified that the Council duly informed NATO and the CSCE of the results of its meetings but 
deploring the fact that it neglected to inform the Assembly, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Decide upon and implement without delay effective measures to ensure respect for the embargo 
on all supplies of arms to Yugoslavia decided upon in Security Council Resolution 713; 
2. Proceed immediately to prepare the possible implementation of each of the various options con-
sidered on 30th September to help to ensure respect for a cease-fire once it becomes effective; 
3. Strengthen its organisation and ability to intervene to ensure Europe's security and urge the 
Security--Council and the CSCE to give a further mandate to WEU to facilitate a return to peace; 
4. Continue to associate any European countries that might make a contribution with all appro-
priate action to secure a cease-fire and eventual peace in Yugoslavia; 
5. Use all appropriate means to bring pressure to bear on the parties to the conflict to ensure the 
success of the conference in The Hague on peace in Yugoslayia; 
6. Continue to inform NATO and the CSCE of its decisions; 
7. Inform the Assembly without delay of the results of each of its ministerial meetings. 
1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 15th October 1991 in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Pro-
cedure. 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1283). 
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REPLY OF 1HE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 506 
1. The evolution ofthe Yugoslav crisis and the preparation of a possible active WEU contribution 
to its resolution continues to be under consideration by the Council and its working groups. The 
Assembly's recommendations have been examined in this framework. They fundamentally coincide 
with the Council's approach to the problem. 
2. The Yugoslav crisis has been discussed by the Ministerial Council at its ordinary meetings on 
27th June and its extraordinary meetings on 19th September and 29th October 1991. On the basis of a ·, 
ministerial mandate, an ad hoc group of experts and a military joint contingency study group have 
elaborated plans for a possible WEU peace-keeping support once the indispensable conditions for such 
action are met. At their last meeting on 29th October, ministers agreed that this is at present not the 
case. A WEU engagement in Yugoslavia is only practicable if all Yugoslav conflict parties agree to it 
and a truce with the perspective of lasting has been firmly established. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th January 1992. 
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RECOMMENDATION 507 1 
on the evolution of WEU's public relations 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the public's interest in WEU's future role and function has never been so high 
as in the second half of 1991; 
(ii) Deploring that neither the Council nor member governments have so far been able to explain 
adequately in public the organisation's achievements and contributions, particularly during the Gulf 
crisis, in order to avoid misunderstanding among the European and American public; 
(iii) Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 494 is insufficient; 
(iv) Noticing that the two parts of the thirty-sixth annual report and the first part of the thirty-
seventh annual report of the Council contain no mention of the Council's public relations activities, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Consider again the Assembly's proposals made in Mr. Pontillon's Written Question 285 and in 
Recommendation 494 and in particular: 
- publish basic information documents for widespread circulation in all member countries and 
in North America; 
- create a WEU periodical in the official languages of the member countries; 
- urge member governments to release more information about the activities of the various 
WEU bodies; 
2. By implementing an effective communications campaign, provide a clear public explanation of 
WEU's position in the present international debate on its future role and place in the European and 
Atlantic framework; 
3. Instruct the Secretary-General to implement his reported plan to circulate a booklet on WEU in 
the languages of all member countries for the use of pupils in the senior classes of secondary schools; 
4. Study the possibility of circulating other information documents with the assistance of the WEU 
Institute for Security Studies; 
5. Resume its information to the Assembly on its public relations activities in its annual reports as 
used to be the practice; 
6. Earmark sufficient funds for a study of a general communications strategy and the wherewithal 
to implement it. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (8th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Ewiitg on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public 
Relations (Document 1286). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 507 
The Council welcomes the keen interest shown by the Assembly in the evolution and devel-
opment of WEU's public relations. It greatly appreciates the numerous innovative proposals and con-
structive criticisms contained in Assembly Recommendation 507 and in the report on " the evolution 
of WEU's public relations " submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions by Mr. Ewing, Rapporteur. The Council concurs, in principle, with the Assembly that WEU's 
public relations effort should be commensurate with the perspective of an expanded role for the 
organisation. 
However, in the opinion of the Council, WEU's public relations can be developed only grad-
ually, in line with the organisation's evolution. For 1992, no supplementary funds for WEU's public 
relations are available under the operating budget. 
At the same time, the Council feels that the positive impact of public relations efforts already 
made by the Secretariat-General and by the Institute should not be underestimated. The Secretariat-
General continues to concentrate on the dissemination of background information and on liaison with 
the press while the Institute focuses on the academic community. In the opinion of the Council, this 
approach has yielded results, though scope for improvement remains. For instance, a close scrutiny of 
the press analyses prepared by the Secretariat-General's press section (regularly transmitted to the 
Assembly as an annex to the information letter from the Secretary-General ofWEU on the activities of 
the intergovernmental organs) reveals that the - admittedly quite numerous - ill-informed articles on 
the organisation are being increasingly counter-balanced by a growing number of well-researched and 
accurate articles on the development of the organisation's activities. 
The Council will bear in mind the proposals and suggestions contained in Recommendation 507 
and place the question of enhancing WEU's public relations on its agenda in due course. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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RECOMMENDATION 508 1 
on WEU's external relations - the enlargement of WEU 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 make it necessary to 
re-examine the organisation of the security of Europe as a whole and in particular Western Europe; 
(ii) Noting that the role of WEU in the organisation of European security must be redefined in the 
context of the process of a Community policy and adapting NATO strategy to the new situation in 
Europe and the world; 
(iii) Considering that the accession of further countries to the modified Brussels Treaty should be 
considered after the role of WEU has been redefined; 
(iv) Noting that the nine member countries are unanimous in considering that the Atlantic Alliance 
is and must remain the essential framework of western defence in Europe; 
(v) Considering that NATO is not at present in a position to take direct action outside the area 
defined by the North Atlantic Treaty nor to respond effectively to certain threats to peace in Central or 
Eastern Europe, but recalling that it is essential that measures taken by WEU in such cases, in 
accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, should guarantee Euro-American cohesion, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Explore and set in motion the best possible machinery for co-operation with the European coun-
tries which so wish, while bearing in mind that, in present circumstances, it would not be wise to invite 
formally countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance to accede to the modified Brussels 
Treaty in application of its Article XI; 
2. Encourage the participation of European countries so wishing and fulfilling the necessary condi-
tions in those of WEU's activities and institutions which, not involving the application of Articles IV 
and V of the treaty, concern the implementation of Article VIII; 
3. Prepare to invite other European countries to co-operate with members of WEU in diplomatic 
or military action designed to keep the peace in Europe; 
4. Prior to any engagement of forces under the aegis of WEU, hold consultations with NATO to 
ensure the smooth running of the Atlantic Alliance. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (9th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 
1284). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 508 
1. In its reply to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Recommendation 508, the Council wishes to quote from the 
declaration of the member states of Western European Union issued on the occasion of the 46th 
European Council meeting on 9th and 1Oth December 1991 at Maastricht, in which the member states 
of WEU agreed the following: " States which are members of the European union are invited to accede 
to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to 
become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European member states of NATO are invited 
to become associate members ofWEU in a way which will give them the possibility to participate fully 
in the activities of WEU. The member states of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corre-
sponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31st December 1992. " Since mid-
December 1991, discussions on the implementation of this declaration of the member states of WEU 
issued on 1Oth December 1991 and on the modalities for new members, observers and associate 
members have been on the agenda of the Council and its Special Working Group. Information on the 
outcome of these discussions and their follow-up will be made available in due course. It is expected 
that the forthcoming June session of the WEU Assembly and the next regular meeting of the WEU 
Council of Ministers on 19th June 1992 will provide opportunities for informing the Assembly. 
2. While the Council does, in principle, not exclude the possibility of extending invitations to other 
countries to co-operate with members of WEU in possible " diplomatic or military action designed to 
keep the peace in Europe", such measures can be contemplated only in the context ofthe specific situ-
ations which would warrant WEU action and cannot be decided in advance as a matter of principle. 
The desirability of extending such invitations would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. For 
WEU to become active in possible" diplomatic or military action to keep the peace in Europe", the 
specific political preconditions would of course have to met. The Council also wishes to recall to the 
Assembly the reservations it expressed in its reply to Recommendation 475 and which it considers 
remain just as valid now as then. 
3. The declaration of the member states of Western European Union which are also members of 
the European union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European union and with the 
Atlantic Alliance specifies in paragraph 4: " The objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close 
working links between WEU and the alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contribu-
tions of WEU member states in the alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary 
transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and 
the alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance. " 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
256 
DOCUMENT 1313 
RECOMMENDATION 509 1 
on the activities of the WEU Counci/ 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Satisfied that WEU has enabled Europe to play an active part in applying the measures decided 
upon by the Security Council for establishing a new, peaceful order in the Middle East; 
(ii) Noting with satisfaction that the Council has undertaken to provide the Community with the 
means they may require for possible action to promote peace in Yugoslavia; 
(iii) Noting with satisfaction that, during the year, the Council has developed the means available to 
governments for co-ordinating their action in areas within the purview of WEU; 
(iv) Considering that the various proposals concerning the future of European security that have 
been presented at the intergovernmental conference all assign a major role to WEU both as the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the military organisation of the Twelve; 
(v) Welcoming the fact that the successive French and German presidencies made considerable 
progress in these areas; 
(vi) Welcoming the fact that, at its ministerial meeting in Vianden on 27th June 1991, the Council 
took useful decisions for adapting WEU to the new requirements of European security; 
(vii) Regretting however that the Council, at the level of the Permanent Council, applies only in a 
limited manner its commitments under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in particular: 
(a) by sheltering behind formalist considerations so as not to answer the Assembly, as has fre-
quently been the case, and especially in its replies to Recommendations 4 79 and 490 and 
Written Question 288; 
(b) by taking liberties with the facts as was the case in several respects in its replies to Recom-
mendations 490 and 494 and in the first part of its thirty-seventh annual report; 
(c) by resorting to generalities and vague phrases as in its reply to Recommendation 492; 
(d) by breaking away from its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty as in its replies to 
Recommendations 490 and 491; 
(viii) Regretting further that the public is still insufficiently informed of the activities of WEU, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Examine without delay the adaptation of WEU that has become necessary due to the transfor-
mation of Europe, the development of the European Community's external and security policy and the 
reorganisation of NATO and inform the Assembly of its conclusions but not relinquish in favour of 
institutions other than WEU decisions concerning the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, as it 
appears to be envisaging in its reply to Recommendation 490; 
2. Set up the WEU satellite data interpretation centre without delay and quickly define the condi-
tions for developing Europe's observation satellite capability; 
3. In consultation with NATO, study attentively command structures allowing forces assigned to 
NATO or to national commands to be used for missions defined by WEU, taking into account the 
lessons learned from the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav question; 
4. Study the disarmament proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Union in October 
1991 in order to ascertain Europe's security requirements and make it possible for Europe to play a 
much more active role in disarmament matters; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (1Oth sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1285). 
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5. Define areas in which consideration might be given to countries that are not members of WEU, 
including Greece, Norway, Turkey and certain Central European countries, being associated with the 
activities of the Council or of its subsidiary organs; 
6. Not neglect the application of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, which makes the 
Assembly an essential organ of WEU, and to this end: 
(a) Ensure that it replies pertinently to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions and 
in particular: 
(i) not take as a pretext for refusing to reply the fact that the Assembly, which it keeps inade-
quately informed, is not always able to word its texts in a manner it considers pertinent; 
(ii) ensure that it does not give credence to statements not very close to reality; 
(iii) ensure that the English and French texts of its replies correspond as accurately as possible; 
(iv) give sufficiently precise and detailed replies to precise and detailed recommendations; 
(v) respect the law embodied in the modified Brussels Treaty in its decisions and in its replies 
to the Assembly; 
(b) To allow a true dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, ensure that: 
(i) its replies to recommendations reach the Assembly in time for it to be able to study them 
before the sessions following their adoption, i.e. within three months of being communi-
cated to the Council; 
(ii) its replies to written questions reach the Assembly within a reasonable lapse of time; 
(iii) its half-yearly reports reach the Assembly within three months of the end of each half-year; 
(c) Transmit to the Assembly those of its discussion papers, reports and proposals which are not 
secret, as is normally done by the European Community authorities in the case of the European 
Parliament and as it did on 22nd February in the case of the working paper submitted to it by 
the Secretary-General; 
(d) Inform the Assembly of progress made with the study on Europe's development of a means of 
strategic, maritime and air transport; 
(e) Inform the Assembly of the nature and aim of the military group on Yugoslavia set up in Metz; 
(f) Apply its own decision of 13th November 1989 concerning the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies: 
(i) by communicating to the Assembly "the results of the Institute's unclassified work", 
including " discussion papers on topical subjects " and " reports ... on the seminars it had 
arranged"; 
(ii) by not opposing the Institute giving the Assembly opinions on topical questions; 
7. Implement as soon as possible the decision to which all the governments have agreed on moving 
the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and having that body formed of the permanent represen-
tatives of member countries to the European Community; 
8. Instruct the Secretariat-General to prepare and circulate to the press a periodical information 
bulletin on the activities of WEU. 
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to Recommendation 509 
1. The ministers of foreign affairs of WEU member states met in the margins of the 46th European 
Council meeting on 9th and 1Oth December 1991 at Maastricht. They adopted a declaration of the 
member states of Western European Union issued on the occasion of the 46th European Council 
meeting on 9th and 1Oth December 1991 at Maastricht and a declaration of the member states of 
Western European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role ofWEU and its 
relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, which adapt WEU in the light of the 
new situation. 
2. With the aim of intensifying space co-operation within WEU, and to give substance to the reso-
lutions made at their regular meeting in Vianden (Luxembourg), ministers decided in Bonn on 18th 
November 1991 that the satellite data interpretation and training centre should be established in 
Spain, with effect from 1st January 1992. They agreed that a British national should be the Director of 
this centre for a period of three years. 
Already at their regular meeting in Vianden, ministers decided to task the ad hoc Sub-Group on 
Space to pursue studies on the possibilities for medium- and long-term co-operation on a European 
satellite observation system. Subsequently, a group of experts on satellite studies was tasked to analyse 
the need for studies to be performed by industry and for national establishments. This group of experts 
prepared a request for proposals for a WEU satellite system study. 
A Study Management Team was set up in early 1992 in accordance with the ministerial deci-
sions of 18th November 1991 in order to manage the actual conduct and co-ordination of the indus-
trial studies. The Study Management Team works under the aegis of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, is 
based in France and has an Italian chairman. 
3. The Council remains aware of the importance of questions such as those mentioned in para-
graph 3 of Recommendation 509. Discussions on such issues will be placed on the agenda of the 
Council and its working groups in the process of implementing the declaration of the member states of 
Western European Union which are also members ofthe European Union on the role ofWEU and its 
relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance". 
4. The Council's position on Europe's role in arms control and disarmament matters is explained 
in its replies to Recommendations 513 and 514. 
5. As regards the definition of" areas in which consideration might be given to countries that are 
not members of WEU, including Greece, Norway, Turkey( ... ) being associated with the activities of 
the Council or of its subsidiary organs ", the Council wishes to recall the terms of the declaration of the 
member states of Western European Union issued on 9th and 1Oth December 1991 at Maastricht, in 
which WEU member states agreed that: " States which are members ofthe European Union are invited 
to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European member states of 
NATO are invited to become associate members ofWEU in a way which will give them the possibility 
to participate fully in the activities of WEU. The member states of WEU assume that treaties and 
agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31st December, 1992. " 
6. The Council acknowledges the vital role played by the Assembly in the reactivation ofWEU and 
the impetus given by the Assembly to the definition of WEU's role and place. The Council remains 
fully aware of the implications of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
In its replies to recommendations and written questions, the Council continues to make every 
effort to give the Assembly information which is as accurate and precise as it can be, respecting the 
constraints of classification. The Council also remains aware of the time constraints the Assembly faces 
in its dialogue with the Council. In co-operation with the Secretariat-General, the Council is trying to 
streamline the procedures for replying to Assembly recommendations and written questions so that the 
Assembly committees can take them into account in preparing reports for their next session. However, 
it should be borne in mind that consultation among the Nine is necessary if the Assembly is to receive a 
maximum amount of information. The Council will try to do its utmost to reply to Assembly recom-
mendations and written questions within a few months of their official receipt. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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The Assembly has full access to the Institute's unclassified work. While the Council does not 
object, in principle, to the role of the Institute being extended to giving opinions to the Assembly on 
topical questions, requests for such opinions should be sent first to the Secretary-General who will 
transmit them to the members of the Council. The Council will then decide on a case-by-case basis and 
instruct the Institute's Director accordingly. 
It should be recalled that, at its meeting on 12th December 1991, the Permanent Council 
reviewed the various aspects of relations between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the 
Institute for Security Studies. On this occasion, the Permanent Council asked Mr. Roper to prepare an 
annual report for the Assembly and a periodical document allowing the latter to be kept informed of 
those of the Institute's plans which are of interest to WEU parliamentarians. These documents will be 
sent to the President of the parliamentary Assembly by the Council. As has been the rule since July 
1990, the Assembly and the Office ofthe Clerk will continue to be invited to designate representatives 
to attend the Institute's "open" seminars. Finally, the Council has agreed that the Institute should 
prepare a document setting out thoughts for the symposium to be held by the Assembly in Berlin next 
March. 
The information on the conclusions of the Permanent Council meeting on 12th December 1991 
as regards relations between the WEU Institute for Security Studies and the Assembly were sent to 
Senator Robert Pontillon, President of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, on 16th December 1991, in 
a letter from the Secretary-General. 
7. In accordance with Chapter D, paragraph 6 ofthe declaration of the member states of Western 
European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role ofWEU and its relations 
with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, as a consequence of measures set out in this doc-
ument and " in order to facilitate the strengthening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU Council and 
Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels " . The arrangements for implementing this measure are cur-
rently under discussion, and the Assembly will be informed in due course. 
8. The Council states its position on the Assembly's proposals for enhancing WEU's public rela-
tions in its reply to Recommendation 507. 
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RECOMMENDATION 510 1 
on the defence industry in Cz,echoslorakia, Hungary and Poland 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the complete economic reform from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy 
now taking place in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, here also to be referred to as the Triangle; 
(ii) Recognising that the Triangle, in the framework of the former Warsaw Pact, was obliged to 
develop a large defence industry with considerable armaments and equipment production and several 
hundred thousand employees; 
(iii) Aware that the traditional export markets for this defence industry, mainly the former Warsaw 
Pact allies and third world countries formerly in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, have virtually 
collapsed overnight; 
(iv) Conscious that, due to arms control, severe budget cuts and restructuring of the national armed 
forces, the home market of the Triangle's defence industry has also shrunk dramatically, with imme-
diate negative consequences for its production level; 
(v) Aware that massive unemployment in many of the Triangle defence industry's establishments 
will lead to a complete collapse of those regions where they are the exclusive generator of economic 
activity and the basis of the social and cultural structure as is often the case; 
(vi) Recognising that conversion in a narrow sense, insofar as it means turning defence manufac-
turing companies fully or partially into manufacturers for the civilian market, will mainly have to 
depend on private enterprise initiatives; 
(vii) Understanding that the Triangle countries, after more than forty years of complete dependence 
and submission, have a legitimate interest in an autonomous defence capability linked to the mainte-
nance of a national defence industrial base; 
(viii) Conscious that the Triangle countries have pledged to stop arms exports to areas of tension and 
terrorist organisations; 
(ix) Recognising that the Triangle countries will gradually have to adapt their armed forces and 
defence equipment to their new security needs and to their future role in a larger European security 
framework; 
(x) Aware that, in the foreseeable future, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland are bound to be full 
members of the European Community and that in parallel they will be included in a future European 
security and defence system; 
(xi) Aware that the defence ministers of the member countries of the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group (IEPG) recently initiated appropriate contacts between the IEPG on the one hand and, 
on the other hand, Western European Union and the European Community, both engaged in the elabo-
ration of the future European security architecture; 
(xii) Convinced that for the Triangle nations the IEPG as a European forum is an ideal framework to 
start harmonising their operational requirements and re-equipment time-scales, while offering them, 
through a concerted European military research programme and cost-effective defence equipment pro-
grammes, a fair chance to adapt their slimmed down defence industry to new circumstances and 
include it in European collaborative efforts; 
(xiii) Recalling that, notwithstanding considerable liberalisation in the Cocom export control regime, 
in particular regarding Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, these countries are still among the pro-
scribed countries of Cocom, 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (11th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee 
(Document 1289). 
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REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Urgently call for negotiations between Cocom and Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland to 
remove these countries from the list of proscribed countries as soon as possible; 
2. Promote the participation of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in the activities of the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group (IEPG) as an ideal framework to gain familiarity with pro-
curement procedures for democratically-controlled armed forces, in particular with a view to including 
them in: 
(a) those regular meetings of government officials known as the " European sessions for 
armament managers ", organised with the objective of exchanging information relating to the 
operation of organisations in charge of arms procurement; 
(b) the work of Panel I, which would help them to harmonise their equipment requirements with 
other European nations and to identify potential projects for collaboration; 
3. Urge all member states to respond positively to requests for advice on re-training, the acqui-
sition of new skills, conversion, special help for self-employment and the establishment of small busi-
nesses, attracting new industries and developing employment opportunities by establishing enterprise 
zones. 
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to Recommendation 510 
1. The issue of releasing Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland from any residual proscriptions 
under the Cocom regime will have to be examined primarily in the Cocom framework. 
2. The promotion of participation by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in the activities of the 
IEPG will have to be examined primarily in the framework of this body. However, the Council shares 
the Assembly's concern about the need to familiarise the newly-democratic countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe with procurement procedures for democratically-controlled armed forces, and would 
like explicitly to welcome all efforts undertaken in this sense, whether in bilateral or appropriate multi-
lateral frameworks. 
3. WEU is an intergovernmental organisation and the WEU Council is thus not in a legal position 
to comply with the Assembly's request. However, the Council is aware of the crucial importance of 
those forms of economic assistance to the Central and Eastern European countries as described in Rec-
ommendation 510. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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RECOMMENDATION 511 1 
on Europellll union and developments in Central and Eastern Europe 2 
(i) THE AssEMBLY notes that, while events in summer 1991 both in the Soviet Union and in Yugo-
slavia do not directly endanger the security of WEU member countries, they significantly increase the 
risks to Europe's security. 
(ii) It hopes the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht will allow a decisive step to be taken 
towards co-operation between WEU and the Community in the framework of a E1,1ropean union. 
(iii) It welcomes the fact that the various proposals made at the intergovernmental conference on 
external policy and security and the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council in Rome tend to 
strengthen the r8le assigned to WEU in ensuring the maintenance of peace throughout Europe. 
(iv) It reiterates the advice given by the Presidential Committee to the WEU Council of Ministers 
and the intergovernmental conference that " parliamentary control of the measures by which WEU 
shoulders Europe's new security and defence responsibilities must remain the task of the WEU 
Assembly which is composed of delegations from national parliaments whose attributions in this 
respect are unchanged ". 
(v) It considers that, at the present juncture, the modified Brussels Treaty provides more than ever 
the juridical basis for European co-operation in defence and security matters and it regrets that the 
Council has not yet agreed to give it any indication about the course it intends to follow in revising the 
treaty. 
(vi) It notes with satisfaction that, at its meeting on 18th November, the Council decided to set up 
operational bodies meeting some of the requirements implied by WEU's new responsibilities. 
(vii) It welcomes the fact that NATO has taken decisions to strengthen the CSCE and started to 
organise a permanent dialogue with all the countries which were members of the Warsaw Pact and that 
the Council has decided to organise parallel action. 
(viii) It notes, too, that the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland have started to 
take coherent action in all areas leading to their association with Western Europe but also that they are 
expressing serious concern about their security. 
(ix) It recalls the urgency of implementing its Recommendation 506 on Europe and the Yugoslav 
crisis. 
IT THEREFORE RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Meet at ministerial level the day after the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht to 
prepare the adaptation of WEU to the new situation created by the decisions taken by the North 
Atlantic Council in Rome and by the Maastricht meeting, with particular regard to: 
(a) the organisation and command of WEU forces earmarked for the defence of Europe, and 
their co-ordination with NATO; 
(b) the organisation and command of possible WEU rapid action outside the NATO area or in 
the framework of United Nations or CSCE decisions; 
(c) the necessary revision of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(d) defining the respective roles of the IEPG and a future WEU armaments agency; 
(e) moving the Permanent Council and the Secretariat-General to Brussels in order to help WEU 
to carry out its share of responsibilities in decisions on external and security policy matters 
taken by the European union and to develop co-operation between WEU and NATO along 
the lines of the Presidential Committee's advice of 26th March 1991. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (13th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf ofthe Political Committee (Document 1293). 
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2. Propose forthwith to the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland: 
(a) participation in meetings of the Council when matters relating to the security of Central and 
Eastern Europe are discussed; 
(b) association with the activities of the WEU satellite centre for everything relating to the verifi-
cation of the CFE Agreement; 
(c) the possibility of participating in the activities of the IEPG and all forms of European 
co-operation in armaments matters. 
3. Propose to Hungary, and any country making a formal request, the posting ofmi1itary observers 
to Hungarian territory, in the area of its frontier with Yugoslavia, in order to record any further vio-
lation of Hungarian territory or air space by Yugoslav belligerents. 
4. Take without delay the necessary military and naval measures to enforce the embargo on certain 
supplies to Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav republics decided by the Twelve on 8th November. 
5. Co-ordinate as soon as possible humanitarian operations for Yugoslav civilians and afford them 
naval protection. 
6. Establish the necessary co-operation between member countries with a view to their partici-
pation in a peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia as soon as the conditions exist for making this legitimate 
under the authority of the United Nations. 
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to Recommendation 511 
1. The ministers of foreign affairs of WEU member states met in the margins of the 46th European 
Council meeting on 9th and lOth December 1991 at Maastricht. In the light of the North Atlantic 
Council in Rome and the ongoing Maastricht meeting, they adopted two declarations. Their imple-
mentation will adapt WEU as an institution to the new situation now prevailing in Europe. 
The Council shares the Assembly's views on the importance of issues such as those raised in par-
agraphs (a) and (b) of Recommendation 511. As of early 1992, they were on the agenda of the Council 
and its working groups as part of the discussions on the practical arrangements for implementing the 
declaration of the member states of Western European Union which are also members of the European 
Union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. The 
Council will take every opportunity to inform the Assembly as work on these aspects proceeds. 
2. In accordance with the measures agreed at the WEU Council of Ministers in Bonn on 18th 
November 1991, the foreign and defence ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania will be invited early in 1992 to participate in a special meeting with the members of the 
Council. With a view to this special meeting, further measures for enhancing contacts and co-operation 
with the Central and Easter European countries - in addition to those already agreed on 18th 
November 1991 - are under consideration. The Council took note of the Assembly's suggestion to 
associate countries such as the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland with the 
activities of the WEU satellite centre. 
In this context, the Council wishes to recall that on 18th November 1991, in that part of the 
communique dealing with operational co-operation among member states in the field of arms control 
verification, ministers " decided to take into account in their subsequent deliberations the possibility 
of co-operation with all CSCE member states. " 
The possibility of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland participating in the activities of the 
IEPG will have to be examined primarily in the IEPG framework. 
3. In view of the role which would be played by the United Nations in a possible peace-keeping 
effort in Yugoslavia," formal requests" which countries neighbouring Yugoslavia might make for the 
" posting of military observers " , as specified in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 511, should be 
addressed primarily to the United Nations. 
4. The desirability and feasibility of roles for WEU in " taking military and naval measures " in the 
context of the crisis in Yugoslavia will be assessed, if and when necessary, in the light ofthe evolving 
situation in Yugoslavia and of efforts made in this context by the European Community and the 
United Nations. 
5. At the WEU Council of Ministers on 18th November 1991, a declaration on Yugoslavia was 
adopted which specified that " WEU countries are prepared to participate in operations in order to 
establish humanitarian corridors ". The possible implementation of this proposal, and the desirability 
and feasibility of roles for WEU in possible humanitarian operations of other types will be assessed, if 
and when necessary, in the light ofthe evolving situation in Yugoslavia and in the light of efforts made 
in this context, especially by the United Nations. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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RECOMMENDATION 512 1 
on operational arrangements for WEU - the Yugoslav crisis 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling its Recommendation 506 on Europe and the crisis in Yugoslavia; 
(ii) Welcoming the series of initiatives taken by the WEU Council to help support the continuing 
search for a lasting peace in Yugoslavia; 
(iii) Congratulating the Council especially concerning the prompt actions taken to prepare the pos-
sible options for a WEU peace-keeping force and in particular France for making available the nec-
essary facilities at Metz to allow the WEU joint contingency study group to function effectively; 
(iv) Pleased that some member countries are prepared to participate in operations to establish 
humanitarian corridors and that Italian and French ships are already involved in evacuating children 
and the wounded; 
(v) Supporting the efforts of WEU member states in the United Nations Security Council in favour 
of a resolution concerning peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia and stressing the readiness of WEU 
nations to give practical support to such operations, in addition to making available to the United 
Nations details of the contingency planning work already carried out by WEU; 
(vi) Reiterating the warning that the stationing of peace-keeping forces should not sanction the 
seizure of any territory by force; 
(vii) Convinced that the achievements of WEU over the past three years in creating the necessary ad 
hoc operational structures to meet different contingencies with pragmatic and practical solutions augur 
well for the important new roles soon to be devolved to the organisation; 
(viii) Considering that all the various proposals concerning the future organisation of European 
security assign a major operational role to WEU, both as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance 
and as the defence dimension for the coming European union; 
(ix) Convinced that there must now be a rationalisation and concentration of WEU; 
(x) Stressing the importance of adequate and appropriate operational structures, together with a 
realistic budget, for all component parts of WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue every effort to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, supporting the con-
tinuing initiatives of the European Community, the CSCE and the United Nations; 
2. Make all the necessary preparations to ensure that appropriate forces would be ready to take part 
in peace-keeping operations, preferably under the authority ofthe United Nations, given the right con-
ditions, in particular concentrating on command and control arrangements, rules of engagement, com-
munications, intelligence and logistics; 
3. Encourage all member states to take part in humanitarian operations, whatever may have been 
previous limitations on action outside traditional areas - " all of one company " should be the example 
set by WEU nations; 
4. Instruct the joint contingency study group to examine urgently the most effective ways of: 
(a) grounding all military aircraft in Yugoslav air space; 
(b) using electronic counter measures (ECM) to best effect; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (13th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 
1294). 
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(c) imposing effective arms and oil embargos on all Yugoslav belligerents (even to the extent of 
helping control landward frontiers by offering to second police and/or customs officers to 
third countries); 
and make available the results of such studies to the United Nations and other bodies as appropriate; 
5. In the light of experience of both the Gulf and Yugoslav crises and in the knowledge that WEU 
will be given a definite role to play as an operational organisation complementary to both the Atlantic 
Alliance and the European Community, take the necessary preliminary measures: 
(a) to move the seat of the Permanent Council to Brussels and form the Permanent Council 
itself by " double batting" either NATO Permanent Representatives, or EC Permanent Rep-
resentatives, or with a combination of the two; 
(b) institute a planning staff as urged by the Assembly in Recommendation 502 and ensure that 
it maintains a liaison link with both the Atlantic Alliance and European union; 
(c) invite the United States and Canada to appoint an Ambassador to Western European Union; 
(d) form a military advice group of nine experts on detachment for normal lengths of 
appointment, to provide the military expertise necessary for the Secretariat-General and to 
ensure continuous liaison with national defence ministries; 
6. Give the necessary political and military impetus to the above by: 
(a) convening an extraordinary Council meeting after Maastricht; 
(b) convening a further meeting of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff early in the New Year; 
7. Help the four countries (France, Germany, Belgium and Spain) which have decided to form a 
European army corps, to be headquartered in Strasbourg, to elaborate ideas so that such a unit will be 
compatible with proposals regarding a European rapid action force; 
8. Ensure that appropriate provisions are made concerning 
- command, control, communications and intelligence; 
- transport; 
- logistics; 
- standardisation, if possible, or at least interoperability of equipment used by multinational 
units; 
- common procurement (e.g. through links with the IEPG and the Eurogroup); 
9. Seek to develop military satellite communication systems within WEU, as suggested by the 
French Defence Minister, Mr. Joxe, on 6th and 7th November 1991, and associate non-member coun-
tries such as Canada and Norway (which have already expressed an interest) with not only this project, 
but also the satellite data interpretation and training centre and in addition the study on a European 
space-based observation system; 
10. Examine the possibility of making a WEU concerted contribution when it comes to disaster 
relief, pollution control, protection of cultural heritage and crisis management generally, thus ensuring 
that WEU expertise is used to best advantage. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommetulation 5'12 
1. The Council welcomes initiatives and efforts aimed at arriving at a peaceful solutuion to the 
Yugoslav crisis, especially those undertaken in recent months by the Secretary-General and the 
Security Council of the United Nations and the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia. The 
Council attaches the greatest importance to the early deployment of the United Nations peace-keeping 
force referred to in United Nations Security Council Resolution 724. 
2. Since the beginning of 1991, developments in the Yugoslav crisis and preparations for a possible 
active contribution by WEU to its solution were under discussion by the Council and its working 
groups, in the light of the possible deployment of the United Nations peace-keeping force referred to in 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 724. As stated in the Council reply to Assembly Recom-
mendation 506, "a WEU engagement in Yugoslavia is only practicable if all Yugoslav conflict parties 
agree to it and a truce with the perspective of lasting has been firmly established". The Assembly will 
be informed as to any outcome in due course. 
3. As regards the request formulated in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 512, the Council's 
position has not changed: co-ordination of the action of armed forces of WEU countries can certainly 
be envisaged under the auspices ofWEU. Nevertheless, the provision of contingents for humanitarian 
or peace-keeping operations is a matter to be decided nationally by those countries. It is not WEU's 
responsibility to announce in advance that member states are prepared to co-ordinate such action. Any 
national decisions to commit forces should be taken with due regard for the overall political context, 
which is in fact a matter for EPC. 
4. The Joint Contingency Study Group has examined in detail the options and measures deemed 
necessary in the context of the Yugoslav crisis. In accordance with the declaration on Yugoslavia 
adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers in Bonn on 18th November 1991, details ofthe contingency 
planning work already done by WEU experts were made available to the United Nations on 18th 
November 1991. If it is considered necessary, WEU contingency planning will be further adapted in 
the light of the changing situation in Yugoslavia and the efforts undertaken by the United Nations 
Security Council and the United Nations Secretary-General. 
5. In accordance with Chapter D, paragraph 6 of the declaration of the member states of Western 
European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role ofWEU and its relations 
with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, as a consequence of measures set out in this 
document and" in order to facilitate the strengthening ofWEU's role"," the seat of the WEU Council 
and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels ". The arrangements for the implementation of this 
measure are currently under discussion. The Assembly will be kept informed of the outcome to this dis-
cussion and further action. 
Paragraph 7 of the abovementioned declaration reads: " Representation on the WEU Council 
must be such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article 
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Member states may draw on a double-batting formula, to be 
worked out, consisting of their representatives to the' alliance and to the European Union. " 
Chapter C, paragraph 5 of the same declaration mentions a WEU planning cell in the context of 
the strengthening of WEU's role "by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and 
means ". The precise agreements for the implementation of this provision are currently under dis-
cussion by the Council and its working groups, and 'the potential for "a liaison link with both the 
Atlantic Alliance and European Union" will have to be addressed in the process. 
The Council took note of the Assembly's suggestions as to extending an invitation to the United 
States and Canada to appoint ambassadors to WEU. 
The question of. reinforcing the Secretariat-General with military expertise at the seat of the 
organisation is currently under active consideration by the Council and its working groups. Infor-
mation on the results of these discussions and possible follow-up action will be made available to the 
Assembly as soon as possible. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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6. A meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of WEU member states was convened on lOth 
December 1991 in the margins of the European Council meeting in Maastricht. They adopted a decla-
ration of the member states of Western European Union issued on the occasion of the 46th European 
Council meeting on 9th and 1Oth December 1991 at Maastricht and a declaration of the member states 
of Western European Union which are also members of the European Union on the role ofWEU and 
its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance. Chapter C, paragraph 5 of this 
second declaration mentions meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff in the context of the strength-
ening of WEU's role " by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means ". WEU 
chiefs of defence staff of the WEU member countries met on 27th January 1992 in Bonn. 
7. The Council and its working groups are actively considering ways of developing WEU's opera-
tional role, including the identification of military units answerable to WEU, of which the corps pro-
posed by France and Germany will be one. However, the Council regrets that at the time of formu-
lating its reply to Recommendation 512, it has not yet been able to give further details as discussions 
are still under way. In this context, the Council would also like to draw the Assembly's attention to 
Chapter C, paragraph 5 of the declaration of the member states of Western European Union which are 
also members of the European Union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European union 
and with the Atlantic Alliance which in the context of the strengthening of WEU's role " by examining 
and defining appropriate missions, structures and means ", mentions in the second indent " closer mil-
itary co-operation complementary to the alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, 
training and strategic surveillance ". The proposals to be " examined further " include " enhanced 
co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency ". 
8. The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space will discuss the possibility of additional forms of co-operation 
in the field of space and the desirability and practicability of associating other countries in the light of 
the Maastricht decisions in due course. 
9. The Council took note of the Assembly's suggestions in paragraph 10 of the recommendation. If 
the fields mentioned in paragraph 10 should be included in the co-operation within WEU, then the 
Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to the validity of the reservations expressed in 
Council reply to Recommendation 475. 
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RECOMMENDATION 513 1 
on arms control negotiations - further initiatires for WEU 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the changes affecting peace and security which have occurred in recent years in Europe 
resulting in major progress in disarmament agreements and offering henceforth unprecedented possi-
bilities for greater reductions in all types of armaments; 
(ii) Noting the importance of the agreements achieved so far for the reduction of conventional and 
nuclear armaments and the monitoring and verification of the ban on certain weapons of mass destruction; 
(iii) Welcoming the proposals for radical reductions in nuclear weapons recently made by President 
Bush and President Gorbachev which represent a major step forward in this area in both qualitative 
and quantitative terms; 
(iv) Welcoming the reduction in nuclear armaments agreed by NATO at its recent meeting in Taormina; 
(v) Convinced, however, that the principles reiterated in The Hague platform remain a mainstay of 
European defence; 
(vi) Convinced that the CFE Treaty will be a milestone in the limitation of these armaments and 
expressing the wish that this treaty be ratified without delay by all countries; 
(vii) Considering that there are new prospects of developing conventional disarmament in the 
framework of the CSCE and of the Atlantic Alliance; 
(viii) Recognising the efforts made in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference for a 
total ban on chemical and biological weapons; 
(ix) Aware that WEU has an important role to play in backing the process of disarmament and in 
taking initiatives for its achievement in practice; 
(x) Determined for its part to maintain a permanent debate on arms control matters in 
co-ordination with all appropriate forums, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Contribute by its action to the advancement of all initiatives for peace and detente now being 
taken, in particular by endorsing disarmament and arms control proposals; 
2. Act continuously to promote a consensus between member countries on disarmament in order to 
draw positions closer together, harmonise legislation and take joint measures to reduce and control 
armaments, including the regulation and transparency of arms sales; 
3. Ensure that the organisation of peace at European and national level concords increasingly with 
quantitative and qualitative criteria in defence matters to achieve reasonable minima; 
4. Actively support the Bush-Gorbachev proposals to reduce nuclear weapons and efforts to avoid 
their proliferation, in accordance with the terms set out in the non-proliferation treaty and to obtain a 
ban on nuclear testing; 
5. Elaborate and subscribe to a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence which takes account of 
recent changes but which safeguards European interests; 
6. Continue to press for the banning of the production, deployment and sale of chemical and bio-
logical weapons; 
7. Resolutely endorse the CFE Treaty by urging member states to ratify it without delay, thus 
ensuring that WEU sets an example in this respect; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1991 during the second part ofthe thirty-seventh ordinary session (14th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1288). 
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8. Give impetus to the verification agreements so as to be able to establish verification systems and 
programmes acceptable to all member states; 
9. Ensure that the satellite data interpretation centre is integrated into the verification process to be 
instituted; 
10. Implement the necessary procedure for WEU to participate in a co-ordinated manner, in par-
ticular with the Atlantic Alliance and with other responsible bodies in the necessary exchange of infor-
mation and elaboration of disarmament proposals. 
272 
DOCUMENT 1313 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 513 
1. The Council is convinced that the action of WEU member states has greatly contributed to the 
advancement of recent initiatives for peace and detente. WEU member states have individually wel-
comed initiatives such as those mentioned in Recommendation 513 and in the text of the report on 
arms control negotiations - further initiatives for WEU, submitted on behalf of the Defence Com-
mittee by Mr. de Puig, Rapporteur. 
2. The Council has set out its position in its reply to Assembly Recommendation 502: " Within the 
framework of the European Community, WEU member states have, together with Japan, introduced a 
resolution at the 46th United Nations General Assembly calling for a comprehensive but non-
discriminatory register of arms transfers in order to enhance and make worldwide the process of 
greater transparency in arms transfers with a view to contributing to greater restraint ". 
3. The ultimate achievement of reasonable minima in the field of defence remains the aim of all 
WEU member states. 
4. The Council welcomes all measures aimed at a reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the United 
States and the former Soviet Union and is fully aware of the need to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
5. The formulation of a policy of minimum nuclear deterrence is not at present on the agenda of 
the Council and its working groups. 
6. WEU member states are actively fostering a convention on a global ban on the manufacture, 
possession and use of chemical weapons, together with an appropriate verification regime. The Council 
welcomes all measures aimed at the banning of the production, deployment and sale of chemical 
weapons. WEU consultations on proposals to be introduced in the CSCE and alliance frameworks are 
taking place. 
7. Ratification of the CFE Treaty is now the prerogative of the respective national parliaments. The 
Council views as a priority the inclusion of the CIS states with territory in the area of application (as 
well as Georgia) into the CFE Treaty. 
8. The Council continues to attach great importance to the search for cost-effective solutions in the 
field of arms control verification. 
9. In the communique adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn on 18th 
November 1991, ministers " underlined the link between space co-operation and arms control verifi-
cation, including verification of the CFE Treaty". The possibilities of integrating the satellite data 
interpretation and training centre into the verification process will be examined by the Council and its 
working groups in due course. 
10. The Council welcomes the suggestions made in paragraph 10 of Assembly Recommendation 
513 and intends to intensify the existing exchange of information and the elaboration of proposals in 
the fields of disarmament and verification which already takes place. While discussing the modalities 
for the implementation of the declaration of the member states of Western European Union which are 
also members of the European Union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union 
and with the Atlantic Alliance, the suggestions will be borne in mind. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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RECOMMENDATION 514 1 
on arms control negotiations -further initiatives for WEU 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming th.e positive results of the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn on Monday, 
18th November 1991, namely: 
(a) the decision to establish the WEU satellite data interpretation and training centre at 
Torrejon, in Spain, with effect from 1st January 1992; 
(b) the decision to form a study group in 1992, in France, to examine the necessity and desira-
bility of a medium- and long-term realisation of a European space-based observation system; 
(ii) Pleased that the Council has taken so many of the Assembly's previous recommendations on 
arms control verification to heart and strongly approving the 18th November communique on the 
subject: 
" Ministers took note of the progress made on co-operation among member states on the verifi-
cation of arms control agreements. In this context, they underlined the link between space 
co-operation and arms control verification, including verification of the CFE Treaty. 
Ministers noted with approval the preparatory steps taken to set up multinational inspection 
teams as part of the implementation of the verification regime laid down in the CFE Treaty. 
They approved a set of rules for the co-operation of multinational teams. 
They decided to take into account in their subsequent deliberations the possibility of 
co-operation with all CSCE member states. 
The Council welcomed the progress made following the resumption of the open skies negotia-
tions in Vienna, which gives hope for their successful conclusion by the time of the Helsinki 
follow-up meeting. The ministers continue to attach great importance to accelerating the search 
for cost-effective solutions in the implementation of an open skies agreement. " 
(iii) Taking account of the new strategic concept defined by NATO at its Rome meeting and its con-
sequences and urging still further practical co-operation between WEU member states to cover all 
aspects of arms control and disarmament; 
(iv) Concerned however that not enough international concertation has been applied to the par-
ticular problem of pollution control now urgently required to ensure the safe disposal of both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons; 
(v) Welcoming all moves towards a reinforcement of the missile technology control regime and 
especially the People's Republic of China's recent declared willingness to abide by its provisions, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Support the Atlantic Alliance's new strategic concept and show that WEU, as the European 
pillar, is ready to respond to current challenges by producing a specific initiative on arms control which 
would demonstrate our considerable political, legal and technical capabilities; 
2. Encourage the participants at the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces to reach positive 
conclusions to be presented at Helsinki in March 1992; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (14th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. De Puig on behalf of the Defence Committee (Document 1288 
Addendum). 
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3. Encourage member countries and CSCE colleague states to pay greater attention to the environ-
mental problems linked with the destruction of both conventional and nuclear weapons, study and 
report on avoiding this tY,pe of potential pollution, thus ensuring greater transparency in this important 
domain; 
4. In addition to seeking progress on verification, satellite observation, multinational inspection 
teams and open skies, actively seek a greater respect for the missile technology control regime. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 514 
1. The Council welcomes the results ofNATO's Rome summit and subsequent NATO ministerial 
meetings. In accordance with the declaration of the member states of Western European Union which 
are also members of the European Union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European 
Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, WEU will be developed not only as the defence component of 
the European Union but also as the means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance. This will help Europe's voice to be heard on the world stage. The development of WEU also 
paves the way for WEU member states to produce " a specific initiative on arms control ", if and when 
deemed necessary. This would of course be done with due regard for the necessary transparency and 
complementarity between the European security and defence identity and the alliance. 
2. WEU member states have called on the participants at the Vienna negotiations on conventional 
arms to further strengthen stability in Europe by agreeing on measures to limit manpower levels and to 
conclude successfully the CFE 1 a negotiations by the time of the Helsinki follow-up meeting. 
3. The Council is aware of environmental problems linked with the destruction of both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons and welcomes all measures for their solution. At present, however, these 
issues are not on the agenda of the Council and its working groups. 
4. The Council is well aware of the need to seek greater respect for the Missile Technology Control 
Regime and for progress on verification, satellite observation, multinational inspection teams and 
open skies. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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RECOMMENDATION 515 1 
on arms and equipment for a European rapid action force 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware of the decision of NATO's Defence Ministers to establish a multinational Allied 
Command Europe rapid reaction corps; 
(ii) Aware of the declaration on European security and defence issued jointly by Italy and the United 
Kingdom on 4th October recommending that WEU members develop a European reaction force; 
(iii) Aware ofthe Franco-German initiative of 14th October on security and defence in the European 
union recommending the creation of military units under WEU's responsibility; 
(iv) Convinced that there is an irreversible trend towards more political responsibilities for Europe 
on the international scene in the context of a political union; 
(v) Recognising that a political union with a common security policy also implies a stronger 
European defence identity in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy; 
(vi) Conscious that now and in the future the United States defence budget is and will be subject to 
considerable restraints which, as a consequence, will increasingly limit the possibilities for European 
armed forces to rely on United States equipment; 
(vii) Recognising that WEU member countries will be obliged to provide the full range of equipment 
needed for an operational and effective European rapid reaction force, in particular including an 
autonomous strategic and tactical airlift capability; 
(viii) Aware that major equipment procurement programmes are long-term projects requiring 
timescales up to 15 to 20 years before coming to fruition, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to examine urgently the possible contri-
butions of all member countries which have agreed to participate in a future European rapid action 
force in order to harmonise the arms and equipment of this force at an early stage; 
2. Urge the Defence Representatives Group to proceed energetically with its study of a European 
sea- and airlift capability and include in this study the possibility of establishing a European strategic 
airlift command in the WEU framework. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (14th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Com-
mittee (Document 1292). 
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REPLY OF 1HE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 515 
The Council agrees with the Assembly on the topicality and importance of the questions raised 
in Assembly Recommendation 515. Both the Council and its working groups devote a substantial 
amount of time to their thorough consideration and analysis. Information on the outcome of the dis-
cussion and its follow-up will be fed into the ongoing institutional and political dialogue. 
In this context, the Council wishes to comment upon Chapter C " Operational role of WEU " of 
the declaration of the member states of Western European Union which are also members of the 
European Union on the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic 
Alliance: " WEU's operational rOle will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate mis-
sions, structures and means ", covering, inter alia, " closer co-operation complementary to the alliance 
in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance ". Furthermore, the 
proposals to be " examined further " in the context of this declaration include " enhanced co-operation 
in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency ". The Council is of 
the opinion that the implementation of the abovementioned declaration will ultimately contribute to 
greater harmonisation of arms and equipment of military forces. This will happen only after an 
assessment by IEPG of all the implications of the Maastricht agreements. 
The WEU chiefs of defence staff discussed at a first meeting after Maastricht on 27th January 
1992 options for an increased operational role ofWEU. They examined possibilities for regular CHOD 
meetings, for military units answerable to WEU as well as for the creation of a WEU military planning 
cell. As decided in Maastricht the reflection on these issues will be carried on in the framework of 
WEU. 
The desirability and feasibility of setting up new bodies in the WEU framework, such as a 
European strategic airlift command will have to be examined taking into account the discussion by the 
DRG of the conclusions of a bilateral study undertaken by France and Germany in the framework of 
the appraisal of the lessons to be drawn from the Gulf conflict. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1992. 
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RESOLUTION 84 I 
on the situation in East Timor 2 
1. While affirming its commitment to defending the freedom and democracy of nations in 
accordance with international law, the Assembly condemns the massacre in East Timor on 12th 
November and the continuous violence of the occupying Indonesian forces. 
2. From the outset of annexation, the occupying Indonesian forces were faced with resistance from 
the population of East Timor. In sixteen years, this has led to the death of 200 000 Timorese. 
3. In face of a policy of forced annexation by the Indonesian Government, constituting a crime of 
genocide, which is being pursued and is worsening, the Assembly considers the international com-
munity must take futher action to bring about conditions in which the people of East Timor may 
exercise the right to self-determination and independence. This right is recognised by the Charter of the 
United Nations and resolutions of that organisation's Security Council and General Assembly, the 
Council of Europe, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the European Parliament and also by the Con-
ference of Non-Aligned Countries. 
4. To this end, the parliamentary Assembly of WEU calls upon the Indonesian Government: 
(a) to stop all violence and violation of international standards guaranteeing respect for human 
rights and the right of peoples to self-determination and independence; 
(b) to withdraw armed forces from the territory of East Timor and create the political conditions 
necessary for the free exercise of self-determination; 
(c) to open up the territory of East Timor effectively and immediately and allow international 
aid and human rights organisations and United Nations missions to exercise their humani-
tarian activities there and assess the situation in regard to the violation of human rights. 
The Assembly asks all member states: 
(i) to place an immediate embargo on arms for Indonesia; 
(ii) to suspend immediately military support to Indonesia. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1991 during the second part of the thirty-seventh ordinary session (14th sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Brito on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1298). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Resolution 84 
The Council took note of Assembly Resolution 84 on the situation in East Timor. The Council 
wishes to recall and reaffirm in this context the importance it attaches to the worldwide respect for 
human rights and expresses its hope that a just, comprehensive and internationally-acceptable set-
tlement may be achieved, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, thus fully 
respecting the legitimate interests of the East Timorese. The Council expresses its support for the 
efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General to promote talks between the governments of Indo-
nesia and Portugal designed to achieve such a settlement. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th March 1992. 
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Written questions 290 to 298 and replies of the Council 
QUESTION 290 
put to the Council by Mr. Roseta 
on 15th October 1991 
Can the Council give the Assembly infor-
mation about the proposed reform of 
co-ordination that, according to the first part of 
its thirty-seventh annual report, it approved 
during the first half of 1991? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 23rd January 1992 
The new regulations relating to the system 
of co-ordination were approved by the WEU 
Council on 3rd May 1991 [CR(91) 9, VIII, 1] 
after prior approval by the Councils of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the Council of Europe and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
These new regulations were subsequently 
approved by the European Space Agency on 4th 
June 1991 and by the Council of the European 
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts 
on 19th June 1991. They came into force on that 
same day. As is usual for co-ordinated rules, 
they will be published in the next annual review 
book of the co-ordinated organisations, which 
will be printed as soon as the new salary scales as 
at 1st July 1991 are finally approved. A copy of 
the new regulations, in advance of their official 
publication, is attached. 
QUESTION 291 
put to the Council by Mr. Roseta 
on 15th October 1991 
In the first part of its thirty-seventh 
annual report, the Council says it " welcomed 
the fact that the points raised by the Assembly " 
in Palermo on 26th March 1991 " on the future 
of European co-operation in security and 
defence questions "... " had been taken into 
account in the debate which it was itself cur-
rently conducting on the role of WEU in the new 
European security architecture ". The Assembly 
in turn must welcome this coincidence. 
Does the Council not believe further coin-
cidences should be fostered by keeping the 
Assembly informed of its deliberations just as it 
is informed of those of the Assembly as soon as 
the agenda of the next session of the Assembly is 
published? 
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communicated to Jhe Assembly 
on 23rd January 1992 
In reply to Written Question 291, the 
Council wishes to recall and confirm the com-
mitment which it made in its reply to Assembly 
Recommendation 503: "( ... ) communication 
between the Council and the Secretariat-General 
on the one hand and the Assembly on the other 
has steadily improved in line with WEU's reacti-
vation. While bearing in mind the need for con-
fidentiality, the Council considers that possibil-
ities for further improvements in the exchange 
of information with the Assembly could be 
explored as WEU becomes more operational ". 
QUESTION 292 
put to the Council by Mr. Roseta 
on 15th October 1991 
According to the first part of the thirty-
seventh annual report, the Council's decision of 
11th July 1991 on United Kingdom forces sta-
tioned on the mainland of Europe has " already 
[been] forwarded to the Assembly". 
Can the Council say when this was done? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 23rd January 1992 
At the meeting of the Permanent Council 
on 26th June 1991, the United Kingdom repre-
sentative commented to his counterparts on the 
proposals made by Her Majesty's Secretary of 
State for Defence as regards British forces sta-
tioned on the mainland of Europe. On 11th July 
1991, the Permanent Council had a debate on 
the matter and took. note of the United 
Kingdom's intentions in this respect. This 
Council debate was mentioned in the Secretary-
General's information letter to the Assembly 
which the Secretary-General sent to Senator 
Robert Pontillon, President of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of Western European Union, 
on 23rd October 1991. 
The second part of the thirty-seventh 
annual report of the Council to the Assembly on 
the activities of the Council will further address 
the topic in depth. It is by mistake that the 
footnote on page 17 of the first part of the 
annual report mentioned that a Council decision 
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had been forwarded to the Assembly. In fact, the 
Council only took note of the British proposals 
on 11th July 1991. 
QUESTION 293 
put to the Council by Mr. Roseta 
on 15th October 1991 
According to the first part of the thirty-
seventh annual report of the Council, " the 
co-ordination within WEU ... covered the fol-
lowing areas: 
- land and air deployments and action, 
- general naval support operations during 
the hostilities, " 
Can the Council give details of WEU 
co-ordination in these two areas? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 23rd January 1992 
Pursuant to the ministerial decision of 
18th September 1990 to set up further forms of 
co-ordination - in addition to the co-ordination 
of naval forces ofWEU countries (cf. paragraph 
7 of the communique of 18th September 1990) -
in the field of land and air deployments and 
action, a co-ordination framework was defined 
in joint specific guidelines on logistic support 
for ground and air forces deployed in the Gulf 
region. The guidelines on logistic support 
covered the fields in which there was a need for 
co-operation (transport, medical support and 
technical support), laid down the rules of 
command and provided for co-ordination with 
the forces of third countries deployed in the 
region. Logistic co-operation in the ground and 
air sector covered mainly the means of transport 
between Europe and the zones of deployment, 
convoy safety, in-flight refuelling and technical 
support. Those member states which decided to 
deploy ground and air forces not only 
co-operated among themselves but also received 
support from other member states in the fields 
of transport, medical assistance and technical 
support. 
A network of military points of contact 
similar to the naval points of contact was also 
set up and the French Presidency established a 
specific unit at the joint armed forces head-
quarters to facilitate exchanges of information. 
As far as general naval support operations 
during the hostilities were concerned, joint spe-
cific guidelines - drawn up to complement the 
joint specific guidelines for co-ordination action 
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by WEU countries to enforce the naval embargo 
- were adopted and applied by the forces of par-
ticipating WEU countries, the aim being to 
ensure maximum efficiency in co-ordinating 
their naval forces involved in implementing 
UNSCR 678. The following tasks were envisaged: 
- direct operations against Iraqi forces 
(escort and naval gunfire support), 
- general support operations (air defence 
and mine counter-measures, protection 
of off-shore installations, participation 
in medical evacuations, in evacuation 
of, or assistance to, refugees and pro-
tection and control of sea traffic). 
In this latter context, it was agreed that a 
WEU co-ordinator - in the first instance, the 
French Indian Ocean Commander Alindien -
would carry out the overall co-ordination of the 
naval forces made available to it by WEU 
member states. 
QUESTION 294 
put to the Council by Mr. De Hoop Sche/fer 
on 17th December 1991 
Urgently to ask what action the WEU 
Council intends taking to co-ordinate further 
European support for the continuing United 
Nations maritime embargo on Iraq which at 
present France, Australia and the United States 
(in the Red Sea) and Great Britain (in the Gulf) 
are experiencing difficulty in applying alone. 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 5th March 1992 
In reply to Written Question 294 put to 
the Council by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer " urgently 
to ask what action the WEU Council intends 
taking to co-ordinate further European support 
for the continuing United Nations maritime 
embargo on Iraq ", the Council would like to 
state that the issue raised by the Honour-
able Parliamentarian is under consideration. 
Whenever appropriate, additional information 
will be made available to the Assembly. 
QUESTION 295 
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens 
on 11th February 1992 
The Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
told the Assembly committees meeting in Bonn 
on 28th January 1992 that the declaration by the 
nine member countries of WEU, adopted in 
Maastricht on 8th December 1991, was part of 
the Maastricht " Vertragswerk ". 
Can the Council say how, from a legal 
standpoint, the nine-power declaration can be 
considered an integral part of the Maastricht 
agreements? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 21st April1992 
1. The two WEU declarations adopted by 
the Nine in Maastricht do form " an integral 
part " of the Maastricht " Vertragswerk" (the 
term " V ertragswerk " denoting a " set of agree-
ments ", a " treaty package " encompassing a 
treaty itself, its Final Act as well as any annexes). 
However, both WEU declarations are docu-
ments of the Nine, not of the Twelve. They are 
annexed to the Final Act of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the conference of the representatives 
of the governments of the member states of the 
European Community " notes " them. 
2. The two WEU declarations are closely 
related politically to the Maastricht Treaty and 
can only be understood in its context. This is 
clearly reflected in the fact that Article 1.4 of the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union is quoted 
in full in the declaration of the Nine " on the 
role of Western European Union and its rela-
tions with the European Union and with the 
Atlantic Alliance ". 
QUESTION 296 
put to the Council by Mr. De Decker 
on 9th March 1992 
Title V of the Maastricht Treaty on 
European Union contains "provisions on a 
common foreign and security policy ". Article 
1.4, paragraphs 2, 5 and 6, refer to the activities 
of WEU. According to Article 1.11, paragraph 1, 
the provisions referred to in Articles 137, etc., 
" of the treaty establishing the European Com-
munity shall apply to the provisions relating to 
the areas referred to in this title [V]". However, 
according to Article 137, the European Par-
liament " shall exercise the ... powers which are 
conferred upon it by this treaty ". 
Can the Council say, therefore, what 
powers the Maastricht Treaty attributes to the 
European Parliament in regard to the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty and how 
these powers can be reconciled with those 
attributed to the WEU Assembly in Article IX of 
the latter treaty? 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 21st April 1992 
1. WEU is referred to as " an integral part of 
the development of the Union " in paragraph 2 
of Article 1.4 relating to the common foreign 
and security policy of the Treaty on European 
Union. Moreover, the Nine have extended an 
invitation to states which are members of the 
European Union" to accede to WEU on condi-
tions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI 
of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become 
observers if they so wish". 
2. The relationship between WEU and 
European Union described in Article 1.4 relating 
to the common foreign and security policy of the 
Treaty on European Union as well as in Chapter 
A " WEU's relations with European Union " of 
the declaration of the Nine " on the role of 
Western European Union and its relations with 
the European Union and with the Atlantic 
Alliance " is essentially of a political nature and 
cannot be seen as implying that Western 
European Union is identifiable in legal terms 
with the European Union. 
3. The Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union does attribute certain powers to the 
European Parliament in regard to its appli-
cation. In the opinion of the Council, this does 
not in any way impair the role attributed to the 
WEU parliamentary Assembly by virtue of 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
The Council remains fully aware of the WEU 
parliamentary Assembly's independence and its 
powers, as expressed in the Charter of the 
Assembly, which is in itself an application ofthe 
provisions of Article IX of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
4. In accordance with the declaration of the 
Nine" on the role of Western European Union 
and its relations with the European Union and 
with the Atlantic Alliance ", the Council wishes 
to reiterate its encouragement for any measures 
the WEU parliamentary Assembly might take in 
order to achieve closer co-operation with the 
European Parliament. 
QUESTION 297 
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens 
on 13th March 1992 
Can the Council explain why Article 1.4, 
paragraph 6, of the Maastricht Treaty (called 
D.6 in the declaration on the role of WEU) 
refers to Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, when 
that treaty had only ten articles and, in any 
event, it is quite clearly Article XII of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty? 
DOCUMENT 1314 
Is the aim of the signatory governments 
not to make it believed that the Brussels Treaty 
is still in force so as to bring forward the date on 
which it will be possible for them to escape the 
commitments into which they entered in 
1954? 
Do they consider it right to refer to a date 
(echeance in the French text) in regard to this 
treaty, whatever this date may be, when the 
article in question provides merely for the right 
of each signatory to cease to be a party to the 
treaty provided one year's notice has previously 
been given? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 21st A.pril1992 
1. References to the modified Brussels 
Treaty contained in the declaration on Western 
European Union leave no doubt as to the fact 
that Article XII of the treaty of economic, social 
and cultural collaboration and collective self-
defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, 
as amended by the protocol modifying and com-
pleting the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 
23rd October 1954 - and not a non-existent 
" Article XII " of the treaty signed in Brussels on 
17th March 1948 - is meant in paragraph 6 of 
Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union. 
The Council is grateful to the Honourable Par-
liamentarian for drawing its attention to this 
minor inaccuracy. 
2. A change in the numbering of the Treaty 
Article relating to the common foreign and 
security policy quoted in the declaration of the 
Nine" on the role Western European Union and 
its relations with the European Union and with 
the Atlantic Alliance " became necessary after 
the Twelve had introduced such a change in the 
text of the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union prior to the signing of its Final Act on 7th 
February 1992. 
3. Article XII of the treaty of economic, 
social and cultural collaboration and collective 
self-defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 
1948, as amended by the protocol modifying 
and completing the Brussels Treaty (commonly 
referred to as the modified Brussels Treaty) pro-
vides that the treaty shall " remain in force for 
fifty years " after which " each of the High Con-
tracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be 
a party thereto provided that he shall have pre-
viously given one year's notice of denunci-
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ation. " The period of 50 years specified in 
Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty, for-
merly Article X of the treaty signed in Brussels 
on 17th March 1948, runs from the date on 
which the treaty of economic, social and cultural 
collaboration and collective self-defence, signed 
at Brussels on 17th March 1948 came into force, 
i.e. 25th August 1948, the date of the deposit of 
the last instrument of ratification. Indeed, a 
change in the numbering of an article does not 
constitute grounds for considering this to be a 
new provision. This position of the Council has 
already been explained ,. in Council reply to 
Written Question 288. 
4. The date of 1998 referred to in paragraph 
6 of Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union 
and regarding the modified Brussels Treaty has 
to be seen in the context of the abovementioned 
Council position. 
QUESTION 298 
put to the Council by Mr. De Decker 
on 14th May 1992 
The Council's reply to Written Question 
296 raises the following additional questions: 
1. What is meant by the fact that Article J.4 
of the Maastricht Treaty is " essentially of a 
political nature " and that it is not " identifiable 
in legal terms ", when it is part of a treaty that 
has been signed and submitted for ratification? 
Is it a policy or a treaty that has to be rat-
ified? 
2. Can the Council say what are the 
" powers " attributed to the European Par-
liament, referred to in paragraph 3 of its 
reply, and whether it endorses the opinion of the 
French Constitutional Council that the 
European Parliament has only the responsibil-
ities defined by the treaties attributing them? 
3. Can the Council say whether the fact that 
it refers in paragraph 3 of its reply to its 
" opinion " means that it is based on a political 
option and not on the juridical certainty that the 
text of the modified Brussels Treaty appears to 
justify? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
No reply has yet been received from the 
Council. 
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WEU Foreign Ministers, Maastricht, lOth December 1991 
I. Introduction minated in the drafting of the declaration of 
member states of Western European Union 
which are also members of the European Union 
on the role of WEU and its relations with the 
European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, 
issued in the margins of the European summit in 
Maastricht on 1Oth December 1991, and of 
Article J.4 of the Treaty of Maastricht on 
European Union. 
In terms of the activities of the WEU min-
isterial organs, the second half of 1991 was 
marked by the fruitful culmination of the debate 
that had been initiated on the role and place of 
the organisation in creating a European security 
architecture. This debate had been officially 
launched by the Ministerial Council on 22nd 
February 1991 (see first part of this report). 
There were a number of important contri-
butions to the debate on the role of WEU in the 
European security architecture: in June, the 
Spanish Foreign Minister presented a paper (see 
first part of this report) and, in October, there 
were two bilateral initiatives: an Anglo-ltalian 
declaration on European security and defence 
and a letter from President Mitterrand and 
Chancellor Kohl containing proposals on the 
political union and the role of WEU. The delib-
erations that ensued from these initiatives cul-
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In Maastricht, WEU member states 
decided that " WEU will be developed as the 
defence component of the European Union and 
as the means to strengthen the European pillar 
of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will for-
mulate common European defence policy and 
carry forward its concrete implementation 
through the further development of its own 
operational role " . 
The Special Working Group was man-
dated to draw up detailed proposals on 
co-ordination between WEU and the European 
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Union and the Atlantic Alliance with a view to 
the Ministerial Council on 19th June 1992. 
WED's continuing work on concrete 
forms of co-operation in the field of security was 
given fresh impetus by the mandate given to the 
Defence Representatives Group to formulate 
and evaluate proposals in the military field. The 
two main proposals were to establish a planning 
cell, and to identify military units answerable to 
WEU and their tasks. 
The Maastricht summit placed the future 
enlargement of WEU at the heart of the 
organisation's political work. The decision 
reached there was to open out to all European 
Community member states, while offering those 
European states that are members of the alliance 
but not of the Community the status of associate 
member with a view to strengthening the 
European pillar of the alliance. A definition of 
the rights and obligations of future members, 
associate members and observers will be 
finalised on the occasion of the Ministerial 
Council on 19th June 1992. 
II. Follow-up on events in the Gulf 
Delegations continued with their exchange 
of information and concertation on the situation 
in the Gulf, both through the WEUCOM 
network and at Council and working group 
meetings. 
(i) Mine-clearance operations 
The Presidency forwarded to the United 
Nations Secretary-General and President of the 
Security Council, on behalf of WEU member 
states, the text of a declaration regarding the end 
of WEU mine-clearance operations in the Gulf. 
This text was issued in United Nations doc-
ument no. 22825. 
(ii) Withdrawal of forces deployed in Iraq 
The Council Working Group met infor-
mally on 12th July for an exchange of infor-
mation on member states' plans concerning the 
withdrawal of their forces from Northern Iraq, 
the maintenance of certain forces in Turkey and 
the way they envisaged relating these forces to 
the activities of the United Nations. 
(iii) Council replies to Assembly recommenda-
tions 
The Council's replies to Assembly Recom-
mendations 498 and 501 on the Gulf crisis -
lessons for Western European Union and 
weaponry after the Gulf war - new equipment 
requirements for restructured armed forces, 
were forwarded to the Assembly on 12th Nov-
ember 1991. 
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Ill. Situation in Yugoslavia 
On the initiative of the German Presi-
dency, a Permanent Council was convened on 
5th July to consider the situation in Yugoslavia 
and consult as to the role that WEU might have 
to perform. 
A further Council meeting on the subject 
was held on 7th August, with observers from 
Denmark and Greece, who had been invited as 
members of the European Community. Member 
countries agreed to continue to consider possible 
concrete contributions they might make to the 
maintenance of an agreed ceasefire, taking into 
account the efforts made in other international 
fora, such as the EC and the CSCE. 
On 16th September, the German Presi-
dency convened an Extraordinary Ministerial 
Council meeting on Yugoslavia for 19th Sep-
tember in The Hague, following a ministerial 
meeting of the EPC. The other Community 
member states, together with Turkey and 
Norway, were invited as observers. Ministers 
took note of the recommendation made by the 
Community and its member states to the effect 
that WEU should explore ways of supporting the 
activities of Community monitors so that they 
could perform their task in greater security and 
thus make a more effective contribution to the 
peace-keeping effort. 
Ministers decided that this was not a mil-
itary intervention. They confirmed the condi-
tions formulated by the EPC, which should be 
met before strengthening the monitor mission: 
an effective cease-fire and agreement of all the 
Yugoslav parties. They envisaged obtaining the 
endorsement of the CSCE and the United 
Nations Security Council. 
They decided to establish close co-oper-
ation in preparation for any measures that WEU 
might take, and also to set up an ad hoc group 
consisting of representatives of foreign and 
defence ministries. 
The ad hoc group, in the course of two 
meetings in Bonn, drew up a report for min-
isters. 
Ministers were convened by the German 
Presidency to a meeting on 30th September (the 
other Community member states together with 
Canada, Norway and Turkey attended this 
meeting as observers). WEU ministers noted the 
ad hoc group's report and decided that the 
group should continue and expedite its work so 
that WEU would be able at any time to 
implement decisions reached by the Ministerial 
Council. 
At the Extraordinary Council meeting on 
WED's role and place in the European security 
architecture held in Bonn on 29th October, min-
isters were briefed on the work of the ad hoc 
group and the sub-groups of experts, as well as of 
the Joint Contingency Study Group (JCSG) set 
up in Metz. 
They agreed that the prerequisites for any 
action by WEU had still not been met and asked 
the Presidency to decide on future work. 
Meeting in ordinary session in Bonn on 
18th November, ministers adopted a declaration 
on Yugoslavia (see Annex 1), in which they 
pointed out that WEU member states were pre-
pared to provide practical support for a peace-
keeping operation in Yugoslavia as soon as the 
relevant decisions had been taken. 
Details of the contingency plans drawn up 
by JCSG were forwarded to the United 
Nations. 
The last meeting of the ad hoc Group on 
Yugoslavia convened in the period covered by 
this report was held in November. The Per-
manent Council was given a report and has 
continued to monitor developments in the 
situation. The delegation representing the Neth-
erlands Presidency of the Twelve has kept the 
Council informed of activities within the 
framework of the Community. 
The Assembly was kept regularly 
informed of the Council's activities in this field 
by the German Presidency. 
IV. Contacts with the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe 
(i) The Council monitored the implemen-
tation of measures adopted by ministers at 
Vianden on 27th June 1991, i.e. 
- regular contacts were established 
between the Embassies of Czechoslo-
vakia, Hungary and Poland in London 
and the WEU Secretariat. The 
embassies of the Presidency in those 
countries also made contact with the 
host governments; 
- fact-finding missions to Bulgaria and 
Romania took place in November; 
- the second seminar for officials respon-
sible for politico-military affairs was 
held on 28th-29th November 1991 
under the aegis of the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies. Participants from 
Bulgaria and Romania were also 
invited to attend; 
- the WEU Institute has already awarded 
its first study awards to young 
researchers from Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
(ii) On 18th November in Bonn, ministers 
decided on the following measures: 
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- to invite the foreign and defence min-
isters of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe to attend a special 
meeting with the members of the 
Council; 
- to extend the regular contacts between 
the embassies in London and WEU 
Secretariat to Bulgaria and Romania; 
- to arrange for the organisation of sem-
inars in these countries by the WEU 
Institute for Security Studies; 
- to extend the WEU Institute's study 
award programme; 
- to arrange fact-finding missions for the 
Presidency and the Secretariat-General 
in the Soviet Union and, if they were 
interested, to the Baltic countries. 
The development of these relations with 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will 
be decided in the light of decisions to be taken 
on WEU's future role. 
Ministers stated their belief that these 
measures being planned by WEU and similar 
initiatives by the Atlantic Alliance and 
European Community were complementary and 
mutually reinforcing. 
V. Council activities 
Except in the case of special meetings on 
certain specific subjects, the agenda for Council 
meetings regularly includes a briefing on 
working group meetings, as well as an item on 
"Topical questions". The Permanent Council 
monitored the preparation of decisions reached 
at the level of Ministerial Councils and their fol-
low-up, as well as the work of the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies and the Assembly; it has 
reached decisions on budgetary and adminis-
trative matters, taking the views of the Budget 
and Organisation Committee into account. 
1. Topical questions 
(i) The Council monitored developments in 
the situation in Yugoslavia, details of which are 
given in Ill above. 
(ii) It also consulted on the end of the WEU 
mine-clearance operations in the Gulf and the 
withdrawal of forces deployed in the region. 
(iii) Situation in the former Soviet Union! 
CIS 
The Council regularly monitored major 
political events occurring in the former Soviet 
Union/CIS. 
(iv) It was kept informed of special activities 
carried out by certain delegations in the field of 
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European security, as well as the Secretary-
General's activities abroad. 
2. A.ctMtia of the intergonrrunental orgtiiiS 
(i) Council working groups 
At each of its meetings the Council took 
note of the results of the latest meetings of the 
working groups, commenting on them where 
appropriate. 
(ii) WEU Institute for Security Studies 
The Secretary-General asked the Director 
of the Institute to attend Council meetings 
whenever the agenda made his presence useful. 
The Director reported to the Council on 
the main activities of the Institute from July 
1990 to June 1991 and from July to September 
1991, as well as on the programme of activities 
for the first half of 1992. 
The Council approved the Institute 
budget for 1992. 
It asked the Secretary-General, on the 
proposal of the Director of the Institute, to 
appoint Mr. Mathias Jopp to the post of 
Research Fellow from 1st April 1992. 
3. Redllction in United Kingdom forces stationed on the 
IIUiinlluul of Europe 
At its meeting on 11th July 1991, the Per-
manent Council, pursuant to Article VI, Pro-
tocol no. 11, of the modified Brussels Treaty, and 
in full awareness of the view of the Supreme 
Command, Allied Forces Europe, took note of 
the United Kingdom's intention to reduce forces 
on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, 
as stated in a letter dated 16th June 1991 to the 
Secretary-General from the United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Tom King. 
Mr. King and General Galvin, SACEUR, were 
informed of this on 12th July. 
VI. Acti,ities of the Specilll Working Group 
(SWG), in separate meetings tuUl in joint meetings 
with the Defence Representati,es Group (DRG) 
I. Joint SWGIDRG meetings 
The SWG met on two occasions jointly 
with the DRG to prepare for the European 
Council at Maastricht and the follow-up action 
to be taken. 
2. SWG meetings 
The SWG considered what action should 
be taken following the Ministerial Council in 
Vianden. 
288 
(i) It continued its discussions on WEU's 
role and place in the new European security 
architecture and WEU's relations with the 
European Community and Atlantic Alliance. 
It prepared for the work by ministers on 
these themes at their meetings on 29th October 
and 18th November. 
On the latter occasion, ministers asked the 
SWG to complete its work before the conclave 
of European Community foreign ministers on 
2nd December. 
It was at the European Council meeting in 
Maastricht on 1Oth December 1991 that the 
foreign ministers of the Nine then adopted the 
two declarations, the text of which is set out in 
Annexes 3 and 4 attached. 
(ii) The SWG also consulted on questions 
pertaining to the CSCE and disarmament, espe-
cially in the post-Helsinki period, CFE la and 
open skies. It also embarked on discussions as to 
WEU's possible role in peace-keeping opera-
tions. 
(iii) In the light of these developments, they 
consulted as to the content of the post-Helsinki 
arms control negotiations and their institutional 
framework. 
VIL ActMties of the Defence Representatim Group 
I. Withdrawal of coalition forces from Northern Iraq 
In July delegations exchanged infor-
mation on the withdrawal of their forces sta-
tioned in Northern Iraq. 
2. WEU's operational role 
The group considered possible tasks for 
WEU operational capabilities and the resulting 
requirements, as well as the requirements for 
co-ordination and planning structures. It also 
studied European requirements for strategic 
mobility. 
The group was briefed on the work of the 
Joint Contingency Study Group on the Yugoslav 
crisis. 
Following the Bonn Ministerial Council 
on 18th November, the group considered new 
tasks that might be envisaged for WEU's opera-
tional capacity and aspects relating to WEU's 
planning cell. 
• 
• • 
The Verification Experts Group provided 
for the co-ordination and proper conduct of the 
opening up of national inspection teams. 
Experts also exchanged information on 
the training of inspectors and on bilateral 
inspection exercises. 
The experts on Open Skies continued 
their search for an efficient solution regarding 
practical co-operation on the implementation of 
an agreement. 
VIII. ActiJ1ities of the Meditemmean Sub-Group 
During the period covered by this report, 
the Mediterranean Sub-Group met twice. 
1. In accordance with the mandate it had 
been given, the group continued its discussions 
on the proposals regarding security in the Medi-
terranean, in particular in the light of the prin-
ciples it considered to be likely to contribute to 
the settlement of security questions in the 
region. 
(i) It followed with interest the progress 
made within the " 5 plus 5 " Group and has been 
kept informed of progress with the CSCM 
project, bearing in mind the new prospects 
offered by the third, multilateral phase of negoti-
ations on the Middle East. 
(ii) On 5th November 1991, the Netherlands 
Presidency of the European Community out-
lined to the group the main points emerging 
from the Middle East Peace Conference which 
opened in Madrid on 30th October 1991. 
2. The group considered the suggestion 
made at the Extraordinary Ministerial Council 
on 29th October 1991 to consider what might be 
the procedures for contacts between WEU and 
the countries of the Maghreb. 
Opening up such a dialogue would 
provide a better insight into the security expec-
tations of the states concerned. 
The group also wished to pursue its dis-
cussions on this subject and to submit draft con-
crete proposals to the next ordinary meeting of 
the Ministerial Council. 
3. The group continued its exchange of 
information on regional situations affecting 
member states' security interests in the Mediter-
ranean basin, namely: 
- conflict in Yugoslavia and tension in 
the Balkans; 
- the Arab Maghreb Union; 
- Sahara; 
-Cyprus. 
4. The group continued its study of the mil-
itary situation in the Maghreb. 
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IX. ActiJ1ities of the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space 
The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space devoted 
its efforts to preparing for and following up the 
decisions reached by the Ministerial Council in 
Bonn on 18th November, following the deci-
sions . that had been taken by the Council in 
Vianden on 27th June (see the first part of this 
report), and to setting up the WEU satellite 
centre for a three-year experimental period and 
launching feasibility studies for a WEU satellite 
system. 
The items on its agenda included the 
mandate for, and organisation of, the personnel 
responsible for setting up the centre, budget and 
staff questions and drafting a memorandum of 
understanding on Helios. 
A project team was set up to consider 
applications for the location of the centre and its 
staffing from the technical viewpoint. 
In Bonn on 18th November, ministers 
decided: 
l. that the WEU satellite centre would be 
established in Spain with effect from 1st 
January 1992, 
2. that a United Kingdom national would be 
appointed as Director of the WEU sat-
ellite centre for a period of three years 
with effect from 1st January 1992, 
3. that the multinational team reponsible for 
managing the long-term studies would be 
based in France and headed by an 
Italian. 
X. ActiJ1ities of the WEU Institute 
for Security Studies 
1. Research staff 
The Institute's fifth research fellow, 
Roberto Zadra, took up his post on 1st July 
1991. Ursel Hoppe left the Institute at the end of 
August; Mathias Jopp was appointed with effect 
from April 1992, and Peter Schmidt from the 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, 
was invited to spend the intervening six months 
at the Institute. 
2. Documents intended for the CouJU:U and its worlcing grDUJII 
(i) The Institute prepared several discussion 
papers on topical subjects for the Council and its 
working groups: " The security of Europe after 
19th August ", " The influence of recent events 
in the Soviet Union on the future of arms 
control ", " The impact of the restructuring of 
the Soviet Union on the implementation of the 
CFE Treaty " and " The impact of the upheavals 
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in the East on the European security and defence 
identity". 
(ii) The Institute forwarded reports to the 
Council on the seminars it had arranged, as well 
as its first annual report for the year 1st July 
1990 to 30th June 1991 and the quarterly report 
for the period 1st July to 30th September 1991. 
3. Semiurs 
The Institute organised the following sem-
inars during the second half of 1991: 
- "Security and stability in the Western 
Mediterranean " held in Lisbon and 
organised jointly with the Institute de 
Estudos Estrategicos e Internacionais, 
11th-12th July; . 
- " Military aspects of European inte-
gration" 25th-26th October, bringing 
together a group of retired military 
officers; 
- First meeting of the defence industries 
task force, 28th-29th October; 
- A joint workshop with the Forschungs-
institut der DGASP and the RIIA on 
the future of arms transfers, 19th-20th 
November; 
- " The Soviet revolution and its impacts 
on European security", 22nd-23rd 
November; 
- " Political union and security institu-
tions after the revolutions in the East ", 
25th-26th November; 
- The second seminar for officials 
responsible for politico-military affairs 
in WEU governments with their coun-
terparts from Central and Eastern 
Europe, 28th-29th November. 
4. l11Stitute rencontres 
The second meeting in this series of occa-
sional meetings of a study group of specialists on 
European security was held on 26th September, 
and a discussion on the future of European and 
Atlantic security institutions was introduced by 
Ambasador Hans von Ploetz, the German Per-
manent Representative to NATO. 
A meeting for an invited audience 
addressed by the Secretary-General on European 
security in a changing world, followed by a 
round table with a number of leading specialist 
European journalists, was held on 5th 
November. 
5. Meeting for members of the Council 
The Institute invited members of the 
Council to a meeting during the Assembly 
session, on 2nd December, to discuss topics of 
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current concern. In addition working lunches 
were held for the Permanent Representatives' 
deputies and for the secretaries to the Assembly 
parliamentary delegations. 
6. Fellowships and study awards 
Three holders of Institute fellowships, 
coming from WEU member countries, spent 
short periods at the Institute during the second 
half of 1991: Bob van den Bos from the Nether-
lands, Eric Ramacle from Belgium and Ettore 
Greco from Italy. 
Study awards for researchers from Central 
and Eastern Europe to spend time at West 
European research institutes were made to two 
people from Poland and one from Czechoslo-
vakia. 
7. PublicatioiiS 
(i) Chaillot papers 
The third Chaillot paper, "European 
security integration in the 1990s " was published 
in November. 
(ii) Quarterly newsletter 
The second and third issues were pub-
lished in July and October respectively. 
8. Other acti11itles 
The Director and research fellows took 
part in a number of conferences and seminars 
organised by other institutes, and received vis-
itors from a wide range of countries. 
XI. Administratire and budgetary questions 
1. The work of the Secretariat-General 
changed direction and intensified due to the 
Gulf crisis and the changes occurring in the 
political and economic structure of Eastern 
Europe. At the end of the year, the declarations 
made by WEU member states in Maastricht also 
marked a turning point for the organisation and 
to an extent mapped out its development over 
the next few years. On this occasion, ministers 
decided to transfer the seat of the WEU Council 
and Secretariat from London to Brussels. 
All these developments had repercussions 
on the organisation's workload and adminis-
tration. During the year, the WEU Council met 
at ministerial level on six occasions and the Per-
manent Council had 19 meetings in London, 
two of them enlarged. The budgetary effects of 
the additional meetings and the growing number 
of official missions were reflected in the 
Secretariat-General's budget. In point of fact, it 
has been possible to absorb these costs by a reas-
signment of credits, avoiding the need to call for 
additional funds. 
2. For the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies, 1991 was the first budget year since it 
was established on 1st July 1990 in the premises 
of the former WEU ministerial organs in Paris. 
Its budget and administration are separate from 
those of the Secretariat-General although it is 
subject to the same Staff Rules and Financial 
Regulations. The Institute employs 24 people, 
all of them in Paris. 
3. The Council accepted the political need 
for an increase in Assembly staff- a direct con-
sequence of WEU's enlargement following the 
accession of Spain and Portugal- while pointing 
out that the climate of financial austerity was 
imposing severe restrictions on national 
budgets. The Council accepted the staffing 
increase directly linked with enlargement, 
within the limits of an overall budget repre-
senting a 4.1% increase in the operating budget 
by comparison with 1990; following a period in 
which there was an exchange of views between 
the Council and the Assembly, the latter agreed 
to a 5.5% increase in its operating budget com-
pared with the figures for 1990. The Council 
officially approved this budget in October 1991 
and the Assembly ratified it in December 1991 
at its 37th ordinary session (second part). 
4. WEU's Ministerial Council decided, in 
June 1991 and in November of that year, to set 
up a WEU satellite centre for a three-year exper-
imental period at Torrej6n (Madrid); it would 
have a maximum budget of 38.2 million ecus for 
those three years. 
At the same meeting in November 1991, 
the Ministerial Council decided to give the 
Secretariat-General a 4.5 million ecu budget to 
finance a feasibility study for a WEU satellite 
system and associated studies; technical man-
agement would be provided by a multinational 
pilot team operating in Paris. 
5. Following several years' negotiations, the 
revised co-ordination regulations were approved 
by all the Councils of the co-ordinated 
organisations and came into force in 1991. They 
are not in fact new regulations as their " prede-
cessor" never officially existed. Rather, they are 
a preliminary attempt at official regulation in 
this field. 
Under the regulations, three committees 
have been set up, the first bringing together 
national representatives, the second representa-
tives of the secretaries-general and the third staff 
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representatives; the committees may meet sepa-
rately or jointly. In the latter case, they pass rec-
ommendations to be put to councils. 
If unanimity is not obtained, the 
chairman may nonetheless send the recommen-
dations to the councils, stating each group's 
position. 
The new regulations, which may be 
revised after three years, have immediately 
helped to expedite the work of co-ordination, as 
evidenced by the form of approval of at least 
eight reports during the first year of implemen-
tation. This greater efficiency bodes well for the 
triennial review of the salary adjustment pro-
cedure, which has to be approved by 31st May 
1992 at the latest. 
6. The Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments (ACA), with a staff of one, is maintained 
in accordance with Protocol No. IV. It is housed 
on the premises of the WEU Institute and its 
operating expenses are borne by the Secretariat-
General. 
XII. A.ctMties of the Public Administration 
Committee (PA.C) 
The Public Administration Committee's 
two annual meetings were held in Toledo on 
14th and 15th March and London on 1Oth 
October 1991. 
Members of the Assembly may consult the 
minutes of these meetings in the Office of the 
Clerk. 
The 40th meeting of government officials 
was held at the European Institute of Public 
Administration, Maastricht, on 14th-18th 
October 1991. The theme was " The implica-
tions for the organisation of public adminis-
tration in WEU member states of a changing 
security environment". 
Participants examined the potential 
implications of changes in the international 
security environment for the organisation of 
public administration, including policy struc-
tures, in WEU member states, both domestically 
and with respect to international organisations. 
The seminar was opened by the WEU Sec-
retary-General and chaired by Ambassador 
Charles Rutten (retired), former Permanent 
Representative of the Netherlands to the EC. 
Apart from EIPA faculty members, the invited 
speakers included experts from ministries, other 
institutions and intergovernmental agencies. 
DOCUMENT 1315 ANNEX 1 
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WEU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
Bonn, 18th November 1991 
Declaration on Yugoslavia 
Ministers noted with interest the report 
by Mr. van den Broek, on behalf of the Nether-
lands EC Presidency, about the recent develop-
ments in Yugoslavia, and the efforts of both 
Lord Carrington and Mr. Cyrus Vance, the 
special envoy of the United Nations Secretary-
General. 
Ministers expressed their growing concern 
about the situation in Yugoslavia. Ministers 
appealed once again to all parties immediately 
to cease hostilities. They took note with dismay 
of the violations of cease-fire agreements, espe-
cially by the JNA and Serbian irregulars 
attacking the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. 
In this context, they recalled and confirmed the 
repeated statements by EC foreign ministers 
that under no circumstances will territorial 
changes brought about by force be recognised. 
Ministers stressed that, above all, the 
civilian populations threatened by the unprece-
dented violence must be assisted as quickly as 
possible. In this context, ministers welcomed the 
support given by some member states to 
UNICEF's efforts to provide assistance for 
Yugoslav children and to allow for their possible 
evacuation. WEU countries are prepared to par-
ticipate in operations in order to establish 
humanitarian corridors. 
Ministers expressed their firm support for 
the efforts of the three WEU members on the 
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United Nations Security Council in favour of a 
United Nations Security Council resolution con-
cerning a peace-keeping operation in Yugo-
slavia. 
Recalling the conditions necessary for 
such an operation, namely an agreement by all 
parties concerned and an effective cease-fire, 
ministers expressed the readiness of WEU coun-
tries to give practical support to such an oper-
ation as soon as the relevant decisions had been 
taken. 
They stressed that the stationing of peace-
keeping forceS must not in any way sanction the 
seizure of territory by force. 
Ministers expect parties in Yugoslavia to 
create the appropriate conditions for a United 
Nations peace-keeping effort. They expressed 
their hope that the United Nations Security 
Council would rapidly adopt the necessary reso-
lution. 
The WEU Secretariat will make available 
to the United Nations details of the contingency 
planning work already done by WEU experts. 
The Presidency will convene another 
meeting of the ad hoc group on Yugoslavia 
further to develop and adapt WEU's plans in 
anticipation of a United Nations resolution. 
' t
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ANNEX 2 
WEU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
Bonn, 18th NoJiember 1991 
Communique 
1. At their regular meeting in Bonn on 18th 
November 1991, the foreign and defence min-
isters of WEU member states issued a decla-
ration on Yugoslavia (annexed). 
2. Role and place of WEU in the security 
architecture 
In the run-up to the meeting of the 
European Council in Maastricht, ministers dis-
cussed in depth the place and the specific role of 
WEU in the ·future European security archi-
tecture. They underlined the great importance of 
shaping the security and defence dimension of 
the European unification process. Ministers 
noted with satisfaction that, in the Rome Decla-
ration on peace and co-operation and through 
the adoption of a new strategic concept, the 
heads of state and government of the Atlantic 
Alliance, meeting on 7th and 8th November 
1991, had taken far-reaching decisions which 
will also give strong impetus to the development 
of the European security and defence identity. 
Ministers reiterated the objective of 
developing WEU as the defence component of 
the European unification process and as a means 
of strengthening the European pillar within the 
alliance. They were able to bring closer their 
positions, in particular on three points: 
- future role and specific tasks of 
WEU; 
- the definition of WEU's future rela-
tionship with the European Union; 
- transparency and complementarity 
between European security and defence 
identity and the Atlantic Alliance. 
Ministers decided to charge the Special 
Working Group ofWEU to complete their work 
on this subject before the next Conclave of the 
EC foreign ministers on 2nd December. 
In the light of ongoing discussions, the 
Presidency will decide, if necessary, on an addi-
tional extraordinary ministerial meeting. 
3. Relations with the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Ministers reaffirmed their intention to 
help consolidate peace and stability in Europe 
by enhancing the dialogue on security and 
co-operation between WEU and the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic 
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states and the Soviet Union. They considered 
the measures undertaken since April 1990, and 
particularly since the meeting of the Council in 
Vianden in June 1991, to be constructive steps 
in this direction. 
Ministers resolved that the next measures 
should be as follows: · 
- the foreign and defence ministers of 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania will be invited to 
participate in a special meeting with the 
members of the Council; 
- seminars in these countries organised 
by the WEU Institute for Security 
Studies; 
- expansion of the WEU Institute schol-
arship programme; 
- fact-finding visits by the Presidency 
and Secretary-General to the Soviet 
Union and to the Baltic states, if the 
latter are interested. 
The further development of this rela-
tionship will be decided in the light of decisions 
to be taken about the future role of WEU. 
Ministers expressed the conviction that 
these measures envisaged by WEU and the 
similar endeavours by the Atlantic Alliance and 
the European Community are mutually comple-
mentary and reinforcing. 
4. Operational co-operation among member 
states 
In the field of space 
With the aim of intensifying space 
co-operation within WEU, and to give substance 
to the resolutions made at their last regular 
meeting in Vianden (Luxembourg), ministers 
decided that the satellite data interpretation and 
training centre should be established in Spain, 
with effect from 1st January 1992. They agreed 
that a British national will be appointed as 
Director of this centre for a period of three 
years. 
Ministers also decided that a study group 
should be formed in 1992 to examine the 
necessity and desirability of a medium- and 
long-term realisation of a European space-based 
observation system. This group will be based in 
France and have an Italian chairman. 
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In the military field 
Ministers noted studies submitted by the 
working group consisting of representatives of 
the defence ministries in association with the 
WEU Special Working Group on the opera-
tional organisation of eo- operation within WEU 
both in the politico-military field and in the mil-
itary field. They mandated the groups to pursue 
their studies further in the light of the results of 
the forthcoming European summit in Maas-
tricht. 
In the field of arms control verification 
Ministers took note of the progress made 
on co-operation among member states on the 
verification of arms control agreements. In this 
context, they underlined the link between space 
co-operation and arms control verification, 
including verification of the CFE Treaty. 
Ministers noted with approval the prepar-
atory steps taken to set up multinational 
inspection teams as part of the implementation 
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of the verification regime laid down in the CFE 
Treaty. They approved a set of rules for the 
co-operation of multinational teams. 
They decided to take into account in their 
subsequent deliberations the possibility of co-
operation with all CSCE member states. 
The Council welcomed the progress made 
following the resumption of the open skies nego-
tiations in Vienna, which gives hope for their 
successful conclusion by the time of the Helsinki 
follow-up meeting. The ministers continue to 
attach great importance to accelerating the 
search for cost-effective solutions in the imple-
mentation of an open skies agreement. 
5. Security in the Mediterranean 
Ministers took note of the report by the 
Secretary-General of WEU on the work of the 
Mediterranean Sub-Group. They asked the sub-
group to address in its future studies the 
question of developing contacts between WEU 
and the Maghreb states. 
! 
' 
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ANNEX 3 
MAASTRICHT, lOth December 1991 
Declaration 
of Belgium, Germany, Spai,., France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, which are members of Western Europeo,n Union 
and also members of the Europeo,n Union 
on 
the role of Western Europeo,n Union and its relations with 
the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance 
Introduction 
1. WEU member states agree on the .need to 
develop a genuine European security and 
defence identity and a greater European respon-
sibility on defence matters. This identity will be 
pursued through a gradua! process inyolving 
successive phases. WEU w1ll form an mtegral 
part of the process of t~e developm~nt of th.e 
European Union and w1ll enhance 1ts contn-
bution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. 
WEU member states agree to strengthen the role 
of WEU, in the longer-term perspective of a 
common defence policy within the European 
Union which might in time lead to a common 
defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
2. WEU will be developed as the defence 
component of the European Union and as the 
means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate 
common European defence policy and carry 
forward its concrete implementation through 
the further development of its own operational 
role. 
WEU member states take note of Article 
J .4 relating to the common foreign an~ secur:itY 
policy of the Treaty on European Umon whtch 
reads as follows: 
" 1. The common foreign and security 
policy shall include all questions 
related to the security of the 
European Union, including the 
eventual framing of a common 
defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence. 
2. The Union requests Western Euro-
pean Union (WEU), which is an 
integral part of the development of 
the European Union, to elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions 
of the Union which have defence 
implications. The Council shall, in 
agreement with the institutions of 
WEU, adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements. 
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3. Issues having defence implications 
dealt with under this Article shall not 
be subject to the procedures set out in 
Article J.3. 
4. The policy of the Union in accord-
ance with the present Article shall not 
prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain 
member states and shall respect the 
obligations of certain member states 
under the North Atlantic Treaty and 
be compatible with the common 
security and defence policy estab-
lished within that framework. 
5. The provisions of this Article shall 
not prevent the development of 
closer co-operation between two or 
more member states on a bilateral 
level, in the framework of WEU and 
the Atlantic Alliance, provided such 
co-operation does not run counter to 
or impede that provided for in this 
Title. 
6. With a view to furthering the 
objective of this Treaty, and ~aving 
in view the date of 1998 m the 
context of Article XII of the Brussels 
Treaty, the provisions of.this Artic!e 
may be revised as provtded for m 
Article N(2) on the basis of a report 
to be presented in 1996 by the 
Council to the European Council, 
which shall include an evaluation of 
the progress made and the experience 
gained until then. " 
A. WEU's relations with European Union 
3. The objective is to build up WEU in 
stages as the defence component of the 
European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, 
at the request of the European Union, to elab-
orate and implement decisions and actions of 
the Union which have defence implication. 
To this end WEU will take the following 
measures to de~elop a close working rela-
tionship with the Union: 
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- as appropriate, synchronisation of the 
dates and venues of meetings and 
harmonisation of working methods; 
- establishment of close co-operation 
between the Council and Secretariat-
General of WEU on the one hand, and 
the Council of the Union and General 
Secretariat of the Council on· the 
other; 
- consideration of the harmonisation of 
the sequence and duration of the 
respective Presidencies; 
- arranging for appropriate modalities so 
as to ensure that the Commission of the 
European Communities is regularly 
informed and, as appropriate, con-
sulted on WEU activities in accordance 
with the role of the Commission in the 
common foreign and security policy as 
defined in the Treaty on European 
Union; 
- encouragement of closer co-operation 
between the parliame~tary Assembly of 
WEU and the European Parliament; 
The WEU . Council shall, in agreement 
with the competent bodies of the European 
Union, adopt the necessary practical arrange-
ments. 
B. WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance 
4. The objective is to develop WEU as a 
means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared 
to develop further the close working links 
between WEU and the alliance and to 
strengthen the role, responsibilities and contri-
butions of WEU member states in the alliance. 
This will be undertaken on the basis of the nec-
essary transparency and complementarity 
between the emerging European security and 
defence identity and the alliance. WEU will act 
in conformity with the positions adopted in the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
- WEU member states will intensify their 
co-ordination on alliance issues which 
represent an important common 
interest with the aim of introducing 
joint positions agreed in WEU into the 
process of consultation in the alliance 
which will remain the essential forum 
for consultation among its members 
and the venue for agreement on policies 
bearing on the security and defence 
commitments of allies under the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 
- Where necessary, dates and venues of 
meetings will be synchronised and 
working methods harmonised. 
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- Close co-operation will be established 
between the Secretariats-General of 
WEU and NATO. 
C. Operational role of WEU 
5. WEU's operational role will be 
. strengthened by examining and defining appro-
priate missions, structures and means, covering 
. in particul~: 
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- WEU planning cell; 
- closer military co-operation comple-
mentary to the alliance in particular in 
the fields of logistics, transport, training 
and strategic surveillance; 
- meetings of WEU chiefs of defence 
staff; 
- military units answerable to WEU. 
Other proposals will be examined further, 
including: 
- enhanced co-operation in the field of 
armaments with the aim of creating a 
European armaments agency; 
- development of the WEU Institute 
into a European security and defence 
academy. 
Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a 
stronger operational role will be fully compatible 
with the military dispositions necessary to 
ensure the collective defence of all allies. 
D. Other measures 
6. As a consequence of the measures set out 
above, and in order to facilitate the strength-
ening of WEU's role, the seat of the WEU 
Council and Secretariat wll be transferred to 
Brussels. 
7. Representation on the WEU Council 
must be such that the Council is able to exercise 
its functions continuously in accordance with 
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
Member states may draw on a double-batting 
formula, to be worked out, consisting of their 
representatives to the alliance and to the 
European Union. 
8. WEU notes that, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article J .4 ( 6) concerning the 
common foreign and security policy of the 
Treaty on European Union, the Union will 
decide to review the· provisions of this Article 
with a view to furthering the objective to be set 
by it in accordance with the procedure defined. 
WEU. wjll re-examine the present provisions in 
1996. This re-examination will take account of 
the progress and experience acquired and will 
extend to relations between WEU and the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
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ANNEX 4 
MAASTRICHT, lOth December 1991 
Declaration 
of Belgium, GermiUJy, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, 
which are members of Western European Union 
" The member states of WEU welcome 
the development of the European security and 
defence identity. They are determined, taking 
into account the role of WEU as the defence 
component of the European Union and as the 
means to strengthen the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship 
between WEU and the other European states on 
a new basis for the sake of stability and security 
in Europe. In this spirit, they propose the fol-
lowing: 
States which are members of the 
European Union are invited to accede to WEU 
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on conditions to be agreed in accordance with 
Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to 
become observers if they so wish. Simultane-
ously, other European member states of NATO 
are invited to become associate members of 
WEU in a way which will give them the possi-
bility to participate fully in the activities of 
WEU. 
The member states of WEU assume that 
treaties and agreements corresponding with the 
above proposals will be concluded before 31st 
December 1992. " 
Document 1316 
The situation in Yugosla•ia 
REQUEST FOR A DEBATE UNDER URGENT PROCEDURE 1 
tabled by Mr. De Decker tUUl others 
1st June 1992 
In view of the worsening situation in the former Yugoslavia and the decisions taken by the 
United Nations Security Council, Mr. De Decker and ten others ask the President to arrange for a 
debate to be held on this question at the present session under urgent procedure. 
Signed: De Decker, Feldmann, Konen, Mackie of Benshie, Kempinaire, Dees, Roseta, Aguiar, Reis 
Leite, Fernandes Marques, P~as Santos 
l. See lst sitting, 1st June 1992 (urgent procedure agreed to). 
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Document 1317 1st June 1992 
Application of United Nations Resolution 757 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 1 
tabled by Mr. Caro and others with a request for urgent procedure 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling Recomm~ndations 506, 511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis; 
(ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is 
currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; 
(iii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757, voted in the Security Council on 
Saturday 30th May 1992; 
(iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro 
to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective; 
(v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the 
application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appro-
priate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. 
Signed: Caro, De Decker, de Puig, Martino, Newa/1, Dudley Smith, Geoffrey Finsberg, Diaz de 
Mera, Reddemann, Sinesio, Colombo, Lopez Henares, Roseta, Feldmann, De Hoop Scheffir, Bassinet, 
Martinez, Brito, Palacios, Fourre, Pecriaux, Stoffelen, Guirado, Garcia Sanchez, Gaits, Autain 
1. See lst sitting, lst June 1992 (urgent procedure agreed to). 
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Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure 
MOTION FOR A DECISION 1 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli .and others 
1st June 1992 
The Assembly authorises the Presidential Committee, in exceptional cases, to waive the provi-
sions of Rule 39, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure. 
The decision of the Presidential Committee must be taken unanimously. It will be valid for one ' 
year and may be applied only to a parliamentary group that afready exists in the Assembly. 
Signed: Pieralli, Rubbi, Martino, Colombo, Benassi, Gabbuggiani, Pecchioli, Mesoraca, Greco, Rosetll 
l. See 2nd sitting, 1st June 1992 (motion referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges). 
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The Assembly, 
Application of United Nations Resolution 757 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 1 
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee 2 
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur 
(i) Recalling Recommendations 506, 511 and 512 on the Yugoslav crisis; 
2nd June 1992 
(ii) Anxious that the peoples concerned should no longer be exposed to the terrible suffering which is 
currently prevailing, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Croatia; 
(iii) Wholeheartedly endorsing United Nations Resolution 757 voted in the Security Council on Sat-
urday, 30th May 1992; 
(iv) Determined to ensure that the trade and oil embargo designed to bring Serbia and Montenegro 
to realise the errors of their actions should prove effective; 
(v) Strongly supporting the WEU Secretary-General's appeal for European action and calling for the 
application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
URGENTLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Take immediate steps to invoke Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and prepare appro-
priate action by WEU states to help apply United Nations Resolution 757. Further measures should be 
considered if Resolution 757 does not have the desired effect. 
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. de Puig (Alternate: Moya) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Jeambrun), Bassinet, Borderas, Brito, Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox, De Decker, Dees 
(Alternate: Tummers), Durand, Fernandes Marques, Fiandrotti (Alternate: Fassino), Fioret, Fourre, Inner (Alternate: Feldmann), 
Jung (Alternate: Masseret), Kelchtermans (Alternate: Sarens), Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden (Alternate: De Hoop 
Schejfer), Marten, Lord Newa/1, MM. Pecchioli, Perinat (Alternate: Cuco), Reis Leite, Scheer (Alternate: Antretter), Sinesio, 
Speed, Steiner, J. Thompson, Vazquez (Alternate: Bolinaga), Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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DoCument 1319 
Amendment 1 
Application of United Nations Resolution 757 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Feldmann 
1. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
2nd June 1992 
.. Take immediate initiatives to ensure that war criminals will be judged following the guidelines 
of the proposal of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of May 1992. " 
Signed: Feldmann 
1. See 4th sitting, 2nd June 1992 (amendment agreed to). 
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